2024-08-31
한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina
interface news reporter | chen zhenfang
jiemian news editor | song jianan
agents who are eager to make a small fortune and "earn money without doing anything" by sharing power banks are collectively falling into a loss-making dilemma.
recently, several jiedian agents told jiemian news that before joining, the platform claimed that they could get a high commission and make back their investment in half a year, but after half a year, these agents not only did not make a profit, but suffered a huge loss. in their view, jiedian was engaged in false propaganda and data fraud.
according to agent li na, many people stopped paying the balance after realizing they were losing money, but were sued by jiedian. in order to minimize losses and protect their own interests, they are also trying to fight back with legal weapons, but this road is not easy.
the "defection" of agents encountered by jiedian is just the tip of the iceberg of the "collapse" of the shared power bank industry. just a week ago, another shared power bank company, laidian, was also in trouble due to rumors of the "disappearance" of its founder, and was even involved in "loss of state-owned assets."
lai dian was the first company to capture the business opportunity of shared power banks, and its founder yuan bingsong was the first person to "take the plunge" in the industry. now, lai dian has fallen behind, and yuan bingsong lost all his shares in lai dian in a bet and was forced to leave.
although yuan bingsong denied his "disappearance" through a live broadcast, it is difficult for him to "call" again - the company's news stopped updating as early as october 2020, and the last tweet on the wechat public account was in august last year.
in addition to jiedian and laidian, monster charging, the "first shared power bank stock", has also lost its glory. not only has it been reported to have shut down its direct business on a large scale and turned to a lower-cost agency franchise model, it has also frequently caused dissatisfaction among consumers and agents due to unreasonable charges and poor service.
from 2015 to now, in less than 10 years, shared power bank companies have written a business story of the rise, explosion, reshuffle and crisis of an industry. the business model adopted by them has been controversial since its inception. who can make money from it? what new stories can be told in the future? these questions are waiting for a clear answer.
whether the shared power bank business is good or not, agents have their own unique say.
last july, chen li invested 26,000 yuan to buy 30 jiedian cabinet devices. after a year, she only got back 6,000 yuan, which was far from the "6 to 8 months payback" claimed by jiedian staff. "in fact, it will take at least two years to get back the investment," chen li said.
chen li's experience is not an isolated case. she even suffered relatively little loss among agents. li na previously purchased 100 six-port street electric cabinets, and with other installation service fees, she invested more than 110,000 yuan in total. after one year of agency, she only got back 35,000 yuan. with the loss and poor operation, she believed that she had no hope of getting back her investment.
the shared power bank industry is recognized to have three characteristics: heavy assets, heavy cash flow, and low barriers. the profit model is mainly based on the sharing of usage fees paid by consumers. the parties to the sharing include the shared power bank companies, agents who expand channels, and merchants who place power bank cabinets. this determines that the key factors for competition among different platforms lie in financial strength and channel locations.
among these, the profit sharing ratio among the three parties has become the top priority that influences the development of the industry.
jiemian news found that usually the power bank sharing company or platform can get 10% to 20% of the revenue, and the rest is distributed by agents and merchants through independent negotiation, with merchants often asking for the lion's share. since each agent has different inputs, the actual share that merchants get is also different.
the power banks that li na represented were mainly installed in beijing, tianjin, hunan and other places. as there were too many cabinets for her to represent, li na chose the platform's "help shop" fee service, which means asking the latter to help find merchants. at this time, an additional 260 yuan is required for each cabinet, not including non-explicit costs such as car rental, gas, and laying of power strips.
the platform's help in laying out the stores is subject to acceptance conditions. the average turnover per store must reach 3.3 yuan within a week after the installation to be considered qualified. if it does not meet the standard, it will continue to optimize and help agents to re-develop new merchants. however, during the installation period, li na found that large orders appeared inexplicably, even though the store was not located in a prosperous commercial district. once the acceptance period was over, the turnover plummeted, and at its worst, it was only more than 80 yuan a day. because the jiedian salesperson had already promised the merchants a share of up to 90% (excluding the remaining amount of the platform's share), li na actually only had 10% of the turnover income during the assessment period.
