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On August 7, US President Biden mentioned in a letter to Congress that the United States, Britain and Australia had reached an "understanding" that would provide "additional relevant political commitments" and would be implemented once the new agreement reached by the three countries came into effect. What exactly is the "understanding"? What does the "new agreement" refer to?

As the Australian government submitted the "new agreement" to parliament for deliberation on August 12, this "new agreement" and "understanding" caused an uproar in Australia. The successive revelations and questionings from various media and political parties made the signing of the AUKUS Agreement 2.0 version by the United States, Britain and Australia finally known to the outside world, and the relevant controversies surrounding this agreement are continuing to ferment.

Overall, the new agreement is a further deepening of the original version, while strengthening the dominant position of the United States and Britain in their relations with Australia. Faced with such a trilateral agreement full of flaws and very disadvantageous to itself, it is not a wise choice for Australia to let the United States and Britain do whatever they want.

Three changes and controversies of AUKUS 2.0

The Agreement between the Governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States on Cooperation in Naval Nuclear Propulsion signed on August 6 was used to replace the original agreement that came into effect during the tenure of Australia's former Morrison government, so it is also called the "Ocus" Agreement 2.0. Compared with the old version, the new version has three changes:

1. A step further in the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion. The new version elaborates on the transfer of information, materials and equipment related to naval nuclear propulsion to Australia, and clarifies that Australia will be responsible for the disposal of nuclear waste generated by the nuclear submarine project. According to the new agreement, the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion devices and other equipment, including equipment required for the disposal of naval nuclear propulsion facilities, is permitted. While stating that they only seek nuclear-powered submarines rather than nuclear weapons, the United States, Britain and Australia called this move "the highest standard of nuclear non-proliferation." As we all know, nuclear non-proliferation includes the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear materials, nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. This manipulation is clearly an attempt to override the concept of nuclear non-proliferation.

On the other hand, regarding the application of the security agreement reached between Australia and the IAEA, the new agreement states that the transfer of nuclear materials to Australia, the use and production of specific nuclear materials in Australia must comply with the security agreement reached with the IAEA. However, it also stipulates that Australia needs to consult the United States and the United Kingdom first, and then negotiate with the IAEA on relevant issues after the three countries reach a consensus. The United States and the United Kingdom have clearly shown their willingness to support Australia in the IAEA.

Second, the United States and the United Kingdom enjoy priority on many issues, and Australia is clearly at a disadvantage. The new agreement emphasizes the need to protect the intellectual property rights of the United States. In the process of promoting nuclear cooperation with Australia, it is necessary to prevent information, materials or equipment that appear without the consent of the United States from exceeding the "jurisdiction". At the same time, if the assistance to Australia will pose an "unreasonable risk" to its own military needs, the United States and the United Kingdom can choose to withdraw by giving a written notice one year in advance. In addition, when selling specific nuclear materials to Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom should receive price compensation. The price of uranium-enriched materials will be jointly determined by the United States and the United Kingdom. In contrast, Australia is responsible for the management, disposal, storage and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated by the operation of the naval nuclear propulsion plant. If the United States and the United Kingdom suffer losses as a result, Australia needs to make compensation. If this is still a common practice for nuclear transfers between countries, then Australia has really acted as a "sucker" in terms of funding. According to reports, Australia will allocate a total of US$6 billion in the next five years, half of which will be used to expand the production capacity of nuclear submarines in the United States and half for conceptual research on nuclear submarines.

3. The additional "understanding" shows that the new agreement is not as simple as it seems. Although it is not legally binding, the additional "understanding" has caused a lot of controversy. One of the controversial points is that the Australian government did not mention the existence of the additional "understanding" until it submitted the new agreement to the parliament for review. If Biden had not revealed the existence of such an "understanding" in his letter, the Australian society would still be kept in the dark. This has triggered unanimous criticism of the government by the Australian society.

