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【columnist yan mo】

recently, regarding the issue of cross-strait reunification, there has been a view circulating in the international community that mainland china will become "chiang kai-shek-ized." this means that as time goes by, objective conditions will gradually become unfavorable for reunification because neighboring hostile countries will increase their armaments, making the cost of reunification by force increasingly high. peaceful reunification will become increasingly mere slogans and ultimately end in "regret."

this argument comes from yasuhiro matsuda, a professor at the university of tokyo. he believes that chiang kai-shek was old at the time and could no longer fight, nor did he want to fight, so he failed to "counterattack the mainland."

in addition to "taiwan independence", there are also pro-unification factions in taiwan who agree with this oversimplified argument, but their mentality is the opposite of "taiwan independence". they intend to urge the mainland to actively promote reunification and indirectly warn that if it is delayed again and again, time is not on the mainland's side.

from a historical perspective, although i do not want unification to be delayed, yasuhiro matsuda's stance is right-leaning. i personally have always scoffed at the claims of the japanese right wing. this kind of weak argument can be refuted in one sentence: it was the united states, not age, that stood in the way of chiang kai-shek's "counterattack on the mainland."

major historical changes are never caused by a single factor, nor do they develop linearly. instead, they are often unexpected results produced by the interaction of many unexpected variables. therefore, assumptions about predictions are often inaccurate.

in my personal opinion, the mainland does not lack a unified roadmap, but is struggling with two opposing viewpoints, namely, two kinds of “just do it and it’s over”: one kind of “just do it and it’s over” means cutting the gordian knot and ending the contest by directly resorting to military force; the other kind of “just do it and it’s over” means that if a war breaks out too early, china’s rise will be over.

the really interesting perspective is: is development the main obstacle to unification? and vice versa. if so, can the cause of unification be incorporated into the logic of development?

since the situation on the korean peninsula is somewhat similar to that on both sides of the taiwan strait, this time we will talk about the current status of unification or independence between north korea and south korea.

kim jong-un abandons unification

can real progress be achieved when only one side is willing to achieve these goals at all costs? what happens when it becomes clear that the broad ideals of “peace and reconciliation” and “engagement” mean something entirely different to north and south korea?

the above passage was asked by ramon pacheco pardo, an expert on north korea and south korea at the european institute (ies-vub) in 2019. like many question settings, the question is the answer, just like when you ask "will pie fall from the sky", the answer is self-evident.

pardo did not believe in his heart that the appeasement policy of the united states and south korea toward north korea at that time could promote the unification of the peninsula, because kim jong-un regarded the carrots of the united states and south korea as sticks.

on july 1, 2024, local time, in seoul, south korea, people watched the news at the station. it is reported that the north korean missile general administration successfully conducted a test launch of the new tactical ballistic missile "mars cannon-11 bing-4.5" on the 1st. the missile can carry a 4.5-ton super-large warhead. oriental ic

starting this year, kim jong-un officially announced that he would give up unification, recognize the republic of korea, and set it as an enemy country. does this historic change mean that the korean peninsula will be divided forever, or is it just a strategic expedient for north korea? i tend to think it is the former, because this is almost an irreversible strategic change, not just a tactical adjustment. in any case, it is certain that the path of peaceful reunification of the korean peninsula is already a dead end.

abandoning the national narrative is not a trivial matter, nor is it easy in practice, because north korea has to erase all tangible and intangible symbols of the same nation, including historical memory and national sentiment, from the constitution to textbooks, from government agencies to the public. kim jong-un is vigorously eliminating all unification content, showing that he is serious about this.

abandoning nationalism, what is the alternative option to maintain the legitimacy of the ruling? the answer is "a country without enemies abroad will always perish." kim jong-un set south korea as an enemy country and used the heightened awareness of the enemy to resist his own people who have stronger soft and hard power.

ethnic ties are the main route to assimilation, and assimilation has always been dominated by the strong.

therefore, some western observers believe that this is a prelude to the outbreak of war on the peninsula, but the truth may be just the opposite. this is north korea using the "two enemies theory" as a firewall for an independent new normal. the purpose is not aggression, but anti-aggression. kim jong-un wants the normal development of the country, but unification has become a stumbling block to development.

if i were to decide, the korean war would not end in 1953, but in 2024, when north korea officially recognized south korea and began to amend the constitution, and the legal (civil war) armistice would lose its meaning. so far, the official end of the korean war is that north korea has bid farewell to the civil war narrative, and if south korea insists on the civil war narrative and does not give up on attracting external forces to intervene and start a war, then according to the spirit of international law, it is a clear aggressor.

north korea's thinking is "military independence", which is the goal that "taiwan independence" has long wanted to achieve. however, "taiwan independence" cannot "amend the constitution" or even "make a constitution", formally recognize the people's republic of china, and its sovereignty is not recognized by the international community. in other words, what kim jong-un envies most is "taiwan independence".

yoon seok-yeol's new unified strategy

in response to kim jong-un, south korean president yoon seok-yeol declared "august 15 unificationism" on liberation day last month, insisting on achieving peaceful reunification based on the constitution, freedom and democracy, and the concept of national community, and said that military action would never be taken to achieve the goal.

the "august 15 unificationism" is not a dovish idealism, but a hawkish strategy that emphasizes action and aggression. its three visions, three implementation strategies, and seven action plans emphasize awakening the north korean people with liberal democratic values ​​and spurring an uprising to overthrow kim jong-un's regime. as for the reconciliation and cooperation line promoted by the progressives in the past, the conservatives represented by yoon seok-yeol have not completely abandoned it, but have placed it in a secondary position.

