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In the spring of 1951, the Chinese and North Korean troops, with the Chinese People's Volunteer Army as the main force, and the "United Nations Army" led by the US Army, fought repeatedly near the 38th parallel. The offensives of both sides rose and fell. By May and June, with the end of the fifth battle of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, the two sides formed a stalemate on the battlefield.

Under such circumstances, how to continue the war or how to stop the war has become a major issue that decision makers on both sides have to face and urgently need to resolve.

It is worth noting that the United States was the first to implement policy adjustments, which at the time triggered a major debate on the Korean War policy within the U.S. government and the public.

1. Why can’t the United States fight anymore?

It took the United States nearly a year from sending large-scale troops to North Korea to implement military intervention to stabilizing the front line north and south of the 38th parallel, and it paid a considerable price in casualties and material losses.

According to the official U.S. war history, as of July 10, 1951, the "United Nations Forces" led by the U.S. military had lost nearly 294,000 people, of which the U.S. military lost about 77,000 people, the South Korean army lost about 212,500 people, and other national forces of the "United Nations Forces" lost about 4,500 people.

The war history states:

To date, the Eighth Army has set the highest record for casualties suffered by the US military: 11,327 killed; 42,925 wounded, of which 1,075 died; 6,088 captured, of which 2,583 eventually died in captivity; 3,979 missing in action, of which 3,323 were declared dead either based on direct evidence or under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act of 1942.

As a result, the 8th Army's total casualties in the first year of the war were 64,319, of which 18,318 were deaths.

According to statistics from China and North Korea, the number of U.S. casualties in the first year of the war was even higher, reaching more than 88,000, which is nearly half of all U.S. casualties during World War II.

More importantly, the damage caused by the Korean War to the United States is not just the heavy casualties, but the directional and structural disruption and impact it caused to the U.S. global strategy.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States focused its global strategy on Europe and made European security its core concern.

However, due to the dispatch of a large number of troops to fight in North Korea, the actual military deployment and focus of the United States' military operations shifted to the Far East, which was seriously disconnected and misaligned with its global strategic goals and strategic priorities.

The Korean battlefield attracted one-third of the total U.S. Army, one-fifth of the total Air Force, and one-half of the total Navy. The forces of Western European allies such as Britain and France were also affected. All these forces were originally used in areas with higher strategic value to the United States and Europe.

The average monthly material consumption of the United States on the Korean battlefield was 850,000 tons, which was equivalent to the total amount of materials provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the pillar of European defense, in one and a half years.

If the war on the Korean Peninsula continues endlessly, the negative impact on the US global strategy will be even greater. As a result, it will not only greatly erode the US military and economic strength, but also tie its hands and feet, making it unable to form a military deployment that matches its greatest strategic interests, while allowing its global strategic rival, the Soviet Union, to reap the benefits.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley said:

"Moscow is the real enemy, and North Korea is just Moscow distracting us. A war with China may be Moscow's last resort to distract us." "Therefore, I must look at the North Korean issue with a cautious and conservative eye. We don't want to send more troops to North Korea, only necessary weapons and equipment. Sending one more infantryman, one more ammunition, and one more plane to North Korea means that we will be delayed in the more important issue of arming NATO to defend Europe."

The adjustment of the US war policy toward North Korea was proposed in this context.

2. Dispute between the State Council and the military

In mid-February 1951, the "United Nations Forces" led by the US military recovered from the full retreat after the failure of the "MacArthur General Offensive", gained a firm foothold near the 37th parallel, and then launched a new offensive.

The Chinese and North Korean troops switched from offense to defense, and retreated to the north bank of the Han River on the western front. Although they organized and implemented a campaign counterattack on the central front (the Hoengseong counterattack), they failed to disrupt the entire offensive deployment of the "United Nations Army" and subsequently switched to mobile defense across the board.

The change in the offensive and defensive situation on the battlefield freed American decision-makers from the calculations and worries about whether and when to withdraw from North Korea, and they began to discuss whether to continue advancing northward or stop at an appropriate position line to seek an end to the war.

On February 15, when the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a regular meeting to discuss the North Korea issue, an important and sensitive topic was raised for the first time: Under what conditions could a ceasefire be proposed?

Assistant Secretary of State Rusk stated:

Our goal is to punish the enemy while considering achieving a ceasefire in the first step and reaching an agreement in the second step to restore the situation before June 25, 1950 (the outbreak of the Korean War).

He said:

"Our public position remains support for an independent and unified Korea, but at the same time we must be prepared for the iron curtain to fall on the 38th parallel."

