us expert: eu becoming a military entity is not in the interests of the us
2024-09-09
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reference news reported on september 8on september 2, the website of the us magazine foreign policy published an article titled "why the eu should never become a military actor", written by jacob grygiel, a professor of political science at the catholic university of america. the full text is excerpted as follows:
the united states needs militarily strong european allies who can defend europe’s borders to the east and south against threats from both directions. but the desire for a stronger european flavor in military affairs is unlikely to promote european security. on the contrary, this desire could be harmful for two reasons.
first, the 27 eu member states do not share a common threat assessment. disagreements over the ends and means of security policy will inevitably produce a series of weakening compromises or inefficient allocation of resources to 27 objectives, as is often the case in brussels. second, even if the eu does manage to pursue a serious defense policy, there is no guarantee that it will work effectively. thus, a closer union that incorporates defense issues may not necessarily improve the continent's security.
that europe has no shared threat assessment is neither new nor surprising. rome worries about migrants from north africa, while warsaw focuses on the russian threat. paris’ interests in sub-saharan africa are not on berlin’s radar. no matter how effective the eu’s institutions, these deep divisions cannot be avoided. for obvious reasons, such as geography, history, domestic politics, and many other reasons, perceptions of threats will remain diverse.
as a result of these divergent priorities—and not just in foreign policy—the eu has developed a series of vague, trendy, and even ridiculous policy goals that assume that europe is a peaceful continent with ample funds to pursue all kinds of lofty ambitions. for example, the european commission’s top priority over the past few years has been to promote the european green deal, a costly and economically risky project that aims to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 and “leave no one and no place behind.”
another reason why promoting the eu as a security actor would be detrimental to the stability of the continent is that some individual eu member states might push the entire union toward a grand strategy of appeasement.
germany, with its long history of mercantilism and belief in “change through trade,” may prefer to engage rather than compete with its rivals. even if french president emmanuel macron has recently taken an unexpectedly tough stance toward russia, france has a longer history of engaging with russia in a coordinated way among the great powers. berlin, paris and their supporters in the european union may attribute the conflict with moscow to the alleged bellicosity of the eu’s frontier states rather than russia’s resurgent imperial ambitions.
as a result, an eu-wide security policy could end up being less effective than the combined effect of the policies of the bloc’s 27 parts, as it could give appeasement groups the power to veto decisions by central and eastern european countries that prefer a more aggressive defense policy.
so far, the signs are not encouraging. the eu has undoubtedly managed to free up some funds to train ukrainian soldiers and purchase weapons since russia’s invasion of ukraine, the first time the eu has armed a country in war. but there is still a long way to go from these small-scale moves to becoming a major security actor, which requires a coherent strategic vision and policy coherence that can only be achieved at the eu level through centralized decision-making and the suppression of divergent national views.
even if the eu were to adopt a serious defence and security policy, it might not gain what it really needs to deter and defeat russia, or to stabilise the wider mediterranean region.
the greatest threat to the transatlantic relationship, therefore, is not that washington will become less supportive of europe but that europe will eschew deterrence, abandon the transatlantic grand strategy, and seek accommodation with america’s adversaries. an eu-centric security policy would greatly increase the likelihood of this outcome.
a still fragmented eu on security issues—where member states continue to make independent decisions based on their own national security concerns—is more likely to strengthen deterrence and maintain europe’s transatlantic orientation. at the very least, there is a solid bloc of countries from the nordic countries to the black sea that have agreed on the need to strengthen their military, deter the kremlin, and maintain close ties with the united states. centralization of the eu could weaken and overturn their strong defense policies.
it is in washington's interest to retain a firm eu frontier that does not require large-scale deployment of us troops and the constant consumption of scarce resources. this outcome is more likely to be achieved if the united states continues to bet on individual allies. (compiled by liu xiaoyan)
