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on july 22, 1995, chen shigui, a founding general and former chief of staff of the east china field army, passed away. in november, chen shigui's memoirs, three years of upheaval: memoirs of the war of liberation, were officially published.

after reading the book, xu yutian, who was once su yu's confidential secretary, wrote a letter to the "su yu biography group" to point out that there were some things in the book that were inconsistent with historical facts.the preface of this book, in particular, seriously distorts history.。

the preface of the book includes an article titled "chen shigui in the east china field army" written by two of chen shigui's subordinates in the huaye general staff headquarters, wang de and huang yesong. not only xu yutian, but many old comrades in the huaye felt strongly uncomfortable after reading this preface, because wang de and huang yesong used all their sarcasm, sarcasm and ridicule in their articles.

let’s start with the first section of this article.

the title of the first section is "wholeheartedly supporting comrade chen yi's correct leadership and command". the two authors regard chen shigui's support for commander chen yi as a contribution of chen shigui. this wording seems a bit abnormal and makes people feel confused - shouldn't it be the duty of a general of the huaye army to support the leadership and command of the commander of the huaye army? why do they say "wholeheartedly" and emphasize "correctly"?

as we read on, we will find that the two authors are referring to an event in the history of huaye:

in 1946, chen yi led the shandong field army to attack si county but failed, and the huai river and huai river regions were lost. the two authors said seriously:

"at that time, chen yi, the commander of the new fourth army and the commander of the shandong field army, was in a state of confusion between internal and external troubles. external troubles were not terrible, but the shadow of internal troubles was shrouding them and was difficult to dispel for a while. since sixian was not fought well and huaiyin was not defended, several responsible comrades of the central china branch pushed the responsibility onto chen yi and song shilun. some even criticized chen yi for not implementing chairman mao's instructions to concentrate troops to fight an annihilation war; song shilun was therefore removed from his post as chief of staff of the shandong field army. the central military commission and chairman mao were also somewhat dissatisfied with chen yi's poor performance in the huaibei battle, and tried to send xu xiangqian to assist chen yi in commanding the battle and serve as chen's assistant."

the two authors describe marshal chen yi's situation at the time in a strange tone, saying that he was "confused by internal and external troubles." they also pointedly emphasized: "external troubles are not terrible, but the shadow of internal troubles is looming and difficult to dispel for the time being."

the two authors seem to want to convey a conspiracy theory-like view: at that time, "several responsible comrades of the central china branch" wanted to take this opportunity to oppose chen yi's leadership.

putting aside the historical facts, this does not make sense from the logic of their writing: first, the two authors also believe that the shandong field army "did not fight well" in si county and huaiyin, and the central military commission and chairman mao were "somewhat dissatisfied" with this, and "tried to send xu xiangqian to assist chen yi in commanding the war."

it is true that victory and defeat are common in the military, but it is also true that rewards and punishments should be clearly distinguished. if the battle was not fought well, should we analyze and summarize the reasons? should we hold the commander accountable? if so, why did this normal criticism become "several responsible comrades of the central china branch put all the responsibility on chen yi and song shilun"? did the central military commission and chairman mao also want to put all the responsibility on chen and song?

the two authors went on to write: "chen shigui, who was in such a difficult and complicated environment within the party and the army, had great trust in chen yi and had great sympathy for him... he greatly admired chen yi's emphasis on the overall situation, his disregard for personal gains and losses, his willingness to compromise, his courage to blame himself, and even his unwilling self-criticism.unfair criticism……”

"he firmly believed that the final solution to the differences of opinion within the party and the army in east china and central china would depend on chen yi, and only he could solve the thorny problems within the party and the army."

in fact, in the post-war criticism and reflection, neither the comrades in shandong nor the central china denied the leadership of commander chen yi. even when the central committee sent xu xiangqian, it was only to serve as chen yi's assistant and share chen yi's pressure.

the two authors used obscure and tortuous wording to exaggerate the differences between the leaderships of the two armies and portrayed "several responsible comrades of the central china bureau" as taking advantage of others' misfortune and creating divisions, which is completely inconsistent with historical facts.

in the second section of this preface, "actively participate in the decision-making work of formulating combat strategies and campaign plans," the two authors wang de and huang yesong mixed up the facts, distorted the facts, and put forward some statements that did not conform to historical truth.

