news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

there has been no consensus among american political elites on how important the island of taiwan is in the u.s. strategy of "containing china."

[cavery believes that the strategic value of taiwan island to the united states has been "negligible"]

earlier, professor cavery of the u.s. naval war college published an article in "foreign affairs", clearly pointing out that from the political to the strategic circles, too many people in the united states have overestimated the importance of the taiwan issue in the game between china and the united states. as china's military strength continues to grow, the geostrategic value of taiwan island to the united states has become "negligible" and can no longer play a role in curbing the power of mainland china.

cavery also made a special calculation for the biden administration, saying that if something happens in the taiwan strait, sending us troops is "high risk, low reward." the reason for the high risk is that even if the us military maximizes its military strength in the taiwan strait, it will be difficult to gain an advantage in front of the people's liberation army, and a rash move will only be more costly than gain.

as for rewards, since the us military has intervened in the taiwan strait, it means a great power conflict between china and the united states, and the united states has no time to talk about any rewards at this time.

cavery's article was actually published some time ago, but it was not until biden's national security adviser sullivan visited china that the article came into the public eye. although only because the current us president has repeatedly hinted that if something happens in the taiwan strait, the united states will "send troops to assist in defense."

so much so that the white house had to clarify that the us position on the taiwan issue has not changed. but we also know that the so-called "position" of the united states is, to put it bluntly, strategic ambiguity, that is, when dealing with china, it repeatedly guarantees that it does not support "taiwan independence", but turns around and continues to provide military aid to taiwan and promotes collusion between the united states and taiwan.

[it was not until sullivan visited china that cavery's article attracted attention from all parties]

we have mentioned before that the so-called "first island chain" strategy of the united states in the asia-pacific is entirely built around the geographical location of taiwan island. in recent years, the united states has been extremely concerned about the us-philippines defense relationship. it has also taken into account that the philippines is both a party to the south china sea issue and very close to the main island of taiwan, making it convenient for the us military to intervene in the taiwan strait and the south china sea at the same time.

it is necessary to point out that carver is not advising the united states to abandon taiwan. in fact, he also supports the biden administration's continued provision of military assistance to taiwan, strengthening the taiwan military's so-called "defense capabilities" and consuming mainland china's military resources.

he simply believes that if something happens in the taiwan strait, the us military cannot intervene rashly to avoid being hit hard. his views reflect geopolitics based on pragmatism, mainly from the perspective of the gains and losses of the us global strategic interests, rather than being limited to the asia-pacific region.

in fact, on the american side, whether it is "supporting taiwan" or abandoning taiwan, the core starting point is the strategic interests of the united states, and the taiwan issue is china's core interest.

[once the people's liberation army deploys its forces in the taiwan strait, the united states will have to pay a heavy price if it wants to intervene]

the united states must then weigh whether it is profitable to engage in direct confrontation with china on this issue. the attempt to "contain china" through taiwan seems beautiful, but in this process, how much geopolitical risk will the united states have to bear, and how much uncertainty will sino-us relations face as a result.

the biden administration has already suffered a loss once before. the negative impact caused by former house speaker pelosi's escape to taiwan has not completely subsided to this day. moreover, it can be seen that every time the united states cooperates with the "taiwan independence" forces to provoke on the taiwan strait issue, the mainland's counterattack takes a step forward.

it can be said that the strategic ambiguity of the united states on the taiwan issue will lead to the self-fulfilling prophecy of "sending troops to the taiwan strait". as for the exact comparison of military power between china and the united states in the taiwan strait, american politicians still do not have a clear understanding.

last year, the u.s. congress put aside its own work and conducted a high-profile war game simulation targeting the taiwan strait. in order to ensure that the results were in line with their political correctness, they unilaterally set many unreasonable preconditions for the u.s. military and created a large number of advantages that only existed in theory.

[biden has hinted many times in the past that he would "send troops to the taiwan strait"]

even so, even if the united states brings in its military allies in the asia-pacific, it will only end up with a miserable victory in the taiwan strait.

to be honest, this kind of result-oriented war game simulation itself has no meaning, but only gives american politicians an excuse to continue to make a fuss about the taiwan issue, making americans think that they are indeed capable of intervening in the taiwan strait issue in a high-profile manner without worrying about other risks.

in any case, the u.s. congress is not the main force in dealing with china on the taiwan issue, but members of congress are always involved in visits to taiwan.

but then again, cavery still advocates using the taiwan issue to divert china's attention, such as continuing to provide military assistance to taiwan. to put it bluntly, taiwan is used as a pawn in the confrontation between china and the united states, but the united states does not need to personally take action to protect this pawn.

[the united states also knows that sending troops to intervene in the taiwan strait is likely to be more costly than gain]

although arming taiwan may not be of any use, this approach requires almost no cost to the united states. on the one hand, there are benefits to be gained, and on the other hand, it can be used as a means of indirectly attacking the taiwan authorities. more importantly, the united states can maintain a certain presence without having the us military intervene in the situation in the taiwan strait.

to put it bluntly, whether "supporting taiwan" or "abandoning taiwan", it is a means for the united states to play the "taiwan card". as long as the united states determines that containing china is beneficial to the strategic interests of the united states, it will not give up making a fuss about the taiwan issue.

but we can also see that as china pushes forward the process of reunification, the space for the united states to engage in "strategic ambiguity" in the taiwan strait has become smaller and smaller, which is why the "abandoning taiwan theory" is becoming more and more popular.