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About the author: Young (original pen name:Chemistry Competition Leader), ChongqingCurrently studying at Bashu Middle School. He is interested in modern naval history and is good at using archives, war history, papers, memoirs and other historical materials to restore historical events (B station: Young Li Mingyang)

The full text has 13,304 words, 42 pictures and 9 tables. It takes 25 minutes to read. It will be first released on August 24, 2024.

1. Japan’s Claims of Victory and Losses

(1) Battle Overview

After the battle, the Japanese air forces immediately summarized the results of the battle according to the reports of the attack teams and contact aircraft. The 22nd Air Combat Command submitted a battle summary report to the Southern Expeditionary Fleet Command after integrating the reports of various teams.

At 22:30 on the 10th, the 22nd Air Force Command reported to the Southern Expeditionary Fleet Command the "22nd Air Force Confidential Telegram No. 328" and submitted the "Malay Force 1st Air Force Combat Overview No. 3", the full text of which is as follows:

1. Between 0600 and 1230, 10 medium-attack aircraft of the reconnaissance team, 2 land-based reconnaissance aircraft, 51 medium-attack aircraft of the torpedo team, and 34 medium-attack aircraft of the explosive attack team set out for a position near 93 degrees 55 nautical miles from Kuantan on the east coast of Malaysia. Between 1258 and 1415, they launched fierce torpedo and explosive attacks on the British battleships "Prince of Wales", "Repulse" and other direct-defense destroyers, sinking 2 battleships, and returned to land at 1810. 2. Two Lukong aircraft and one Yuankong aircraft were killed and self-exploded on the battlefield. Two Lukong aircraft were forced to land in southern French Indochina. Hit: 7 Yuankong aircraft can be repaired within the team, Lukong 2 aircraft can be repaired in the confidential factory, 5 aircraft can be repaired within the team, and 10 Meikong aircraft can be repaired within the team. 3. Weapons used: 49 aerial torpedoes, 26 50-range general-purpose bombs, 16 25-range general-purpose bombs, and 4 6-range land-use bombs

At 15:00 on the 11th, the 22nd Air Force Command reported to the Southern Fleet Command "Secret 330th Telegram of the 22nd Air Force", and submitted "Supplementary Report No. 2 of the 1st Air Force Combat Overview of the Malay Force", supplemented with details about the night operation on the 9th. The full text is as follows:

At 1810, after receiving a telegram about the dispatch of two enemy warships, the reconnaissance team, consisting of one land reconnaissance aircraft and three medium attack aircraft, set off. The torpedo team, consisting of 26 medium attack aircraft, and the explosive attack team, consisting of 9 medium attack aircraft, continued to dispatch. Due to bad weather in southern French Indochina, all of them returned after 0145 on the 10th without engaging the enemy.

On the 11th, the crews of each air force gathered and held a meeting to review the results of the battle. After re-evaluation, the Kanoya Air Force believed that its torpedo team sank a guided destroyer in addition to the Prince of Wales and the Counterattack.

After further summarizing the reports from various air forces, the 22nd Air Force Command submitted the "Secret 22nd Air Force Telegram No. 332" to the Southern Expeditionary Fleet Command in 1920, and submitted the "Additional Correction to the 3rd Combat Overview of the 1st Air Force of the Malay Forces", the full text of which is as follows:

1. Added 1 enemy cruiser (or guided destroyer) sunk. 2. The number of planes damaged in the southern part of French Indochina that made an emergency landing in Lukong was revised to 1, the number of planes damaged in Lukong that were repaired in a confidential factory was revised to 3, and the number of planes damaged in Meikong that were repaired in a confidential factory was added.

(2) Actual losses of the Japanese side

During the entire naval battle, a total of 3 Japanese land attack aircraft were shot down, and all 21 crew members were killed. The list is as follows:

