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imamura wrote this long chapter too lengthy. how the guards talked to whom, how they walked, which people lived in which rooms, what the conversations were like, etc. if all of it were translated, it would be a complete diary and no one would like it. i can only give a brief summary, but it still feels very lengthy. it mainly records how the japanese military high-ranking officials demanded a high-pressure policy in java, and how imamura withstood the pressure and implemented a conciliatory policy.

after the indonesian war ended, there was an endless stream of people visiting me every day from my homeland and all over southeast asia.

one day, a young man came to visit me with general kazunari ugaki’s business card. he conveyed general ugaki’s thoughts to me and listened to my opinion on the war situation.

(original text as follows: my guard post was built next to the door of the government building. one day, a soldier took two business cards and handed them to corporal kono yoshitada. corporal kono yoshitada said to me: "just now, a man came by plane from tokyo with a business card. he said he wanted to see the army commander. can you introduce him to me?"

i saw that the person on the card was a stranger, but attached below was the card of a senior, general ugaki kazunari, who lived in the suburbs of tokyo. on the back was written: "i think this young man is a talent." it was clearly written by general ugaki.

i told the guard i wanted to see him and took him into this room."

after a while, the man appeared in my study.

he was a young man in his early thirties. his expression looked sincere, and although he was wearing an ill-fitting suit, my sixth sense told me that this person was trustworthy.

"it's not easy for you to buy a plane ticket. there are many people coming from tokyo now..."

"i was asked by general ugaki and the people from the army ministry to find out the situation here."

"is this a trip with a special purpose? have you been visiting the various occupied territories?"

"once the plane arrives, i will know the general situation here, but i want to hear your opinion. this is what general ugaki ordered me to do..."

"what advice does that experienced and wise man need from me?"

i could have said it in one sentence, but imamura wrote down several hundred words of rambling. i guess it’s because he spends too much time at home in his old age.)

"general ugaki is very worried about this war. he said that he might have to clean up the mess like marshal pétain of france. he is worried that due to the gap in national strength, even if they win the initial battle, they will not be able to fight a protracted war. however, this is his feeling in japan. he really wants to know how the people on the front line observe the enemy's combat effectiveness and will, and how they judge the direction of the war. so he really wants to hear your opinion. he heard that i was going to come to java, so he entrusted me to visit you. (ugaki is a talent. he thought about the defeat at the beginning of the great victory. he is a person with strategic vision)

it was not until after the failure of the greater east asia war that i felt ashamed when i recalled this incident. at that time, i also felt that the results of the first battle were extremely brilliant, and i did not take general ugaki's worries to heart at all.

"i am really touched that mr. ugaki always cares about the country. people like me who are on the front line have a local and limited vision. it is not easy to see the problem from the overall perspective, so it is difficult to judge the success or failure of the war. now i feel that after the indonesian war, if we do not end the offensive and switch to a defensive posture, the country will fall into crisis. however, just after the java war, the headquarters has withdrawn two-thirds of my troops and is preparing to further expand the combat area. i am worried that we will fall into a situation like the chinese war of resistance and get out of control."

indeed, unlike my predecessor, general ugaki, i did not think of the possibility of defeat when i won the first battle. i was just worried that the war would continue to escalate.

the jinan incident did not escalate, thanks to general shirakawa yoshinori, the then minister of the army, who requested the withdrawal of the army. the russo-japanese war was able to end, thanks to general kodama, the chief of staff of the manchurian army, who repeatedly suggested to the government to accept president roosevelt's mediation and peace talks.

if kazunari ugaki was the prime minister, the greater east asia war would not have happened, and even if it had happened, the opportunity for a ceasefire would not have been missed.

on march 10, the headquarters held a meeting to discuss future military and political policies, with the chief of staff and about twelve other staff members present. the young group said: "even if we gradually adopt a policy of easing the situation based on the existing results, we should still adopt a high-pressure policy in order to make the local people realize the authority of the japanese army."

in response to such a claim, colonel nakayama ningren, who was in charge of military affairs, said: "military and political policies should be in accordance with the clear provisions of the "outline of occupied territory governance" issued by the central government. they should be fair, be kind and strict, and satisfy the local people. only in this way can the resources of the occupied territories be better restored and used."

