news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

the author of this article is still everyone's old friend uo nick, a super powerful guy who has been insisting on popular science for many years, with a strong sense of responsibility and attention to details! following the previous mediterranean air battle and strait air battle, today he brings you popular science about another unpopular topic: the burmese air battle in the late world war ii. the links to the previous mediterranean air battle series and the remake of the strait air battle are as follows:

【mediterranean air battle】(remake) the battle between the german single-engine fighter unit and the allied fighter unit over the mediterranean sea in world war ii (part 2)

【mediterranean air battle】(remake) the battle between the german single-engine fighter unit and the allied fighter unit over the mediterranean sea in world war ii (part 1)

two wings dominate the skies of western europe! the peak moment of the german fighter force: the channel air battle from 1941 to 1942 (remake)

as the most marginalized and least important battlefield during the entire world war ii, the burmese battlefield is an almost completely forgotten battlefield. people know very little about the air battles that took place in this battlefield in the late stage of world war ii, and the burmese air battles are even less well-known than the series of ground battles in the burmese battlefield (it can even be said that the air battles in the entire china-india-burma theater are not well-known. when it comes to air operations over china-india-burma during world war ii, most military fans who have a certain understanding of world war ii can probably only think of the "hump route" and the early "flying tigers"). however, the scale and severity of the burmese air battles were second only to the air battles in the pacific theater in the entire asian battlefield, and the confrontation between the fighter units of both sides in the sky over burma in the late stage of the war was also very exciting. therefore, it is necessary to systematically popularize the air battles between the japanese fighter units and the allied fighter units in the late stage of the war, which can also fill a gap in the domestic research in this field. before starting the main text, i first need to declare the following points of attention to everyone:

first, the time period covered in this article only includes the period from july 1943 to the end of the war, and does not include a series of air battles that took place in the burma battlefield before the second half of 1943. friends who want to know the details of the air battles that took place in burma before the second half of 1943 can pay attention to the public account "sky captain" (the owner of the account is a big shot in the domestic military circle who studies the asia-pacific battlefield of world war ii. he is very skilled. in his early years, he created and published the "burma air battle" series, which describes in detail every air battle that took place over burma from december 1941 to june 1943, with very high quality).

second, the main reference for this article is the third volume of bloody shambles, “air war for burma: the allied air forces fight back in south-east asia 1942-1945”.written by christopher shores, a famous historian and a leading figure in the study of air combat in world war ii, this book is the most authoritative and objective book in the world on the study of the mid- and late-stage burma air battles.this book describes in detail every air battle that took place over burma from june 1942 to the end of the war, and quotes the contents of the combat logs of the warring parties for cross-comparison and careful verification.we strictly follow the basic principle of self-reporting, rather than blindly accepting one party's "base camp battle report."

third, the data that i will list below are the sum of the number of aircraft that can be completely or basically confirmed to have been lost to the enemy fighters in every air battle between the japanese fighter units and the allied fighter units over burma mentioned in this book in the late world war ii (including aircraft whose specific reasons for loss are unknown in their own battle reports but can be basically confirmed to have been lost to the enemy fighters by cross-comparing with the enemy's combat logs). in other words,these data are counted by me one by one.this project is huge and the creation is not easy, so i hope that all viewers can like, forward and support it.

fourth, all the data i quoted only include the number of fighters shot down and delisted by both sides in the air battle (that is, the number of total losses)., does not include the losses of both sides during non-combat periods, losses of both sides during combat periods due to non-hostile reasons (such as bad weather, operational errors or engine failures, etc.), aircraft destroyed on the ground by air strikes, aircraft shot down by the self-defense firepower of other types of aircraft of the opponent (such as bombers, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and transport aircraft, etc.) in air combat, aircraft shot down by enemy ground firepower (such as anti-aircraft guns), aircraft captured by the enemy, self-destructed aircraft, aircraft destroyed on the ground by enemy artillery fire, aircraft that were damaged and forced to land in air combat but were not eventually deregistered, and also does not include the number of bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, liaison aircraft, transport aircraft, torpedo aircraft, seaplanes and fighter-bombers shot down by both sides in air combat. therefore, all the data appearing in the article are not only much lower than the total losses including non-combat losses, but also significantly lower than the actual number of combat losses and air combat losses.

