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an f-16 launches an agm-65 maverick missile.

introduction

at present, the air confrontation between russia and ukraine is in an equilibrium situation, that is, no one can gain air superiority. the reason why such a situation has evolved can be summed up in a nutshell: russia and ukraine both have advanced air defense systems, which limits the combat effectiveness of each other's fighter planes. before the war, the russian aerospace forces had 1,391 aircraft, while the ukrainian air force had only 132. despite its size and technological advantages, the russian aerospace forces failed to take the initiative to seize offensive opportunities. in addition, following the guidance of mechanized large corps combat theory, its air tactics gradually became passive. the reason is mainly due to the superposition of multiple factors such as underestimating the enemy and having no backup plan, slow battlefield information updates, lack of precision-guided weapons, and insufficient coordinated action capabilities.

although the russian aerospace force far exceeds the uzbek army's equipment in scale and quality, it did not effectively destroy the uzbek army's (mobile) ground air defense system at the beginning of the war. in addition, nato air defense systems (such as "patriot", nasams, iris -t, "hawk", etc.). as time passed, the losses of fighter aircraft remained high, and the russian army gradually gave up the use of air power; at the same time, in the face of the powerful ground air defense system and electronic warfare of the russian army, the ukrainian army it doesn't take much advantage. in order to preserve its strength, the ukrainian army also adopted air blockade tactics like the russian army. therefore, it is difficult for the air forces of both sides to form effective air power to support large-scale offensive or counterattack by ground forces.

one reasonable explanation for the poor performance of the russian aerospace forces on the ukrainian battlefield is that its military doctrine is different from that of the us military. the decisive use of air power in the 1991 gulf war revolutionized warfare and rendered all previous experience obsolete. the us military believes that air control is one of the primary tasks of joint combat forces. according to the degree of control from small to large, it is divided into air balance, air superiority and air supremacy. the ground campaign first seeks to suppress enemy air defenses, seize and maintain air superiority, and establish a safe combat environment for ground forces. when one side is unable to carry out effective air intervention in the combat area, the other side has air superiority. at present, it is basically considered inefficient for the armed forces of any country to conduct war without the guarantee of air superiority.

photos of ukrainian f-16s released by the ukrainian air force.

ukraine needs f-16 engines

since the russia-ukraine conflict began two years ago, nato has been in a state of uncertainty regarding whether to provide f-16 fighter jets to ukraine. in early august 2024, denmark took the lead in transferring the first batch of six f-16s, opening the door for nato f-16s to enter the ukrainian army's combat order. under the current battlefield situation, the f-16 does not yet have the ability to change the rules of the game. based on strategic considerations, nato fighter aircraft military assistance focuses on long-term interests rather than immediate tactical gains. the successive addition of f-16 will make it possible for the ukrainian fleet to achieve longer weapon range and better damage accuracy, effectively improving the effectiveness of air-to-air and air-to-ground combat.

(1) compensating for battle losses

on february 24, 2022, the russian aerospace force relied on its powerful air power to launch more than 200 long-range strikes against command and control centers, air defense and radar bases, airports and high-value targets throughout ukraine. during this period, fighter jets once penetrated deeply air strikes were carried out over 300 kilometers within ukraine. due to the "escape + hide" strategy of the ukrainian air defense system (to avoid the first round of strikes by the russian army), only ukrainian fighter jets took off to engage in combat with the incoming russian fighter planes. in just 5 days, ukraine lost 25 aircraft of various types (13 russian aircraft). if this battle damage rate continues, the ukrainian air force will soon cease to exist. as the ukrainian air defense system gradually recovered, surface-to-air missiles began to play an air denial role. during the six months from the beginning of march to the end of august, the ukrainian army lost only 10 aircraft, but the russian army lost 33 aircraft. the data that the russian-ukrainian fighter exchange ratio ranges from 1:3 to 3:1 reflects from the side that the ukrainian army is good at using the mobility and dispersion of its air defense system and has achieved good results.