The military leaders attending the meeting believed that a "battle of death" is currently taking place on the Korean battlefield; what needs to be considered now is "not only how long the Chinese are willing to resist, but also how long the American public can tolerate the losses of the United States."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley expressed the opinion that the current ceasefire is of no benefit and that "another offensive should be launched before the Chinese are ready to consider an acceptable agreement."

Army Chief of Staff Collins believes that North Korea's military operations have now been consolidated, although there will still be some tug-of-war: there is not much military benefit in crossing the 38th parallel, and retreating a little from the current position may produce better results.

This discussion reflected the changing situation of the Korean War, especially the impact of the war's gradual stalemate on the U.S. decision-makers, although there was an initial disagreement between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On February 23, Secretary of State Acheson wrote to Secretary of Defense Marshall, explaining the U.S. policy objectives in Korea and analyzing the pros and cons of the "United Nations Forces" crossing the 38th parallel again.

He wrote:

Neither the United Nations nor the United States is obliged to achieve the reunification of Korea by force; therefore, a restoration of the situation before June 25, 1950, can be considered the minimum acceptable level.

He also believed that limiting combat operations within the existing positions would be much more beneficial than a large-scale advance northward. After weighing the pros and cons, he decided that crossing the 38th parallel and continuing to advance northward was not the best strategy.

Acheson sent the letter to the Department of Defense for comment and then reported it to the president. Once approved by Truman, the content of the letter would become the policy basis for issuing military instructions to the commander-in-chief of the US military in North Korea.

Before submitting it to the Department of Defense, Acheson specifically noted at the end of the letter: "This is an urgent matter, please respond as soon as possible."

Marshall responded:

"The Ministry of National Defense believes that from a military perspective, this draft should not be submitted to the President" because it "is of no benefit to the long-term military deployment of the United Nations forces in North Korea."

He relayed the following opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Acheson:

Under the current circumstances, it is premature to discuss the "United Nations" operations around the 38th parallel, even if it is a preliminary decision, and it will be even more dangerous if it is leaked; out of political needs, the "United Nations" operations north of the 38th parallel should not be prohibited. As for setting the minimum goal to restore the status quo before June 25, 1950, "in addition to being unacceptable from a political point of view, it is also completely unacceptable militarily in terms of the military risks it brings."

3. The military and the State Council share the same understanding

According to Truman's account, it was not until March that the Department of Defense and the State Department gradually reached a consensus.

By this time, they had formed a common conclusion: since the "United Nations Forces" had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese army and were driving it across the 38th parallel, stopping the fighting was now at least as beneficial to China as it was to the United States.The State Department drafted a statement indicating that it was possible to engage in ceasefire negotiations with the other side, and prepared to submit it to the president after seeking the opinions of relevant Western allies, and suggested that the president make the announcement personally.

Truman had high hopes for this matter, believing that this "proposal for a peaceful solution without any threats or condemnations might receive a good response."

Unexpectedly, MacArthur learned four days in advance that Truman was carefully planning to start negotiations with the Chinese, but he took the initiative to publicly issue a statement that was not seeking peace talks but "threatening the enemy with an ultimatum", completely disrupting Washington's established deployment.

Truman was very angry. He said:

"Our careful preparations were in vain," "the long time we spent obtaining the consent of other governments and the detailed discussions among many diplomats and defense leaders were all wasted."

In fact, it was not just MacArthur who opposed the peace talks at the time. Many high-ranking military officials also expressed doubts.

On March 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum on the U.S. position on the North Korean ceasefire issue, which reads:

The Chinese and North Korean troops are suffering huge losses. Any ceasefire arrangement that does not damage the Communist Party’s position in North Korea and can stop their huge losses will be in their interests, but will be extremely disadvantageous to the US military.

The memo said:

"Such an arrangement would most likely impair the safety of our military, cause an unnecessary drain on our military resources, and tie down our forces in North Korea no less than a war. Therefore, from a military point of view, such an armistice agreement itself, even if temporary, is not an acceptable solution to the North Korean issue."

At the end of March, the "United Nations Army" approached the 38th parallel; in early April, it further advanced to the "Kansas Line" north of the 38th parallel. At this time, the United States began to consider whether to continue to advance northward and how far to advance, which led to the discussion of whether to implement a ceasefire on a certain line.

On April 18, at a regular meeting between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley proposed:

If there is any chance to calm the fighting, we should try to make the Communists withdraw to end the war; but if we pursue them relentlessly, they will not stop fighting, and we will never chase them to the Yalu River, so we should stop now.

Rusk asked: Under what circumstances can we stop?

Bradley replied: In terms of our capabilities, the current front line (the "Kansas Line", from Namnyari on the east coast, through the Hwacheon Reservoir and Yeongpyeongcheon, to the mouth of the Imjin River) should be the most ideal.

Other military leaders shared or had similar views.

Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg said the Air Force prefers to stop at the current front line or move the right wing of this line further toward Wonsan. Both options can meet the breadth required for the Air Force to launch an air offensive.

Army Chief of Staff Collins confidently declared:

Based on the current deployment, the U.S. military can face any challenge from the Chinese Communist Army.

4. Two major situations

In May, two major developments occurred, which ultimately established a complete framework and made clearer definitions for the adjustment of the U.S. policy toward North Korea and the guidelines for the war.

The first situation is that from May 3 to June 25, the U.S. Congress held a special committee hearing to investigate the U.S. Far East policy and the dismissal of MacArthur.

This was the famous "MacArthur Hearing". During the meeting, in addition to MacArthur, military and political leaders including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed forces were all present. While these leaders collectively defended Truman's dismissal of MacArthur, they also gave a comprehensive, specific and detailed explanation and description of the US policy on the Korean War from different angles.

The second situation is that from May 2 to 16, the National Security Council held a meeting to systematically review the US war policy toward North Korea, and finally passed a policy memorandum on the North Korean issue, namely, National Security Council document No. 48/5 (NSC48/5).

The United States' policy objectives in North Korea and guidelines for military operations were redefined in this document.

Before the "MacArthur Hearings", MacArthur was welcomed with unprecedented enthusiasm across the United States as a "returning hero".

Gallup poll data showed that 69% of voters supported MacArthur, while only 29% supported Truman.

After MacArthur returned to the United States, in San Francisco, his motorcade took two hours to slowly pass through a 14-mile-long cheering crowd; in Washington, the "hero" triumphantly passed through a welcoming team of 300,000 people; as for New York, it was even more exaggerated. When MacArthur arrived, all kinds of streamers and colored confetti thrown at him from the balconies and windows of high-rise buildings covered the sky. Afterwards, the city's sanitation department cleaned up the garbage along the way, with a total weight of 2,859 tons.

In Manhattan alone, 7.5 million people took to the streets to pay tribute to the dismissed commander-in-chief of the US military in the Far East.

The hotel where MacArthur was staying received 150,000 letters and 20,000 telegrams paying tribute to him that day, and a large number of letters "poured in in bags."

5. MacArthur’s “afterglow”

MacArthur spoke first and was questioned at the hearing.

Before attending the hearing, MacArthur delivered a highly inflammatory speech in Congress, which the American media exaggeratedly called "a wonderful and magnificent performance, from piety to patriotism, with sadness running through the entire movement." Some members of Congress even claimed to have heard "the voice from God" in it.

During the three-day hearing, MacArthur spoke eloquently, with powerful words and rich emotions. He advocated that the Korean issue must be completely resolved through military means, because "the only purpose of war is to achieve victory - not a protracted battle of victory and defeat. In war, nothing can replace victory."

He accused the Truman administration of adopting a policy of "limited use of force," which "brought a new concept to military action - the concept of appeasement" and was therefore a "broken" policy.

It was precisely because the United States implemented this policy that the Korean War became a "half-baked war" that "expanded and contracted, up and down, like an accordion," causing "continuous and indefinite bloodshed."

He said he could not accept the idea that "it is possible to wage a half-fighting war rather than fighting it to the end."

Taking the Korean War as an example, he could only think of three solutions:

"Either you pursue victory, or you surrender to the enemy and end up accepting the enemy's terms. The worst option is to be stuck in an endless stalemate, neither winning nor losing."

He advocated:

To win the war, the United States must not hesitate to expand the war to Chinese territory, give full play to its naval and air military advantages, bomb the Chinese mainland, blockade the Chinese coast, and at the same time allow the Kuomintang army in Taiwan to counterattack the mainland (the so-called "releasing Chiang Kai-shek out of the cage"), without worrying about dragging the Soviet Union in, because even if the Soviet Union joined the war, the United States could bear it, and it was better to show its cards early than late.

He also said that expanding the Korean War would not affect the United States' strength in Europe; Europe's first line of defense was in North Korea, not in Germany; if the United States' European allies were intimidated by the Soviet Union and lagged behind, the United States should "fight alone."

A member of Congress asked him:

If the United States were drawn into a total war, how would you plan to defend against it without exposing the United States to the war?

He said that was not his duty, his duty was in the Pacific.

The congressman then asked, do you think the United States is currently prepared to resist a Soviet attack on Western Europe?

He replied impatiently: he had stated many times that he did not want to be "dragged into any topic that is not related to his own field."

6. MacArthur’s halo fades

The hearing quickly turned into a major debate over U.S. war policy toward North Korea.

However, as the debate progressed, MacArthur's halo gradually faded.

Marshall and Bradley appeared at the hearings, and each of them spent six days defending the US government's war policy toward Korea and Truman's removal of MacArthur from office.