The second controversial point is the concern about the consequences of the "Understanding". Most people are worried that the clauses in the "Understanding" are promises made by Australia to the United States and Britain in exchange for nuclear submarines on the premise of conflict with China. Therefore, the so-called "additional relevant political commitments" are essentially pushing Australia to the forefront of the competition between China and the United States, making it a pawn at the mercy of the United States to deal with China. A spokesperson for the Australian Green Party believes that the existence of the relevant clauses in the "Understanding" means that Australia's foreign policy towards the United States in the next half century will serve the strategic interests of the United States in a way that damages its own sovereignty.

Australia will not get the desired result if it allows the US and UK to do whatever they want

Ocus 2.0 is an agreement that is clearly disadvantageous to Australia, but the Australian government sees it as an opportunity to build "greater defense industrial capabilities." This shows that Australia has gone further and further on the road of betting on the United States, but in the long run, it will be difficult to achieve the expected results.

1. Over-betting on the United States in terms of security will cause an imbalance in Australia's foreign policy and limit its own room for maneuver. Since the signing of the treaty between the United States, Britain and Australia in November 2021, namely the Ocus 1.0 version, and its upgrade to version 2.0 today, the United States and Britain are making substantial progress in transferring nuclear technology to Australia. At the same time, Australia proposed in April 2023 to acquire advanced capabilities including artificial intelligence, hypersonic flight technology and marine perception capabilities by cultivating the second pillar of the Ocus Alliance. It can be seen that Australia has placed too much expectation on the Ocus Group in terms of security. To this end, Australia proposed to build a large area from the Cocos Islands in the northwest to the port city of Townsville in the northeast into a large platform for power projection. At the same time, actively cooperate with the United States to intervene in the domestic affairs of island countries in the South Pacific, forcing the Solomon Islands to hand over the task of expanding its police force to Australia. The most recent example is the agreement with the United States to establish a military base in the Cocos Islands targeting the Strait of Malacca and the eastern Indian Ocean.

Given the reality that the US is trying hard to get Australia involved in the South China Sea situation, Australia's all-out bet on the US in terms of security will easily lead to an imbalance in its diplomatic layout of "relying on China for economy and the US for security". In other words, if Australia excessively follows the US and UK in terms of security and does not respect China's interests, its economic cooperation with China will sooner or later be impacted, and its room for maneuver between China and the US will inevitably be greatly compressed, which is not in line with Australia's national interests.

Second, allowing the United States and Britain to have their way will lead to Australia ignoring risks, and it may eventually pay a huge price for unilateral payment. Faced with various doubts from all walks of life, Australian officials can be said to have shown no risk awareness at all. In response to former Prime Minister Keating's statement that "the US military buildup in Australia is turning Australia into a base for the United States", Defense Minister Mars argued that "this reflects the growing cooperation between Australia and the United States" and "this is nothing new." When asked whether "additional commitments" were made to the United States, Australian Prime Minister Albanese said perfunctorily, "Now that the world has changed, Canberra is doing things differently now." The implication is that betting all on the United States is in line with the trend and there is nothing wrong with it. In response to the concerns of social groups about how to store radioactive waste, the Australian Department of Defense simply evaded the question by saying that "this problem will not arise until after 2050."

The reality on the other side of Australia's great hopes for the United States and Britain is that American shipyards are suffering from a series of problems such as insufficient production capacity and lack of qualified labor. The production capacity of the "Virginia" class nuclear submarines cannot even meet the needs of the country, so how can they be transferred to Australia? As for the United Kingdom, its shipbuilding capacity has shrunk even more severely, and it is almost impossible to build new nuclear submarines for Australia. Therefore, Australia can only pin its hopes on the United States. However, the clause that the United States and Britain have the right to withdraw from aid to Australia if it assesses that it will pose "unreasonable risks" to themselves and the reality that the recovery of the shipbuilding industry requires a long period of time have put Australia at risk. This means that Australia's commitment to spend 368 billion Australian dollars in the next 30 years to purchase nuclear submarines and other weapons has actually become a hugely risky gamble.

(Cui Rongwei, Assistant Researcher, Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)