for example, they said that after the suibei campaign, according to the previously established plan, the next step would be the lunan campaign. this was a joint decision and was approved by the central committee."however, su yu insisted on attacking the 74th division in northern jiangsu and huaiyin"however, zhang yun逸 and li yu suggested returning to southern shandong to fight the 26th division on december 20, and an argument ensued between the two sides.

did su yu insist on having his own way and forcibly change the battle plan that the central committee and everyone had worked out? no.

according to the "biography of su yu", on december 18, the central committee instructed chen yi, su yu and others: "the second step of the battle seems to be to concentrate the main force to annihilate the enemy in southern shandong... so that southern shandong can be consolidated." at this time, the troops were going to attack southern shandong.

on december 19, our army suddenly received intelligence: the 74th division suddenly attacked northward from lianshui. chen yi and su yu immediately held an emergency meeting and believed that the 74th army was advancing alone and recklessly, so they could first transfer the main force southward and seize the opportunity to annihilate it. this was a joint decision, not the so-called "but su yu insisted on attacking the 74th division in northern jiangsu and huaiyin".

on december 19 and 20, the central committee sent two telegrams in response, agreeing with chen yi and su yu's proposal to attack huaiyin instead of attacking lunan for the time being: "the 74th division is advancing towards muyang, and it is necessary to attack the division first."

the evidence is clear and in black and white. where is the situation that "su yu insisted on attacking the 74th division in northern jiangsu" and zhang yun逸 and others insisted on attacking southern shandong?

authors wang de and huang yesong said that when the opinions on going south and north were arguing endlessly, it was chen shigui and tang liang who sent a telegram to the central military commission, insisting that the southern part of shandong should be attacked first. the central military commission replied on december 24, agreeing with the views of chen shigui and tang liang and approving the southern shandong campaign, which led to the final victory of the southern shandong campaign.

is this really the case? no. after the 74th division invaded northern jiangsu, chen, su and the central committee once decided to attack the 74th division first. but until december 23, the 74th division had not moved, trying to wait for its friendly forces to gather before continuing to attack the north. their formation was dense and difficult to separate, so chen yi and su yu immediately gave up the plan to attack the 74th division in the south and decided to carry out the battle in southern shandong as originally planned. they reported to the central committee on december 24, and the central committee responded on the same day.

the two authors said: "it is impossible not to think that chen shigui and tang liang's telegram to the military commission and the military commission's reply played a key role." what they meant was that if there was no telegram, there might not have been the lunan campaign at that time, and the army would have marched south according to su yu's plan. the above telegram proves that this is not the case, and the role of chen and tang's telegram was far less significant. general chen shigui entered the east china field army front committee after the lunan campaign ended. he may not have been aware of the decision-making process between the central committee and the leadership of chen yi, su yu, zhang dingcheng, deng zihui, zhang yun逸, li yu and others.

another example is the two authors' incorrect description of the henan east campaign. they say:"before the launch of the east henan campaign, su yu crossed the yellow river and headed south. his basic intention was to single-mindedly destroy the enemy qiu qingquan's 5th army, but qiu qingquan was very cunning and closely joined the 75th division and other units, making it difficult for our army to separate. su yu proposed several combat plans several times, but none of them could be implemented and were difficult to fight. su yu was anxious day and night, thinking hard about various plans for as long as a month..."

finally, su yu sought advice from chen shigui and tang liang. chen shigui and tang liang advised him "not to be limited by fixed targets or fixed areas." only then did su yu give up attacking qiu qingquan's 5th army and decided to attack kaifeng.

the biography of su yu directly responded to the two authors’ erroneous descriptions:"he (su yu) was not, as some people say, 'deeply thinking about attacking the 5th army', nor was he 'bound by fixed targets and fixed regions'..."

such a description is just short of directly mentioning the names of wang de and huang yesong.

in fact, su yu was not obsessed with attacking qiu qingquan's 5th army from the beginning. he thought that our army had not yet concentrated its forces, and the troops were insufficient to attack the reinforcements. it was also a battle with its back to the river, so attacking the 5th army was not an ideal plan. but the central committee gave him the task of "making the annihilation of the 5th army the central goal of the summer operation."he couldn't emphasize that the 5th army was not easy to fight.。

su yu's situation is understandable, as he said:"i have already proposed that the three columns not cross the river for the time being. we cannot always disagree with the central government's decisions."