along with nato military assistance, slovakia and poland provided 13 and 14 mig-29s to ukraine respectively, which made up for the ukrainian air force's battle losses to a certain extent. although the russian aerospace forces have not achieved air superiority, they often dispatch su-35s fighter jets to conduct combat patrols at an altitude of 8,000 meters over the front line, equipped with long-range r-37 air-to-air missiles (according to ukrainian air force on-site records, its longest range 177 kilometers), posing a major threat to ukrainian fighter aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles; at the same time, su-34 fighter aircraft were dispatched to launch kh-29 or kh-59 air-to-ground medium-range missiles to hit key facility targets; su-30sm was also used to launch kh-31p and the kh-58 anti-radiation missile, which suppresses ukrainian radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. in addition, russian fighter planes also dropped a large number of fab500 gliding bombs within 70 kilometers of the front line. although the accuracy was not high, it also posed a serious threat to ukrainian ground troops.

given the huge gap in technology and numbers between the two sides, the challenge faced by the ukrainian air force is: if the russian aerospace force launches an attack, especially if it is dispatched in large numbers, the ukrainian air force will be defeated thousands of miles away and cause huge losses to its ground forces. therefore, it is urgent to establish a matching air force. if the ukrainian air force launches an effective counterattack against russian-occupied territories in the future, it will also need a fleet of fighter jets that can suppress and damage the russian air defense system and provide air support.

(2) add a weapon platform

even if the ukrainian army retains its original fleet, the equipment it uses mainly comes from the soviet union, and the supply chain for daily maintenance or replacement of equipment and ammunition replenishment has long ceased to exist. as the conflict intensifies, the remaining fighter planes will gradually lose their combat effectiveness due to the above reasons. this situation is unlikely to support the ukrainian air force in achieving positive results in a protracted war of attrition.

maintaining and rebuilding combat formations, including aviation equipment, is an important task for ukraine at the moment. providing ukraine with equipment that meets nato standards is crucial to integrating ukrainian weapons systems into the nato combat system. the history of fighter development and actual combat proves that with the advancement of technology, off-board information support and beyond-visual-range missiles have the highest contribution rate to fighter aircraft’s aerial victory. after 30 years of development, the nato link16 tactical data link has become very mature. the f-16 carries data link port equipment, advanced medium-range missiles and other ancillary products. compared with the original russian-made mig-29 and su-27 fleets, the ukrainian air force has undoubtedly improved its combat effectiveness.

the united states and nato allies have provided nearly $100 billion in arms assistance to ukraine, mainly including air defense systems, high-mobility artillery rocket systems (himars), advanced surveillance and radar systems, m1 main battle tanks and hundreds of ten thousand rounds of 155mm artillery shells, etc. each type of weapons and ammunition has its own unique application field. if the ukrainian army is equipped with f-16, it is equivalent to opening a launch platform in the air. with the help of off-board information provided by special aircraft such as early warning aircraft and electronic warfare, and the suppression/destroy of enemy air defense positions, it can effectively attack opponent targets. in addition, the f-16 is also a very successful multi-purpose fighter with strong air and ground capabilities. it can not only provide close air support, but also launch stand-off ammunition, and can also carry out long-distance operations in deep areas behind enemy lines. running and attacking can be of great use.

it is true that in modern warfare, the speed and ceiling of fighter jets are no longer as important as in the past, and the importance of situational awareness and "launch and forget" over-the-horizon attacks has become increasingly apparent. from this point of view, tactical aircraft are platforms for carrying and launching weapons. prior to nato's donation of the f-16s, the ukrainian air force's sukhoi and mig fighter jets had been modified to carry the same western products as most f-16 weapons, including jdam (joint direct attack munitions), agm-88 harm (high speed ​​anti-radiation missile), etc. therefore, the meaning of using soviet-made aircraft or western fighter jets to attack potential targets is the same. in other words, even if a small-scale (less than 50) f-16s are formed into an army, it will neither reduce the maneuverability of the russian aerospace forces nor change the current balance of power on the front line.

