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after india's independence, especially after the chinese people's liberation army entered tibet, india established diplomatic relations with china at an early stage and developed friendly relations. at the same time, it took advantage of the fact that new china was in a state of disrepair and unable to take care of other things due to the korean war to quietly advance toward the chinese side of the traditional customary line of the sino-indian border, without mentioning the border issue in diplomatic exchanges, in the hope that china would accept the fait accompli.

it was revealed that india's first foreign secretary, bajpayee, had asked the indian government to resolve the border issue with china through negotiations as soon as possible.

in 1952, when bajpayee was the mayor of bombay, he again made this suggestion to the ministry of foreign affairs, but it was still not accepted.

1. india’s policy of secretly encroaching on chinese territory

speaking on this issue in the rajya sabha on december 9, 1959, prime minister nehru said, "the boundary issue was before us from day one. the question was whether we raised it at that stage. we decided not to raise it."

he said this was "a decision made after long reflection and consultation with our ambassadors, members of our foreign affairs committee and others," and "we must stand our ground. current events will further define the border issue, and once the challenge comes, we will be in a stronger position to face it."

in an august 1961 interview with a reporter from contact weekly, he admitted that from the time china entered tibet, “we have set up checkpoints along the northeast border special zone.”the fact is that in the eastern section, india set up the "northeastern and northeastern frontier commission" in the "northeastern special zone" (now "arunachal pradesh") in 1950 to "fix" and "legalize" its occupation. in 1954, it was changed to the "northeastern frontier special zone" under the leadership of the ministry of foreign affairs.

this shows that india believed at that time that the border still needed to be negotiated diplomatically, so the area of ​​about 90,000 square kilometers in the eastern section became the most controversial area on the china-india border.

in the middle section, except for sang and congsa, which were occupied by the british colonial government in india in 1919, the rest of the places were occupied by india between 1954 and 1958.

in the western section, the barigas area on the chinese side was also occupied by india in 1954.

in connection with these occupations, india's official maps were modified accordingly.

in 1950, the official indian map still indicated that the western and central sections of the sino-indian border were "undetermined". although the "mcmahon line" was drawn for the eastern section, it was still marked as "undetermined". in july 1954, the official indian survey bureau published a new map, which changed the undetermined sino-indian border to a determined international border in accordance with the instructions of the indian government.

china has repeatedly proposed to india that, before the border issue is resolved, the status quo on the border should be maintained and should not be changed by unilateral action or force. when the time is ripe, it should be resolved comprehensively through friendly consultation in a prepared and step-by-step manner with an attitude of mutual understanding and accommodation, taking into account the historical background and actual conditions and based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

however, india continued to encroach on the border, which eventually led to the first open conflict on the border, namely the langju incident and the kongka pass incident, which attracted worldwide attention.

2. the longjiu incident

in 1959, after accepting the tibetan rebels and the dalai lama's escape to india, india formally made large territorial claims against china on the border.

prime minister nehru wrote to premier zhou enlai on march 22, 1959 (excerpt):

as you may know, the traditional border follows the geographical principle of the watershed at the top of the himalayas. apart from this, most of it was confirmed by special international agreements between the then indian government and the central government of china.

please note the following items in the agreement:

(1) sikkim

the border between the indian protectorate of sikkim and the tibet region of china was determined by the anglo-sino special convention of 1890 and was jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.

(2) ladakh region of jammu and kashmir

a treaty in 1842 between kashmir on the one hand and the chinese emperor and the guru lama of lhasa on the other referred to the india-china boundary in the ladakh region. in 1847 the chinese government recognized that this boundary was fully and clearly defined.

(3) the mcmahon line was drawn at a trilateral conference held in simla between the plenipotentiaries of the chinese government, tibet and india in 1913-1914.

the remaining section from the nepal-india-tibet tri-junction to ladakh is also traditional and follows a distinct geographical feature. here, too, the border follows a clear watershed between the river systems to the south and west and those to the north and east. old tax records and maps, as well as decades of indian administrative authority and access to the border, confirm this approach.

in action, india secretly moved langjiu and jianzemani, which were located north of the mcmahon line in the eastern section of the border, to the south of the mcmahon line and set up outposts in these two places.

