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[Text/Observer Network columnist Chen Feng]

"The top priority is to drive the enemy out of Russian territory and ensure reliable protection of the border."

Putin made the latest statement at the Kursk State Security Meeting held on August 12. The exchange of fire between Russia and Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia has entered the sixth day, and the Russian army also admitted that the Ukrainian army has penetrated 30 kilometers into Russian territory.

Ukraine may still be excited, but foreign media commented that this invasion was a bit like the Battle of the Bulge during World War II, which seemed to carry an ominous shadow. The fate of the Ukrainian army in Kursk is worrying.

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Historically, Kursk and the Ardennes were both places where many battles took place. Kursk and the Ardennes were both important battlefields in World War II. Now, the Ardennes Forest has returned to peace, but Kursk is once again raging with gunpowder.

During World War II, the German army took advantage of the blind spot of the "impenetrable Ardennes Forest". The armored forces first boldly penetrated the Ardennes Forest, bypassing the Maginot Line carefully built by the French army. The French defense collapsed in an instant. The German army walked through the Arc de Triomphe in triumph, and the British army fled back to the island in embarrassment from Dunkirk.

Four years later, the German army was losing ground on both the eastern and western fronts, but once again took advantage of the Allied blind spots in the Ardennes and launched a decisive counterattack, trying to attack Antwerp directly, cut off the Allied supply lines, sever the connection between the British army in the Netherlands and the American army in France, and encircle and destroy the American and British Allied forces that broke into Germany. The German army achieved surprise tactically, and the desperate penetration was almost successful, but was forced to give up because of running out of fuel and ammunition.

But even if the German army had sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Ardennes counterattack would still only scare the Allies and would not achieve the goal of the campaign. The Allied forces that landed on the European continent were already strong enough, while the German army was at the end of its strength. After breaking into the rear of the Allied forces, it had only a thin supply line to survive. Under the air strikes and ground armored attacks of the United States and Britain, it was very likely that its rear would be cut off first and it would be destroyed.

At Kursk, the Germans, who had been losing ground after the Battle of Stalingrad, tried to break the Soviet Red Army's counterattack with a powerful counterattack at Kursk and regain the initiative on the Eastern Front, but ultimately failed. The Battle of Kursk remains the largest tank battle in history, and it is unlikely that such a feat will be repeated in the future, with both sides deploying thousands of tanks.

At present, the Ukrainian army launched an unexpected counterattack in the Kursk direction, which absolutely shocked the Russian army. This can be regarded as Kursk 2.0. If the Ardennes counterattack is called Ardennes 2.0, Kursk 2.0 is surprisingly similar to Ardennes 2.0, but there are also obvious differences.

Ardennes 2.0 was Germany's "mad leap before destruction", and Kursk 2.0 was also launched when Ukraine was in great difficulty. This is not necessarily the reason why Kursk 2.0 will inevitably have the same fate as Ardennes 2.0, but Kursk 2.0 does have the potential to become Ardennes 2.0.

There are different reports about the number of Ukrainian troops that broke into Russia. The Russian military claims that there are only more than 1,000 troops, while Ukraine claims that there are at least five brigades, which could be nearly 10,000.

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The biggest mystery remains the Ukrainian army's campaign purpose.

On the Donbass front, the Ukrainian army is becoming more and more passive. The defense line carefully built between 2014 and 2022 withstood the attack of the Russian army (and the Donbass local armed forces) at the beginning of the war, but after more than two years of fighting, it has been "worn out" a lot. No matter how solid the defense line is, it can't withstand the bombardment of tens of thousands of shells every day. The Ukrainian infantry filling the line is becoming increasingly scarce, especially experienced elite infantry.

After Bakhmut, Avadivka was also lost, and more strategic locations are in danger. The Donbass defense line is not only on the verge of collapse, but also less stable than at the beginning of the war. More importantly, the support of the United States and Europe is fading. With no prospect of victory in sight, the United States and Europe may cut off their arms to stop losses.

Ukraine was not originally an arm of the United States and Europe, but when they saw that they could bleed Russia through the Ukrainian war, the United States and Europe enthusiastically provided military assistance to Ukraine on the one hand and economic sanctions to Russia on the other, hoping to use left hooks and right hooks at the same time to knock down Russia, which was on the verge of a resurgence, in one fell swoop, and preferably cause a second collapse, so that they can return to the Asia-Pacific region and concentrate on dealing with China.