Then, the chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force - Collins, Vandenburg and Sherman - took turns to testify, each taking two days.

The last person to appear was Acheson, who took a full eight days alone.

26 senators took turns asking questions, and the same questions were repeated over and over again in various ways, so that in the end, everyone who was speaking, asking, and listening felt extremely bored.

All the military and political leaders who testified at the meeting supported the removal of MacArthur from office and opposed expanding the Korean War into Chinese territory.

They said that if the United States acted according to MacArthur's proposal, it would be difficult to achieve its goals and it would run the risk of direct military conflict with the Soviet Union and thus trigger World War III, so it was not advisable; considering global strategic interests, the United States could only fight a limited war in Korea.

Many years have passed, and the testimonies given by these people at the congressional hearings have long been forgotten, with perhaps the exception of one sentence, which is Bradley's famous quote about the "four wrong wars."

Bradley wrote in his memoirs:

When I first testified on May 15, I said that expanding the war with China would be a mistake. "Frankly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that if this strategy is pursued, it will put us in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and in the wrong war with the wrong enemy."

Later, many careless readers took this sentence as the Joint Chiefs of Staff's evaluation of the Korean War.

The "four mistakes" pointed out by Bradley refer to the uncontrolled expansion of the Korean War into Chinese territory, not the Korean War itself.

Like other military and political leaders in the Truman administration, Bradley stressed that the United States should fight a limited war in Korea.

He repeatedly stated:

“Rejecting an expansion of the war that would weaken our global power is surely not appeasement, but the right military approach under the circumstances.”

The MacArthur Hearings lasted for more than 50 days, and the final results were:

Truman's limited war policy was widely recognized, while MacArthur's calls for expanding the war no longer had much appeal.

A poll in late May showed that MacArthur's approval rating had dropped from 69% to 30%.

7. Guiding Strategies of “Limited War”

Just one day before the "MacArthur Hearings", the US National Security Council also began a "systematic discussion" of the US Far East policy and Korean War goals.

This historic discussion lasted nearly half a month and resulted in two documents, National Security Council No. 48/4 (NSC48/4) and No. 48/5 (NSC48/5).

The main purpose of NSC 484 is to "seek a solution to the North Korean issue that is acceptable to the United States," and it sets five "minimum" conditions for this purpose:

(1) "End hostilities under appropriate ceasefire arrangements"; (2) "Prohibit communist occupation of areas south of the 38th parallel"; (3) "Restore South Korea's sovereignty over all areas south of the 38th parallel"; (4) "Allow South Korea to build up sufficient military strength, with the United States providing a limited number of backup and combat troops to prevent or resist new North Korean or Chinese attacks"; (5) "Strive for the possibility of eventually withdrawing U.S. and other UN forces from Korea, but not as a mandatory order."

Goals relate to the direction and expected results of strategic operations.

Document NSC 48/4 considers the US war goal against North Korea to be at the “minimum level”, indicating that the viewpoint and angle of the decision-makers on the issue have undergone a meaningful change.

It indicates that U.S. decision-makers have realized that it is not necessary to pursue a "thorough" or "decisive" outcome to the war in North Korea. A reasonable and feasible option is to seek ways to end the war under conditions that are not ideal but still acceptable.

Document NSC48/5 was prepared after revising Document NSC48/4.

The difference between it and the previous document is that for the first time it divides the US goals in North Korea into two levels: "ultimate goals" and "current goals."

The ultimate goal is to "seek a solution to the Korean issue through political means other than military means, in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea"; the current goal is to "seek a solution to the Korean conflict acceptable to the United States through appropriate mechanisms of the United Nations."

At this time, the United States had accepted the basic judgment that "it is not feasible to resolve North Korea's political issues through military means alone", but at the same time emphasized: "For political needs, the actions of the United Nations and US forces north of the 38th parallel should not be prohibited."

Because of this, NSC document 48/5 clearly stipulates that the actions to be taken should be considered with an eye to "the possibility that the United Nations forces can continue to inflict huge losses on the Chinese", and special attention should be paid to the negative effect that an armistice in Korea will "enable the Chinese army to withdraw from Korea for use elsewhere and end China's losses in Korea".

The release of document NSC48/5 marked the formal establishment of the US guiding strategy for fighting a limited war in Korea.

Ridgway later commented:

"For the first time in American history, we learned about the concept of limited war"; "Before the Korean War, all our military plans envisioned a war that would sweep the world, and we believed that it would be foolish to defend a distant and undefended peninsula in such a war. However, the Korean War has made us understand that wars from now on must be limited wars. From now on, the question is no longer whether we should fight a limited war, but how to avoid any other kind of war."

(End of text)