on january 16, 2024, local time, in seoul, south korea, south korean president yoon seok-yeol held a cabinet meeting. regarding north korea's definition of inter-korean relations as "two hostile countries", yoon seok-yeol said that north korea's move was an admission that it was an anti-national and anti-historical group. the current south korean government is different from previous governments. once north korea launches a provocation, south korea will double its countermeasures. oriental ic

simply put, north korea is moving towards armed independence and south korea is moving towards forced reunification. the two koreas are becoming increasingly incompatible, which is somewhat similar to the situation across the taiwan strait.

however, the problem is that the post-2000s generation, the so-called "market generation", has lost interest in the vision of unification. even if yoon seok-yeol holds all the power, the support for unification in society will quickly fade over time, let alone his lameness. this means that time is running out for south korea, and the peaceful unification route that excludes the option of force must be very active and aggressive, and must have actual results, so that the will for unification can be maintained.

needless to say, the new approach of south korean conservatives to overthrow the kim regime has helped kim jong-un strengthen the necessity of "military independence". compared with the divisions and turmoil in south korean politics, north korea is confident that "time is on my side."

so, does this mean that time is on the side of "taiwan independence" and that if the mainland takes the route of forcing unification it will only backfire?

no, if "taiwan independence" wants to emulate kim jong-un, it must develop nuclear weapons or seek the us nuclear umbrella, otherwise it will have no confidence, and the united states will not allow taiwan to be "north koreanized."

furthermore, north korea is very close to political backers, while taiwan is very far away from political backers. therefore, kim jong-un has the conditions to take the path of armed independence, but lai ching-te cannot.

kim jong-un's most ideal scenario is that in addition to the normal development of north korea, the united states is also willing to acknowledge north korea's status as a nuclear-armed state. as long as these two requirements are met, the military confrontation with south korea can be stopped.

if it were the united states in the past, it would not have been possible to accept north korea's rise in both nuclear weapons and economy, but if trump returns, many problems will become a series of deals. on the contrary, if the democratic party continues to govern, north korea will have less concerns about unification and ethnic ties after its independence, and its diplomatic space will still increase greatly, and south korea's unification demands will gradually lose legitimacy.

of course, the north korean people will have an uncomfortable period of adaptation, which will prompt kim jong-un to work harder to achieve normal development of the country in exchange for the people's recognition. therefore, in the future we may see a north korea that gradually opens up, but is only closed to enemy countries, in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of its armed independence.

at the same time, south korea's progressive opposition parties, which advocate reconciliation between north and south korea, will gain political dividends from the ruling party's failed north korea policy and propose a new unification or independence route that can be accepted by the "market generation."

no matter how the future develops, kim jong-un's move to reposition the country will be difficult to reverse. although youth is an important asset for kim jong-un to promote major changes, he is also determined to change the environment, including the united states's pressure, the gap in soft and hard power between north and south korea, and the progress of relations with russia. in contrast, it is south korea, which still insists on unification, that is standing at the crossroads and hesitating.

unification should not be an obstacle to development

what is more interesting is the relationship between china and south korea. before the unification of the two sides of the taiwan strait, it is difficult for beijing to support north korea's armed independence, so if south korea still wants to unify, it must rely on china's help to "fight north korean independence", and china can use this leverage to ask the united states to stop intervening in the korean peninsula issue. if this develops, kim jong-un may gain substantial benefits by giving up the unification move.

this is a paradoxical situation, but it must be said that kim jong-un's move does have the potential to break the deadlock and reshuffle the situation.

looking at the current north korea-rok issue across the taiwan strait, although it is impossible for taiwan to achieve independence by force or by peaceful means, its “de-ethnicization” actions started more than 20 years earlier than kim jong-un. currently, the majority of public opinion is either “suspicious of unification” or “against unification.” it can be said that independence is only one step away. however, this final step will never score a goal, and therefore it is impossible to be “kim jong-unized”.

in addition, as long as the will to unify is firm, the mainland will not become "chiang kai-shek-ized" because no country can stop china. only china itself has to overcome two obstacles that "can be overcome at will".

what we really need to pay attention to is that, according to south korea’s experience, economic development will weaken the young generation’s interest in unification. if this group of people think that unification is an unnecessary hassle and that they would rather spend their time suppressing housing prices or solving their own livelihood problems, then the situation will be difficult to reverse. this is what happened to the kuomintang and its sins. from this perspective, time is not on the mainland’s side.

on april 8, 2023, the eastern theater command of the chinese people's liberation army organized combat readiness patrols and the "joint sword" exercise around taiwan island in the taiwan strait and the northern, southern, and eastern sea and airspace of taiwan island as planned from april 8 to april 10. shi yi, spokesman for the eastern theater command, said that this is a serious warning to the "taiwan independence" separatist forces and external forces who are colluding and provoking, and is a necessary action to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. oriental ic

for this reason, i have previously proposed that the unification roadmap should be embedded in the development route rather than being seen as an obstacle to development. once it is seen as an obstacle, the self-hypnosis of "taiwan can't escape anyway" can easily hypnotize oneself.

looking at the peninsula, it is not unreasonable for south korea to want to overthrow kim jong-un's regime by forcing unification. who dares to say that north korea can't escape? kim jong-un will run away for you to see. however, the yoon government's use of the "american medicine list" is a pure stupid move, which will only backfire. in addition, whether the lame yoon seok-yeol has the execution ability is also a question.

taiwan will not become "kim jong-un-ized" and the mainland will not become "chiang kai-shek-ized". if this prediction is inaccurate, i will definitely not be the one to be blamed.