Wonsan Air Force 1st Squadron 31st Squadron No. 3

Main Operator: Katsujiro Kawada and Ichibi So

Deputy Operator: Jōtaro Kawasaki, Mitsuko

Investigation: Sakai Kyuhei, Second Flight Officer

Main conductor: Kametaro Takeda, Mitsuhiro

Vice TV: Wei Yong Yi Nan Yi Fei

Main coordinator: Akimoto Yasuo

Deputy Chief: Aizawa Hikaru

Kanoya Air Force 3rd Squadron 1st Squadron Unit 2

Main Operator: Momoi Toshimitsu Erfei Cao

Deputy Operator: Ikeda Hiroyuki

Investigation: Yamamoto Fukumatsu Ichihiro

Main conductor: Yoshikatsu Tanaka, Mitsuhiro

Vice Director: Sato Kinjiro

Main chorus: Nono Shigeka

Deputy Director: Nakura Yoshio Sanzheng Cao

Kanoya Air Force 3rd Squadron 1st Squadron Unit 3

Main Operator: Tian Zhiliang and Sanfei Cao

Deputy Operator: Abe Yoshiho Ichi

Investigation: Nakajima Yusou Ichikatsu

Main actor: Sasa Millennium Sanfei Cao

Vice-director: Sanji 1111fei

Main organizer: Shigeo Yamaura

Deputy Director: Aoyama Katsuji

In addition to the dead, one person was seriously injured after the No. 2 plane of the 2nd Squadron of the 1st Squadron of Kanoya Air Force was hit. He was the second lieutenant commander Shinichi Suzuki.

In addition to the three land attack planes shot down, the Japanese also had a land attack plane from Kanoya Sora that was severely damaged and forced to land in southern French Indochina, with all the crew members surviving. The number of other planes that were hit is as follows:

Table 1: Statistics of Japanese Army Losses

During the naval battle, the Japanese army consumed a total of 49 aerial torpedoes, 26 500kg conventional bombs, 16 250kg conventional bombs, 4 60kg land bombs, and 10,260 machine gun bullets.

The Yuanshan air force consumed 16 torpedoes, 9 500kg conventional shells, 4 60kg land shells, and 2,100 machine gun shells.

Mihoro Air consumed 7 torpedoes, 17 500kg normal shells, 16 250kg normal shells, and 930 machine gun bullets.

Kanoya Sora consumed 26 torpedoes and 7,230 machine gun bullets.

(3) Japan’s Claims of Victory

The Japanese claimed that they fired 26 torpedoes at the port side of the counterattack, hitting 10, fired 9 torpedoes at the starboard side of the counterattack, hitting 4, fired 5 torpedoes at the port side of the Prince of Wales, hitting 2, and fired 9 torpedoes at the starboard side of the Prince of Wales, hitting 5. In total, 49 torpedoes were fired, hitting 21. In addition, the Japanese also claimed that their horizontal bombing dropped 25 500kg and 14 250kg torpedoes, achieving the results of 2 500kg and 1 250kg. The specific distribution is as follows:

Figure 2: Distribution of lightning strike locations claimed by the Japanese

But strangely, in the statistical tables of each team, the total number of lightning hits by the Japanese army dropped to 20, as shown below:

Table 3: Statistics of hits by the Japanese Army's Thunder Attack Team

The statistics of the Japanese Army's horizontal bombing teams are as follows:

Table 4: Japanese bombing team hit statistics

In the end, the Japanese claimed that they sank the battleship Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser Repulse, and a cruiser or guided destroyer in the Battle of Malaya. They claimed to have achieved 19 to 23 torpedo hits and 3 horizontal bombing hits. They also claimed to have shot down 3 aircraft, abandoned 1 aircraft after severe damage, 2 aircraft seriously damaged, and 25 aircraft slightly damaged, for a total of 31 aircraft. 3 crew members and 21 people died, and another person was seriously injured.

2. British Claims of Victory and Losses

(1) Actual losses of the British side

The British claimed that the Japanese launched 7 waves of attacks on Force Z (minus Tenedos), totaling 63 sorties. The recorded air raids are shown in the following table:

Table 5: British air raid record

During the battle, the British army recorded that the Counterattack and Prince of Wales were hit by horizontal bombing once each, the Counterattack was hit by torpedoes five times, and the Prince of Wales was hit by torpedoes 4 to 6 times.

In terms of personnel, the British Army recorded that 42 of the 69 officers (including Tennant) and 754 of the 1,240 crew members of the Counterattack were rescued, and 90 of the 110 officers and 1,195 of the 1,502 soldiers of the Prince of Wales were rescued.

That is, the Counterattack lost 27 officers and 486 crewmen, and the Prince of Wales lost 20 officers and 307 crewmen, for a total of 47 officers and 793 crewmen.

The specific losses of the Prince of Wales are as follows (as mentioned above, so I won’t repeat them here):

Figure 6: Summary of Prince of Wales's losses

The specific losses of the counterattack are as follows (as mentioned above, so I won’t repeat them here):

Figure 7: Summary of counterattack losses

(2) British claim of victory

The British side claimed to have shot down a total of eight Japanese planes in the naval battle, but no information about the specific number of planes shot down seemed to have been seen.

In the end, the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse were sunk, killing 47 officers and 793 crew members, a total of 840 people. They were hit by torpedoes 9 to 11 times and bombs twice. A total of 8 Japanese planes were claimed to have been shot down.