therefore, when su yu mobilized everyone to attack the 5th army, he actually had a plan in his mind: "capture kaifeng first, then annihilate the enemy reinforcements." however, due to the environment, he did not pass this plan up and down, and chen shigui naturally did not know about it at the time.

the two authors believe that: "chen and tang's suggestions played a facilitating and key role in su yu's change of mind about attacking the 5th army and making the decision to open kaifeng." this is wrong.

we can say that generals chen and tang and su yu had similar views, but we cannot say that their opinions played a "facilitating and key role". first, su yu did not insist on attacking the 5th army; second, su yu had a plan to attack kaifeng long ago; third, chen and tang only suggested that su yu "do not be limited by a fixed target or a fixed area", but did not propose a plan to attack kaifeng. the copyright of this plan belongs to su yu, and it was su yu who made the decision, and it had nothing to do with chen and tang.

general chen shigui played a role in the decision-making process in the lunan campaign and the yudong campaign, but this role was not as great as the two authors emphasize. more importantly, su yu's decision-making in these two campaigns was critical and decisive, far less insignificant than the two authors say.

the third section of the article, "strive to complete the heavy combat command tasks of the military commission and the front committee," also contains many very obvious errors.

first, after the july division of the huaye army in 1947, chen shigui and tang liang led five columns across the canal in early august and joined forces with liu and deng's army. the two authors said: "at this time, the central military commission sent a telegram pointing out:'whether liu and deng's campaign to the south could be successful depended in part on whether the five columns of chen, tang, ye and tao could play a major role.'from then on, the chen-tang corps took direct orders from the military commission and took on the important task of supporting liu and deng's army in their strategic operations in central china.

this is totally wrong and a blatant distortion. because on august 4 and 5, 1948, the central military commission sent four telegrams in two days, asking su yu to go to southwest shandong to command the five columns of chen, tang, ye and tao. on august 27, the central committee again asked chen yi and su yu to lead two columns and an artillery column to southwest shandong to command the five columns of chen, tang, ye and tao. there was no so-called "from now on, the chen tang corps will directly obey the military commission." this is a very low-level mistake.

what is particularly incomprehensible is that the original text of the telegram sent by the central committee on august 4 was: "please consider comrade su yu taking the main artillery force to the southwest of shandong to unify the command of the five columns and actively support liu and deng's operations.whether liu and deng's campaign to the south could be successful depended in part on whether the five columns of chen, tang, ye, and tao could play a major role.”

two authorscrudely and boldly deleted the previous sentence "please consider comrade su yu taking the main artillery force to the southwest of shandong to unify the command of the five columns", but said something like "from then on, the chen tang corps directly obeyed the military commission", which is simply suspected of falsifying history.

the two authors also said that on february 20, 1948, the military commission ordered the chen tang corps and the chen xie corps to move together, with chen xie under the command of chen tang. "from then on, the combat operations of the chen tang corps in western henan were directly under the command of the central military commission and chairman mao."

the chen tang corps is part of the huaye army, but the two authors are obsessed with separating them from the huaye army and placing them directly under the command of the central military commission, usurping the functions of their superiors. this is really incredible.

the most obvious and most criticized paragraph in the entire article is that the two authors said: "during the final encirclement and annihilation of du yuming's group in the third phase, su yu fell ill due to overwork during command and entrusted chen shigui with command. he was on duty in the operations room day and night and commanded the troops, which enabled him to give full play to his skilled battlefield command ability and made important contributions in the huaihai decisive battle."

this statement has turned general chen shigui into the commander of the third phase of the huaihai campaign, which is completely inconsistent with historical facts. moreover, in the original memoirs of general chen shigui himself, there is no similar description. i wonder where the two authors got the information? it can only be conjecture and fabrication.

it is obviously ill-considered to put such an article full of low-level mistakes and loopholes in the preface of the late general chen shigui's memoirs. this is not only disrespectful to general chen shigui, but also disrespectful to the history of the huaye war and to history.