after the tibetan rebels fled to india, china had to send troops to garrison the area between the yarlung zangbo river and the "mcmahon line" in southern tibet in order to cut off the outflow of tibetan "refugees". upon hearing the news, the indian government sent elite troops to reinforce the defense and ordered the indian army to move forward.

in order to take into account the overall situation of china-india friendship, the chinese government did not take immediate corresponding actions, but only lodged a solemn protest and warning to india.

but finally the "longjiu incident" happened:

at about 6:00 a.m. on august 25, 1959, a small group of indian armed forces opened fire on the chinese border guards from the southern end of majidun (where langjiu is located). after being counterattacked, the indian troops withdrew from the conflict area. but the next morning, the indian troops stationed at the langjiu outpost opened fire on the chinese border guards again and were counterattacked again. the indian soldiers suffered one casualty and one wounded. on the 27th, the indian troops withdrew from langjiu.

the gunshots at langjiu not only broke the tranquility of this important pass on the sino-indian border, but also opened the prelude to armed conflict on the sino-indian border, leaving a deep scar in sino-indian relations.

neville maxwell, then a resident correspondent of the british newspaper the times in new delhi (from 1959 to 1967 he was the newspaper's correspondent in south asia), described the "mcmahon line" and india's tampering with the line and the indian army's advance north of the line in his book india's war with china:

the mcmahon line has never been demarcated, that is, it has not been marked on the ground. most of the mcmahon line follows a line of summits that are difficult to climb. one of the villages near majidun is located on the pilgrimage route for tibetan pilgrims. in order to keep this place in tibet, mcmahon turned the mcmahon line about 20 miles south to meet the main ridge.

when india surveyed this area in 1959, it quietly drew the border line on the south side of majidun, and included langjiu south of majidun to the south of the "mcmahon line", and established a post here.

it can be seen from this that it was india that invaded china's territory, which led to the "langju incident". however, india falsely accused china of "aggression", setting off a new wave of anti-china sentiment.

3. how does india put the blame on others?

after the langju incident, the indian government sent a note to the chinese government, accusing china of "deliberate aggression."

prime minister nehru delivered speeches on the sino-indian border issue in the indian lok sabha, rajya sabha and at press conferences on august 25, 28, 31 and september 4, fiercely accusing china of "invading" india.

in his speech on august 28, he announced that the indian government had taken necessary defense measures and put the assam rifles, a paramilitary force used to maintain security on the northeastern border, under the command of the army. the army established an "operation headquarters" near jorhat in assam, with instructions to shoot at chinese troops when necessary.

in early september, nehru submitted a white paper to parliament, which was the correspondence between china and india on tibet and the border issue after the signing of the 1954 agreement. this made the negotiation process public for the first time.

indian mps attacked and slandered china in parliament. some right-wing parties and reactionary politicians gathered their followers five times in kolkata, delhi and mumbai to demonstrate in front of chinese embassies or consulates, shouting anti-china slogans.

indian bourgeois newspapers have used full-page headlines to spread nonsense such as "china has invaded indian territory" and even fabricated outright lies such as "chinese troops have invaded bhutan and sikkim and threatened nepal" in an attempt to arouse fear of china among these small neighboring countries and undermine their relations with china.some pro-american newspapers took the opportunity to demand "an end to friendship with china and a change in india's foreign policy," and the target was directly pointed at prime minister nehru, the maker of india's foreign policy.

in this context, in order to clarify the truth about the sino-indian border and to make clear china's position on the border issue, premier zhou enlai wrote to prime minister nehru on september 8, comprehensively and systematically expounding china's position on the sino-indian border issue and the border situation. this letter was also a reply to prime minister nehru's letter of march 22.

however, india did not curb its territorial demands because of this letter, and the soviet union's attitude further emboldened its arrogance.

on september 9, tass was authorized to issue a statement on the langju incident:

“the soviet leaders expressed their deep conviction that the governments of the people’s republic of china and the republic of india would not allow those forces that do not want the international situation to be relaxed but rather to be aggravated and those forces that are trying to prevent the easing of tensions between the two countries to take advantage of this incident.”

at that time, when the two camps were clearly divided, this statement without distinguishing right from wrong meant that the differences between china and the soviet union were made public. therefore, the shock it caused was even greater than the langjiu incident itself.

western public opinion applauded the statement, believing that it did not support the accusation made by premier zhou enlai in his letter to prime minister nehru on september 7 that india was invading china, and that it showed that "moscow did not fully and openly support its chinese ally."praising "khrushchev's action was brave and of great significance"; "it was khrushchev who fired the first shot at the bow of the chinese ship"; and surrounding the famous american journalist hash, who believed that "the soviet union's position was close to that of the united states."