6. Sharpening the Mustache: Summary of the Combat Experiences of Britain and Japan

The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse in the Malay Sea Battle was obviously a huge blow to the British Royal Navy, and undoubtedly a brilliant victory for the Imperial Japanese Navy. As the first case of an aviation unit directly sinking a battleship in action, the British obviously had a profound summary of Japan's aviation tactics and their own failure experience, and the Japanese would also make a deep reflection on the many shortcomings they showed in the battle.

1. Summary of the British Battle

The author has translated in full the part on the summary of combat experience (two sections in total) from the History of the Naval Staff published in 1955 (BR1736 (8)/1955 "Naval Staff History Second World War Battle Summary No.14 Loss of HMShips Prince of Wales And Repulse 10th December 1941" Historical Section Admiralty SWI) and presented it below.

The opening paragraph of Section 13 of the document, “Japanese Air Tactics,” begins with a fair and positive assessment of the Japanese victory in this battle:

Doubts about the efficiency of the Japanese air forces had now been answered indisputably. On the third day of the war they had accomplished in less than two hours what the other belligerents had failed to accomplish in two years, some 400 miles from their bases and at such a small cost. Colonel Tennant commented: "There can be no doubt that the enemy's attack was brilliantly conducted," and all who witnessed the Japanese air raids unanimously acknowledged "the determination and efficiency which they have repeatedly demonstrated."

The document then begins to summarize the Japanese air attack tactics they saw during this battle:

All the enemy's planes entered the route and attacked in a similar manner. The high-altitude horizontal bombers were in close formation, while the torpedo bombers were in loose lines. The high-altitude bombing was carried out by nine-plane formations at an altitude of about 10,000 to 12,000 feet. The planes always maintained perfect parallel formation, with the two in the middle slightly ahead of the rest. The attack was carried out in a direction from bow to stern, and the bombs were obviously released by signal - because they were dropped at the same time and in a close proximity. Long-range, high-angle anti-aircraft fire could not damage them or affect their actions. The torpedo attacks were also carried out by nine-plane formations, although in some cases the number may have varied. They were usually found in close formation at high altitude, then gradually lost altitude out of range while forming loose, staggered formations in front. Then two or three groups of 1 attacked side by side in batches. Each plane seemed to be aiming individually, and the enemy did not seem to attempt a fan attack with torpedoes, and no attempt was seen to coordinate or change their attacks. Some of the attacks were indeed simultaneous, and, as in the case of Repulse, from both sides. But in the opinion of Captain Bell, this was due to the ship's change of course. The torpedoes were dropped at ranges of 1,000 to 2,000 yards, but at altitudes significantly higher than the British aircraft were accustomed to. It was estimated that they entered the water at an angle of 25° to 40° to the horizontal and traveled in an almost straight path. In addition, reports noted that a considerable amount of time passed between the enemy torpedoes entering the water and the appearance of their tracks. These tracks were particularly clear on calm waters, as if the torpedoes were traveling at a lower depth.

The claim in this passage that the Japanese attack was not coordinated seems a bit untrue. In fact, the Japanese used the method of flanking attack from both sides in almost every round of torpedoes in the Malay Sea Battle. But the criticism that the Japanese did not coordinate the fan-shaped attack seems to be reasonable. In common situations, the Japanese torpedo team seemed to use parallel torpedoes more often.

Regarding the issue of release height, the document makes the following additions in the notes section:

Captain Tennant commented: "I think it is interesting to report here the astonishing altitude of the torpedoes, estimated at between 300 and 400 feet, all of which seemed to be travelling straight ahead from their point of impact." Captain Bell said: "Some of the torpedoes appeared to have been dropped from altitudes far exceeding 200 feet. According to one observer, the enemy dropped mines from altitudes as high as 500 feet. Certainly, his altitudes seemed to be higher than the normal altitudes for our aircraft. No tail or glider attachments were seen." Later experience of the U.S. Navy tended to confirm these estimates. Regarding the tactics of Japanese torpedo bombers in the Battle of the Coral Sea, Taikenso commented: "Some of the enemy aircraft continuously approached at low altitudes and dropped their torpedoes at a relatively high speed at an altitude of 150 to 200 feet above the water; others approached by gliding at high speed and dropped their torpedoes from altitudes as high as 500 feet."

Comparing with the Japanese military records, it seems that no crew of the 96th Land Attack Team from Motoyama Air Force and Mihoro Air Force entered the route at an altitude of 500 feet (the highest altitude was 60-70 meters, or about 200 feet), but some crews of Kanoya Air Force seemed to have used high-altitude gliding to enter from an altitude of 150 meters. But overall, the land attack using a higher altitude should still be a minority, and the British record seems to be slightly inappropriate.