But Russia refused to be defeated, so the US and Europe had to gradually upgrade their military aid.F-16It is said that they have also appeared in the direction of Kherson. It is no secret that the Ukrainian war has emptied the arsenals of the United States and Europe. Not only is the replenishment speed not fast enough, but it has also seriously squeezed the normal military production capacity and funding.

Politically, the war in Ukraine has become an opportunity for the United States to rally its allies.NATOThe key to revival. But as Ukraine moves further and further away from victory, the United States is increasingly eager to get rid of the burden in order to concentrate strategic resources on the Asia-Pacific region. Europe is also increasingly anxious about "what will happen after Ukraine" and is trying to find a way out for itself. After all, Russia is a neighbor that cannot be moved away.

In this way, Ukraine gradually became an arm of the United States and Europe, and step by step became an arm that had to be cut off to stop the loss.

Therefore, the Ukrainian army must create a brilliant tactical victory to avoid becoming a loss-stopping arm. After the failure of the Zaporizhia counterattack, the Ukrainian army fell into a low ebb. The Donbass was in a state of emergency and the Ukrainian army's morale was low. The victory of the Kursk counterattack was necessary for Ukraine to stabilize the support of the United States and Europe externally and stabilize the morale of the army and the people internally.

Therefore, there is a possibility that the Ukrainian army intends to send heavy troops to penetrate the Russian hinterland like the Ardennes counterattack, cut off the Russian supply lines on the front line, shake the Russian offensive, and even encircle and annihilate it.

But this possibility is very small. The Ardennes counterattack was based on the geographical reality that the Allies came across the sea and most of the supplies passed through Antwerp. The Russian army on the Ukrainian battlefield did not have the bottleneck problem of Antwerp. The battle line and supply channels were hundreds or thousands of kilometers wide. The force that broke into the Ukrainian army was too weak. Whether it was a thousand or ten thousand people, it would not be able to have such a stronghold to cut off and control such a vast area.

There is another possibility: Zelensky sees that a negotiated solution is inevitable and must create bargaining chips in order to obtain favorable negotiating conditions.

There are three negotiation options:

1. Ukraine recognizes Russia's sovereignty over Donbas and Crimea, and the administrative borders of the four eastern Ukrainian states are the boundaries. This is Russia's position, but it may also accept the current actual control line.

2. Russia recognizes Ukraine's sovereignty over Donbas and Crimea and restores the 1992 border. This is Ukraine's position.

3. The sovereignty of Donbas and Crimea is shelved, and the Russian army retreats to the 2014 line before the outbreak of the Ukrainian war

Ukraine cannot accept Option 1, Russia cannot accept Option 2, and it is said that the West is pushing Option 3. Ukraine once refused to consider this, but if the US and Europe threaten to withdraw aid, Ukraine may be forced to accept it. But this requires Ukraine to have negotiating power, and it is not possible to get something for nothing. Even if it retreats to the 2014 line, it means that the Russian army has fought in vain for the past two years, and Russia has suffered in vain from the economic blockade. More importantly, Crimea will once again lose its land connection with Russia and its fresh water source.

If the Ukrainian army can penetrate into the Russian mainland, seize and hold parts of Kursk, then in exchange during the negotiations, "Kursk for the 2014 line" may be feasible.

Regardless of whether Russia is likely to accept it, the Ukrainian army must first be able to hold the newly captured Kursk region militarily, otherwise its bargaining chips will be broken and Ukraine's negotiating position will become more difficult.

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It must be said that the Ukrainian army achieved tactical surprise. The Russian troops on the border could not resist the Ukrainian army's surprise attack at all, and it is said that more than 40 prisoners were captured. The reinforcement and counterattack of the rear corps were not fast or powerful either - the Russian army once again made the mistake of underestimating the enemy.

After the Ukrainian army's counterattack in Kharkov, the contact line between Russia and Ukraine outside Donbass basically returned to the position of the 2014 line. The Ukrainian army continued to "cross the border" and attack during the friction. Not to mention artillery shells and missiles, small infiltrations of anti-Russian armed forces also occurred from time to time. The Russian army took precautions against this, but defending against small infiltrations and large-scale breakthroughs are two different things. The Israeli army has first-hand lessons in this regard.

After the third Middle East War in 1967, Nasser maintained a "neither war nor peace" state in the Suez Canal, and often sent small commandos to sneak through the Suez Canal to launch surprise attacks. For this reason, the Israeli army built the "Bar Lev Line" along the Suez Canal and built more than a dozen company-level outposts on the canal embankment to support each other.