(3) striving for air superiority

since the two sides are in a balance of power in the air, in the low-level airspace between the ground and the troposphere (1000~3000 meters), the uzbek army with inferior equipment quickly realized the potential in this field and achieved impressive results by using military drones such as tb-2. achievements. with the russian army's "hindsight", the two sides once again achieved a balanced situation in this near-earth space. given the potential for cost-effective and precision strikes in this space, it is likely to be a (drone) confrontation zone for one or both sides that “cannot achieve air superiority.”

the u.s. air force considers air superiority to be "the degree of control of the air by a force that allows it to operate at a given time and location without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats" (u.s. air force "afdp 3-01 air control operations" "regulations). according to this definition, the air battles that occurred in the russia-ukraine conflict over the past two years can only be classified as balance-of-air battles, that is, no one side controls the air for its own purposes, and no one side is significantly interfered with. today, each side in the war possesses relatively strong air defense capabilities, so each side can deny the other's air superiority.

the ukrainian air force's lack of air offensive capabilities is the main reason for the lack of air superiority. facing the powerful russian integrated air defense system, establishing air superiority in disputed territory is an arduous task. while f-16s cannot provide air superiority by themselves, they are an important part of achieving this goal.

once the f-16 completes its core missions of suppressing/destroying russian air defense positions, air interception and defense, and air counterattack, it can carry agm65 "maverick" missiles or 500 to 2,000 pounds (226 to 907 kilograms) of heavy bombs to provide ground support the troops provide close air support and effectively attack the opponent's ground forces. in 1991, operation desert storm lasted 40 days of air strikes, resulting in the surrender of the iraqi army less than 100 hours after coalition ground forces entered the battle. likewise, ground equipment such as tanks, artillery and armored vehicles also succumbed to air-to-ground weapons. once local air superiority is established, the f-16 can bring the damage effect of ground firepower to the russian-ukrainian battlefield, thereby creating conditions for supporting the ukrainian ground forces to break through the blockade, break away from relatively static trench warfare, and transition into a decisive mobile battle.

the ultimate goal of receiving the f-16 fleet transferred from nato: first, to establish local air superiority, second, to maintain lasting air superiority, and third, to subsequently use air power to support ground operations. only in this way can the f-16 be able to use its ability to mount various weapons and flexibly confront the russian aerospace forces within its territory, thereby gaining greater leverage in wars or negotiations.

(4) boost morale

since it was put into service in 1979, until today 45 years later, the f-16 is still the main equipment of more than 20 countries or regions, including the us military. due to different user needs and technological updates, it has undergone multiple upgrades and derived more than ten models, with a total output of more than 4,600 aircraft. the f-16 is recognized by the aviation industry as an outstanding representative of the third-generation fighter jet with high cost performance and excellent performance.

the f-16 fighter jet began to be developed during the cold war of the last century, and its main combat targets were fighter jets equipped by the soviet union. for decades, f-16s have fought against most russian-made fighter jets in air battles around the world (for example: israeli f-16 shot down syria's mig-21 in july 1981, and the us military shot down a syrian mig-21 in december 1992. shooting down iraq's mig-25, and pakistan's f-16 shooting down india's su-30mki in 2019), russian-made fighter jets have never won against f-16; f-16 air combat has achieved a total of 69:1 (turkey's f-16 16 shot down by the greek "mirage" 2000, 1996) brilliant record. today, the f-16 has been upgraded to an advanced phased array radar, equipped with advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, coupled with powerful off-board information support. it can be said that the f-16 is a very difficult opponent for the russian aerospace forces.

the f-16 has been the main combat platform of the nato air force for decades. with its impressive combat record, providing assistance to ukraine is tantamount to sending a clear signal to the world: as nato’s involvement becomes deeper and deeper, russia and ukraine will the war could risk escalation.