Interestingly, the passage quoted Taikan-sō's comments on the Japanese torpedo attack during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Coincidentally, the Motoyama Air Force and Mihoro Air Force crews that participated in this battle would soon participate in the assault on the TF17 support team before the Battle of the Coral Sea as the 4th Air Force and Motoyama Air Force crews. This may indicate that the Japanese Navy's aviation torpedo attack technology did not make much adjustment in the six months from the Battle of Malaya to the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Table 8: Statistics of the height and speed of mines dropped by the Japanese Army’s mine-throwing team

Regarding the depth setting, the following supplement is made in the notes section of the document:

Subsequent information from American sources indicated that the standard depth setting for torpedoes used by the Japanese Navy was around 12 feet, but that the depth setting was left to the choice of the attacking unit at this time. During the attacks on Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Kanoya, Bihoro, and Motoyama air groups used depth settings of 10 feet, 13 feet, and 16 feet, respectively.

Comparing with the detailed battle report, Yuanshankong's torpedo depth standard was 6 meters, which is basically consistent with the records in the text.

Table 9: Yuanshan Airborne Thunderbolt Team Adjustment Parameters

The document also gave positive praise to Tennant's extremely superb steering skills:

Regarding the first wave of torpedo strikes, Captain Tennant said that all the bridge personnel calmly pointed out the direction of the approaching aircraft, which greatly helped him to avoid a large number of torpedoes; he maintained a steady speed of 25 knots until it was obvious that the aircraft was about to attack, then he turned the rudder and cleverly avoided the track of the torpedoes.

After this, the document goes on to comment on the Japanese actions:

Even after dropping their torpedoes, the enemy seemed to take little evasive action. In retreating, they rose steadily and slowly disappeared past the attacked ships. In some cases, they opened fire with machine guns on exposed personnel as they passed over the attacked ships.

The end of this section of the document comments on the effectiveness of British air defenses, referring to reports from the British side and Japanese data obtained after the war:

Colonel Bell said that our close-range fire was more accurate than high-angle fire, but all weapons continued to fire at nearby targets that had been torpedoed and were now harmless, rather than opening fire at new incoming targets. The Japanese believed that high-angle fire on high-altitude horizontal bombers was more accurate. The first wave of horizontal bombing planes encountered particularly fierce anti-aircraft fire, and most of them were damaged. Many planes returned to base with their hulls riddled with holes from fragments from the explosion of anti-aircraft shells. Although the torpedo bombers encountered much heavier fire than expected, especially from light and medium anti-aircraft fire, they were almost not hit, and only three planes and 21 people were killed in the battle. The Japanese attributed the light losses to cloudy weather and the extremely low altitude at which the torpedo bombers entered the route. Given that the Japanese expected to lose 50% of their aircraft before the battle, they were probably very satisfied with the results of the morning's battle.

The last section of the document, Section 14 "Conclusion", continues to introduce the battle report itself and comments on the failure experience of the enemy's lack of air cover.

The section begins with an introduction to the battle report and the origin of the document after the battle:

The Admiralty was soon informed of Admiral Phillips's death, and orders were quickly sent to Vice Admiral Layton to immediately re-raise his flag as Commander of the Eastern Fleet. Under his direction, reports from the surviving officers and men were collected - a task begun on the Express by Colonel Bell and Major Skipwith on their return from the operation - and an account of the action was drafted by Commodore FEP Hutton. Based on these documents, and material obtained from the Japanese, this document was prepared.

The document ends with a lamentable assessment of the lack of air cover for the British fleet during this operation:

The lessons of Norway and Crete were tragically confirmed: fighter support for surface forces is essential wherever heavy enemy air attack is likely. As if as a reminder of this lesson, two months later two German battleships, heavily protected by fighters, bravely confronted the British air force within 20 miles of the English coast and escaped unscathed.

2. Japanese Battle Summary

The summary of the Japanese combat experience in the Malayan Naval War is mainly concentrated in the "Wonsan Naval Air Force Detailed Report on the Battle of the Malayan Sea" and "Daidong Anji Battle Training (Aviation) Part 2 of the Malayan Battle Division". However, since the author really does not speak Japanese and has no money to hire a translator, I only present the original texts of the two documents on combat training here for reference only.

