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Military Review of the Week: The H-6K participated in the China-Russia joint cruise. What are the implications?

2024-07-28

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[Text/Observer.com columnist Xi Yazhou]

On July 25, the strategic bombers of China and Russia conducted their eighth joint air strategic cruise. my country's H-6K strategic bomber and Russia's Tu-95MS bomber flew together in the Bering Strait area. The U.S. Air Force and the Canadian Air Force immediately took off, leaving the first group photo of the four countries' aircraft flying together.

Through the pictures and videos released this time, we can see that our H-6K strategic bombers did not carry any ammunition during this operation, but only carried self-defense electronic countermeasure pods on the outer wing racks. This also shows that in addition to carrying and launching ammunition, our bombers were conducting a serious exercise under conditions close to actual combat. After all, this mission was carried out near the "North American Air Defense Identification Zone" designated by the United States, and our bombers would face realradarIn terms of detection and tracking, this is the first time we have truly seen the level of the opponent's radar network here compared with the surrounding airspace such as Japan, Taiwan, and even Southeast Asia. Even though we can obtain the approximate electronic situation of the relevant airspace provided by them through cooperation with the Russian side, it is not the same as our own first-hand information after all.

This is a "first experience" for both China and the United States.

Therefore, even if we do not consider the difficulties in organizing operations such as flight and navigation, I believe that this "e-sports" opportunity alone is a very rare test for our army under actual combat conditions.

As the saying goes, "It is impolite not to reciprocate." In recent years, the activities of the US and Canadian naval and air forces in the sea and airspace around my country have been very frequent and intensive. This time, we are "returning the favor" to them.

Of course, we can also see from the previous reports from the United States that "Chinese bombers may approach US airspace in the near future" that this operation, from planning to implementation, was not completely out of the US intelligence vision.

This is not surprising. It is unlikely that we are completely unprepared for such a strategic cruise operation in unfamiliar airspace. For the United States, which has strong space surveillance capabilities, detecting signs of the transfer and deployment of Chinese strategic bombers is also a capability they should have.

But this does not diminish the strategic significance of our country’s action this time. After all, it is a “precious first” for both China and the United States.

We know that currently there are only three countries in the world that have the "three-in-one nuclear deterrence" capability: China, the United States and Russia. In comparison, China's air strategic deterrence capability developed the latest. Although it may have surpassed Russia and is second only to the United States in terms of the number of strategic bombers available at any time, our main aircraft, the H-6, still has a large gap in range and bomb load compared with the Tu-22M3, Tu-160, Tu-95, B-52, B-1B, and B-2 models of the United States and Russia.

In addition, China also lacks actual combat experience in using strategic bombers. my country's most recent experience in using strategic bombers in actual combat was the use of the Soviet-made Tu-4 strategic bomber during the Tibetan rebellion. In that operation, the Tu-4 used the 23mm self-defense machine gun it carried on board to carry out ground support missions, which was actually similar to the American AC-130 "air gunship".

In contrast, American bombers carried out a large number of actual combat bombing missions in the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, and even a series of other military operations later, and carried out a large number of air patrol missions during the Cold War. Correspondingly, the Soviet Air Force and today's Russian Aerospace Forces also carried out many patrol missions in tit-for-tat fashion. Similarly, in recent years, in the Syrian War and the Russian-Ukrainian War, Russian strategic bombers have also carried out actual combat missions ranging from air-to-air bombing to long-range cruise missile launches.

Therefore, whether it is exchanges with the Russian army or with the US army, it is of great significance for our army to improve its future combat capabilities, and many of the experiences and lessons are worth learning.

From the most importantnuclear weaponIn terms of projection capability, my country's strategic bombers currently have only one nuclear strike means, which is the air-to-ground-20 cruise missile with "nuclear and conventional" capabilities. In theory, if this missile with a range of more than 2,000 kilometers carries a nuclear warhead that is lighter than a conventional warhead, it should have a range of more than 2,500 kilometers or even longer. This means that our bombers need to fly to airspace relatively close to potential adversary targets to launch such missiles. From the geographical environment of China and the United States, we can find that the shortest distance from China to the United States is from my country's northeast region to the north across Russia and the Arctic region, and then approach the United States from the north.

