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at 6:30 a.m. lebanon time on september 23, the first wave of israeli missiles flew over lebanon.

"it was terrible, missiles flew over our heads. we were awakened by the sound of bombing, we didn't expect this," a local woman told the media.

according to cctv news, the israel defense forces announced on the evening of the 23rd that the airstrike was named "northern arrow" and its target was "the combat infrastructure that hezbollah in lebanon has been building for more than 20 years."

lebanese health ministry officials said on september 24 that the death toll from israel's attacks on lebanon since the 23rd has reached 558, including 50 children and 94 women. in addition, 1,835 people were injured.

after the conflict between israel and the palestinian islamic resistance movement (hamas) broke out in october 2023, the israeli army and hezbollah, which supports hamas, continued to exchange fire. according to the israeli army, the "current military focus" has shifted to lebanon in the north.

some media further believe that since the outbreak of the fifth middle east war in 1982, there has been a conflict between israel and hezbollah, and the shadow war has lasted for more than 40 years. now, a new military conflict is breaking out.

an expert told the paper (www.thepaper.cn) that in the recent conflict between the two sides, hezbollah's main damage was to its infrastructure and communications, including the "unprecedented" explosion of lebanese communications equipment a few days ago. although israel achieved tactical success in this regard, it did not achieve strategic success, and hezbollah has its own way of dealing with it.

based on the military actions and statements of both sides at this stage, experts believe that the middle east has been pushed to the brink of a new war, and therefore diplomatic mediation is needed at the international level after overcoming obstacles.

expert profile:

ahron bregmansenior lecturer at the department of war studies at king's college london. he participated in the 1982 lebanon war and served in the israeli army for six years.

andreas kriegassociate professor at the department of defence studies, king's college london. since 2007, he has been researching declassified british, american and israeli records that reveal a previously unknown role of intelligence in combating terrorism and insurgency, and in shaping uk policy.

steven wagnersenior lecturer in international security at brunel university, geopolitical risk analyst and strategic consultant with 20 years’ experience working in the middle east and north africa.

hezbollah remains cautious for now, and the israeli army has not achieved a strategic victory

the paper:how do you assess the damage done to hezbollah by the coordinated israeli military action? some analyses point out that even if hezbollah is weakened, it still has the ability to launch thousands of missiles at strategic locations in israel, such as from the airport to the center of tel aviv, water supply pipelines, power hubs and offshore gas drilling platforms. what does it mean that the leader of hezbollah announced that an "indefinite war of reckoning" is underway? is the war expected? what scale will it reach?

bregman:the main damage the israelis have inflicted on hezbollah recently has been attacks on its communications systems, particularly damage to pagers and other communications equipment. this has been a tactical success for israel, but hezbollah could overcome this difficulty by switching to a different communications mode.

hezbollah still has the ability to launch hundreds of rockets into israel. at this stage, hezbollah is cautious because they believe israel is looking for an excuse to move into lebanon. an attack on tel aviv would cause heavy casualties, which could provide an excuse for israel to invade.

kriging:in the past few weeks, attacks on hezbollah’s infrastructure and communications command and control have disrupted this network. the hezbollah organization must be understood as a network system (similar to a network) rather than a hierarchy. this means that the organization is very resilient and can withstand these attacks without being completely defeated.

wagner:the destruction caused by the israeli operation was extensive, but i don't know how much of hezbollah's stockpiles were destroyed. the key issue here is the quality and detail of israel's intelligence on hezbollah's caches.

i don't think hezbollah is likely to use a large portion of its stockpile unless:

1) hezbollah is planning an offensive (unlikely at this stage);

2) hezbollah believes that israel could destroy most of its weapons stockpiles.

the second possibility is similar to "use it or lose it." in this case, although hezbollah has a large stockpile of weapons, these stocks have lost their deterrent effect because hezbollah has been weakened.

but for hezbollah, the destructive potential and range of these weapons can be politically helpful. for example, israel was deterred from attacking hezbollah in the early years of the israeli-palestinian conflict, but that is no longer the case.

hezbollah leader nasrallah's talk of a "war of reckoning" has two goals: to prepare hezbollah for a difficult period of struggle, while also signaling to the israelis that hezbollah is willing to endure this campaign.