Greater East Asia War Combat Training (Aviation) Part 2

Figure 10-17: Greater East Asia War Combat Training (Aviation) Part 2

Figure 18-25: Combat Training (Aviation) of the Greater East Asia War Part 2 (Continued)

Figure 25-27: Combat Training (Aviation) of the Greater East Asia War Part 2 (Continued)

Wonsan Naval Air Force Battle Report

Figure 28-36: Detailed report of the battle of Wonsan Naval Air Force

7. Right and Wrong: Success and Failure: The Malay Naval War from a Political and Strategic Perspective

For the Royal Navy, the defeat in the Malay War undoubtedly had a huge impact on the spiritual level of the entire British Empire. Prime Minister Winston Churchill said in his memoirs published after the war:

Never in the whole war had I been struck so directly.

For the British public and elites, the absolute superiority of naval power has always been a belief of the public group, but now, this proud belief has collapsed in front of Japanese aircraft. Such an outcome of the naval battle is not only unexpected, but also makes people feel extremely sad.

For the Royal Navy, the direct loser in the naval battle, the disastrous defeat in the Malay War had fostered a gloomy atmosphere throughout the navy. Robert Bruce Lockhart, then Director of Political Warfare, recalled after the war:

Walking into the smoking room, filled with high-ranking officers from the army and navy, was like walking into a Scottish house where a will was being read after a funeral. There were drinks on the table, but everyone's face was gloomy. The officers spoke in hushed voices, and the atmosphere was heavy with the traditional baggage. Military defeat was the first fate of the British in almost every war. Although it could be endured with fortitude, such disasters were almost unbearable for the navy.

However, after the naval battle, the division of responsibility for the failure may not be as traditional as the traditional view, which puts all the blame on Churchill or Dudley Pound. In fact, the Admiralty's naval strategy and plan for the Far East were not the main factors that caused the destruction of Fleet Z. Churchill's failure as a naval strategic planner was far less important than his, and even the assumption that it was commonplace in Whitehall was that sending additional battleships could effectively deter Japan. Moreover, most importantly, Fleet Z was not destined to be destroyed from the moment it set sail from Scapa Flow. At the last moment before setting sail on December 8, Fleet Z still had hope of survival.

In the traditional view, especially in a series of works represented by the Royal Navy's official war history "The War at The Sea", the decision-making process of the entire Z fleet is often simplified to a debate and dialogue between Churchill and Pound. Accordingly, Churchill became the culprit of the destruction of the Z fleet. The author also followed this system in the first issue of this series. But in fact, in the official war history, the author Roskill obviously concealed the cabinet's political considerations and exaggerated Churchill's shortcomings as a naval strategist. The idea of ​​sending a small deterrent fleet to the Far East is not only common in Whitehall, but also has a long history. Since 1937, British and Australian strategic planners during the interwar period have been interested in sending a deterrent force to Singapore. In the next four years, this idea was raised again and again. Before Churchill proposed this idea, this idea had already had a strong vitality in the cabinet, especially among some members headed by Foreign Secretary Robert Anthony Eden. Therefore, Churchill was by no means the first or only person to propose sending a fleet to the Far East. But the book still focuses more on the debate between the Cabinet and the Admiralty on naval strategy.

But now, if we re-examine the role of Fleet Z in the overall political strategy, we will find that the stereotypes brought to us by traditional views seem to be somewhat inappropriate.

Churchill defended himself after the publication of the official history of the war, claiming that "the book is very misleading". According to him, his own purpose was simply to hope that Force Z:

Go to Singapore and let the enemy know that they have reached Singapore, and then they can hide in the vast archipelago less than 1,000 miles away from Singapore. In this way, they can always exert political deterrence on the Japanese, just as Tirpitz and other ships have done to us.

He believed that the biggest factor in the destruction of Fleet Z should be Phillips. The author holds the same attitude. Although Churchill and Eden misjudged Japan's ambitions and the timing of political deterrence in terms of strategy, this does not mean that Fleet Z will end up in such a bad way. On the evening of December 9, the meeting of the Cabinet War Room reached a consensus that "Fleet Z must go to sea and hide among countless islands", which only required Fleet Z to "hide" (the original word was vanish). Regarding the future action plan of Fleet Z, since it was already late at the end of the meeting on the 9th, Churchill and others decided to continue the discussion tomorrow. However, before the cabinet could discuss a reasonable result, Fleet Z was destroyed on the morning of the 10th. However, this decision of the cabinet and any results of the previous cabinet discussions had nothing to do with Phillips' own rash decision on the 8th to set out to search and annihilate the enemy's landing site and transport fleet. In fact, Phillips, who had just been promoted to acting admiral shortly before leaving for the Far East, was very inexperienced in war and was notorious for his ignorance of the vulnerability of capital ships in front of aircraft. If a different commander had led Fleet Z, perhaps such a reckless and naive decision would not have been made. Dudley Pound reminded Churchill at least twice on the eve of the war that the fleet should be evacuated from Singapore. Even at the cabinet meeting on the evening of December 9, the participants unanimously agreed that Fleet Z should be evacuated from Singapore immediately. Some even thought that Fleet Z should cross the Pacific Ocean to join the US Pacific Fleet. No one mentioned or asked Phillips that Fleet Z needed to actively seek a decisive battle with the Japanese.