But the "Bar Lev Line" has always been a tripwire, not a real line of defense to keep the enemy out. The firepower of the canal outpost was only enough to destroy small Egyptian commandos below the reinforced squad level, and the more powerful Egyptian commandos at the company and platoon level could only be held back by firepower and fortifications, and the Sinai Division tank brigade in the rear quickly drove up to the canal embankment to reinforce and destroy them.

The Egyptian army dismantled Israel's Bar Lev Line using only high-pressure water cannons, which Israel believes requires technology that Egypt does not have.

The entire "Bar Lev Line" was designed for anti-infiltration. After the Third Middle East War, the Israelis did not believe that the Egyptian army had the courage to actually attack Israel. As a result, when the Fourth Middle East War broke out in 1973, the Egyptian army launched a powerful river crossing attack. These fancy moves were not enough, and the "Bar Lev Line" quickly collapsed. The Egyptian army that crossed the river controlled the canal area.

During the Kursk counterattack, the Russian troops on the border made the same mistake as the Israeli troops on the "Bar Lev Line", thinking that the Ukrainian army was not only weak but also politically afraid to cross the border to attack Russia. As a result, the border defense designed for anti-infiltration could not stop the substantial attack of the Ukrainian army.

After successfully breaking through the "Bar Lev Line", the Egyptian army immediately switched to defending on the spot. When the Israeli army's rear defense was empty, it did not try to break through deep into Sinai, which ultimately led to the failure of the war. The Ukrainian army also has the potential to make the same mistake this time.

The Egyptian troops that landed on the east bank of the Suez Canal did not go far from the canal and deep into Sinai, so they received strong support from the direct and indirect fire of the Egyptian troops on the west bank. Before the war, the Egyptian troops raised the canal embankment on the west bank to form a favorable shooting position, which effectively supported the Egyptian troops on the east bank in the subsequent battles in the canal area.Anti-aircraft missilesIt also provided an air defense umbrella for the Egyptian army on the east bank, causing great suffering to the Israeli army, which boasted of its air superiority.

After the Israeli reinforcements that arrived at the canal zone failed to attack by force, they finally crossed the river in the opposite direction at Dahuru and attacked, outflanking the rear of the Egyptian Third Army in the south, forcing Egypt to sign a ceasefire agreement under unfavorable conditions.

The Ukrainian army's advance into Kursk was obviously a big surprise to the Russian army and was tactically successful. But whether it was active or passive, the Ukrainian army in Kursk was short of manpower and had to switch to on-the-spot defense as soon as possible, trying to lock in territorial gains, but this was where the problem lay.

The Ukrainian war has become a kind of trench warfare, but this is conditional. In the Donbass region, both sides dug deep holes and stored food before the war. The solid permanent fortifications, strong military forces, and careful combat plans meant that both sides could only fight each other and could not engage in mobile warfare.

In the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions, the Russian army gained initial success and then captured cities. The Ukrainian army focused on the Kharkov direction and the right bank of Kherson in the counterattack, and achieved great success. However, it also gave the Russian army from the left bank of Kherson to Zaporizhia time to build an effective defense line, causing the Ukrainian army that broke into the battle in Zaporizhia to return home in defeat.

The Ukrainian army in Kursk lacked manpower and could not maintain the necessary supply lines. It was impossible for them to "reach Moscow and capture Putin alive" or to outflank the rear of the Russian army in Donbass. To gain a foothold, they had to first withstand the Russian counterattack.

It must be said that the Russian counterattack is not yet effective, but the invasion of Ukraine has solved a big problem for Russia. Russian law stipulates that conscripts are not allowed to fight outside the country. In the Ukrainian war, the Russian army had all kinds of tricks, but the Russian army's military advantage was still restricted by this law and could not be brought into play. Now that the Ukrainian army has entered Kursk, the restrictions of this law no longer exist. Not only can the Russian army, which is mainly conscripts, be used in the counterattack in Kursk, but it is also possible to enter Ukraine in the pursuit.

In other words, the Ukrainian army in Kursk will not have the time like the Russian army on the left bank of Kherson and Zaporizhia to build a tight defense line.

The Kursk region is flat and wide, with few strategic locations to defend. If the battle gets bigger, the only option is to attack, which is good for the Russian army, which has superior manpower and firepower. Being invaded may also inspire the morale of the Russian army and the people.

