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[text/observer network columnist chen feng]

in the budget draft of the u.s. senate armed services committee for fiscal year 2025, the budget for the u.s. navy's next-generation carrier-based fighter fa-xx was reduced from $450 million proposed at the beginning of the year to $53.828 million, a sharp drop of nearly 90%, and a decrease of nearly 97% compared to $1.53 billion in the previous fiscal year. this cut basically means that fa-xx has been put on ice, after all, this amount of funding is almost enough to keep the fa-xx office running.

the u.s. navy issued a request for information (rfi) for the fa-xx project to the industry as early as 2012, and its project alternatives analysis (aoa) was completed in 2019. for a long time, the progress of the project has always been highly confidential, which is understandable, but the direct refrigeration is still beyond people's expectations.

at the end of the cold war, the u.s. navy was in the process of developing the next generation of tactical aircraft. at that time, the u.s. military wanted to simultaneously promote the natf project to replace the f-14 and the ata project to replace the a-6. at that time, the u.s. military had the idea of ​​modifying the f-22 into a variable-sweep wing as the natf project, and the ata project had successfully developed the a-12 prototype with a tailless flying wing layout, but in the end both projects were scrapped, and the f-18e, which was similar in appearance to the classic f-18, was chosen to achieve the replacement of the two aircraft with one stone.

many people disdain the f-18e because it does not meet people's expectations that american fighter jets "should" have overwhelming performance. but the f-18e is a fighter jet that is very much in line with the times and the specific needs of the us navy.

since the basic aerodynamic layout of the f-18e has not changed much, the uncertainty in the aerodynamic design is very low, and the problem of "wingtip droop" in high-maneuver flight that appeared during the test flight was quickly solved. the f-18e eventually became a rare model project in the history of us combat aircraft research and development in recent decades that was completed on time, with quality and at a reasonable price.

the f-18e's energy maneuverability is not outstanding, but its instantaneous maneuverability is excellent. in addition, the navy has always focused on weapon systems and beyond-visual-range air combat capabilities. in the hands of naval pilots with higher training levels, the f-18e has good fleet air defense capabilities and ground attack capabilities. although the reason for using the f-18e to attack iran in "top gun 2" is a bit far-fetched, in actual combat, the f-18e, as a versatile fighter, is indeed a good choice. after all, the f-35c has not yet achieved enough capabilities to be able to perform missions with confidence.

although the f-18e's range and speed are both inferior to the f-14, this is only a problem when targeting supersonic bombers such as the backfire. although the f-18e's aim-120 has a shorter range than the f-14's aim-54, it has a stronger multi-target engagement capability in actual combat.

in fact, not only in the era when the f-18e was designed and deployed, it was not necessary for the fighter to achieve or even exceed the performance of the f-14. even until now, as long as there is no requirement to directly break through china's air defense line, the performance of the f-18e is sufficient in other parts of the world.

the f-35c has always been an "adopted child" and has an awkward position in the us navy. as the only stealth fighter of the us navy, the f-35c is inferior to the ata in strike capability, and is far inferior to the natf in fleet air defense, and even inferior to the f-18e. the f-35c is a bit "overcapable" when dealing with any opponent other than china, but has too big a capability gap when dealing with china.

but for the us navy, which aims to defeat china, the planned fa-xx may not be enough, because no one knows what kind of aircraft is really enough. after all, china's space isr and anti-ship ballistic missiles have completely changed the traditional aircraft carrier combat mode, and made the sea area within 1,500-2,500 kilometers of the coastline a dangerous zone for us aircraft carriers.

in the new era, it is foolish to use carrier-based fighters to compete with ballistic missiles in terms of range, strike flexibility, and platform resistance, just like thinking about a more powerful bayonet in the machine gun era. but carrier-based fighters have a wide range of uses, just like elite infantry is still the most versatile force.

the navy has traditionally opposed strong attacks and stubborn defenses. aircraft carriers are floating airports, and their biggest advantage is that they can run. aircraft carriers have the advantage of "taking a step forward if the sword is not long enough" and the advantage of "taking a step back if the enemy's sword is too long". maneuverability is the lifeblood of the fleet. even when the carrier-based air force strikes against a strong enemy's land force, it is also maneuvering to avoid the real and attack the fake, tear open the enemy's defense line, and use the weak points to launch attacks.

but the only problem is that if the enemy aircraft carrier catches up, a decisive battle between the aircraft carriers will be inevitable.