So why was Churchill so keen on sending capital ships to the Far East? In fact, contrary to stereotypes, Churchill was a staunch opponent of sending capital ships before mid-1941, because at that time he believed that there was no need for political deterrence against Japan. However, by late 1941, especially after August, the change in the situation led Churchill and Eden to conclude that the fact that a new battleship like the Prince of Wales appeared in Singapore could symbolize Britain's still strong national strength and cover up the shortcomings of Britain's current poor naval capabilities. More importantly, the arrival of the Prince of Wales could highlight the close relationship between Britain and the United States and the close integration of their Far East policies. Most of the actions on the eve of the outbreak of the war, including the dispatch of the Z Fleet, including the strengthening of Malaya's defense, urging the Canadian government to strengthen the hopeless garrison in Hong Kong, and strengthening economic sanctions against Japan, were all due to the British government's desire to leave the world, especially Japan, with the impression that the British government's strength and determination in the Far East were increasing. This is also an invisible political deterrent.

Therefore, in my opinion, Phillips still needs to bear the primary responsibility for the destruction of Fleet Z. If it were not for his reckless and hasty decision, Fleet Z would not have been annihilated by the Japanese army on December 10. The second responsibility should be shared by the British political and strategic planners during the entire interwar period. The wrong but not unreasonable decision to send Fleet Z to Singapore was still the result of the joint decision of the civilian staff of the Defense Committee.

So, what exactly was wrong with Phillips? In addition to his recklessness mentioned above, in my opinion, his biggest mistake was his lack of communication with the intelligence department - the root of which was Phillips's own self-righteousness. In the second issue of this series, I briefly mentioned that the British Far East Joint Bureau had accurately judged the basic performance of the Japanese new long-range bomber and the scale of the Japanese air strike. But Phillips did not take the initiative to ask the Far East Joint Bureau for any relevant matters about Japan's air force. Even the communication with the Royal Air Force was very rare. He only had a few simple meetings with the commander of the Royal Far East Air Force, Marshal Brooke Popham, in the week after he arrived in Singapore and before the hasty attack on the 8th, and had no contact with the relevant person in charge of the Far East Joint Bureau. The Far East Joint Bureau could do its best to remind Phillips through Marshal Popham. But Phillips believed based on experience that the Type 1 land attack would not and could not carry torpedoes to participate in anti-ship air strikes, and posed no threat to the Z fleet within 400 miles. Even at the last moment of Fleet Z, he was unwilling to call the 453rd Fighter Squadron stationed in Sembawang, which could reach the battlefield in only about an hour.

So, what impact did the destruction of Fleet Z have from a political and strategic perspective? First of all, and most importantly, the destruction of Fleet Z marked the loss of the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet's last mobile combat force, and the British completely lost the entire sea control from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam to the Malay Sea. In addition, the destruction of Fleet Z also declared to Churchill and others politically that their efforts to use political deterrence to force Japan to compromise or avoid war ultimately came to nothing.

After Phillips' death, Admiral Geoffrey Leighton resumed his command of the Eastern Fleet. After taking over the command again, he immediately asked the Admiralty for help. He claimed that if Singapore was to be defended, reinforcements must be sent immediately. But the fact was that such reinforcements did not exist, and even if the troops in the Mediterranean had been withdrawn to the mainland, the Royal Navy could not send enough troops in time to reverse the decline on the land battlefield. Therefore, Leighton foresaw on the 13th that Singapore would soon become a besieged fortress and the naval base would be unusable. Therefore, he proposed to withdraw all forces except submarines to Colombo, Ceylon. Obviously, Colombo was the necessary new strategic focus for the Royal Navy to rebuild its strength. The next day, the Admiralty approved his proposal, so under the influence of this disaster, the Eastern Fleet finally resumed the policy that the Admiralty originally hoped to adopt - to establish a base in Colombo and use it as a basis to advance to Singapore for operations.

However, it is undeniable that the destruction of Fleet Z did not have much impact on the overall political strategy and war process of the Pacific War. At best, it accelerated the defeat of the British Army in the Far East. But it is true that the destruction of Fleet Z was almost one of the biggest disasters of the Royal Navy.

