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marshal yamamoto isoroku died in battle

in the early morning of november 20, the 17th year of the showa era, together with more than ten staff officers and adjutants including the chief of staff of our army, lieutenant general kato yabuhira, we boarded a navy ship and set out from yokohama to the southeastern pacific ocean 4,500 kilometers away. rabaul island, new britain.

stayed for one night in saipan that day. on the afternoon of the 21st, we arrived at the combined fleet base truk. in the evening, i met with commander yamamoto isoroku (later marshal) on the warship musashi.

the friendship between general yamamoto and me began around the 13th year of taisho, when he was lieutenant colonel and i was major.

one day, when i was playing poker at the house of lieutenant colonel watahisao (later lieutenant general), yamamoto was also introduced to our card game. this kind of game is only interesting if four people of similar skill levels get together. the three lieutenants, watanabe, washujin, and yamamoto, were military attachés stationed in the united states at the same time, and they often played cards. major shizuichi tanaka (later general) and i both learned this game while we were stationed in the uk. we took turns sitting in the bank every sunday and inviting our card friends to play cards at home. for this reason, i have been to yamamoto-kun’s rental house in shibuya more than a dozen times. (for die-hard gamblers, is shibuya a famous red light district in tokyo? did you meet yamamoto’s geisha lover’s sister at this time?)

the relationship between poker friends will always become closer and closer. once they become addicted to playing, their respective personalities will be revealed unabashedly, thus enhancing their understanding and being rude to each other.

when i was stationed in the uk, i stayed in an infantry regiment for eight months. during this period, i played bridge games with british officers almost every night. i almost never lost. i was quite confident and thought that i was better than yamamoto in card skills. one step ahead, but mr. yamamoto refused to admit defeat and always emphasized that he was better. (imamura has always been modest, but here he is proud to think that he is better at cards than yamamoto, and yamamoto is praised as the god of gamblers by later generations, which also reflects that imamura looks honest and honest, but in fact he has a high iq and is very shrewd)

when he was the undersecretary of the navy, i was the director of the military manpower bureau of the ministry of war. due to official duties, we often went to the undersecretary's office to talk. because of our relationship as old friends, we had no scruples and spoke freely, and there was never a time when we couldn't reach an agreement.

because our relationship was so close, commander yamamoto welcomed me with great pleasure. in the dining room of the commander's room, twenty army and navy officers had dinner together.

commander yamamoto said in front of everyone: "when a telegram came from the base camp saying that you would be in charge of the coordinated land and sea operations here... i felt a sense of relief. although it was the same for anyone... but we could do it without any problems. communicate with concern…”

after the dinner, he proposed that the two of them talk alone, without the chiefs of staff of both parties participating.

yamamoto: "we can't hide things from each other now. at the beginning of the war, the navy said that one zero fighter (fighter) could fight against five to ten u.s. military aircraft. due to the failure of midway, the navy lost many excellent pilots, it is difficult to get replenishment. although we can still fight one against two, the enemy's replenishment capacity is more than three times that of ours, so the gap in the number of aircraft is getting bigger day by day. now we must face enemies several times our own. frankly speaking it is already an extremely difficult situation. according to the central land and naval combat agreement, the air combat to the west of new guinea is handled by the army, and the navy is responsible for the east side. i heard that this time your front army will be equipped with a flying division, starting from the third one a week ago. judging from the fate of the 18th division's transport fleet, the next battle you and i are going to carry out to retake guadalcanal must increase its aviation combat effectiveness. however, the combat effectiveness that can be increased by the navy alone is very limited. after arriving at rabaul, you must observe the actual situation of the air combat between the two sides. in order to implement the guadalcanal operation, do not stick to the central agreement. please submit your opinions to the general staff headquarters and recommend that more powerful army aviation combat capabilities be injected into rabaul, not just it’s a pilot regiment.”

me: "since we have decided to coordinate the sea and land operations on guadalcanal, we should not stick to the previously decided agreement. for us, if the two new divisions that landed on guadalcanal suffered the same fate as sano's division, we would not be able to mission accomplished. after confirming the air combat situation at rabaul, i will send a telegram to the central committee. then, i heard in tokyo that we are in famine on guadalcanal and new guinea. what extent is it now?"