only after the acceptance period and the final payment for installation was made could li na change the profit sharing. "if the profit sharing is not adjusted, the agents will not make any money. if the profit sharing is adjusted, the merchants will often end the cooperation due to low profit sharing." in the end, li na could only remove some of the cabinets.
the so-called "re-sharing" is an "unspoken rule" in the shared power bank industry. usually, the bank account for profit sharing is managed by the agent, who can set the operating cost and other figures in advance without the merchant knowing. it is worth noting that the platform staff will often teach the agent how to perform such operations in advance.
this practice of secretly adjusting data and changing the sharing ratio can be traced as early as when the shared power bank industry was mainly based on the direct sales model.
the shared power bank industry exploded in 2015, and then in 2017, a "spot war" was launched, which led to a surge in channel incentive costs. a large number of small power bank companies "collapsed" as a result, and an oligopoly led by "three electrics and one beast" was initially formed. "three electrics" refers to xiaodian, laidian, and jiedian, and "one beast" is monster charging.
from 2019 to 2020, the cumulative number of users of jiedian, xiaodian and monster charging exceeded 100 million respectively. xiaodian also received strategic financing from major internet companies including tencent and ant group.
as 2021 begins, competition in the industry has become increasingly fierce. monster power has successfully landed on the nasdaq, winning the title of the first "shared power bank" stock. jiedian and soudian have merged into zhumang technology, and xiaodian is also working hard to go public.
however, the capital market did not buy into the story of shared power banks. monster charging’s stock price fell below the ipo price upon listing, and has continued to fall since then. as of press time, its stock price is only $0.621, down more than 90% from the ipo price, and its market value has also shrunk significantly from $2.129 billion on the first day of listing to $160 million today.
at its peak, monster charging had a direct-operated bd team of more than 3,000 people. in order to further expand its market share, the company stepped up the promotion of the agency model in the year of its listing. during the same period, players such as meituan, xiaodian, and zhumang began to shrink their direct-operated city businesses and vigorously expand their agents.
when the direct sales model was dominant, agent wang lei observed that since the platform's direct sales city managers could know the merchant's transaction details, they would take advantage of system loopholes to replace equipment, replace the agent's equipment with profitable stores, and remove the direct sales machines. merchants were also unaware of this.
many agents also mentioned that platform managers stole cash flow, and agents were unable to export detailed store data and revenue due to insufficient authority at the time, and could only see order details and cash flow. due to the information gap between agents and merchants, conflicts are inevitably exacerbated due to uneven benefits.
wang lei told jiemian news that many managers of direct-sale teams of some platforms have hired others to act as agents, thus encroaching on the company's resources and cash flow. "managers are good at both ends. they can catch others' illegal operations, but it is difficult for others to catch them." wang lei believes that once a manager has problems, the entire direct-sale city will also have problems, which is one of the core reasons for the decline of shared power bank companies.
and now, a similar situation is happening again, except that the agents themselves are the ones carrying out the behind-the-scenes operations, and some of them have even simply "disappeared."
a store owner in changsha told jiemian news that she has not been able to contact the changsha agent she was supposed to work with, and she has not received her share for five consecutive months. she has tried to communicate with monster charging headquarters, but the other party has not responded, and she is currently preparing to sue monster charging.
for the platform, shifting from direct sales to agency is the only way to cope with the challenge of survival.
in 2021, as a strong rival of monster charging, xiaodian planned to launch an ipo in hong kong. the prospectus submitted that year showed that its revenue in 2020 was 1.91 billion yuan and its net loss was 104 million yuan. the company has 710,000 shared charging service points and nearly 6 million power banks, ahead of monster charging and jiedian in the same period.