4. kongka pass incident

it was amid this cheering that the "kongka pass incident" occurred in the western section of the sino-indian border on october 27, 1959. india made territorial claims on the aksai soft area in the western section, ignoring the fact that china had always actually governed it.

this is something that no fair-minded person in india would agree with.an indian scholar said that in the process of studying the sino-indian border dispute, he found some important documents and maps from the british "india department archives", which showed that china has always exercised jurisdiction over the aksai chin region, and india's territorial claim to the region is unreasonable; in particular, the newly discovered protest note submitted by the chinese kashgar administrative commissioner to the british authorities in 1941 over the indian invasion of aksai chin proved that some of india's arguments were false.the dispute over the western section of the sino-indian border arose because the history department of the indian ministry of external affairs deceived the indian cabinet.

the course of the "kongka pass incident" is roughly as follows:

india attempted to seize the chinese territory before the snow closed the mountains. at 6 a.m. on october 20, 1959, karam singh, commander of a special police force stationed on the western border of india, sent a small team consisting of two policemen and a porter to conduct reconnaissance. they were scheduled to return to the team headquarters at 12 noon that day. however, after they set out, they kept moving northeast and entered chinese territory. the officers of the chinese outpost gestured to tell them to withdraw, but they did not listen and were taken to the chinese outpost. karam singh saw that the team had not returned, so he organized a patrol team to set out at 7:30 p.m. that night to search, but naturally they did not find it. the patrol team returned to the camp at 11 p.m.

so on the morning of the 21st, karam singh led a special police force of more than 70 people to the northeast. when they reached a ridge on the chinese territory south of the kongka pass, they found a chinese outpost on the mountain and quickly penetrated behind the ridge. wu qingguo, the deputy squad leader of the chinese outpost on the mountain, noticed the movement and jumped out of the outpost. he waved his hand to signal the indian army not to shoot and retreat immediately, but he was shot dead on the spot by the indian army's bullets.

the other six chinese soldiers in the post then rushed out and fired back at the indian army. seven soldiers (including squad leader zhang baoguo) in another chinese post across the river were also forced to fire back at the indian army. the exchange of fire lasted about two hours.

after the kongka pass incident, on october 31, khrushchev said in his speech to the supreme soviet:

"we deeply regret the recent incidents on the border between our two friendly countries - the people's republic of china, with which we are bound by unbreakable ties of brotherly friendship, and the republic of india, with which we are developing friendly relations smoothly." "we will be happy if the current border dispute can be resolved to the satisfaction of both sides through friendly negotiations."

after the kongka pass incident, in order to avoid another border conflict, the chinese government, through premier zhou enlai, wrote to prime minister nehru on november 7, 1959, suggesting that both sides withdraw their armed forces 20 kilometers from the actual control line. it also suggested that the two prime ministers hold talks in the near future. on november 14, the chinese border guards handed over the detained and captured indian soldiers to the indian side.

the indian government did not accept such a reasonable proposal. on november 16, 1959, prime minister nehru put forward a counter-proposal, advocating that "all chinese personnel in the aksai chin area of ​​xinjiang, china, withdraw to the east of the international boundary line claimed by india, and all indian personnel withdraw to the west of the international boundary line claimed by china."

since india had not actually entered this area, india's proposal was actually just to ask chinese personnel to withdraw unilaterally from a large area of ​​its own territory. china immediately asked whether the indian government agreed to withdraw to the other side's claimed boundary line in the eastern section of the border, that is, india would withdraw to the south of the traditional customary line pointed out by china, and china would withdraw to the north of the so-called "mcmahon line" advocated by india.

however, the indian government insisted that its proposal only applied to the western section of the sino-indian border and did not involve the eastern section. on november 20, when answering a member of the lok sabha’s question about the border line, prime minister nehru said arrogantly:

"our maps show that the mcmahon line is our border, and whether there is a map or not, this is our border. this fact has not changed. we adhere to this border and we will never let anyone cross this border."