yamamoto: "this is also because the enemy has gained air supremacy and the transport ships cannot reach it. the navy responsible for supply feels a heavy responsibility, so it is necessary to enhance its air combat effectiveness and regain air supremacy as soon as possible."

me: "is the u.s. air force also proficient now?"

yamamoto: "we are becoming more and more proficient, but now we are facing the competition between japan's elite military doctrine and the us military's mechanism. the advantages brought by our elite military training are gradually lost every time we lose veterans and recruit new people." americans can take advantage of advances in technology and science and have more machine power. even if their training level is not as good as ours, the gap is gradually getting smaller. the japanese army's elite military doctrine is certainly good, but it must be scientifically improved. we are somewhat inferior to the americans. being behind, especially people like me who have the closest relationship with naval aviation, feel a heavy responsibility." (human training is not as good as technology and quantity, not to mention that if there is no fuel in the later stage, training cannot be guaranteed).

i don't know many naval officers. however, among the people i know, there is no one more humane than commander yamamoto, and no one is more pretentious in his dealings with others. i heard that the battle of midway dealt a big blow to him, and now the battle in the south pacific has become quite difficult, but the commander's attitude and words are very calm and admirable.

however, my sensitive eyes still saw some worry from the brows of admiral yamamoto. he shoulders the important responsibility of the entire navy and the pacific battlefield. how can you not worry about it. i sincerely wish governor yamamoto good health.

on november 22, i arrived in rabaul, observed the aviation situation every day, and sent the following telegram to the chief of staff, marshal sugiyama:

"the navy should have been responsible for this aspect of air combat, but according to the current situation of the junior officer, air supremacy has gradually fallen into the hands of the enemy. if the current situation continues to develop, it will be more difficult to supply guadalcanal and new guinea, and the soldiers' starvation will become more and more serious. before the arrival of the two new divisions, the frontline troops are likely to lose their combat effectiveness, which will have a significant impact on the operation to recapture guadalcanal. i am convinced that the immediate priority is not to stick to the previous central army-navy agreement. "it is necessary to urgently dispatch powerful aviation units from the army to this area to assist the navy." (anyone on the front line who is not blind can see that the u.s. air superiority is too great. shi zhengxin also strongly requested the dispatch of the army air force for support in guadalcanal. details. meet me in another series - tsuji masanobu - "guadalcanal" -13, break with the aviation director)

after the war, i learned why the central government did not give instructions on this telegram. it was said that the base camp was preparing to form an aviation force with lieutenant general kumaichi teramoto as commander, including six combat and bombing teams to join my front army. however, these troops had to be mobilized from other battlefields, and it would take six months to assemble and complete attack preparations. this did not meet commander yamamoto's expectations. the base camp finally gave up the attempt to recapture guadalcanal and ordered commander yamamoto to cooperate with me to capture guadalcanal and new guadalcanal. troops in southeastern guinea withdraw. that happened on january 4, showa 18.

the withdrawal of the japanese troops stationed on guadalcanal was an action taken under the enemy's air and sea control. in particular, food must be sent up first to give them the strength to retreat.

tens of thousands of soldiers who had been fighting for nearly three months on grass roots had starved to death, and more than 10,000 were still alive. although all of them were malnourished, they continued to repel the us military attacks.

relying on submarines to transport food, the soldiers on the island can barely walk a kilometer or two to reach the coast. with 20 destroyers and a few submarines, more than 10,000 survivors can be accommodated on bougainville island south of rabaul. .

in order to visit our comrades who had been fighting without food for a long time, my adjutant, captain numata, and i took a "zhonggong" (medium bomber) of the naval flying team and flew to buin naval airport located at the southern end of bu island on february 10. the distance from rabaul to there is about the same as the distance from tokyo to osaka. the seat assigned to me was diagonally behind the pilot, with a good view.

after flying over the ocean and the virgin forest of the island, about an hour and a half later, the airport appeared in the far south. i thought we would land in ten minutes, but what i saw was a formation of thirty us fighter planes.

although it seemed far away and i couldn't hear the gunshots of the enemy planes, i could tell from the flashes and smoke coming from the wings of each enemy plane that they had begun to fire at me.

"we need to make an emergency evacuation," shouted the marine admiral piloting the plane. looks quite calm...