The Ukrainian army needs to hold on, whether it is 1,000 or 10,000 troops, which is not enough, but troops are the most scarce resource in Ukraine at present. It is difficult not to affect the stability of Donbass and Zaporizhia-Kherson by sending a large number of troops to Kursk. It is not impossible for the Russian army to reversely break in from Sumy and Kharkov and form a pincer attack on the Ukrainian army in Kursk. The Ukrainian army must also pay close attention to the two wings in the direction of Kursk.

In terms of firepower, the Ukrainian army also suffered a disadvantage. In the Donbass artillery battle, the Ukrainian army was always suppressed. After the Russian air force dropped heavy bombs equipped with guidance components outside the defense zone, the Ukrainian army's firepower disadvantage became more prominent.Patriot air defense missileHowever, the Patriot is a mobile theater air defense missile, not a mobile field air defense missile. The former can only be reset after the camp is disbanded, while the latter can launch missiles during maneuvers or short stops. The Ukrainian army in Kursk needs a large number of field air defense missiles with good mobility, such as the Red Flag 17, to intercept everything from war bombers, cruise missiles to cruise missiles,Guided bombvarious air threats.

But the West simply does not have suitable field anti-aircraft missiles, and the Ukrainian army in Kursk is unlikely to have any.Sting"Shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles are not enough to close this fatal "air defense skylight".

F-16 fighter jets have arrived in Ukraine. Apart from the insufficient number, air defense command and air-ground coordination are not easy to achieve overnight. The bigger problem is the distance. Kursk is too far from the Polish border and the Black Sea. NATOAWACSThe Russian military’s early warning aircraft are also not very effective, but the Su-30SM andSu-35After all, the F-16 has a 30-40 year development time advantage over the basic F-16, and has advantages in airspace awareness and beyond-visual-range air combat. The F-16s given to Ukraine are early models that are about to die. They were originally pulled back from the graveyard by the West. Their radar and situational awareness are designed for within-visual-range combat. After upgrades and modifications, they only have limited beyond-visual-range air combat capabilities. Going deep into the enemy's territory alone is likely to be dangerous.

The Ukrainian army also lacked the necessary tanks and armored vehicles to fight the Russian army in Kursk. In the breakthrough operation, facing the unprepared and unarmored Russian border guards, the "Stryker" rushed around and the "Leopard 1" took advantage of the loopholes. But after the main force of the Russian army gathered, these equipments were not enough.Leopard 2”、“Abrams", "Challenger 2" was hit hard in Zaporizhia and Donbass, and there seems to be no further assistance.

The Russian army was caught off guard and now needs to stick to the invading Ukrainian army and prevent it from building a stable defense line, but it does not necessarily need to rush to drive the Ukrainian army out. This is actually a new opportunity for the Russian army.

The US and Europe were not excited about the tactical victory of the Ukrainian army in Kursk, and the reactions of Western governments and media reports were surprisingly low-key. First, they did not want the Ukrainian war, which had already become a mess, to expand and become permanent; second, they were perhaps not optimistic about the actions of the Ukrainian army. But the embarrassment that cannot be avoided is that both the "Stryker" and the "Leopard 1" are US and European equipment. The US and Europe have regulations that military aid cannot be used in Russia. It's not enough to fire artillery shells, but tanks and armored vehicles have also been driven over, which is a bit difficult to fool. Unless it can lead to a relatively certain victory, the US and Europe are not enthusiastic about further intensifying the conflict with Russia.

In the case of a shortage of troops and inadequate foreign aid, the Kursk Ukrainian Army lacked confidence. But this was the biggest highlight of the Ukrainian Army after its failure in the Zaporizhia invasion. It was unacceptable to be easily defeated by the Russian army, and giving up voluntarily became an absurd performance art. The Kursk Ukrainian Army had no choice but to stand firm, shrink its head, and prepare for a fierce battle.

This has become a good opportunity for the Russian army to free up its conscript resources. Whether it is to wipe them out in one fell swoop or to create a meat grinder and consume the Ukrainian army's already limited elite forces, it will greatly weaken the Ukrainian army's strength and may even eventually lead to political changes in Ukraine.

Only after history is revealed in the future will people know whether Kursk 2.0 is the brainchild of Zelensky or Zelensky. From a military perspective, Kursk's tactical victory is unlikely to lead to greater strategic changes. But from a political perspective, this may be a necessary gamble.

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