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Author/ Lin Haidong

On the evening of August 20th local time, the US media NY Times reported that Biden approved a nuclear strategic plan in March this year. This highly confidential "nuclear weaponThe User Guide is a revised version that is updated approximately every four years. There is no electronic version, and only a very small number of paper documents are distributed to a very small number of national security officials andPentagonThe disclosure came after two U.S. officials were allowed to submit a detailed unclassified briefing to Congress before Biden leaves office, “hinting at the change in a few carefully restrained words” before submitting the briefing.

The first is Vipin Narang, who was once the acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy.Vipin Narang, an expert on nuclear strategy, left the post in May and returned to MITHe said the guide is intended for “Dealing with Multiple Nuclear-Weaponized Adversaries"; he specifically mentioned China.

The second is Pranay Vardy, senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the White House National Security Council.Pranay VaddiHe said the guide “firstThe document "examines in detail whether the United States is prepared to respond to simultaneous or sequential nuclear crises with a combination of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons"; in particular, he noted that the document "emphasizesThe necessity of simultaneously deterring China, Russia and North Korea”。

On August 21, local time, Sean Savit, spokesman for the US National Security Council,Sean Savett)In response to the US media (VOA) said in an email interview that the guidance "is not a response to any single entity, country or threat." He emphasized that the latest guidance builds on the guidance issued by previous administrations, "There are more continuities than changesSavit did not provide details of the new strategy, but noted that "while the specific text of the guidelines is confidential, its existence is by no means confidential." Savit's remarks indicate that the White House isLighten upThe relevant issues of this guideline are: first, this guideline has existed for a long time and is only being revised this time; second, the new version of the strategy is not aimed at any specific target.

In comparison, the information disclosed by the three US officials is somewhat contradictory, but it is worth noting that the official meaning of Narang and Wadi's statements is less official, while Savit is the one who represents the White House in a serious manner. Savit's understated attitude reflects the high sensitivity of the guidelines. These two statements are actually explanations of the guidelines from different perspectives. When combined, they are closer to the truth of the matter.

North Korea did not respond to the NY Times immediately, but instead put its response after Savit’s official statement. A spokesperson for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on August 24 that Savit’s statement was “naive propaganda fabrication” and that the U.S. attempt was to “legitimize its dangerous nuclear use strategy aimed at military containment of other countries and maintaining geopolitical hegemony, and avoid condemnation from the international community.” As a member of the “international community,” North Korea “expressed serious concerns, strong condemnation and opposition” to the U.S. move. This also shows North Korea’s cautious attitude toward external news—it waits and sees and does nothing about media reports; it takes the knife to the battle and uses all its tricks when it comes to official statements.

During the conversation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson exposed the US's "keenness to ensure unilateral nuclear superiority", saying that the US, which has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, has "adjusted its nuclear posture" and "has had a very serious negative impact on the global nuclear balance, security environment and nuclear disarmament system". He also said that in the face of the US's "intensified nuclear threat", the efforts of "sovereign states to strengthen their own national defense capabilities" cannot under any circumstances become an "excuse for aggressive nuclear force enhancement and provocative nuclear posture adjustments". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said that no matter how the US exaggerates "nuclear threats from other countries", North Korea will "Promote the construction of a fully reliable nuclear force according to the prescribed timetable", safeguarding national sovereignty and security interests, and called this "the most necessary and legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense to safeguard regional peace and security and its own defense"; at the same time, it stated that North Korea will, as always, "do everything possible to strengthen its strategic forces, strive to control and eliminate all security challenges that may arise from the United States' adventurous adjustment of its nuclear posture, and will resolutely respond to any form of nuclear threats."

The focus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman's remarks was still on the "military balance" that North Korea has been concerned about in recent years; for details, please see "”, I will not elaborate on it. Although the whole speech is righteous, there is a sense of pride in the “opportunity” between the lines. It can be said that the revision of the “Guidelines for the Use of Nuclear Weapons” by the United States came at the right time. On the premise that the US-South Korea “Ulchi Freedom Shield” joint exercise has already provided an excuse for North Korea, it has provided North Korea with a better excuse for the next move, as if it feels that the excuse provided by “Ulchi Freedom Shield” is not sufficient. North Korea has always been good at seizing opportunities, and this opportunity should not be easily let go. No matter how it responds to the US move, it now has a more sufficient reason, and will attribute all the responsibility to the United States afterwards.

There are two key points worth noting in the Foreign Ministry spokesman's remarks. First, he emphasized that North Korea has a "prescribed timetable" for building its nuclear force. Second, he emphasized that North Korea will "continue to strengthen its nuclear force." This latest statement is consistent with a series of related statements made by North Korea since April this year.The direction is becoming clearer, that is, the first is to strengthen nuclear force, the second is to strengthen nuclear force, and the third is to strengthen nuclear force. In the context of North Korea, the concept of "nuclear force" includes not only the increase in the number of existing nuclear weapons, but also the development of new nuclear warheads and new missiles; it is worth noting that the latter includes the possibility of nuclear testing - inI once mentioned in the article that I would not be surprised if there was any noise in Punggye-ri between August and October. This was the possibility I was referring to.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the adjustment of the U.S. nuclear posture this time has brought about "very serious negative impacts." It seems that North Korea's future actions will also be part of this "negative impact." After all, it is all the fault of the United States, and North Korea is just following suit. Once North Korea makes a big move, no one can mention it. If you mention it, it will be considered "hostile North Korean policy" and "double standards." Why don't you mention the United States first?

By the way, recently foreign media have hyped up the topic of "North Korean athletes who take photos with South Korean athletes at the Olympics will be punished", and many friends in the background have asked about this. I have answered this question before, see "". It should be added that the initiator of this hype is the so-called "South Korean media NK", which was quoted by Singapore's "Sino-Japanese Morning Post" and its audience has been expanded. This is one reason. Second, the source of the initiator is said to be "high-level sources in Pyongyang". Its reports always have various "sources", from "high-level officials in Pyongyang" to "inside the North Korean military", from "local cadres" to "people in a certain place"; if it says that its source is "local cadres and masses", I am still unwilling to argue with it, but if it says that the source is "high-level" or "inside the military", I would like to ask, what is wrong with these North Korean "high-level sources" to provide information to a "South Korean media" "hosted" by a North Korean defector and to be willing to contact the defector?

By the way, the news that North Korea will open up to tourism in December has been commented on before, but it is only a "possibility" and has not been finalized. For details, please refer to "》。