Here comes a question: will Russia "allow" our strategic missiles or strategic bombers to pass over its territory?

Let us discuss the issue of "international law" in this situation. According to current international law and international practice, airspace refers to the airspace above the territory and territorial waters, with an upper altitude limit of 100 kilometers.

That is to say, for intercontinental ballistic missiles, except for the ascending and descending phases, they do not violate the airspace of other countries. So just talking about legal issues, if our missiles fly over Russia to attack US targets, they do not enter Russian airspace.

Of course, this is actually a meaningless "being serious", because by that time "the lights have been blown out, the candles have been drawn, and everything is over", who will care.

So the real question is whether China's missile launches will cause Russia to conclude that we are launching a nuclear strike against them, thereby triggering a nuclear counterattack.

This problem is actually simple. China and Russia can reach a communication and coordination mechanism - this mechanism has already been established between China and Russia in recent years. Thanks to the closeness of China-Russia relations and common external pressure, the two sides have carried out anti-missile early warning cooperation and even computer simulation joint anti-missile exercises.

Although China and Russia currently both have mid-course anti-missile capabilities that can intercept medium-range and even intercontinental missiles, this capability does not have much practical significance when used to deal with large-scale missile attacks. However, this kind of cooperation is sufficient for mutual notification and verification within just a few minutes at the "critical moment" that the missiles launched by each other are not launched into the other's territory.

Therefore, the greatest significance of China-Russia anti-missile cooperation is actually to solve the problem that China's intercontinental missiles may cause Russia to misjudge when flying over the Arctic.

On the other hand, if Chinese bombers want to carry out strategic deterrence against the United States, the closest direction is of course to fly over the Arctic, but this route is not ideal becausefighterIt will be difficult to provide escort. Moreover, Canada and Alaska are not the core areas of the United States. If cruise missiles are to be used to attack key strategic targets in the United States from the Arctic route, bombers will actually need to fly over Canada and Alaska.

Therefore, at present, if Chinese strategic bombers want to attack the U.S. mainland, the ideal situation is to use Russia's base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, pass through the Bering Strait, attack targets in Alaska, or go further south to attack targets on the west coast of the U.S. Russia has been very familiar with this flight route since the Cold War, and this time our army's H-6K is just practicing with the Russian "master" to get familiar with the "road conditions."

This situation will change to a certain extent due to technological development in recent years.

Now everyone knows that China's large air-launched hypersonic missile has been given the "honorary title" of "Beijing Heavy Hammer" by the US media, and a video of the H-6N strategic bomber flying with this missile has also appeared on the Internet. At present, Americans also analyze that we should have two types of such missiles, one with a shorter range and smaller size, mainly responsible for conventional strike missions against land targets and large targets at sea; the other is larger in size and longer in range, used to perform strategic nuclear delivery missions.

Based on the size of the larger missile and theoretical calculations of the effect of air launch on the range extension of the missile, if it carries a warhead with a yield of hundreds of thousands of tons and a weight of hundreds of kilograms, and only considering its ballistic flight, its range may be close to that of the DF-31 long-range missile, that is, about 8,000 kilometers. If it is to launch a large warhead with a yield of more than one million tons, three independently targetable reentry vehicles, or conventional warheads of the same weight, the range can at least reach 5,000-6,000 kilometers.

If it is launched from the North Pole, it can directly pass over Canada and Alaska and cover all the core strategic targets of the United States. During the whole process, the bombers do not even need to enter the current "air defense identification zone" of the United States.

Of course, at present it is impossible for our strategic bombers to fly above the airspace altitude, which inevitably involves the issue of using Russian airspace.

Therefore, it is a precautionary measure for our country's strategic bomber forces to start adapting to flying in Russian airspace as early as possible. After all, our country's bombers have no experience in flying to high-latitude areas and are not familiar with the "road conditions", so they need more practice.

