news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

in accordance with the relevant requirements of the new "nine national regulations" to "strictly and tightly improve the management of resigned personnel", in order to further strengthen the management of resigned personnel from the csrc system investing in companies to be listed and maintain the "three fairnesses" of the capital market, the csrc recently issued the "regulations on the supervision of resigned personnel from the csrc system investing in companies to be listed (trial)" (hereinafter referred to as the "regulations on the supervision of resigned personnel").

based on the original "guidelines for the application of regulatory rules - issuance category no. 2" (hereinafter referred to as "guidelines no. 2"), this regulation adds three new provisions: first, extend the prohibition period for resigned personnel to acquire shares. the prohibition period for resigned personnel from issuance supervision positions or committee management cadres to acquire shares will be extended to 10 years; for resigned personnel other than issuance supervision positions or committee management cadres, the prohibition period for resigned personnel at the department level and above will be extended from 3 years to 5 years, and for resigned personnel below the department level will be extended from 2 years to 4 years. second, expand the scope of strict supervision of resigned personnel. expand the scope of strict review from the resigned personnel themselves to their parents, spouses, children and their spouses. third, put forward higher verification requirements. intermediary institutions must fully verify the investment background, source of funds, price fairness, and authenticity of cleanup of resigned personnel, and the csrc will verify and review the relevant work.

of course, this is not the end of strict entry control, but only a phased achievement. for a long time, the acquisition of shares by former employees of the csrc system in proposed listed companies has aroused the sensitive nerves of the market. this issue has also been the focus of regulatory crackdowns. for example, deyiwei (which eventually withdrew its ipo application) held by 8 former employees of the csrc system not long ago is a typical case. previously, gao bin of jinglin equity investment was taken away by relevant departments, which also set off a big wave. before joining jinglin, gao bin worked in the csrc system for 22 years. he served as the director of the market supervision department of the csrc and the deputy general manager of china securities depository and clearing corporation. this shows that under the premise of the existence of the primary and secondary price difference of a-shares, the moral risks of "revolving door" and "escape resignation" between government and business always exist, and the game of "the devil is one foot higher than the road" will also run through the development of the capital market. however, for companies and intermediaries that are planning to go public, strengthening the regulatory constraints on sudden equity investment, abnormal equity price, interest transfer, "shadow shareholders" and other behaviors, whether it is the previous "no. 2 guidelines" or the latest "regulations on the supervision of resigned personnel", is not a kind of self-protection in the face of "human relations and worldly affairs".