fifth, in the later period of the burma air war, the british army's "hurricane" was once equipped in large numbers in reconnaissance aircraft units and fighter-bomber units.all figures given in this article do not include the number of british reconnaissance and fighter-bomber units equipped with hurricanes shot down by japanese fighters, nor do they include the losses of these units to japanese fighters in air combat. at the same time, the article does not mention the losses of a-36 attack aircraft (the ground attack version of the p-51) equipped by the 311th fighter-bomber unit.therefore, the air combat loss data of the hurricane and p-51 given in the article are significantly lower than the air combat loss data of the two aircraft given by the famous japanese historian umemoto hiroshi in his own works.

sixth,since the author strictly abides by the principle of self-reporting, all the data appearing in the article are from the battle losses counted by both sides themselves, which are much less than the number of fighter jets shot down by both sides in the battle as reported by both sides.

seventh,the british fighter air combat loss data includes not only the losses of local raf (royal air force) fighter units in the mediterranean, but also the losses of local fighter units of other commonwealth air forces and rnfaa (royal naval air arm).

let’s first talk about the air combat between the allied and japanese fighter units in burma in the second half of 1943.throughout the second half of 1943, the p-40n had the best exchange ratio with the type 1 fighter "falcon" ii among all the local allied aircraft in burma. in the second half of 1943, the p-40n of the army air force had an overwhelming exchange ratio of 14:3 against the "falcon" in burma.since the local army air force fighter units equipped with p-40n generally had certain combat experience, they adopted the tactic of "one hit and one escape" when facing japanese aircraft, trying to avoid fighting with japanese aircraft at low altitudes and exerting their firepower and speed advantages to the maximum extent. therefore, it was not accidental that they achieved such an exchange ratio. the british spitfire 5, which had just arrived in burma, destroyed two hawks and lost three of its own in the air battle. the hurricane proved with actual actions that it was completely outdated. at least eight of its planes were shot down by japanese fighters in the air battle, but it did not shoot down a single japanese fighter. the p-51a's debut performance was very poor. the guys of the 530 fighter squadron of the 311 fighter-bomber group, who had just transformed from fighter-bomber pilots to fighter pilots, had no experience in air combat. they circled with japanese planes at low altitudes right from the start, and only shot down two japanese fighters (moreover, these two were not hawks, one was the type 2 fighter "zhong kui" and the other was the type 2 fu war "dragon slayer"), and lost seven of its own. the p-38, which had shined in the pacific theater, had just arrived in burma and did not perform well. instead, it was shot down by two hawks. in addition, the british p36 shot down one hawk without any losses. overall,in the second half of 1944, the jaaf fighter units in burma had an advantage of 23:19 in air combat against the allied fighter units, with an average exchange ratio of 1.2 allied fighters for every fighter lost. (in comparison, the japanese fighter units could only exchange one for one against the us b-24 four-engine heavy bombers over burma during the same period. it can be seen that due to the hurricane's hindrance, the exchange ratio of the allied fighter units was even worse than that of the us heavy bombers equipped with b-24s.)this was in stark contrast to the predicament faced by other fighter units of the japanese army and navy in air battles in the pacific theater (pto theater) at the time (it should be noted that the navy's units equipped with zero fighters can be regarded as the most elite japanese fighter units in the entire pto theater, but even the zero fighter team could not achieve a good exchange ratio: if the losses of bombers, torpedo planes and reconnaissance planes on both sides are not counted, the navy lost 401 zero fighters in the solomon air battle from august 1943 to february 1944, while the number of fighters lost by the us army, navy and air force on the opposite side during the same period was only about 200, and the exchange ratio between the two sides was 2 to 1), but,the advantage exchange ratio achieved by the japanese army was based on the fact that the entire cbi theater (china-burma-india theater) was the theater with the worst equipment, the lowest resource allocation order, and the lowest priority for equipment updates and replenishments on the allied side during the entire world war ii.how poorly equipped were the allied fighter units in the cbi theater? we only need to look at the following objective facts to know:

