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Former US Ambassador to Russia Sullivan said: Washington exaggerated Moscow's "red line" and the risks of crossing Moscow's "red line", so much so that it delayed too long in making the decision to provide Ukraine with weapons.

Former US Ambassador to Russia Sullivan believes that the West overestimates the risks of Putin's "red line"

Sullivan believes that judging from the cases in the past two years, the West has overestimated the critical point at which Putin will take catastrophic actions. Ukraine used unmanned boats to drive the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, but Putin did not respond. In the past, Putin has said that he would consider usingnuclear weaponHowever, judging from Putin’s reaction after the Ukrainian army’s surprise attack on Kursk, Sullivan believes that there is no so-called “nuclear risk” at all.

Sullivan believes that Putin does not want to fight a nuclear war with the United States. No sane person would want a nuclear war, and Putin is not a madman.

In the past, Moscow has always emphasized the so-called "red line", but judging from the dynamic changes in the Ukrainian battlefield over the past two years, perhaps even the West is not clear about where Putin's "red line" is. However, if we look at the previous Ukrainian battlefield from today's perspective, perhaps some Western leaders are regretting why they did not provide these weapons to Ukraine earlier? Perhaps in a few years, Ukraine may see it this way: if the West could have provided tanks and fighter jets earlier, perhaps the Russian-Ukrainian conflict would have ended long ago.

Sullivan's statement is a microcosm, which means that the West will be bolder in providing weapons to Ukraine in the future. After all, now that they have even given Ukraine fighter jets, what else can't they give Ukraine except nuclear weapons? Let's take a look at Putin's "red line".

1. Sullivan’s Midnight in Moscow

The successful Ukrainian army's raid on Kursk has become big news on the Ukrainian battlefield. Now the hot news about the situation in Ukraine is basically gathered here. Now the hot spots of attention about the Kursk offensive are nothing more than the following: what purpose the Ukrainian army wants to achieve with this offensive, what the Ukrainian army will do next, how will Putin respond to Ukraine's Kursk offensive, what kind of chain impact will the Kursk offensive have on the Ukrainian battlefield, and how Ukraine achieved the success of the Kursk raid.

Ukrainian troops raided Kursk. Putin's response may stimulate the West to be more bold in aiding Ukraine in the future

However, former US Ambassador to Russia Sullivan also interpreted another message from the Kursk Offensive: the West may have overestimated Putin's "red line" and even more underestimated the risks of crossing the "red line."

According to a report by Newsweek, this month, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Sullivan published a new book titled "Midnight in Moscow", which mainly tells the process of diplomatic war before and after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In the weeks before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Sullivan, as the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, warned based on the news he received in Moscow that this was not a joke, nor was it groundless worry, this would happen. When the Russian army finally crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border, the area around Kiev was attacked by Russian missiles, and Putin delivered a speech on special military operations, he was awakened by a pre-arranged alarm in the middle of the night, and Sullivan needed to summon his bodyguards to arrive at the embassy as soon as possible. At this time, the war has begun, and the world will never be the same.

Sullivan uses "Midnight in Moscow" to show how the relationship between the United States and Russia has deteriorated, the direction of the relationship between the two countries in the future, and how the United States will respond to the challenges posed by Russia in the future. The book also mentions such a sentence; although Putin decided how this conflict started, "the outcome of the conflict will be determined by us."

In fact, this book is ultimately a diplomatic memoir. Everyone is familiar with the series of diplomatic interactions before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Of course, there are some secrets in it, such as what some European leaders talked about on the phone with Putin when he talked about the situation in Ukraine.

As for what Sullivan said about the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is true that Putin did start the conflict, and at his command the army quickly crossed the border and rushed into Ukraine. Judging from today's situation, Putin is indeed unable to decide the outcome of this conflict, but if it is said that the outcome of this conflict will be decided by the West led by the United States, this is probably very debatable.

In this conflict, the support of the West has indeed provided crucial support for the Ukrainian army's operations and has also had an immeasurable impact on the current situation on the Ukrainian battlefield. However, it seems too arbitrary to say that this influence will allow them to decide how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will end. In the context of the current stalemate and consumption on the battlefield, how the conflict will end may not be ended by any party, but by strength. From the perspective of strength comparison, the financial resources of the West are naturally much stronger than Russia. They have sufficient financial resources to support Ukraine to continue fighting, but the reality is very complicated. The West is generally tired of aiding Ukraine. This year, the United States will face a general election. Trump, who often complains about aid to Ukraine, has made it clear that he has a very mature plan to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. If he wins the election and obtains the power of the US President, he will end the conflict within 24 hours. Everyone knows what Trump will do. If Trump cuts off aid to Ukraine, the situation on the Ukrainian battlefield may change suddenly, and the strength of the Ukrainian army will be greatly reduced.