the paper:there have been many reports, debates and critiques of israel’s stunning intelligence success in lebanon. for example, it was recently reported that the head of the idf’s 8200 intelligence unit resigned over his failure to prevent a hamas attack on israel on october 7 last year.

analysts believe that israel's pager bombing in lebanon was a "tactical success without a strategic goal." us intelligence officials revealed that israel planned the bombing for 15 years. how do you understand the possible role of israel's intelligence agency mossad in the bombing? what is the impact on the region and the world?

bregman:to launch a pager bombing campaign like the one in lebanon would take years. in fact, the israelis (i mean the mossad), built a small factory from scratch. they assembled pagers, put small bombs in them, weaponized the devices, and sold them to hezbollah.

we have to remember that hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization and therefore cannot buy equipment such as pagers from respectable companies (if a company sells such equipment to hezbollah, it may be subject to us sanctions). therefore, the israelis took advantage of this and sold these devices to hezbollah.

the problem is that other terrorist groups around the world will soon be using the same technology to turn devices into small bombs, which will force airlines to change their rules to avoid plane crashes. can you imagine having to leave your phone behind when you go abroad instead of taking it with you?

kriging:israel has achieved only tactical and operational victories over the past 12 months. strategically, israel has lost the war in gaza and is likely to lose the war in lebanon. israel has chosen violence over diplomacy, making it difficult to achieve sustainable peace and stability.the pager explosions were tactically spectacular events that masked israel’s strategic failure to deal effectively with hezbollah.

wagner:this is certainly unprecedented, and i agree that there is a lack of any strategy (on the israeli pager bombings), although it could also be a "use it or lose it" moment.

a full-scale war has not yet broken out, and diplomatic mediation needs to overcome obstacles

the paper:after nearly a full year of tensions with hezbollah, have israeli leaders changed their tune and risked escalating the situation, which could get out of control?

what is israel's strategy, goals and estimates after its recent series of victories against hezbollah? do you agree that israel's actions have "crossed all red lines" and could herald the outbreak of an all-out war?

bregman:we are not in a full-blown war yet, but we are very close. in recent days, israel has added a new war goal and is sending israeli citizens living in the north of the country, near the lebanese border, back home.

the israelis are using military means to achieve this goal, and things are moving in an escalatory direction. we are on the brink of a third lebanon war (the first two were in 1982 and 2006), but war is still avoidable.

israeli tanks and troops might soon enter lebanon to establish a "safe zone" inside lebanon to separate hezbollah and israeli villages on the israeli side. a ground invasion (of lebanon) would mean a full-scale war that could spill over and become a regional war.

if israel does enter lebanon, they risk being trapped inside lebanon for years.

israel last established a "safe zone" in lebanon in 1985, and was trapped there until 2000. the israeli army left lebanon in may 2000 after being trapped and attacked, killing more than 850 people.

kriging:neither side still wants to risk a full-scale war. israel cannot sustain the current war and is trying to increase pressure on hezbollah to make it feel that the current situation is also unsustainable.

the hope is that as the pressure mounts, hezbollah will either come to the negotiating table to discuss the withdrawal of hezbollah fighters north of the litani river, or hezbollah will be cornered and escalate the situation into a major attack between the two sides, requiring an idf response.israel is currently gradually increasing the pressure as both sides are on the brink of war.

wagner:hezbollah's intensive attacks have forced many people to leave their communities. israel's goal is to get its citizens living on the lebanese-israeli border to return home.

this is perhaps the worst security failure in israel's history, not even happening since 1948 (during the first arab-israeli war), when both sides were evenly matched. it is also a blow to israel's "self-image of resilience and toughness". at present, the strategy israel pursues seems to be to increase pressure on hezbollah to force them to withdraw from their border positions.

ideally, israel would prefer to implement un security council resolution 1701, adopted in august 2006, which calls for hezbollah to withdraw north of the litani river.

i think the risk of all-out war is relatively low, but greater than it was a few weeks ago, and the idf does not seem ready to conduct such an operation. they do not have the strength to conduct such a campaign, especially since such a campaign would be difficult and slow.

if israel were to deploy more troops along the border, call up reserves or delay the discharge of conscripts, a scenario that could change the situation, and hezbollah would be powerless to change it.