It is conceivable that at some critical point in the future, if the tension between China, the United States and Russia develops to a certain extent, and Chinese strategic bombers begin to appear frequently over the Arctic, the pressure on the United States will naturally be greater than the pressure exerted by our strategic bombers circling over the mainland. Even if our more advanced air-launched strategic missiles have the ability to launch attacks on the United States mainland from the mainland in the future, this kind of "demonstration of capabilities" is also necessary. It is like when you see your opponent holding a gun in his hand versus pointing the gun at his forehead, the latter is naturally more deterrent.

Among my country's "three-in-one nuclear deterrence", sea-based deterrence is currently the most difficult, because the sea areas and activity ranges of my country's nuclear submarines are not ideal, and it will take a long time to complete the next generation of strategic nuclear submarines that can be compared with the US "Columbia" class. In terms of land-based missiles, my country has developed rapidly in recent years, but the problem with land-based missiles is that the "showdown" action is not obvious under nuclear crisis conditions, and the ability to exert pressure is limited.

Strategic bombers have the highest visibility and the most obvious pressure effect. Even stealth bombers can be seen taking off from airports by opponents, but they cannot be tracked after taking off.

The ability of strategic bombers to be recalled also makes them very useful in the "Extreme Pressure" game, because "Extreme Pressure" requires the ability to quickly reduce pressure after achieving the goal to avoid "playing too far". There is no more obvious means of reducing pressure than recalling bombers operating under the enemy's nose.

Therefore, it can be speculated that even if my country is equipped with the H-20 stealth bomber, it will most likely continue to serve together with the H-6 for a considerable period of time. The H-6 will definitely be a "century bomber" like the B-52.

In addition, my country's recent participation of the H-6K in a joint cruise has a less obvious but understandable hint to all parties concerned under the current international situation: since the H-6 can be stationed at Russian airports, then other Chinese Air Force aircraft can naturally be stationed at airports in other parts of Russia.

We know that NATO is currently facing despair in Ukraine. Will there be some irrational actions in despair? For example, NATO Air Force will join the war to suppress the actions of the Russian Aerospace Forces and thus reverse the situation?

If only Russia itself, NATO or the United States take such actions, the Russian Aerospace Forces will certainly not have the ability to fight alone, so Russia will most likely be forced to make a decision to expand military operations, such as large-scale missile strikes against Poland, Romania and other countries, or even general mobilization, taking larger-scale land military operations, and expanding the war to the entire Eastern Europe. Correspondingly, NATO and the United States may also enter mobilization, and Europe will then face a real total war with millions of troops participating in the war. The severity of the war will make the current Russian-Ukrainian war look like a child's play. No matter who wins in the end, it will be a catastrophe.

At this point, the nuclear showdown is very close. As for the world economy, the trend of multipolarization, and globalization, all of these will come to naught. The powder kegs in the Middle East and Asia may also be fully ignited, which will be the real Third World War.

Although the above-mentioned "hell scenario" is unlikely to occur, it is still necessary to add some weight to the current balance.

Military affairs are a matter of life and death for a country, and we must be cautious. Therefore, even if there is only a 1% risk, the army must be 100% prepared. It is better to be prepared and not use it than to sharpen the weapon before the battle. From this perspective, the joint strategic cruise has another meaning. At least it is necessary to let our aircraft actually take off and land at the airports of the Russian Aerospace Forces to understand their situation.

Today, some retired generals in Taiwan have talked about some "secrets" from the last century and the beginning of this century, that is, the US Air Force reached an agreement with the Taiwan military at that time to provide Taiwan with a batch of "hot aircraft", that is, the US Air Force's active aircraft, in "critical moments".

However, on the other hand, our army will naturally not be unprepared.

But the agreement was never implemented at that time because things did not develop to that stage. Many years later, when we look back on the dangerous possibilities behind today's joint combat readiness cruise, we may just sigh as we do when we look back on this period of history.

Here I am reminded of a "Chinese proverb" that is often quoted by Americans but never heard in China: "may you live in an intresting time", and they think it is "the most vicious curse of the Chinese", perhaps some weird translation of "it is better to be a dog in prosperous times than a man in troubled times"; but judging from the literal meaning, the times that can arouse the imagination of history lovers today were all catastrophes for the people at that time. In order to prevent our times from becoming more "interesting", many people are quietly moving forward with heavy burdens.

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