1.、until the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the british fighter units in burma were still equipped with hurricane 2 in large numbers.this fighter had basically disappeared from the fighter squadrons under the raf fighter command on the western front as early as the end of 1941, and disappeared from the british fighter units in the mediterranean theater in early 1943. however, many british fighter squadrons in the cbi theater were still flying hurricanes until the battle of imphal.

2、british fighter units in the cbi theater did not receive their first spitfire 5 until late september 1943.(at that time, the spitfire 5 was about to be eliminated on the western front, and most of the units in the mediterranean theater that were originally equipped with spitfire 5 began to switch to spitfire 9 and spitfire 8), and the first spitfire 8 arrived in burma at the end of 1943;

above: a p-51a from the 530th fighter squadron of the 311th fighter-bomber group.

3、the p-51a, which was used as a reconnaissance aircraft on the western front and the mediterranean theater, was actually treated as a high-end aircraft and played the role of a fighter in the cbi theater.what’s even more outrageous is that the 530th fighter squadron of the army air force, which was equipped with p-51a at the time, was not a pure fighter squadron before, but a fighter-bomber squadron;

4、from the end of 1943 to the beginning of 1944, the main combat equipment of the us army aviation in the cbi theater was still the p-40n.

above: mvp---p-40n fighter over burma in the second half of 1943.

in contrast, the japanese army paid more attention to the cbi theater than the allies, and even the old elites such as the 64th and 50th flying squadrons were pulled over to fight against the allies. therefore, it is not surprising that the jaaf fighter unit can achieve an advantageous exchange ratio under such circumstances.

above: a type 1 fighter "hayabusa" ii from the 2nd squadron of the 33rd flying squadron。

next, let's move the timeline forward to the first half of 1944. compared with the second half of 1943, the air combat exchange ratio between the local jaaf fighter units in burma and the allied fighter units during this period dropped drastically: the us p-51a successfully shot down 11 falcons and 6 zhong kui in air combat, and lost 4 of its own aircraft; the us p-38 shot down 15 falcons and 1 zhong kui in air combat, and lost 4 of its own aircraft; the us p-40n shot down 1 falcon in air combat, and lost 0 of its own aircraft; the british spitfire 8 shot down 14 falcons in air combat, and lost 6 of its own aircraft, in the second quarter of 1944, the exchange ratio between spitfire 8 and type 1 fighter reached an astonishing 1:8 (the exchange ratio in the first quarter of 1944 was not much better because the raf 81st squadron, which had just been transferred from the mediterranean theater, was not familiar with the characteristics of the falcon and the local air combat mode in myanmar. they circled around the falcon at low altitude right from the start, so they paid a little tuition); the british spitfire 5 shot down 11 falcons in air combat and lost 8 of its own aircraft; the british fighter unit's hurricane 2 shot down 3 falcons in air combat and lost 8 of its own aircraft. it is worth mentioning thatmost of the jaaf fighter losses occurred in the second quarter of 1944, when the skies over burma became a one-sided massacre of japanese fighters by allied fighters.during this period, the japanese planes could only make their presence felt when facing hurricanes (the score was 5:0, not counting the hurricanes of the british reconnaissance aircraft units and combat bomber units). in addition to the allied fighter units, the frequent air raids of allied aircraft, the self-defense firepower of allied strategic bombers (mainly b-24) and medium and light bombers, the allied ground air defense firepower, the bad climate and environment, pilot operating errors and mechanical failures of the aircraft also caused huge losses of personnel and equipment to the jaaf fighter units in the burma theater. among them, the allied air raids were the most deadly (in the second quarter, the japanese battlefields in the burma theater were basically bombed to pieces by the allies, and a large number of aircraft of the 5th air division were destroyed on the ground, and the casualties of flight personnel and ground crew were very serious)。even more difficult to replace than the lost equipment was the loss of experienced old pilots. as the old birds died or went missing, the quality of the japanese fighter unit declined seriously. due to the low quality of personnel and lack of actual combat experience, the highly expected 87th flying squadron (equipped with a brand new "zhong kui") performed terribly in the second quarter of 1944. at least 7 type 2 fighters were shot down by american planes in air combat, 6 pilots were killed, and more type 2 fighters were lost in air raids. not only that,the team also boasted in the combat log that they shot down "17 us fighter jets", but in fact they did not shoot down a single one.the record of the us military made the squadron's face slapped. what's more terrible is that since the second quarter of 1945, even the 64th flying squadron (also known as the "kato hayabusa fighting squadron"), the leader of the cbi theater and one of the most elite units of the jaaf, has been basically abolished. due to severe blood loss, the 64th squadron, which is full of rookies, performed very weakly in air combat and completely lost its previous style.