Although the West is rich, its military production capacity is very weak and cannot meet Ukraine's battlefield needs.

In addition, although the West is rich, its military production capacity is very weak. The current war of attrition is not only a competition of financial resources, but also of military resources. Whoever has stronger military capabilities and more artillery shells will gain battlefield advantages. But the total artillery shell production of the entire West is far less than that of Russia. The West may initially hope that Ukraine can fight a war of attrition to continuously consume Russia's strength, but it also means that the West needs to continue to pour resources into the battlefield. If this war of attrition lasts too long, changes within the West will become a very big variable.

2. Sullivan believes that the West overestimates Putin’s “red line”

However, the focus of today's discussion is not "Midnight in Moscow", but Sullivan's discussion of Moscow's "red line".

According to Newsweek, the United States is Kiev's largest military aid provider, providing a total of $56 billion to date (the actual military aid figure is probably even higher). However, these donations are affected by the constant concern about the escalation of the situation, especially the concerns about the nuclear threat rhetoric within Russia. "From the military aid process over the past two years, whether it is main battle tanks, 'Fighting Falcon' fighter jets, or missiles, the United States has only been delaying, delaying, and delaying again," Sullivan said bluntly: The United States failed to provide these weapons in a timely manner, which was a big mistake.

In fact, there are many discussions within the West about the slow pace of arms aid to Ukraine, which has led to the slow operation of the Ukrainian army and missed opportunities. Looking back at the history of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past two years, we can find that this is a process of increasing and increasing the level of aid. When the Russian-Ukrainian conflict first broke out, the West had no confidence in the Ukrainian army. The United States only provided "Sting", "Javelin", etc.; but as the Ukrainian army withstood the first wave of Russian attacks and even won the Battle of Kiev, the West was full of confidence in the Ukrainian army's operations and began to expand its military aid to Ukraine. However, out of concern that Putin would overreact, the West adopted a "sausage slicing" strategy, using suicide drones, "Himas", air defense systems, main battle tanks, cluster munitions, and fighter jets have begun to be released to Ukraine one after another. Of course, the West is also observing during this process. Every time they make a breakthrough in aiding Ukraine, they will observe Russia's reaction before taking the next step.

Although these weapons were finally provided, it is generally believed in the West that these weapons came too late. To give two examples: In September 2022, Ukraine fought a successful counterattack in the Kharkiv region. From the current time, it was actually a good opportunity for the Ukrainian army to launch a full-scale counterattack. If the Ukrainian army launched an attack on the Russian-controlled area of ​​Zaporizhia again, it would have been very likely to fight all the way to the Sea of ​​Azov, split the Russian-controlled area, and cut off the Russian supply line. However, the Ukrainian army did not do so at the time. This is not to say that the Ukrainian army did not realize this, but that the reality did not allow it. One of the most important factors was the lack of tanks.

In early 2023, after some trials, the West began to provide tanks to Ukraine and asked Ukraine to launch a counterattack as soon as possible. However, this time the Ukrainian army had to face the Russian "Surovykin Line". After the Kharkov counterattack, the Russian army began to build a line of defense consisting of minefields, trenches, and dragon tooth lines in the Zaporizhia area. When Ukraine's summer counterattack began, the Ukrainian army tried to use the West's main battle tanks to attack the "Surovykin Line", but ultimately failed. One of the reasons for the failure was that tanks could not break through the "Surovykin Line" without the assistance of fighter jets. In the end, the tanks provided by the West became the target of the Russian army.

Western main battle tanks are late, the best time is September 2022

After a year, the Western fighter jets arrived, but the Ukrainian army also lost the chance to counterattack. Now the Ukrainian army is forced to defend hard due to the lack of manpower and artillery. Therefore, the general comment from the outside world on the arrival of the "Fighting Falcon" fighter jets is that it is late.

However, it is not surprising that the United States remains cautious on these issues, because Biden needs to avoid getting the United States involved and avoid aNuclear War. Unlike some other radical small European countries, the United States is responsible for Europe's defense to a large extent. Poland, Lithuania and other countries have no such concerns at all. In their view, the United States will cover them if something goes wrong, but Biden dare not have such an idea.

Moreover, in the past two years, Putin has indeed shown his nuclear deterrence more than once. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, then British Foreign Secretary Truss made a brainless remark, which immediately prompted Putin to adjust Russia's strategic nuclear forces to the "special duty" mode. In the end, in order to avoid misunderstandings, the United States was forced to postpone the test launch of the "Minuteman-3" missile at that time.