the new generation of aircraft carriers and carrier-based air forces represented by the fujian are a huge threat to the u.s.'s maritime hegemony. the fujian conducted three intensive sea trials in just three months, which shows that china has high confidence in the design and construction of the fujian, and the actual construction quality meets expectations.

the j-15t is not technologically different from the f-18e, but it is large in size and strong in strength. china's rapidly improving electronic and weapon system technologies have made the j-15t a strong rival to the f-18e, and it is not at a disadvantage against the f-35c.

at the same time, the j-35 is also on its way, and it is only a matter of time before it is deployed on ships. the j-35 is a stealth fighter of the same level as the f-35c but of a different nature, and is a fighter that focuses on air superiority. the j-35 absorbed the lessons of the f-35 during its development and avoided some design traps. of course, people can only guess what the j-35 will be like in the end, but it is already a dark cloud for the us navy.

at this time, the united states also needs to take into account that chinese aircraft carriers also receive full-dimensional support from space isr, anti-ship ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, 055, and shore-based combat aircraft, which gives them considerable home advantage over american aircraft carriers that are alone and deep in the enemy's territory.

faced with the rise of the pla's overall strength, the us aircraft carriers may withdraw before a fight. even if they stop to fight, the us aircraft carriers will focus on the decisive battle between aircraft carriers rather than "defending taiwan." this is not good news for taiwan, which relies on us aircraft carriers for protection, but it is reality.

the u.s. navy once envisioned using highly stealthy, long-flight carrier-based drones to achieve penetrating reconnaissance and strike capabilities, fully controlling air superiority, and calling it air-sea integrated warfare. but then they discovered insurmountable technical difficulties and the rising great wall of china. as a result, the u.s. navy's drone research and development project shifted from uclass to cbars, and from developing the x-47b stealth unmanned bomber to developing the mq-25 "stingray" carrier-based refueling drone.

it must be pointed out that the mq-25 is very valuable for reference, and china also needs its own "stingray", but the transformation of uclass into cbars can only show that the us navy has no choice but to settle for second best. no naval battle can be won by relying solely on tankers.

but the u.s. navy needs to worry about more than just not being able to win an aircraft carrier decisive battle.

the columbia-class nuclear submarine project, which was originally planned to replace the ohio-class nuclear submarine and become the backbone of the next generation of sea-based nuclear forces, has been seriously overspent and overdue. this means that the ohio-class may be forced to start decommissioning before the first submarine is put into service, leaving a gap. at a time when the united states is increasingly concerned about china's nuclear force construction, problems with sea-based nuclear forces are an unbearable pain for american hegemony. the ballistic missile nuclear submarine project is a money-eating beast, and the us navy even tried to ask congress to list it separately to prevent related expenses from excessively encroaching on the navy's daily funds.

now that the ticonderoga-class cruisers are aging and must be retired, their successors, the burke iii-class cruisers, not only need to fill the gap in the number of aegis ships, but also must take over the burden of being the fleet's flagship in terms of quality.

theoretically, the burke iii class has a small technological upgrade span, which is conducive to rapid construction and formation of combat effectiveness. however, the large-scale construction of 055 has made the burke iii obsolete at birth, and the more advanced 055 modification is also looming, which has increased the pressure on the us navy to develop and build the next generation of cruisers/destroyers.

although the performance of the virginia-class attack nuclear submarine, which is characterized by littoral warfare, is sufficient in the near future and its construction is being stepped up, in order to ensure underwater superiority, the us military is urgently required to develop and build the ssnx to return to ocean submarine warfare.

but this is not all the bad news. the marine corps has transformed from "from sea to land" to littoral warfare, and the focus has shifted from amphibious attacks to controlling the sea with islands. the amphibious attacks have been transformed into "lightning aircraft carriers", disrupting the traditional shipbuilding plan.

what is more troublesome is that due to the insufficient number of ships and the need to cover all tasks, the deployment time of us navy ships at sea has been continuously extended. at the same time, due to the serious shortage of maintenance forces, a large number of ships waiting to be repaired are queued for docking. the us fleet actually has insufficient available ships. these are all the results of the overall decline of the industrial base, but in the short term, the us military can only bear the bitter fruit.

all this proves the old saying: money is not everything, but without money is nothing.

although the naval part of the ukrainian war was insignificant, and the sinking of the "moscow" was more due to russia's incompetence and underestimation of the enemy than to ukraine's brilliant record; but the all-round ammunition consumption problem of the ukrainian war really scared the western military, including the us navy.