above: a p-51a over burma. although it was not used to the local climate at the beginning of the war, the p-51a soon proved its strength in the air battles of 1944.

above: a p-51a fighter jet of the u.s. army's 1st air assault group.

above: a spitfire 8 from raf no. 136 squadron taking off.

above: a type 2 fighter "zhong kui" captured by the u.s. army air force, with its paint job changed to the u.s. military logo.

in the second half of 1944, jaaf was shot down by allied fighters in air combat, and 14 hawks and 1 type 4 fighter "syphon" were shot down, as well as 1 p-40n, 1 p-47d, two p-38s, 3 f4u "corsairs" from the british royal navy air force, and 1 spitfire 8. the exchange ratio was reduced to less than 2. the exchange ratio rebounded mainly because the local ija fighter units were drastically replacing new fighters such as the type 1 fighter "hayabusa" type 3, zhong kui, hayate, and type 3 fighter "flying swallow". at the same time, the rainy season in myanmar also restricted the combat operations of the allied air force. in addition, after experiencing terrible losses in the spring of 1944, the japanese air force in myanmar began to preserve its strength and passively avoid fighting, greatly reducing the number and frequency of attacks. however, the good times did not last long, and the jaaf fighter units were soon beaten back to their original form in early 1945.

above: one of the kings in the sky over burma in the later stages of the war - the spitfire 8 fighter.

above: type 2 "zhong kui" fighter.

above: another king in the sky over burma in the late world war ii - the p-38j fighter.

in the air battle in 1945, the jaaf fighter unit in the burma theater had 24 falcons, 15 zhong kui, 7 gale, 3 swallows and 4 dragon slayers shot down by allied fighters, but only shot down 1 p-47d, 1 british naval aviation f6f, 3 british naval aviation f4u, 1 p-38, 1 firefly, 1 spitfire 8 and 1 p-51d. the air combat exchange ratio between the two sides was as high as 5.89:1!of the 53 japanese fighters shot down by allied fighters, 51 were shot down in the burma air battle in the first four months of 1945, and of the 9 allied fighters shot down by japanese fighters, all were shot down in the air battle in the first four months of 1945.in the first four months of 45 years, the jaaf fighter unit not only suffered heavy losses in the confrontation with allied fighters, but also the allied devastating air raids on japanese airfields and the self-defense firepower of allied strategic bombers and medium and light bombers also caused huge losses of personnel and equipment to the jaaf fighter unit. coupled with the deterioration of the entire burmese war situation and the advancement of the british and indian ground forces, the japanese army gradually withdrew all fighter units in burma from the end of april, and even the 64th squadron was forced to withdraw to thailand. therefore, the air battle over burma after april was actually over. the next confrontation between the fighter units of both sides in indochina was in july, over indochina. the us fighter unit successfully shot down 1 hayabusa and 1 tornado in the air battle in july without any losses of its own.