an offensive would be a disaster because the idf is on high alert. hezbollah cannot deplete its rocket stockpile because they would face the further problem of those rockets being destroyed by israeli air power, which would defeat the purpose of these weapons as a deterrent.

any political success hezbollah can achieve requires enduring airstrikes and defeating israeli objectives, which means pushing deep and striking hard wherever possible.

i am not sure that the israeli strategy will work. it is possible if israel can target key hezbollah officials and their weapons stockpiles.

so the big question is, how good is israel's positioning intelligence? if it is detailed, then hezbollah will become vulnerable enough to retreat. but without a political solution, it is unlikely to be safe for civilians along israel's northern border.

the paper:is diplomacy or a peace deal still an option? what's at stake?

bregman:diplomacy can still work, i mean the us and france (note: france once controlled lebanon). i believe the americans are waiting for all parties to be exhausted.

the situation between israel and lebanon is serious. we are on the brink of a catastrophic, possibly even a regional war. us president biden can prevent it. now the united states urgently needs diplomatic mediation with the help of france.

the key elements of these diplomatic efforts are: first, stopping the war in gaza, which in turn will stop hezbollah from firing on israel, and second, trying to convince hezbollah to withdraw from the northern border, where diplomacy is still possible.

kriging:the dispute in lebanon can only be resolved through negotiations. however, the key point is in gaza, not lebanon. israel will have to engage in meaningful negotiations with hamas to end the israeli-palestinian conflict in order to provide israel with a "step down" in lebanon. militarily, israel cannot win the dispute in lebanon.

wagner:a diplomatic solution is always an option, but there are obstacles. israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu has a personal interest in prolonging this war and satisfying the demands of extremist elements in his government. likewise, hamas leader shinwar has not shown much interest in the proposals on the table. it would take enormous pressure to change this, and there is a chance that it will not happen.

after the explosion of lebanon's communications equipment, where is the line of public safety?

the paper:if israel was indeed behind last week's explosions of pagers and walkie-talkies in lebanon, it would mean that israel had penetrated hezbollah's supply chain and knew what kind of security checks were performed on new equipment.

subsequently, hezbollah's senior commander aqil was assassinated. what do you think of this action and the impact of the trend of "weaponization of everyday equipment" on the region and even the world? has the "pandora's box" been opened?

bregman:israel has successfully infiltrated hezbollah, and it is clear that israel's "james bond"-style pager bombings and the assassination of aqil were tactical successes.

but strategically, israel is not there yet. in fact, if a full-scale war breaks out, it could delay the return of 60,000 residents (living on israel's northern border), which is a strategic goal that israel has not yet achieved.

kriging:all evidence suggests that israel was behind the explosion of hezbollah communications equipment last week. this indiscriminate attack on civilians and fighters is unprecedented. this sets a dangerous precedent of weaponizing everyday equipment used by civilians. if the international community does not condemn this, then others can take advantage of this precedent and try similar moves. for a year, israel has been pushing and crossing the line of acceptable and legal behavior in war. this cannot become the norm.

wagner:i understand why people were shocked by (the explosion of communications equipment in lebanon), but this case is unique. it seems that israel deliberately targeted hezbollah, including by setting up a front company to sell them these devices, and perhaps using their social networks to plant the idea and sell these devices.

the paper:according to the initial investigation of these communication devices by the lebanese authorities, the explosives were planted before arriving in lebanon. what new challenges can we see from the current supply chain? is the degree to which public security boundaries are being breached now more serious than ever before?

bregman:in fact, mossad adopted an old technique used by many intelligence agencies: they opened a shop and operated from there. rather than intervening directly in the supply chain, they assembled the equipment themselves and then provided it to hezbollah.

kriging:we live in a networked world where supply chains and commerce are increasingly interconnected and interdependent.

"[the explosion in lebanon] leaves a lot of room for malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities in global supply chains and weaponize interdependence. the fact that civilian supply chains were also exploited this time is worrisome."

wagner:my understanding is that the mossad, as an intelligence agency, was part of the supply chain in the lebanese communications equipment explosion, so it is generally less alarming than some people initially thought. like other risks, these things have to be assessed based on intent and capability. so there is good reason to be concerned, but not to panic.