the losses are largely due to the sharp increase in distribution and marketing expenses. in 2020, this expense alone reached 1.472 billion yuan, a much higher increase than the revenue in the same period. among them, the increase in commissions and entry fees directly led to an increase in marketing costs. the commissions were 710 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 23.7%, and the entry fees reached 302 million yuan, a sharp year-on-year increase of 114.2%. since then, xiaodian's listing has been "stranded" because its application materials have automatically expired, and there have been multiple reports of layoffs.
another company that suffered a setback in the capital market was lai dian.
on january 21, 2020, shi xugang, the actual controller of zhongwei electronics, and han bing, the legal representative of laidian technology, signed a "share transfer agreement". according to the agreement, zhongwei electronics intends to transfer 9.07% of its shares to han bing. after the transfer is completed, han bing will become a shareholder of zhongwei electronics with a shareholding of more than 5%. the transaction was eventually terminated because han bing failed to raise sufficient funds.
subsequently, lai dian began to seek state-owned assets to "save the situation". at the end of 2020, the holder of 100% of lai dian technology's equity was changed to pujiang lai dian zhengqi technology co., ltd., and the shareholders behind pujiang lai dian were mainly state-owned assets of pujiang county, zhejiang province.
the subsequent story of lai dian is the "disappearance" of its founder yuan bingsong, which is familiar to the media. in the live broadcast to prove that he was "still free", yuan bingsong did not respond to the rumor that "laidian caused the loss of state-owned assets", but only revealed that he lost all the shares of lai dian due to gambling. han bing, who was also reported to have lost contact with yuan bingsong, has not appeared yet.
tianyancha app shows that as of august 25, the total amount of money executed by the calls reached 189 million yuan. the company was also listed as a dishonest enterprise, a person subject to execution, and a restricted high-consumption enterprise. the company's executives chen xing and han bing were repeatedly listed as related restricted consumption objects.
faced with the overall "downturn" of the industry, players who are still struggling in this track have to turn to the agency model with lower operating costs.
in early august this year, sina technology reported that monster charging was selling off its direct-sale business in a large area and switching to an agent-franchise model. jiemian news learned from a monster charging staff member that the company currently has only a small number of direct-sale stores, most of which have been cancelled, and most of the agents have signed contracts with the headquarters directly.
under the direct sales model, although the platform has more initiative, it also faces greater cash flow pressure. the opposite is true for the agency model.
the cost items of shared power banks mainly include depreciation of power banks, sales costs, etc. in the past, these costs were mainly borne by the platform, but according to jiemian news, now the costs of some lost power banks will be borne by the agents.
ping an securities once pointed out in a research report that the average life cycle of offline stores in china is 2 years. due to factors such as the low cost of switching merchant cabinets, shared charging points are highly mobile, with nearly 60% of points needing to be replaced every year, placing high demands on the company's direct marketing, agent resources, and subsequent operations and management.
agents who have at least dozens of cabinets are becoming the platform's de facto ground promotion team. the agency model can effectively reduce high sales costs, ease cash flow pressure, increase penetration in the sinking market, and quickly achieve point expansion.
but now, it has become the norm for the same store to display shared power banks of 2 to 3 brands. when neither agents nor outlets are exclusive, market competition is bound to further deteriorate. eventually, the battle for outlets turns into a battle for agents.
by the end of 2022, the proportion of monster charging's agency outlets increased to 52.5%, exceeding the direct-operated outlets for the first time, and achieved full-year profitability for the first time in 2023. but this does not mean that monster charging can continue to grow.
in the first quarter of this year, the company's revenue reached 397 million yuan, a sharp drop of 51.7% year-on-year, and its net profit turned from profit to loss, with a loss of 300,000 yuan. the company explained that the loss was related to the adjustment of the contract arrangement with network partners and the reduction of mobile device charging income.
gross profit margin also declined along with profits. in 2020, monster charging's gross profit margin was as high as 84.67%. in the three years after the agency was liberalized, this figure decreased step by step, to 82.13%, 76.76%, and 56.45% respectively.