8. Epilogue: Talk about the Day After

On December 12, Admiral Geoffrey Layton raised his flag again and became the commander-in-chief of the now almost non-existent Eastern Fleet. As the survivors of the U.S. Pacific Fleet retreated to their west coast bases, the Dutch East Indies, as well as Australia and New Zealand, which were previously outside this area, were now wide open to the Japanese.

With the destruction of the Z fleet and the air strikes of the 3rd Air Group and the 22nd Air Fleet, it was difficult for the British army to affect the Japanese landing in Malay. On December 13, under the cover of the navy and army's aviation forces, the second landing operation in Malay was launched. With the support of the main force of the 3rd Mine Warfare Squadron, the coastal defense ship Zumo, the training cruiser Kashii and a sea sweeper, Lieutenant General Matsui Taikuro personally led the main force of the 5th Division and the follow-up forces of the Ando Detachment, the Tomi Detachment, and the Uno Detachment in 39 transport ships and marched towards the Malay Peninsula. On December 16, with the support of the 12th Destroyer Squadron and a submarine destroyer, Major General Kawaguchi Kiyokane commanded the vanguard of the Kawaguchi Detachment (Brigade Headquarters, 124th Infantry Regiment, 33rd Field Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion) composed of the 35th Infantry Brigade as the core, and the 2nd Special Marine Corps of the Yokosuka Naval Base to land in Borneo. Then, Hong Kong fell on Christmas Day of that year under the fierce attack of the 38th Division. In such a critical situation, the only reinforcement of the Royal Navy was two submarines sent from the Mediterranean theater to Singapore.

On December 18, Captain Haruki Iki, the leader of the 3rd Squadron of the Kanoya Air Force Attack Squadron, passed by the battlefield of the Malay Sea Battle on his way back from completing a bombing mission. He circled the battlefield and dropped flowers on the sunken ship. Regarding this incident, Iki himself recalled in his later years:

On the 18th, the Kanoya Air Force received an order saying that there was a British wireless telegraph station in Xi'antan, Anambas Islands. There was a good port there, and our army was going to use it as a forward base for attacking Singapore. According to the plan of the southern troops, I received an order to bomb the wireless telegraph station. I looked at the plan, "Three squadrons will go, and each squadron will be responsible for the bombing, and each will return after the end." Because the content was like this, and "there were no enemy fighters or anti-aircraft guns, so the attack team could arrive safely", I ordered Maekawakami to make two bouquets of flowers. On the 18th, I prepared two bouquets of flowers, and the bombing was completed as planned. When returning, the 9-plane formation descended to an altitude of 300 meters and first went to the counterattack sinking position, where I dropped flowers for my dead subordinates and another crew of the Wonsan Air Force that blew up. After comforting the souls of my companions and offering flowers, I went to the Prince of Wales to offer flowers. Although I didn't know who the British dead were, I threw a bouquet of flowers to honor the heroic spirit of the British soldiers who persisted in fighting until the ship sank, and with the feeling of comforting the British dead, and then returned. The water there was about 60 to 70 meters deep, and the height to the bridge was only 40 meters. This made the position about 20 meters from the water surface look very clear. After confirming (the sinking ship), I threw the bouquet there.

On that day, 26 Type 1 land attack aircraft were launched from Tsurugi, commanded by Captain Mikichi Nabeda, the leader of the 1st Squadron. Captain Nabeda's 1st Squadron turned to investigate the Natuna Islands due to the deteriorating weather and sank a merchant ship during the voyage. Captain Iki's 3rd Squadron and Captain Higashimori's 2nd Squadron bombed Xi'antan in the Anambas Islands. On that day, the three Japanese squadrons dropped a total of 8 250kg bombs and 106 60kg bombs (including the merchant ship attack). Iki's squadron claimed that all the bombs they dropped hit the target, causing at least 4 buildings and oil depots to catch fire.

Some of the crews of the Wonsan Air Force that participated in the Malay Sea Battle appeared again in the Coral Sea Battle as members of the Wonsan Air Force and the 4th Air Force. In the aerial reconnaissance on May 5, the three crews of the 4th Air Force were all from the Wonsan Air Force 1st Squadron during the Malay Sea Battle. In the assault on the TF17 support team on May 7, almost all members of the Wonsan Air Force's horizontal bombing team had participated in the Malay Sea Battle. The specific situation is as follows:

Figure 37: The 4th Air Force’s aerial reconnaissance formation on May 5. The crews in the red box are all from the 1st Squadron of Wonsan Air Force in the Malay Sea Battle

Figure 38: The composition of the TF17 support team of the Yuanshan Air Assault on May 7. All or some of the crew members in the yellow box came from the Yuanshan Air Torpedo Team in the Malay Sea Battle. All or some of the crew members in the blue box participated in the first wave of horizontal bombing of the Yuanshan Air Force (Tenedos).

