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the russia-ukraine war has been going on for two and a half years. ukraine is now trying to convince the united states, britain and other allies to allow it to use long-range weapons provided by europe and the united states to attack military targets in russia. however, the united states has always refused to allow the ukrainian army to use american weapons and weapons containing american technology to attack targets in russia due to "fears of escalation."

earlier, british foreign secretary david lammy and us secretary of state antony blinken visited kiev to discuss lifting restrictions on long-range weapons strikes with ukrainian president volodymyr zelensky.

on september 13, 2024, local time, us president biden met with british prime minister starmer at the white house. the two sides discussed whether to allow ukraine to use western long-range weapons to attack russia, but no decision was made immediately. starmer said after the meeting that the two sides will have more extensive exchanges during the un general assembly at the end of this month and discuss it again at that time. the outside world generally believes that the united states and the united kingdom are very likely to allow ukraine to use western long-range weapons.

russia, of course, reacted strongly to this, with russian president vladimir putin warning nato leaders that lifting restrictions on ukraine's use of western long-range missiles to attack its territory would be considered an act of war.

"this means that nato countries - the united states and european countries - are at war with russia," putin said in the interview. "if this is the case, then we will make appropriate decisions to deal with the threats we face, taking into account the changed nature of the conflict."

the outside world generally believes that this is a new red line drawn by russia to warn britain and the united states. although such threats have existed in the past, they have always been relatively vague. this time putin's statement seems serious and clear, so britain and the united states may carefully consider whether to really lift the ban on ukraine's use of long-range weapons.

why is the use of long-range missiles so sensitive? if britain and the united states really relax the restrictions, what impact will it have on the war situation?

on september 13, 2024, in washington, dc, the united states, us president biden (left) met with british prime minister starmer (photo: visual china)

western long-range weapons already in ukraine

judging from the list of weapons that have been released, the missiles with a range of more than 200 kilometers provided by the west are mainly the "storm shadow" air-to-ground missiles from britain and france (with a range of more than 250 kilometers) and the army short-range tactical missiles atacms provided by the united states (with a range of up to 300 kilometers). in addition, there are reports that the united states will provide agm-158 stealth air-launched cruise missiles (with a range of more than 300 kilometers).

in addition, although the harm high-speed anti-radiation missile (agm-88) previously provided by the united states to ukraine has a range of only 150 kilometers, its improved extended-range model has a high-altitude launch range of up to 300 kilometers, making it also a potential long-range attack weapon.

except for the agm-158 stealth air-launched cruise missile, the above-mentioned weapons have been used on the battlefields of russia and ukraine before. among them, the storm shadow cruise missile once became a star weapon, and repeatedly attacked military targets and important infrastructure in the crimea region. it not only successfully hit the crimean bridge, but also hit the conventional-powered submarine "rostov-on-don" under maintenance at the sevatopol naval base. this is also the first naval combat submarine ever hit by an air-launched cruise missile. the storm shadow can be said to be a weapon that has set a historical record.

after ukraine received the atacms missiles in early 2024, it used them to attack high-value targets of the russian army, including long-range strikes on the russian air defense system.

in june 2024, ukrainian media reported that the atacms missiles launched by the ukrainian army successfully destroyed the russian s-500 "prometheus" air defense missile system in crimea. the system is russia's latest long-range air defense weapon, claiming to be able to intercept all types of modern hypersonic weapons. the weapon system was officially equipped by the russian army in 2021. so far, only four systems have been put into service. it is regarded as a model of russia's new generation of air defense weapons.

the news that the s-500 "prometheus" system was destroyed has not been confirmed, but after atacms joined the ukrainian army, many russian ground-based air defense systems including s-300 and s-400 were destroyed by it, and several of them were obviously attacked by cluster munitions. in the ukrainian army's long-range arsenal, the weapon that meets this destructive characteristic is atacms.

the agm-88 harm anti-radiation missile is the least effective of the long-range weapons currently owned by ukraine. there are currently no confirmed significant combat results, but the ukrainian side has revealed relevant information showing that they are using the harm missile to suppress the russian front-line air defense radar and have achieved certain results.