The success of the Ukrainian army's counterattack in Kharkiv in September 2022 forced Putin to make a national televised speech and announce a partial general mobilization. In the speech, Putin mentioned "any means" which quickly made the West think of "nuclear deterrence". At that time, the West had been keeping a close eye on Moscow because they were very worried that the unfavorable situation in the war would prompt Putin to take risks and use nuclear weapons.

After 2024, Macron publicly stated that he did not rule out sending troops to Ukraine, which immediately aroused Putin's reaction. In his "State of the Union Address" shortly afterwards, he directly displayed nuclear weapons to deter Macron from making any moves.

Ukrainian troops raided Kursk. Although Putin did not mention nuclear deterrence this time, some people in Russia did. The Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta published a copy of a letter from Volintsev, a physicist and professor at Perm State University, to Putin. The letter mentioned that the war against Ukraine has been going on for more than two years. Kiev launched a surprise attack on the Kursk region of Russia on August 6, and the territory captured was almost equal to the area of ​​land occupied by Moscow in Ukraine this year. He suggested that Putin consider using nuclear weapons in the war to achieve all goals faster. Volintsev believes that the situation on the front line has become stalemate and Moscow has failed to take any major breakthrough military actions. Although Russia has an advantage, progress is quite slow. Secondly, the Russian people have to endure terrorist attacks in the country. Volintsev said that these attacks were actually organized by the West. In this regard, people will ask in confusion: "We are a nuclear power, why don't we respond appropriately?"

The F-16 fighter jets also arrived, but they were also late because the best time had passed.

Volintsev proposed using nuclear weapons to attack Ukraine's Beskidi Tunnel, a railway in the Viv region that is used to transport weapons to aid Ukrainian troops from the West. Volintsev said that tunnels are the most reliable air-raid shelters and are very difficult to destroy with conventional weapons, while nuclear weapons are much more destructive. Volintsev suggested using a "small hydrogen bomb" to carry out a "mild nuclear strike" on the tunnel to block the main supply route.

Volintsev believes that this is a war of attrition, and without Western aid, everything would have ended long ago. Therefore, every effort should be made to prevent Ukraine from obtaining more weapons, other materials and equipment.

So judging from several past cases, the United States has had to be cautious in providing weapons given Russia's nuclear deterrence.

However, Sullivan said that Putin did not react strongly to the West's supply of so many weapons to Ukraine in the past that could be considered to have crossed Moscow's "red line". Not even Ukraine's surprise attack on Russia's Kursk last week, which Putin may have considered to have crossed the "red line". Russian commentators and officials often threaten that the West's supply of weapons to Kiev has crossed the "red line" and may force Putin to escalate the situation. Sullivan also said that the weakening of Russia's Black Sea Fleet provides insight into Putin's mentality. The Ukrainians were able to use Western weapons systems to drive the Russian navy out of Crimea, but Russia did not respond catastrophically, and could only helplessly find ways to defend against Ukraine's unmanned boats, which almost proves that the West overestimated the critical point at which Putin would take "catastrophic action".

Sullivan added: "Over time, our focus has been on what the United States did, but look at what the Russians did or didn't do."

There is no doubt that some of Russia's past actions may cause the West to reassess the risks of Moscow's "red line". In the past, there was a saying in Russia when talking about the "Fighting Falcon" that if the "Fighting Falcon" took off from airports in Western countries, Russian missiles would directly attack the "Fighting Falcon" parked at these airports. Putin also said before, "Let's see which countries will allow Ukraine's "Fighting Falcon" to take off and land." When the "Fighting Falcon" entered Ukraine and it was reported that it might take off and land in neighboring Western countries, Putin's statement changed: no matter where it flew from, it would be shot down by Russia.

Former US Ambassador to Russia Sullivan believes that no one wants to fight a nuclear war, including Putin

In the past, when Putin talked about "nuclear deterrence", he said that nuclear weapons would only be used when Russian territory was threatened. Ukraine attacked the Russian mainland, and the British newspaper The Times said that Zelensky's move was risking a "tactical nuclear strike" from Russia. But Putin did not mention "nuclear". Ukraine's action this time may make the West realize Russia's "red line" again.

“I have always believed that it is highly unlikely that he would use nuclear weapons,” Sullivan said. “Fear of Putin’s red lines should not be a factor in the decision because Putin already believes that he is at war with the United States and that we are Russia’s enemy, but he does not want a nuclear war with the United States, and no one in their right mind wants a nuclear war, and he is not crazy.”

All in all, this Kursk offensive may stimulate the West to take bolder actions in its future aid operations to Ukraine.