book excerpt | after japan’s defeat in world war ii, how did the japanese military exit the stage of history?
2024-09-03
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text｜[japanese] kato yoko
１
transfer of military supplies
when japan was defeated, most people in japan were devastated by the war and lived a poor life with little food and clothing. at the same time, they saw soldiers returning home with a large amount of military supplies in the chaos of defeat. seeing this, the people lost their last trust in the soldiers. the decisive contradiction between the army and the people was exposed in the handling of military supplies at the time of defeat.
it is worth noting that the reason why demobilized soldiers brought a large amount of military supplies back home was not because of the long-term lax military discipline and the chaotic scene of looting supplies at the grassroots level of the army when the war was defeated. on the contrary, this was a decision made by the central government, that is, the last cabinet meeting of the suzuki kantaro cabinet. it was junhisa ikeda, the director of the cabinet comprehensive planning bureau, who proposed to distribute military supplies to demobilized soldiers at the cabinet meeting. ikeda advocated that after the defeat, the national (military) materials should be transferred to local public groups, or transferred to private groups or individuals as soon as possible. in this way, the materials can be hidden and prevented from being confiscated by the us military after the defeat.
after the establishment of the higashikuni cabinet, ikeda attended the cabinet's vice-minister meetings from august 18, 1945, and played a key role in the process of transferring war materials from the military to the civilian sector. before the war, ikeda was known as a reformist military officer who was proficient in planned economy. when japan lost the war, ikeda participated in the transfer of military supplies to the civilian sector as the director of the cabinet's general planning bureau. when japan lost the war, the united states registered the obsolete weapons held by the japanese army and then ordered the japanese to destroy them. at that time, the higashikuni cabinet established the liaison committee for end-of-war affairs, headed by the secretary-general of the cabinet taketora ogata. the destruction of obsolete weapons, known as "special object disposal", was the sole responsibility of this committee. the core members of the committee were reformist bureaucrats during the war, and the first director of the cabinet's general planning bureau, mori eito, personally formulated the specific guidelines for the destruction of weapons. after that, the cabinet established the special object disposal committee. in addition to mori, minobe yoji also joined the committee as an investigator of the cabinet investigation bureau.
starting from october 31, 1945, five large private enterprises engaged in weapons production during the war (nippon steel, nippon steel, furukawa electric, sumitomo metal, kobe steel) jointly established the scrapped weapons disposal committee, which was directly responsible for the scrapping and dismantling of various japanese weapons received by the us military. during the war, the reform bureaucrats and large enterprises used the means of planned economy to quickly shift japan's domestic industrial production capacity from civilian needs to military needs. in the early days of the defeat, these reform bureaucrats and large enterprises used the same means to quickly shift japan's domestic production capacity from military needs to civilian needs. in the process of disarmament of the japanese army, countless materials of all kinds were left behind. the cabinet first tried its best to hide these materials in the sea of people, and the materials that could not be hidden were eventually received by the us military. later, in order to achieve the demilitarization of japan, the us military commissioned japanese private enterprises to scrap and dismantle these materials. in this way, this batch of materials returned to the hands of japanese companies again.
２
end of war crime
after japan announced its surrender, the military destroyed all kinds of weapons while the u.s. military had not yet entered japan. at the same time, it hid military property and materials such as cars and oil among the public, and distributed food and clothing to demobilized soldiers. at the 89th imperial diet held at the end of 1945, the military's actions triggered strong criticism from the parliament. on december 17, in response to the questioning of okawachi teruko (research institute, viscount), hara mori, a member of the government (vice minister of the first demobilization ministry), answered questions about the handling of food in the army's possession. hara mori stated that at the end of the war, the army had a total of about 170,000 tons of rice, wheat, and various grains. from august 17 to 28, the military "transferred" a total of 30,000 tons of food to the public and distributed 50,000 tons of food to demobilized soldiers. the total amount of food actually transferred to the allies was about 90,000 tons.
most of the materials handed over to the allies at that time were eventually packaged and sold by the us military to the japanese ministry of internal affairs, which then distributed them to various prefectures.