"even if we dodge, the speed difference between the medium bomber and the fighter is too big, and we will soon be overtaken." this is the thought that passed through my mind.

what a blessing from god. it was obviously a clear sky, but there was a lone white cloud floating in it. the pilot turned the plane sharply upward and to the left, into the clouds, and hovered in the clouds for about ten minutes. "i'll go out and take a look." he said and flew the plane above the clouds. when he saw it, the enemy formation had passed through boone airport and returned south. our navy's ten zero fighters have also taken to the air and are chasing the enemy planes.

after a while, all the planes disappeared from sight, and my plane landed at buyin airport.

"it's too dangerous. because we didn't see the attack, we're afraid your plane will be shot down!"

the dozen army and navy officers who came to greet us were delighted that we were safe. (imamura is very lucky. how many times has this happened?)

in view of the increasingly rampant behavior of the enemy's aviation forces in the spring of showa 18, admiral yamamoto, the commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, felt that it was necessary to carry out a decisive blow to the enemy's air power, so he personally led the main aviation force from truk base to arrive in mid-april. rabaul. using this as an advance base, the u.s. air force that stormed gua gua several times was worthy of the battle personally commanded by the admiral. the air force officers had extremely strong fighting will and achieved several major results, which boosted the morale of the entire japanese army in this area. (in fact, the results were few, but the losses were not small. the quality of the eagles at that time had declined greatly, and they started to follow the base camp's trick of falsely reporting their results)

on april 17, commander yamamoto, who was temporarily living in rabaul, invited me to have dinner with rear admiral ugaki, the chief of staff of both parties, and rear admiral kato. in november 1942, he was also promoted to vice admiral. in the original text, both positions were rear admiral, which should be wrong). during the chat after dinner, he asked: "i heard that you ordered the army flying corps that came to rabaul to conduct night flight training. i don't know to what extent they have practiced it."

me: "it's just the beginning, and i don't have the ability to fight a big battle yet. it still takes a month or two to train. but a single aircraft can already perform many tasks. since the russo-japanese war, people have believed that night combat is the best way to win with less." the best choice was that the ground forces often operated at night, but for some reason, the aviation forces hardly did so. now, rabaul was bombed by enemy planes every night. although the young pilots still made many mistakes and were unable to fight against the enemy. , they were stimulated by the enemy aircraft and are practicing seriously. i think they will succeed."

yamamoto: "the same is true for the navy. when i came here, i heard that you were conducting night combat training, and i ordered the navy to do the same. u.s. military aircraft seem to be equipped with equipment that can automatically take off and land at night, and we lost another point on this point. , but there is no point in regretting, we must fight in training. i am planning to fly to bouin recently to express condolences to the first-line aviation team there and give encouragement.”

me: "really? they are the frontline troops there, and they often achieve good results. they must be very happy that the commander can come. just two months ago, when i flew to buin on a navy's 'central attack', i was at the airport not far away, we encountered a formation of about thirty enemy planes, staring at us eagerly. however, the first-class soldier flew the plane calmly and dexterously, flew into the nearby clouds, and escaped death... i was almost in despair. compared with giving up, the calmness of the three noncommissioned officers of the "central attack" is still vivid in my mind and is admirable. "

yamamoto: "really? that's great. there are fewer and fewer such excellent pilots. the first-class soldier you mentioned must be a very independent person, right?" he nodded with satisfaction.

the next day, april 18, commander yamamoto went to buyin. this was a top-secret matter and i did not see him off. however, at the same time and at the same place where my plane encountered an enemy formation two months ago, he also encountered thirty enemy aircraft, was shot down on the vast forest sea, and eventually died in the line of duty... general yamamoto isoroku the remains were also found by my officers and soldiers and were finally taken into custody. this is really an incredible fate.

we have been close friends since the days of sakan, and we fought together on the same battlefield. commander yamamoto's death in battle gave me a huge shock.

according to the book of former rear admiral takagi sokichi published after the end of world war ii, the wireless telegraph code was deciphered by the u.s. navy in washington. the departure and arrival times of commander yamamoto were known to the americans, and thus informed the u.s. air force on guadalcanal. the troops issued an order to "attack yamamoto's plane".

so two months ago, my plane was attacked by thirty enemy planes, so it was probably the same thing. if this is the case, then general yamamoto, who is indispensable to japan, was killed, and me, a mediocre person, escaped death. it is really an irreparable misfortune for our motherland.