on june 10, 2024, at an unknown location, a russian expert was inspecting missile fragments from the u.s. army tactical missile system (atacms) and the british-french storm shadow used by ukraine (photo: visual china)

why is russia so sensitive about lifting the ban on long-range weapons?

the war has been going on for more than two years, and both russia and ukraine have a much better understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses than before the war.

russia's overall war potential and national size are several times that of ukraine. judging from the russian army's advance on the eastern front, the russian army's tactics are generally to use precision-guided glide bombs to destroy and soften the ukrainian fortifications, and then let the infantry clear out the remaining ukrainian troops. this tactic is very inefficient and advances slowly, but it is very effective. ukraine's air force is very weak, and russian air force fighters can often perform aerial bombing missions under the protection of their own ground air defense firepower, which makes the ukrainian army helpless when facing this set of russian tactics.

in previous battles, all the ukrainian army could do was reduce the ground forces deployed on the front line to avoid casualties. when the russian army broke into their positions, they used long-range firepower or drones to kill. although this would lead to increased casualties among the russian army, they were unable to hold their positions.

therefore, in terms of strategic situation, the ukrainian army has been in a state of passive defense and its positions have been continuously eroded, which has continued from the beginning of 2024 to the present. if the situation cannot be broken, ukraine will be in a passive position for a long time, and even if the front line can cause certain casualties to the russian army, it will not be able to shake russia's will to fight.

judging from the wartime military industry, russia has entered a quasi-wartime supply system. although high-tech weapons and equipment are difficult to replenish due to external sanctions, the supply of conventional weapons and ammunition is becoming more and more sufficient. ukraine's wartime military industry has taken a different path. since its military industry cannot concentrate on large-scale production, the manufacture of long-range missiles and large equipment is at a standstill.

in order to ensure security, ukraine has established a decentralized and effective military supply system dominated by small workshops and companies. this system can provide ukraine with some weapons and ammunition supplements. more importantly, it can increase ukraine's production of micro-combat drones through decentralized drone manufacturers, ensuring that it has an advantage over russia in this regard. the advantages of drones have indeed played a certain role in front-line tactical operations, and even gave ukraine the ability to use suicide drones to remotely and massively strike the russian mainland.

the advantages of drones are obvious: they are cheap, effective, and difficult to defend against, but their disadvantages are also prominent. the payload of drones is quite limited. even large suicide drones only carry tens of kilograms of explosives. and because of their slow speed, they cannot use speed to enhance penetration like missiles.

drones are clearly incapable of striking at strategic targets deep within the russian army, such as fighter jets hiding in reinforced hangars. the storm shadow warhead provided by the united kingdom and the united states weighs 450 kilograms and has the ability to penetrate concrete walls and destroy targets, an advantage that long-range missiles cannot replace. the long-range weapons provided by the west have been tested in actual combat and have been proven to be able to break through russia's air defense network and have amazing lethality.

therefore, russia has reason to be nervous about ukraine's acquisition of long-range missiles. although the russian army on the front line has some experience in resisting western long-range weapons, its air defense network and troops are seriously insufficient. this is why the ukrainian army was able to advance quickly into the kursk region, and the russian army's response was quite limited. judging from the fact that ukraine has been able to use drones to attack moscow and other places many times, the air defense capabilities of russia's core areas are not optimistic. if it is attacked by large-scale cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, it may be difficult to cope with it for a while.

on august 6, 2023, in kiev, ukraine, ukrainian president zelensky (center left) inspected the air force and viewed missiles and weapons donated by the west (photo: visual china)

can lifting the ban on long-range weapons change the situation of the war?

although the storm shadow missile has successfully destroyed targets in crimea many times, its range is only 250 kilometers, which has limited threat to russian targets in depth. atacms also has the problem of insufficient range. if ukraine deploys these valuable missiles to the kursk region, it may threaten the surrounding logistics hubs and command nodes, but it is difficult to threaten the aerospace fighters in the heart of russia.