Figure 39: The formation of the Yuanshan Air Assault TF17 support team on May 7. All or some of the crew members in the green box came from the Yuanshan Air Torpedo Team during the Malay Sea Battle

The commander of the Kanoya Air Force, Colonel Fujiyoshi Naoshiro, received a special commendation. In December 1942, Fujiyoshi, who had been transferred to the commander of the Suzuka Air Force, received an order from the Navy Ministry to go to Tokyo. Because of the outstanding performance of his subordinates in the Battle of Malaya, Fujiyoshi was allowed to visit Hirohito in the palace, during which he reported his battle experience and the course of the Battle of Malaya to Hirohito. After the visit, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Minister of the Navy, and Admiral Nagano Osami, Chief of the Naval General Staff, and other heads of the Navy and the Naval General Staff invited Fujiyoshi to attend the celebration banquet. (But I don't really understand why he went to Tokyo and celebrated the victory a year later...)

Figure 40: Memorial photo of Fujiyoshi Naoshiro, Kasumigaura Naval Aviation Corps Exhibition Hall

As the only surviving counterattack captain among the high-ranking officers of the Z fleet, Captain William Tennant also had a brilliant war record in the following years. As a staff officer of the Navy General Staff, he was nicknamed "Dunkirk Joe" as early as 1939 for his successful command of the Dunkirk evacuation. After the Battle of Malaya, he returned to his homeland. In February 1942, he was promoted to rear admiral, transferred to the commander of the 4th Cruiser Squadron and participated in the landing battle on Madagascar in September. In 1944, he was appointed Chief of Naval Staff of the Allied Expeditionary Force, providing solid and reliable guarantee for the logistics supply of materials for the Normandy landing. In October 1944, Tennant was appointed commander of the Levant Fleet and commander-in-chief of the Eastern Mediterranean Theater, and was promoted to vice admiral in July 1945. After the war, he was promoted to commander of the West Indies Fleet in 1946. On October 22, 1948, Tennant was promoted to Admiral and retired on August 3, 1949.

Figure 41: Two survivors of the counterattack, William Tennant and K. Armstrong on the bridge of the aircraft carrier Colossus

Phillips and Leach, who died in the battle, were not found or brought back, and their names were eventually recorded in the 44th wall, column 2 of the Plymouth Naval Memorial. In 2011, a monument commemorating the dead of the Malay Sea War was also built. It is made of polished black granite. The base has two layers, the first level is gray marble and the second level is black granite. On the front of the stone, the emblems of the Battlecruiser Counterattack, the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Battleship Prince of Wales are engraved in sequence at the top of the monument, and the back of the stone has a detailed history of each ship. Details of the memorial ceremony are engraved on the base.

Figure 42: The memorial to the fallen of HMS Prince of Wales, Staffordshire

The defeat in the Battle of Malaya was only the beginning of the story of the Royal Navy in the Far East during World War II. In the following six months, the fleet led by Vice Admiral Somerville, the new commander of the Eastern Fleet, would encounter the Japanese mobile forces at the peak of their strength. After 1944, with the gradual end of the naval operations in the Atlantic theater, the more powerful TF57 would assemble in Ceylon from the mainland and the Mediterranean, and regain the glory of the Royal Navy as the Royal Navy's Pacific Fleet in the last year of the war. But in any case, the British crew members of the Battle of Malaya continued to write the naval spirit of never giving up with their lives. As Churchill said, this is a spirit that can enable them to win the war.

The tragedy of the Malay Sea Battle was not forgotten after World War II. On July 6, 1979, Admiral Henry Leach, who was promoted to First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, strongly opposed Defense Secretary John Nott's plan to reduce naval military spending. Three years later, in 1982, with the outbreak of the Falklands War, he insisted that the Navy must send as many aircraft carriers as possible to participate in the war. He admitted in his memoirs that although the Navy lacked available aircraft carriers, he could not forget the death of his father and still firmly believed that two aircraft carriers needed to be sent instead of one as the cabinet believed. Thanks to his efforts, the two aircraft carriers, Invincible and Hermes, joined TF317 and performed well in the Falklands War.

The Malay Naval Battle series, which took me half a year to complete during my sophomore year of high school, has a total of more than 40,000 words and is now finished!

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