china has the world's largest manufacturing industry, which also means that china has the world's largest military production capacity. china has a huge potential to produce anti-ship ammunition if needed. china is also one of the largest countries in the world, with high-value targets all over the country, and advanced air defense systems can shoot down a large number of incoming missiles on the way.

this means that the u.s. navy's existing inventory of air defense missiles may be exhausted in air defense operations in a very short time, and the existing inventory of cruise missiles will almost certainly be exhausted in a very short time. in order to prepare for a possible war, the u.s. military must greatly increase the inventory of all ammunition. this is another bottomless pit.

faced with the situation where money is needed everywhere and demands from all parties are urgent, the fa-xx, which is still undecided, has to be put on hold for the time being.

the us air force actually faces a similar problem. when the f-22 began to be deployed and the f-35 began to be developed, the us air force felt that it was "looking around in the dark". but the emergence of the j-20 changed everything. now the number of j-20 has exceeded that of the f-22.

there is really no reason for china to stop the full-scale j-20 production when the ws-15 is finally finalized, and the gap in quantity with the f-22 will continue to widen. the two-seat j-20 brings a new combat capability and provides a realistic platform for manned-unmanned team operations, which is something that neither the f-22 nor the f-35 can do.

the j-20 and the looming h-20 have shattered the u.s. air force's illusion of overwhelming leadership. the u.s. air force can no longer calmly research the next generation of fighter jets and continue to lead the new trend in the world of fighter jets. but now the u.s. air force lacks decisive technological breakthroughs and is crushed by overwhelming costs.

at the same time, b-21 and f-35a production must be stepped up even to replace the highly aging existing fleet. the u.s. air force is running out of money.

the us air force's next-generation fighter ngad has not been discontinued, but it has also been equipped with ventilators. us air force secretary kendall was once the head of procurement for the department of defense, and he knows more about money than fighter technology. recently, it has been rumored that the unit price of ngad may reach 300 million us dollars, so it is not surprising that the entire project has ventilators.

a few years ago, ropar, the deputy minister of the air force in charge of research and development, enthusiastically boasted about the concept of the "new hundred series" fighter. taking the "hundred series" fighters of the 1950s (from f-100 to f-106, as well as the discontinued f-103, f-107, f-108, and f-109) as a precedent, the low-cost fighter developed by a series of "short, flat and fast" projects achieved the goal of alternating iterations, rapid development, and rapid formation of combat effectiveness.

ropar hopes that each type of the "new hundred series" fighter will focus on solving certain specific problems, and no longer pursue "big and complete"; give full play to the power of the system, and no longer "conquer the world with one horse"; thereby solving the long-standing problem of the alternating increase in the cost and cycle of fighter research and development.

the whole idea is wonderful, but god knows the reality.

on paper, the us military spending is still four times that of china, and even if calculated by purchasing power parity, it is 2.4 times. however, the efficiency of converting us military spending into combat power is far lower than that of china. this makes the us helpless in the face of the increasingly narrowing or even partially reversed military gap between china and the us.

both biden and trump have verbally emphasized the need to strengthen the u.s. military to cope with the "china challenge," but when it comes to actually spending money, they are not so generous. the reason is simple: the u.s. really has no money, and it is too late to print money. but the deeper reason behind the lack of money is the deindustrialization of the united states.

“we don’t work when we should,” vance writes in hillbilly elegy. “and when we do find a job, we don’t stay for long. sooner or later we’re fired, whether for being late or stealing our own merchandise and selling it on ebay or because a customer reports that we stink of alcohol in our mouth or because we take five 30-minute bathroom breaks per shift. we often pay lip service to the importance of hard work, but we tell ourselves that the reason we can’t find a job is because of some perceived injustice: obama closed the coal mines or the chinese took all the jobs. these are the lies we invent to resolve cognitive dissonance—the gap between the world we see and the truth we preach.”

this paragraph describes the "hillbillies" in the rust belt, but it can also be applied to the real economy and manufacturing industry in the united states: the united states does not invest in the real economy and manufacturing when it should, but pursues asset-lightness. even if it invests, it will not last long, and it just hopes to cash out in the stock market as soon as possible.

the united states talks about how important the real economy and manufacturing are, but tells itself that hollowing out is due to unfairness and because china has hollowed out the united states. these are lies the united states has made up to resolve cognitive dissonance - the world the united states sees is very different from the truth the united states preaches.

as for the navy's fa-xx and the air force's ngad, the only option is to cut off the arm. i hope the "arm" can grow back one day.

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