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yanmo | unification problem series 3: does china have almost no missile defense system?

2024-09-30

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[text/observer.com columnist yan mo]

recently, i read a shocking interview in a well-known chinese english media. the interviewee was a well-known mainland scholar. he said that "china has almost no missile defense system." even a military layman like me finds this unbelievable, and out of basic respect for the weight of scholars’ speeches, i did fact-checking on google ai.

china barely has a missile defense system? ai’s answer is succinct: incorrect, china has been investing heavily in its missile defense capabilities in recent years. …it has a growing network of surface-to-air missiles (sams) and other defenses. in addition to this, ai gave several information platforms to further understand the truth to prove its claims.

ai can only speak based on facts, but humans often speak for multiple purposes and do not necessarily need factual support. so, why does information that deviates from the facts come from well-known mainland scholars? even the taiwanese tufang brother dare not say this. i thought about it for a long time and decided to interpret it on the bright side.

to deceive the west, this may be a strategy adopted by dove scholars who hope to steer the sino-us confrontation from the cold war to "cool peace." of course, this is just personal speculation.

what is "lenghe"? in short, it is fierce competition at all levels in the non-military field, that is, a confrontational model that excludes the options of arms race and hot war. the biden administration's strategy toward china is not to be cold, but to achieve a cold war. if harris is elected, she will never choose to be indifferent, because the democratic party will not give up its ideological struggle line.

so, this time we will talk about the possibility of "cold peace" between china and the united states, and what means should be chosen to achieve it. is pretending to be coward a good way?

the following is a list of some of the well-known scholar’s ​​confessions to the united states in an exclusive interview:

1. the more china and the united states talk, the more huge differences are exposed.

2. both trump and biden are not good to china, but the latter at least does not aim to overthrow the chinese government, while the former is a ruthless machiavellian. therefore, china can only choose the lesser of two evils.

3. the russia-ukraine conflict and the gaza war have not increased china’s international influence, absolutely not.

4. taiwan is the most stable issue in sino-us relations. as long as the us's "one china policy" exists, even if it is just an empty shell, and taiwan does not pursue "legal independence" and does not allow foreign countries to directly control it, mainland china will not use force. attack taiwan.

5. an armed attack on taiwan may at least lead to large-scale joint military intervention by the united states, japan and other allies, including the united kingdom.

6. the gap in strength between china and the u.s. is narrowing in some areas, but overall, the gap is likely to widen further.

7. recently, there is a view that if china wants to carry out large-scale military intervention, the united states will change its strategy and refuse to give in. instead, the united states will rely on 200 strategic bombers, each carrying at least 12 or 14 missiles, which equals more than 2,000 conventional bombs with excellent range and radar evasion capabilities.

8. china’s destroyers are built very quickly, but china’s anti-submarine warfare and anti-submarine capabilities are extremely weak. the worst thing is that china has almost no missile defense system... the four ohio-class cruise missile submarines of the us military "can basically reach the yangtze river estuary, xiamen, and even the bohai bay without being discovered."

mainland experts judge whether the actual strength of china and the us military is shrinking or expanding. i really didn't expect the answer to be "the overall gap may further widen." what is the rationale? the scholar actually gave "arguments", namely 7 and 8.

however, the united states does not have 200 bombers. according to the "national interest" website's disclosure at the end of last year [1], the current number of strategic bombers in the united states is 141, including 76 b-52s, 45 b-1s, and 20 b- 2.

furthermore, anti-submarine capabilities have indeed been china’s shortcomings in the past, but in recent years, with the improvement of the people’s liberation army’s submarine technology and underwater detection technology, the wall street journal pointed out in november last year that the united states has absolute underwater advantages around china. the era is over.

in other words, no matter how you say it, it cannot be said to be "extremely weak", let alone that china has "almost no missile defense system." i am a military layman and i don’t dare to fiddle with other details, but it is not difficult to find relevant public information. if you want to be lazy, just ask the ai. the virtue that humans give to ai is to "tell the truth" within the legal scope.

it is not impossible to deceive the west, but if you pretend to be cowardly and are too far away from reality, it will make your opponents wary of your evil intentions, and their unreasonable fear will not decrease but increase. if statements 6, 7, and 8 are true, how should we explain the two large-scale military exercises around taiwan?

i am not opposed to blunting the sharpness of military confrontation in order to avoid war, but the way to achieve coolness is not to be cowardly. on the contrary, china should truthfully demonstrate its military strength to its opponents and constantly emphasize that the reason why we are rapidly expanding our armaments is because of our opponents' aggressive actions. only when the united states abandons its cold war style can china slow down its military investment.

in fact, china is doing this, but it is just being looked down upon by listeners. the problem lies with the biden administration. the reason why the listener is contemptuous is because the speaker has not found a strong "lenghe teammate" in the united states. who is a strong lenghe teammate? without a doubt, it’s trump. in the current united states, only trump has the ability to confront its local cold war forces.

cold war vs cold war

there is no shortage of scholars and experts advocating cold peace in the united states, but they are suppressed by the cold war elements. however, before the election, some experts advocating cold peace publicly advised trump to stay away from the cold war mentality and turn to a cold peace strategy that is more in line with trumpism.

although the senior security officials hired by trump during his term, including the secretary of state, are cold war elements, trump's incompatibility with these "globalists" is also obvious. scholars who support the cold war in the united states believe that trump will inevitably be trapped by the established political structure in his first term, but he will not have such a heavy burden in his second term and should implement trumpism.

in the field of diplomacy, the strategy of aligning with trumpism is called "realist restraint." it requires decision-making to be freed from ideological confrontation and to recognize that the confrontation between china and the united states is a structural issue of balance of power, not about "democracy vs. metaphysical value confrontations such as "dictatorship" and "justice vs. evil" are real contests on the economic, technical, and soft power sides.