the tactic that can really weaken russia's combat effectiveness is to weaken russia's air combat power through long-range strikes, making it unable to effectively support front-line infantry operations. currently, the only weapon that can accomplish this task is the agm-158 stealth air-launched cruise missile. in addition to the basic 370-kilometer range model, the extended-range improved model has a range of more than 900 kilometers. it can also hit targets in moscow when launched from kiev, and has been proven to be able to successfully break through the russian-made air defense network in the syrian conflict.

from the perspective of conspiracy theories, the united states began to discuss whether to lift the restrictions on long-range weapons less than a month after announcing its willingness to provide agm-158 to ukraine in august 2024. this seems to be a premeditated act. after all, if it is only used for ukraine's homeland defense, a range of 370 kilometers is already quite sufficient, and the united states has not promised not to provide improved models with a range of more than 900 kilometers. this is undoubtedly equivalent to deploying air-launched medium-range missiles in kiev, which is enough to threaten moscow's security. it is no wonder that putin reacted so strongly. after all, even in the cold war era, the united states' air-launched cruise missiles have never been so close to moscow.

worse still, ukraine had previously used long-range drones to attack the armavir radar station in southern russia, more than 1,500 kilometers from its border. the radar station was equipped with the "voronezh-dm" long-range strategic early warning radar, which is an important part of russia's long-range nuclear weapon early warning network. if the agm-158 is used to attack such radar station targets, russia's long-range strategic early warning can easily be completely destroyed, which means that russia is completely blind in the face of nuclear strikes.

judging from ukraine's experience in using long-range strikes in the war, such long-range missiles will only be used to attack high-value targets such as fighter planes, air defense radars and air defense weapons at airports, which happen to be technical equipment that is difficult for the russian military industry to manufacture and replenish. the russian military industry can still manufacture main battle tanks, aerial bombs and artillery shells, but it is difficult to re-produce even one tu-95 strategic bomber and mig-31 supersonic fighter, and even the su-34 fighter-bomber is difficult to get enough replenishment after being damaged. these are the main air weapon launch platforms for the russian army to support the front line.

but in the final analysis, wars are never fought with weapons. from the beginning of the war to now, we can notice that both ukraine and russia are learning about war in war. human subjective initiative can often make seemingly powerful weapons fail, and can also make seemingly weak weapons win unexpectedly.

in the kherson counter-offensive, ukraine learned how to use armored mobile forces to defeat the demoralized russian army, while russia learned to use terrain and time to build the surovikin line consisting of fortifications and minefields to deal with the ukrainian offensive. on the eastern front, russia learned to use air power to weaken the solid fortifications that were difficult to destroy by ground artillery fire, while ukraine learned to use drones to kill russian infantry and reduce its own casualties.

russia lacks anti-radiation missiles, but has developed a traditional long-range fire output mode for anti-radar operations, such as using drones to induce the opponent's air defense weapons to turn on, and then using long-range artillery or other suicide drones to attack the locked targets. both sides of the war have found that there are many loopholes in electronic warfare against small drones, so they use multi-mounted machine guns, shotguns, flare guns, net guns and other means to intercept drones - this method of warfare was considered a fantasy in the past.

ukraine lacks air defense weapons, but it has used suicide drones to shoot down russian helicopter gunships in actual combat, which is unprecedented. with almost no navy, ukraine has almost paralyzed the russian black sea fleet with suicide drones and missiles.

correspondingly, russia has also learned how to counter nato's precision-guided weapons, managing to reduce the hit rate of its almost 100% guided artillery shells to only 15%.

in a long war, a certain weapon may be effective temporarily, but it is difficult to completely change the situation unless its quantity is large enough and its appearance is sudden enough.

for example, the sudden appearance of tanks in world war i changed the outcome of the war, but the west’s caution made it impossible for the emergence of long-range missiles to be sudden, nor for their numbers to be large enough to quickly destroy most of the important targets deep in russia. the lifting of the ban on long-range weapons will certainly make the war favorable to ukraine, but it will not change the balance of power between the two sides overnight.

zhu jiangming, special contributor to southern people weekly

editor: li miao