before the war, russia and ukraine were the two countries with the highest density of air defense systems in europe. since the autumn of 2022, the quality of situational awareness and target tracking of the russian military's long- and short-range air defense systems has been continuously enhanced, and the success rate of ammunition interception has been significantly improved. although the russian aerospace forces currently operate basically outside ukraine’s firepower circle and conduct limited strikes every month, the threats posed by the russian military’s long-range ground-based air defense systems, fighter aircraft’s mid- and high-altitude overhead radars, long-range air-to-air missiles, and point target defense systems the combination will make the f-16's air combat environment extremely deadly. the ukrainian air force expects that the introduction of the f-16 will be as fruitful as the tb-2 drone in the early stages of the war, which may be an unrealistic idea.

ukraine hopes that nato countries will relax restrictions on advanced weapons such as aim-120 advanced air-to-air missiles.

problems facing the f-16

(1) training of pilots and maintenance personnel

for a u.s. air force fighter pilot, it often takes 2 years from initial flight training to obtaining combat-qualified wingman certification (54 weeks of undergraduate pilot training, 9 months of type-specific basic training, and 3 months of combat readiness training); consider training times may be longer to the collaborative training required to execute tactical formations.

this reality means that experienced ukrainian pilots also need time to transition. it is not as simple as changing aircraft. moreover, the f-16 tactics, techniques and procedures (ttps), as well as the cockpit operation interface and instrument layout are all different from russian-made fighters. , especially the unit difference expressed in "knots" for the f-16 and "km/h" for the mig-29. to take full advantage of the f-16's multi-role capabilities, ukrainian pilots must reestablish a different way of thinking about combat.

in addition, cultivating qualified f-16 maintainers is as critical as cultivating skilled f-16 pilots. it is said that one f-16 requires 8 to 14 logistics support personnel, and the f-16 requires 7 to 20 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight. for maintenance personnel, it takes approximately 5 to 8 years of on-the-job experience and rigorous certification to possess the expertise required to maintain these aircraft. ukraine must be able to maintain and repair f-16s to ensure combat readiness. in the united states, f-16 ground maintenance personnel are mainly contractor service groups. once the war becomes intense, these contractors may need to evacuate, and their departure will result in a significant reduction in the number of combat-ready aircraft capable of performing missions. based on this, the united states proposed that the nato fleet be responsible for the f-16 logistics support of the ukrainian army. the maintenance team will use the remote maintenance/diagnosis system to directly contact experts and respond quickly to support the good condition of the fighter jets. in order to ensure that the f-16 continues to use its remaining life, a long-term continuous training channel should be established while training pilots and maintaining maintainer capabilities.

in addition to personnel training, the ukrainian air force's operational priority is to disperse the f-16 fleet to prevent it from being destroyed by russian long-range missiles. the use of deception methods such as f-16s, ground models of air defense radar positions or decoys are also powerful measures to consume russian missiles.

(2) adapting weapons

depending on the combat mission, the f-16 fighter jet can be equipped with a variety of weapons and auxiliary equipment such as various pods. the addition of f-16 will undoubtedly enhance the air-to-air capabilities of the ukrainian air force. with the help of combat-proven active phased array radar and aim-120 medium-range missiles, the ukrainian air force can extend the maximum air-to-air engagement range compared to the existing mig-29 and su-27 fleets. to 180 kilometers, the engagement range is significantly increased, making it possible to weaken and defeat enemy air defense systems.

the enhanced air-to-air capabilities will give the ukrainian air force the ability to prevent the russian aerospace forces from launching glide bombs. at the same time, the ukrainian air force can also use the f-16 as a launch platform for the british "storm shadow" or french scalp cruise missiles to attack russian territory. it can carry out long-range strikes and target time-sensitive targets at a more economical speed, compressing the effectiveness of the russian military's comprehensive air defense layered system. in addition, the f-16 can also provide some local air defense and deep strike capabilities, and help intercept "shahid" drones and cruise missiles.

it can carry cluster bombs or heavy bombs on the ground, carry out concentrated bombing on tanks, artillery and armored vehicles as well as russian trenches, and provide close air support tasks for ground troops. at present, the russian aerospace forces’ close air support is limited to low-altitude unguided bombing and unguided rockets, which have not caused decisive damage to ukrainian ground forces.