"realist restraint" advocates object to the united states putting "global well-being" before "domestic interests." of course, globalists believe the opposite and believe that the relationship between the two is inseparable.

the biden administration's cold war intentions are reflected in its "deterrence model" against china, which aims to use a big stick, create conflicts and form gangs to intimidate opponents and curb the possibility of war.

if you want to promote a cold peace situation, you will use the "spiral model" to avoid stimulating the opponent's expansion of military capabilities and willingness to go to war. this methodology emphasizes that the opposing parties should eliminate imaginary fears, otherwise misjudgments will occur due to superimposed fears and excessive separation from reality.

what needs to be emphasized is that the idea of ​​cold peace is not that of a dove, but that of a hawk. this group believes that confrontation between china and the united states is inevitable and necessary. however, it is unwise for the united states to adopt a comprehensive confrontation, and both sides should be excluded from the confrontation. the risk of entering a hot war or even a cold war-type arms race must be avoided.

so what is china’s attitude? i believe everyone agrees that china rejects the cold war and would rather choose cold war if the reality is that we have to choose between two.

the inner contradiction of leng he

having said that, the proposition of the lenghe model seems reasonable, but in fact there is an inherent contradiction in how to position the opponent.

theorists believe that china is not a "comprehensive rival" of the united states, but a "geopolitical rival." this positioning allows china and the united states to maintain deep economic and trade relations. only in this way can china and the united states not give up any ground on the geopolitical level and confront each other tit for tat. implement the bilateral relationship framework of "both competition and cooperation".

however, the cold-war commentators support "technological containment" to curb china's development. how can we maintain deep economic and trade relations in this way? how come it’s not a “comprehensive opponent”?

"complex questions have no simple answers." i have always been unable to agree with this statement, because it omits that humans have the problem of "complicating problems", and this problem often stems from our evaluation of gains and losses. in fact, almost all problems are originally simple.

for example, china can ask the united states a simple question: is the relationship between china and the united states a competition or a cooperative relationship? this question comes from the fact that the united states has complicated sino-us relations and set up a complex framework of so-called "competition and cooperation." the reason why the united states complicates simple issues is because pure competition will make the united states lose more than it gains.

the biden administration intends to realize the cold war, but cannot achieve it, so it imposes the concept of cold war on the cold war mentality, making its china strategy more complex than trump's. for example, the willingness to attack militarily is the same as the willingness to avoid war. the willingness to decouple and link up in economic and trade is equally strong. this contradiction naturally produces complex answers and consequences of worrying about gains and losses.

cold war is a theory that complicates the positioning of opponents, so it is full of controversy in academic circles. however, it also highlights the complexity of international relations and the difficulty of simplifying issues. nonetheless, as long as we realize that this complexity is artificial, we can find ways to simplify it.

an effective means to achieve peace and harmony

some mainland dove scholars seem to believe that the way to achieve a cold peace and for china to take the initiative to shape sino-us relations is to reduce the us's fears by returning to a posture of keeping a low profile and biding its time. if china continues to appeal, china has no ambition to replace the united states, nor does it have any thoughts of hegemony. or, as stated by the above-mentioned scholars, it may even "confess" that it will minimize china's military capabilities, deny china's international influence, and shelve the taiwan issue indefinitely.

although you have good intentions, china and the united states lack a foundation of mutual trust, so your confession will not be effective. if you keep a low profile and bide your time, you will be interpreted as pretending to be a pig and eating the tiger. since it is ineffective or even counterproductive, why bother to humiliate yourself?

in fact, the best way to simplify the problem is that china has already tried it and achieved success, which is to cut off high-level military dialogue and directly block the us "deterrence model." the success of deterrence depends on whether you know what your opponent is afraid of. if you don't know, or even feel that your opponent is not afraid of anything, then you will give up on deterrence methods.

what you fear most in a fight is not an opponent who is physically stronger than you, but a madman, because a madman will risk his life against you. if the united states believes that china has no intention of avoiding war and is fearless in a fight, it will inevitably give up deterrence and instead consider the "spiral model" as a way to avoid risks.

deception also requires methods. for an opponent like the united states, showing weakness is the worst policy. letting the other party not understand your behavior pattern is the best policy, because it is difficult to assess the consequences.

in fact, even dove scholars have noticed that the more china and the united states talk, the more huge differences are exposed. this is not a theory on paper, but empirical experience. if the goal is to be cool, the prerequisite is to keep a distance and don't let the other party find out your details.

another advantage of keeping a distance is that no matter whether trump or harris is in power, they will not try to overthrow the chinese government, because when everything is full of question marks, the united states can only spend a lot of time establishing dialogue and reducing question marks.

finally, mainland scholars are asked to stop publicly stating that "as long as taiwan does not pursue legal independence and does not allow direct foreign control, mainland china will not use force to attack taiwan." this statement is not believed by the united states and makes lai qingde extremely reassured. these words really describe the bottom line of china in a bleak way. china only wants a fig leaf. as for what happens behind the cloth, well, a gentleman talks, talks, talks, but does not take action.

this interview, which is full of flaws, is far less informative than mahbubani's recent speech in taipei. the latter never despises the united states or china, and bluntly said in taipei that taiwan is a pawn. the truth is always more convincing, while deception always reveals flaws.

comment

1.https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-many-bombers-does-us-air-force-have-207991

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