let's take a look at the handling of other materials. when the japanese army was defeated, they had a total of 7.6 million sets of bedding, of which 1.75 million sets were "transferred", 1.85 million sets were distributed to demobilized soldiers, and a total of 4 million sets were handed over to the allies. of the 7.7 million blankets, 1 million were "transferred", 2.2 million were distributed to demobilized soldiers, and 4.5 million were handed over to the allies. of the 9,796 vehicles, 1,054 were "transferred" and 8,742 were handed over to the allies. in addition, the army handed over 8,922 aircraft, 3,113 tank trucks, 2,300 tractors, 10,000 artillery pieces, 40,000 automatic firearms, 1.31 million small firearms, 300 million packs of bullets, and 10 million artillery shells to the allies in the mainland.
compared with the part distributed to demobilized soldiers, there are actually many problems in the process of "transferring" the materials mentioned by hara mori in his parliamentary defense. due to the government's instructions to transfer military supplies to civilian use as much as possible, the military transferred a large amount of materials to local governments, local groups or public groups. however, according to the military's policy, these military supplies should have been transferred to public groups for a fee, but in actual operation, most of them became free transfers. but are these so-called "free transfers" really free? is the military objective and fair in the process of selecting the transfer objects? i am afraid there are many unknown shady dealings in this.
on november 29, 1945, at the 89th session of the house of representatives of the imperial diet, toshikazu fukuya, who was famous as a summoned member during the war, defined the various corruption behaviors of the military in the process of transferring supplies as "end-of-war crimes." he questioned army minister sada shimomura in the parliament about "the military's embezzlement of public funds during the chaos of the end of the war, pocketing the military supplies in the process of disposing of military supplies, colluding with civilian forces to conceal and resell supplies, and other end-of-war crimes." before the end of the war, the military had been strongly advocating the so-called "voluntary disarmament is the core condition for the protection of the national system", but in fact, the term "end-of-war crimes" is the best portrayal of the image of the japanese army in the process of disarmament after defeat.
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summary of the japanese disarmament
after the defeat in the battle of leyte gulf, the koiso kuniaki cabinet and the military began to promote the slogan "the defense of the imperial territory is an indispensable condition for the protection of the national polity" to the people. at the same time, former prime minister tojo hideki and army minister anami korechika and other military leaders began to cite the so-called "divine decree of the infinite heaven and earth" to prove the importance of maintaining armaments or voluntarily disarming for the protection of the national polity, and tried to use this theory to convince the emperor and various military departments.
although the united states insisted on unconditional surrender on the surface, it actually repeatedly explained to japan the actual attitude of the allies on the issue of disarmament through the potsdam declaration, the bernays reply, leaflets dropped before and after the air raid, shortwave broadcasts, newspapers, etc. in the leaflets, the united states clearly divided the government, the people, and the military and the army, stating that if the japanese government and people agreed to disarm the army, the war would end immediately.
on the other hand, emperor showa expressed his unwillingness to compromise on the two issues of disarmament and extradition of war criminals in september 1944. however, in may 1945, after witnessing the actual surrender of the german army, which had already lost its political subject, emperor showa began to think that even if he compromised on the issues of disarmament and extradition of war criminals, the survival of the national system could be guaranteed. after that, emperor showa began to cite the imperial edict of emperor meiji during the three-power intervention to persuade the military to accept the conditions set by the allies.
finally, the military, standing in opposition to the people and the emperor, began to "transfer" the domestic military equipment and military supplies that could be converted to civilian use to private organizations and civil agencies in accordance with the resolution made at the last cabinet meeting of suzuki kantaro's cabinet on august 14, 1945. under this policy, the military closed the curtain on itself by integrating "military" with "civilian" and withdrew from the stage of history.
(this article is excerpted from "the sickness entering the arms and legs: the emperor and the army in modern japanese history", with some content omitted)
"the sickness of the body: the emperor and the army in modern japanese history"
[japanese] by kato yoko
translated by he shenjie
cape of good hope｜zhejiang people's publishing house
this book is a collection of decades of research on "war" by yoko kato, the "first person to study japanese wars" and a professor at the university of tokyo. it explores the development of the relationship between the emperor and the army in modern times, traces the historical roots of japan's meiji military and constitution, and extends to the issue of the disarmament and repatriation of the japanese army, covering the entire period of the existence of the "japanese army." she analyzes facts with clear logic and a brisk style, proposes a new perspective to capture history, analyzes the characteristics of modern japanese political and military relations, and explains the background of japan's national decision-making. by exploring the relationship between the emperor and the army, it answers the long-standing question: "why didn't the emperor call a halt to the war?"