meituan charging, backed by a big company, has undergone many adjustments after returning to the market in 2020. first, the person in charge of meituan's shared power bank resigned, and many bds transferred to meituan youxuan. later, the number of directly-operated cities shrank, and 33 cities including hangzhou, xi'an, tianjin, and chongqing have been transferred to agents for operation.
zhumang technology, which has long switched to an agency model, has never been listed, but several loss-making agents told interface news that they plan to sue the company for false advertising, sales fraud, and excessive promises of profits.
despite the problems with the agency model, a few agencies do make money from it.
wang lei is a veteran in the shared power bank industry. he is also the agent for the products of meituan, jiedian, and monster power. he has hundreds of cabinets under his name and thousands of cabinets in the partnership warehouse. he entered the market in 2021 and invested more than 100,000 yuan in each brand. he eventually achieved several times the profit, with a gross profit margin of about 20% every month.
"the power bank industry actually relies a lot on insider information and relationship resources." in wang lei's view, the reason he was able to make money was that he entered the market early enough and had enough information.
specifically, to be a shared power bank agent, you need to keep abreast of market conditions, policies, and personnel changes, down to the quotations from peers to merchants, merchant turnover estimates, price increases and decreases of power bank charging machines, as well as changes in regional team operating policies, changes in team leaders or liaisons, and other issues.
generally speaking, all kinds of offline locations with large traffic, long business hours, and long consumption time are advantageous locations, which are also the "core assets" of shared power banks. however, this information can only be obtained by insiders, and ordinary agents cannot easily access it, and funds only flow within a small range.
wang lei pointed out that many agents invest in shared power banks as a side business, hoping to make money “while doing nothing”, which is unrealistic and “most people will return empty-handed.”
on the other hand, the platform also hopes to extricate itself through the agency model, but excessive letting go can easily lead to backlash from agents, merchants and consumers.
li na said that during the period when the platform paid for the installation of the agents, there would be salesmen who would directly contact the merchants and help them solve relevant problems. however, after the evaluation period, many salesmen seemed to disappear and no longer responded to any questions from the merchants, which made the merchants full of resentment and then rejected the agents.
wang lei, who has invested more, also faces problems such as the poor service management capabilities of shared power bank companies and the lack of a way to complain. ordinary agents cannot communicate directly with the operation team and can only rely on outsourced customer service. if they need to purchase power banks or deal with related revenue issues, they have to find a corresponding account manager.
the chaotic management also earned the platform the title of “price assassin”.
since the beginning of this year, many consumers have complained on social media about inconsistent charging standards and random deductions of fees for shared power banks. black cat complaints shows that monster charging, jiedian, and meituan charging received 21,166, 24,482, and 6,575 complaints respectively, most of which were related to price.
consumers are willing to use shared power banks because they are convenient and cost-effective. however, as the market price of shared power banks continues to rise, it is obviously more cost-effective to buy them yourself.
at present, the price of shared power banks is generally 2 to 6 yuan per hour, but some consumers have found that the price of power banks in some areas has reached 10 yuan per hour, which is beyond their affordability.
even so, the scale of the shared power bank industry and the number of related companies continue to grow.
a report released by iresearch consulting shows that in 2023, the scale of the shared power bank industry will be 12.6 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 25.7%, and is expected to exceed 40 billion yuan by 2029; the number of industry coverage points has reached 4.04 million, accounting for 19.1% of all potential effective points in the country, a year-on-year increase of 31.8%.
the above report points out that the top five brands account for 96.6%, the overall concentration of the industry remains high, and internal competition is serious.
tianyancha data also shows that there are still a large number of new companies entering the industry. in 2015, the number of newly registered shared power bank companies exceeded 100, and by august this year, there were more than 2,500 existing related companies.
with the increasing number of personal electronic devices, it is still difficult to conclude that "shared power banks are on their way out." however, before balancing the interests of agents and merchants, improving management models, and enhancing consumer experience, every step forward for shared power bank companies will not be easy.
collect and organize the latest news information and make it available for free for everyone to read