on december 9 he added:

"even if we are 100 percent friendly with them, the fact remains that there is a powerful country on our border. this situation itself changes the entire situation," and "china and india will be in a standoff for thousands of years."

on the one hand, he rejected premier zhou enlai's proposal on november 7, and on the other hand, he took advantage of china's unilateral suspension of border patrols based on this proposal to strengthen india's troops in the border area. between november and december 1959, the indian army transferred the 4th infantry division originally stationed in punjab to the northeast, under the leadership of the 33rd army, and established a new infantry division, the 17th division.

the 4th infantry division is an elite unit of the indian army, also known as the "red eagle division". during world war ii, it demonstrated its prowess in the north african and mediterranean battlefields.

5. why did nehru agree to premier zhou’s visit to india for talks?

in order to peacefully resolve the border issue, premier zhou enlai wrote to prime minister nehru on december 26, 1959, reiterating china's position on the border issue and inviting prime minister nehru to meet in any place in china or in yangon if the burmese government agreed, in an effort to reach some principles to guide specific discussions.

on february 5, 1960, prime minister nehru replied that he could not leave india due to the upcoming budget session of the parliament. he warmly invited premier zhou enlai to visit india.

prime minister nehru originally stressed that china had to recognize the mcmahon line with slight adjustments as the border between the two countries, or that "china had to withdraw from the ladakh it occupied" before negotiations could be held. why has he changed his attitude now and stopped putting forward preconditions?

after reading the news in the newspaper on february 6, right-wing opposition lawmakers demanded a discussion in parliament about this "sudden and unreasonable change in policy."

prime minister nehru argued that the indian government had not changed its policy and that the talks were not negotiations.then the parliament started to debate whether there was a difference between the words "talk" and "negotiate". the mps who supported nehru prevailed. the right-wing opposition party shifted the pressure from the parliament to society, attempting to hold demonstrations in cities such as new delhi.

after persuasion by the government, the two sides reached a compromise, stopping these activities the day before zhou enlai's visit, and the government would not hold a mass welcome party.

two days before premier zhou arrived in india, the people's league gathered thousands of people to demonstrate in front of prime minister nehru's official residence, shouting anti-china slogans and submitting a "memorandum" demanding that nehru make a guarantee: "never give up our claim to any part of indian territory" and "not do anything to restrict our right to take all necessary measures to liberate the areas occupied by china."

why did prime minister nehru agree to negotiate with china? the fundamental reason was that he was unwilling to change his non-aligned policy and lean towards the united states as the right-wing forces hoped.

at this time, prime minister nehru was still unwilling to have a decisive conflict with china. he wanted to promote domestic "unity", accelerate economic development and enhance national defense by emphasizing china's "threat" to india.

on november 1, he said that china's "attacks on india on the border constitute a big problem today" and "the greatest need at the moment is unity, because internal problems always affect external problems related to the country."on november 5, he said at a press conference, "the defense of any country means the development of industry, means industrialization, everything else is superficial."

on november 12, he said at a mass rally:

"the indian people have rightly expressed their indignation at such chinese attacks on their border. however, this indignation must be manifested in hard work, because only a strong and prosperous nation can truly defend itself effectively."

on november 27, he said in the lok sabha, "we may first have to concentrate on industrializing india before crossing the himalayas for this purpose."

according to the indian news agency (november 25, 1959), prime minister nehru wrote to the chief ministers of various states at that time, saying that military action on the border issue would hinder india's economic development. indian newspapers also pointed out that prime minister nehru agreed to the talks because of the "friendly pressure exerted by the soviet union" and the "influence of the sino-burmese border negotiations."

these statements are not without reason, because since tass and khrushchev made "impartial" statements on the "langju incident" and the "kongka pass incident", nehru saw the differences between the soviet union and china, so he wanted to show "respect" for the soviet union's sincerity in persuading him to negotiate with china in order to obtain further support from the soviet union for india in the sino-indian dispute.

at the end of december 1959, the soviet government notified india that khrushchev would visit india on february 11, 1960. china and myanmar had also signed the sino-burmese treaty of friendship and non-aggression and the sino-burmese agreement on the boundary issue on january 28, 1960. nehru was worried that if he insisted on not meeting with zhou enlai, it would create an image of india being unreasonable.

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