taking into account nato's hesitation on the issue of f-16 assistance, the intensity of nato weapons assistance depends on the direction of the ukrainian battlefield. in order to avoid escalation of the war and reduce collateral damage, almost all weapons currently provided by nato allies to ukraine have performance limitations. a new u.s. intelligence assessment finds that since ukraine began receiving atacms (army tactical missiles), the russian military has moved 90% of its aircraft to military bases beyond the range of the army's tactical missiles. despite this, the comprehensive combat capabilities of the f-16 fighter jets are significantly higher than the existing mig-29s and su-27s of the ukrainian air force. if nato relaxes weapons restrictions, such as the aim-120 amraam air-to-air missile (similar to the russian r-77) or provides long-range jassm cruise missiles, the f-16's combat capabilities will be amplified. this issue is estimated to be a key issue that the ukrainian air force needs to negotiate with nato in the next step.

(3) the problem of forming an army

in early september, the leader of the ukrainian armed forces stated that russia had launched 9,590 missiles and 13,997 attack drones since the start of the war, of which only 25% of the missiles and 42% of the drones had been shot down. the pressure of ukrainian air defense is evident. based on the current situation, ukraine is most likely to use f-16s to conduct air patrols and defensive air defense missions, set up no-fly zones or barriers, and shoot down incoming cruise missiles and suicide drones. due to the presence of s-400 surface-to-air missile bases in the russian military's medium and short-range air defense network, the f-16 is currently unable to fly close enough to the frontline to provide sufficient air cover for ukrainian ground forces.

ukraine will receive more than 80 f-16 fighter jets (42 from the netherlands, 22 from norway, and 19 from denmark), most of which are early models that have undergone mlu (mid-term upgrade) and have been in service for about 40 years. in addition, they come from different countries. among nato allies, the future status of the f-16 fleet will be uneven, causing many problems for fleet management. in addition, if the ukrainian army receives more f-16s than its flight management capabilities, these fighters will become a burden rather than an advantage.

from the current point of view, nato is gradually providing f-16s to ukraine, so the f-16 fleet is bound to have coordinated command and control issues with existing combat units. on august 26, an f-16 of the ukrainian army crashed. although the cause is unknown, most suspicions point to being shot down by one's own air defense system. this case shows that the ukrainian army's f-16 has not yet been integrated into the ukrainian army's combat system, and the organization and coordination of combat units and the optimization of combat processes should continue to be done to avoid unnecessary losses.

as f-16s from nato allies are gradually transferred to the ukrainian air force, some military commentators believe that ukraine needs nearly 216 f-16 fighter jets (18 per squadron) to deal with different threats and attack different targets in order to significantly improve its air capabilities. . the transfer of more f-16s to the ukrainian air force means more training, more spare parts, more ammunition and more infrastructure, all of which require additional time or take up valuable resources. therefore, the impact of the ukrainian air force’s f-16 fleet on the direction of the russia-ukraine conflict is measured in “years”. the current pilot training, maintenance personnel in place, and the establishment of spare parts and weapons supply chains are all in the foundation stage.

since the ukrainian army lacks support aircraft such as early warning aircraft, the f-16 needs nato combat data link support, otherwise its combat effectiveness will be greatly reduced. these air command platforms can act as a force multiplier by providing the f-16 with a real-time common operating picture, greatly enhancing its situational awareness and expanding its mission profile.

conclusion

since the end of the cold war, nato has always regarded russia as a serious threat. in order to defend against russian raids, most of nato's allies have focused on early warning radars and surface-to-air missiles in building their air defense system. the move to provide f-16s to ukraine, as well as france's commitment to provide mirage fighter jets and sweden's gripen fighter jets and early warning aircraft, actually provides nato with a unique opportunity to closely observe the russian aerospace forces' response strategy. it can effectively test the air deployment and tactical feasibility of the ukrainian air force, and combined with the experience and lessons learned from the two-year conflict between russia and ukraine, it is the best reference for nato allies to adjust their national defense strategies.