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The fact that Vice President Kamala Harris has replaced President Biden as the Democratic presidential candidate and former President Trump's unexpectedly strong poll numbers have completely upended the 2024 U.S. presidential campaign and election landscape. It's time to ask: How would U.S. policy toward China be different if either candidate had won the election?

It is easy (and not necessarily inaccurate) to think that the previous China policies of these two candidates and their administrations can provide a reference for understanding their attitudes toward China after returning to the White House. After all, they both had a set of fairly coherent and continuous China policies for four years. The most striking thing about the China policies of these two administrations is the consistency and continuity they have. The differences between these policies are not large, but only different in degree, not in essence. In almost all policy areas, including diplomacy and politics, military and security, economy and business, political ideology, cyber and espionage, technology, education, human rights and other fields, the United States' China policy has been consistent from the Trump administration to the Biden administration. Although the content is different, the substance has not changed much.

Of course, there are some differences. President Trump and his senior administration officials have been more critical in their rhetoric than President Biden and his senior administration officials. Trump and his administration have publicly condemned China many times, while Biden and his administration officials have been less vocal in condemning China. They have also issued several comprehensive statements on China policy. The Trump administration has adopted a more sophisticated public diplomacy toward China than the Biden team, and in contrast, the Biden administration has done far more to strengthen alliances overseas and build an anti-China coalition than the Trump team. Domestically, Biden has worked with Congress to pass important legislation aimed at strengthening the U.S. technology, education, and research infrastructure to effectively compete with China.

Therefore, the first thing we can foresee is that the US policy toward China will further continue the content of the past eight years, and China should not expect major changes in this regard.Four years ago, some U.S. observers and Chinese officials expected that President Biden would break with Trump’s radical shift in China policy and return to the previous policy of “engagement.” They were proven dead wrong (and this also exposed a major intelligence failure by Chinese experts on the United States). If they thought that the United States would return to the cooperative policy of “engagement” with China before 2017, they will be proven wrong again. Comprehensive competition will continue and continue to be the guiding strategy of the U.S. government.

Nonetheless, Trump and Harris, if elected, may have different China policies than their first administrations to some extent. First, Harris, if president, will likely take a different approach than she did as vice president. We should not assume that existing policies or personnel from the Biden administration will continue. Likewise, a second Trump administration could also include some changes and surprises.

In the case of Trump, he is the biggest wild card, as his behavior is unpredictable. After his first year in office, Trump and his administration were critical of China. But if Trump returns to power, he could suddenly turn around and engage with China as he did with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Most recently, in a July 21 campaign speech in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Trump used flattering language to make clear his respect for China's leaders. But if Trump attempts to reach some kind of reconciliation with China directly through such means, he will be at serious odds with the entire Republican Party, the Trump administration itself, most members of Congress, most Democrats, and most American citizens, all of whom see China as America's number one competitor and adversary.

Regarding US support for Taiwan's defense, Trump said he views Taiwan the same way he views NATO allies, that they are all transactions. In an interview with Bloomberg on July 17, 2024, Trump said: "Taiwan should pay us for its defense. As you know, we are no different from insurance companies." At present, it is difficult to know whether Taiwan can "buy" new defense commitments from Trump and his administration, and what practical impact this will have.

If elected, Trump’s trade policy is likely to be more aggressive than that of his first administration. For this reason, China, the world, and the U.S. economy itself should be prepared to cope with the enormous pressure (and inflation) brought about by more stringent tariff policies.

If Trump is elected, an important question will arise:Who will join the Trump administration and influence China policy, and what impact will their views have?At this point, I can only confirm two (or possibly three) people who will join Trump's team: his former national security adviserRobert O'Brien, former U.S. Trade RepresentativeRobert Lighthizer, and possibly former deputy national security adviser and China expertMatt PottingerO'Brien and Pottinger are ideological hawks with a deep dislike for the Chinese regime, while Lighthizer is a radical trade hawk.Mike Gallagherand SenatorMarco Rubio(another China hawk whom Trump considered for vice president) could also get a senior position. At this point, it’s hard to tell who might get a Trump administration appointment in the security/defense space, but it’s worth keeping an eye onElbridge Colby(founder of the Marathon Initiative), Oriana Skylar Mastro (Stanford University and the Carnegie Endowment), and Zach Cooper (American Enterprise Institute). All three are hawks on China defense.