above: the three-style combat "flying swallow"。

above: type 4 fighter “gas”

。

above: type 2 fukushima “dragon slayer”, a twin-engine fighter equipped with a 37mm cannon.

next, let's review the exchange ratios between the various allied fighters and the japanese fighters in the second half of the burma air battle (i.e. from july 1943 to the end of the war): the f6f "hellcat" fighter of the royal navy air force was the allied fighter with the best exchange ratio with the japanese fighters in the second half of the burma air battle (i.e. from july 1943 to august 1945), shooting down at least 6 japanese fighters and losing 1 of its own, with an exchange ratio of 6:1; the second was the p-40 (i.e. p-40n), shooting down 17 japanese fighters and losing 4 of its own, with an exchange ratio of 4.25:1; the third in exchange ratio was the p-38 (p-38 the p-38 was the allied fighter that shot down the most japanese fighters in burma in the later stages of the war. the fourth place went to the f4u corsair of the royal navy air force, which shot down at least 17 japanese fighters and lost 6 of its own aircraft, with an exchange ratio of 2.83:1. the fifth place went to the p-51 (p-51a and p-51d), which shot down 26 japanese fighters. the p-51d had a 6:1 exchange ratio against japanese fighters. the p-47 (d) and firefly ranked sixth, both of which had a 2:1 exchange ratio against japanese fighters (british and american p-47 units shot down a total of 4 japanese fighters and lost 2 of their own). the spitfire (spitfire 5 and spitfire 8) ranked seventh, shooting down 35 japanese fighters and losing 19 of their own, with an exchange ratio of 1.8 4:1, among which the spitfire 8 had an exchange ratio of 2.75:1 when facing the japanese fighters (it shot down 21 hawks and 1 tornado, and lost 8 of its own aircraft); ranked last was the hurricane in the british fighter unit. the hurricane proved with actual actions that it was completely outdated. the hurricane fighter only shot down 3 hawks in the air combat, and lost 16 of its own aircraft. the air combat losses were more than 5 times the results. this performance was even worse than the p-36 (the british p-36 fighter and the japanese fighter had a score of 1:0).

above: p-51d over myanmar.

above: f4u corsair of the royal naval air force carrier-based aircraft unit.

above: an f6f hellcat from the royal fleet air arm carrier-based aircraft unit.

in summary,during the second half of the burma air campaign, allied fighters shot down at least 149 japanese fighters in air battles with japanese fighters.(including about 110 type 1 fighter "falcon", 23 type 2 fighter "zhong kui", 3 type 3 fighter "flying swallow", 8 type 4 fighter "swift wind" and 5 type 2 fighter "dragon slayer"),selfshot down by a japanese fighter planeabout 70 aircraft(including 16 hurricanes, 2 p-47ds, 9 p-38s, 4 p-40ns, 1 p-51d, 11 p-51a, 8 spitfire 8s, 11 spitfire 5s, 6 f4u corsairs, 1 firefly and 1 f6f hellcat).excluding the records of confrontations with old aircraft such as hurricanes and p-36s, the air combat exchange ratio between jaaf fighter units and allied fighter units in the second half of the burma air battle was 145:54. in the air battle, on average, for every 2.7 fighters lost, one allied fighter was exchanged. when facing american fighters, they basically achieved a three-for-one exchange (27 american fighters were shot down and 83 of their own aircraft were lost).although this exchange ratio may not be as good as that in the chinese battlefield during the same period, it is still much better than the exchange ratio achieved by the japanese fighter units in the pto theater when facing the allied fighter units during the same period. considering that the personnel quality of the jaaf fighter units declined seriously in the later period, it is already very good to be able to achieve such an exchange ratio. of course, this is also related to the fact that most of the fighter units deployed by the allied forces in burma were detachments.