colonel takashima, chief of the operations department, deputy chief of staff harada, and even chief of staff okazaki all agreed with the above statement.

i expressed the following resolution: "military and political affairs are mainly handled by the deputy chief of staff and colonel nakayama yasuto, and the army commander is also determined to follow the instructions of the central committee. the eight-horn ichiyu was originally promoting common race and brotherhood, but now it is considered to be aggression (quite self-aware)

), we have troops at hand and can exert pressure at any time when necessary. therefore, we should implement a policy of relaxation as much as possible in peacetime. "

in mid-april, the minister of the army sent three officials, led by kodama hideo (former minister of home affairs), to serve as political advisers to me.

at the dinner, the three of them said to me: "we have just arrived at the office. it may be impolite to say these words when invited to dinner, but i think we should still say them.

now our colleagues in tokyo, saigon, and singapore have strong opinions about your military and political policies in java.

"(your actions in java) do not show the dignity of japan and the japanese army at all. the white people here do not look defeated at all. if you take measures like singapore, the locals will naturally realize the power of the japanese army, and the colored people will believe us."

i replied, "really? everyone has different opinions. i think that in singapore, the government needs to suppress those overseas chinese who are carrying out a thorough anti-japanese movement. but there is no need for this in java.

first, since the second day after landing, i have been convinced that the indonesian people are indeed compatriots of the same race as us. how could people who are not compatriots have so much goodwill and assistance to the japanese army? the military victory was partly due to their assistance.

second, all the dutch who fought against us were captured. battle training taught us not to suppress their families and innocent citizens.

third, although the overseas chinese on this island are keen on opposing japan and rejecting japanese goods, almost all industries in java are run and developed by the dutch and overseas chinese. if they are retaliated against or detained like in other places, all resources including oil cannot be developed, and the military supplies produced here cannot be used by the japanese army. "

so i asked these three gentlemen to tour the island and see if what i said was right.

three weeks later, the three consultants came back and reported what they had seen: "wherever we went, it was like traveling inland japan. we did not feel any danger. the indigenous people were very friendly to the japanese, and the dutch seemed to have given up their hostility. as for the overseas chinese, they were trying to cater to the japanese, and the industry was recovering faster than expected. there was really no need to implement a high-pressure policy in java. those who condemned the military and political system in java did not understand the local reality at all, and were just idealists."

mencius said: if i shrink from self-reflection, i will go forward even if there are tens of thousands of people. for a person like me, even if there are hundreds of thousands of people opposing me, let alone tens of thousands of people, or even if it is just one person's honest advice, i will reflect on myself, otherwise i will not be reconciled. this time, the right-leaning report of the political advisor has greatly encouraged me. (is imamura really a good person?)

soon, the chief of staff, general sugiyama hajime, came to java with two colonels, hattori and takeda, and we had a full conversation for two days.

me: "the headquarters now defines my 16th army as a security force. according to the staff officer, it is to end the greater east asia war through the conquest of the indonesian archipelago, and then let my army turn to security and demobilization, is that right?"

sugiyama: "yes. however, according to the intention of the southern army, the burma campaign will begin. however, i have not considered the indian campaign and australia strategy advocated by some people. if we do it with open hands, the national strength will collapse."

me: "i don't understand the central government's idea. although they are only maintaining law and order in java, the headquarters has withdrawn two-thirds of the troops here. is it enough to defend java? the battle in the philippines has not yet ended. if the war continues to expand, it will be hard to say."

sugiyama: "regarding the defense of java, we must further consider the situation. mainly due to the shipping capacity of ships, the forces within the southern general army need to be coordinated with each other. in short, the defense plan must be put in place as soon as possible."

i worked under general sugiyama when he was the director of the military affairs bureau, vice minister of the army, minister of the army, and commander of the north china front army, so we were very close. he must have meant what he said when he told me that the war could not be expanded. however, a few months later, the headquarters continued to use troops in new guinea (probably referring to the attack on moresby), and discussed with the navy the plan to attack australia. while fighting in burma, they also had their eyes on india. what on earth was the headquarters doing by dispersing troops in a vast area that could not be supplied at all? it was incredible. (the top leaders of the army knew that continuing to fight would lead to the collapse of national strength, so why was the situation still out of control? you can discuss it, or is this just imamura's attempt to make up for it after the fact?)

to be continued...