As far as we know, Harris was not involved in the formulation of China policy during her tenure as vice president, but she is a conscientious and disciplined "executor." She has visited Asia many times, but never to China; she rarely gives speeches involving China; and she strictly adheres to her own "talking points" when meeting with foreign officials. She has not had direct contact with Chinese officials in Washington or third countries, although she did have a brief meeting with Chinese leaders during the APEC meeting in Bali, Indonesia in November 2022. On January 27, 2024, she briefly met with the new leader of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te, at the inauguration ceremony of Honduran President Xiomara Castro.

Although Harris has not focused on China affairs, she has been actively involved in the affairs of the Indo-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia.As Vice President of the United States, she has visited Southeast Asia five times and the Indo-Pacific seven times. On each visit, she delivered a carefully written speech that adhered to the policy language of the Biden administration. For example, part of her speech in Singapore on August 24, 2021, was a tough statement against China's illegal occupation of islands in the South China Sea. Her carefully written speeches and all her public remarks on the Indo-Pacific over the past four years seem to obscure her deeper interest in the region at the academic and cultural levels. Similarly, Harris's upbringing and her love for India are also conducive to strengthening the US-India partnership. Given the importance of Southeast Asia in Washington's China strategy, we can expect Harris's attention to the region to continue or even increase if she becomes president. This is a welcome development, as the region has long been neglected.

Harris has not been active on other issues involving China. The area where she is more active is human rights. In the field of human rights, we can foresee that she may take a tougher stance on China (the Biden administration seems to have abandoned this tough stance after taking office).

There are still many unclear points about Kamala Harris's views and practices on China. In this context, we should not ignore the fact that she is from California, a state with close contacts and business ties with China. In 2023, California's trade with China reached $138 billion, ranking first in the United States. At the same time, California has a politically influential Chinese American community, many of whom support China.

Another uncertainty is what officials might surround Harris if she is elected president. Will she retain members of the Biden administration's Asia and China team?Current Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell is a key figure to watch as he could potentially be promoted to National Security Advisor or Secretary of State. Campbell has been the main architect of the Biden administration’s China and Indo-Pacific policies.

In addition to Campbell, there is another key figure to watch, and also a key unknown, that is Harris’s foreign policy adviser for the past four years.Philip Gordon. Gordon is an experienced Democratic foreign policy figure who has served in multiple administrations and think tanks, with extensive expertise on Europe (he is fluent in French) and the Middle East. However, he has almost no record on Asia or China, and his public comments have been hesitant and superficial since Vice President Harris's public remarks in Singapore on August 24, 2021. However, he could be a strong contender for the role of national security adviser in a Harris administration, as the two have worked closely together over the past four years. Another candidate to watch for a senior position (possibly secretary of state) is the Biden administration's ambassador to China.Nicholas BurnsIt is uncertain what views Burns will have formed after four years in Beijing, but they have clearly hardened during that time. Burns is a seasoned professional diplomat with extensive experience dealing with China (although many of those experiences have been less than pleasant).

Several other members of the Biden administration's China team have already left, including the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Commerce Department. Therefore, the new team will fill senior vacancies in some government departments. There is no shortage of knowledgeable young China experts in and outside Washington who are ready to join the Harris administration.

The above speculation may open a new window to understand the China policy of a second Trump administration or a Kamala Harris administration. However, there is still a long time before the November election and the presidential inauguration in January 2025. During this period, there will be fierce competition within the two camps, and both candidates and their campaign teams will be under pressure to formulate and publicly explain their China policies.

As in all previous presidential campaigns, a "tough attitude toward China" is expected and a strategy to win voters. Therefore, we foresee that there will be a lot of criticism against China in the next three months. China is also an actor with its own set of rules, but it cannot help itself or change its image in the United States. Its words and deeds will even further hurt itself.