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【Text/Observer.com Lv Yizheng】

On August 7, local time, Jonathan D. Caverly, associate professor at the Naval Warfare Research Center of the U.S. Naval War College, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that the U.S. hegemony does not depend on the single island of Taiwan, and that it should not conflict with mainland China for the so-called "defense of Taiwan." But on the other hand, Caverly still adopts a hostile mentality and tries to "make moves" for the U.S. military to confront China outside of the Taiwan issue.

The article points out that for a long time, many people in the US strategic and academic circles have believed that the security of the United States and even the world depends to a large extent on the Taiwan region, because it has always been an important strategic point for the United States to contain China geopolitically.

Caverly cited the remarks of two American politicians as negative examples. Matthew Pottinger, former deputy national security adviser to former US President Trump, once wrote in Foreign Affairs that "an autonomous Taiwan region can strengthen Japan's national defense and prevent mainland China from gaining a springboard to threaten US allies in the Western Pacific." In 2021, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs Eli Ratner also described Taiwan as "the key to regional security and the key to defending America's core interests" in his speech to Congress.

The above statement comes from the US military's judgment on the status of Taiwan Island since World War II. MacArthur called it an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", while the then Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy, Ernest King, called it a "cork in the bottle", believing that the Taiwan region would "block" the "bottle mouth" leading to the Pacific Ocean from mainland China.

But in Caverly's view, limiting the military power of the Chinese mainland should not be a reason for the United States to "defend Taiwan." Because Taiwan Island is a small island with a width of only 90 miles and is close to the Chinese mainland, even if China recovers Taiwan Island and deploys military forces, it cannot directly change the balance of power between China and the United States in the Pacific direction.

Therefore, he believes that what the US military needs to do is to continue to provide Taiwan with drones, mines and other relatively cheap defensive weapons to turn it into a "porcupine". Deploying a large number of vulnerable US troops around the Taiwan Strait to deter mainland China is too risky and too low-return. Taiwan is not the entire Indo-Pacific region.

China is already strong enough

In terms of the development of China's military strength, the article reviewed the military construction of the People's Liberation Army of China since 2012, and believed that the People's Liberation Army of China has made great progress in "informationized warfare" and "maritime military struggle preparation", saying that "the People's Liberation Army of China has the largest navy in the world (according to most indicators) and is producing fifth-generation fighters and upgraded bombers."

The article also pays special attention to the development of China's long-range missiles and the satellite networks that support them.

The article states that according to data from the U.S. Department of Defense, China's missile inventory has increased fourfold in the past five years. China is currently equipped with more than 1,500 medium-range and medium-to-long-range ballistic missiles that can fly 1,800 to 3,400 miles, covering almost the entire East China Sea and South China Sea, and can even reach the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. China actually already has the ability to strike U.S. and its allies' military assets from its homeland.

The article also believes that China already has a huge satellite network that can monitor and track US aircraft carrier platforms with extremely high precision. For example, the recently launched "Remote Sensing-41" satellite can use high-resolution optical systems and "Land Detection-4" synthetic aperture radar to continuously monitor one-third of the earth's surface in geosynchronous orbit.

In addition, the article also mentioned that the development of China's commercial satellites can also complement military satellites. The article cited an example that a satellite technology company alone has more than 100 satellites in orbit and plans to triple this number by 2025. These satellites can take high-resolution photos of anywhere on Earth within ten minutes of receiving a request.

Therefore, the author believes that it is almost impossible for the United States to completely eliminate such systems without consuming a large amount of ammunition. In fact, the United States has already faced a serious shortage of ammunition when facing attacks by the Houthis in the Red Sea region.

Taiwan Island has almost no effect

The author believes in the article that it seems that recovering Taiwan Island will increase the coverage of the PLA's medium-range and short-range missiles and provide its navy with a forward base to break through the island chain and enter the Pacific Ocean, but this view is untenable and the military benefits of Taiwan Island may be insignificant.

In terms of increasing missile coverage, the author believes that the existing short-range missiles in the Liberation Era were already able to attack Okinawa and Luzon Island from the mainland. Deploying them on Taiwan Island can only provide an additional 190 miles of range, expanding only a small area in the Western Pacific.

As for the view that Taiwan Island will become China's forward base for breaking through the island chain, the author believes that in the island chain strategy set up by the United States around China, most of the islands in the chain belong to Japan or the Philippines, which are allies of the United States and have US military bases. For example, among the four new bases in the 2023 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and the Philippines, two of them are mainly facing Taiwan Island. Therefore, when the mainland recovers Taiwan Island, it will also face threats from the United States.

In addition, using the east coast of Taiwan as a submarine base will not increase China's advantage. China's medium-range missiles can completely replace the role of submarine-launched missiles, and the bases on the east coast are more easily monitored and mined by the United States and its allies.

"Defending Taiwan" is high risk, low reward

Caverly ultimately concluded, claiming that the United States and its allies should focus more on how to engage in a broader and protracted conflict with mainland China rather than the island of Taiwan itself, and that "the United States needs to help protect the global commons and the territorial integrity of Japan and the Philippines."

The author points out that in order to achieve this transformation, the United States must first recognize that fully "defending Taiwan" may come at a very high cost. If a direct conflict breaks out between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait, the US Pacific forces will suffer serious losses. Although the author claims that China's military power will also be severely damaged, "China's advantage in production capacity means that China can recover faster."

U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro pointed out in February 2023 that among the Chinese naval shipyards, at least one shipyard has a production capacity comparable to the entire U.S. Navy's shipbuilding base, and China has a total of 13. The author also joked that compared with trying to prevent cross-strait reunification, the United States' allies would rather the Seventh Fleet "keep sailing."

Therefore, the author believes that the best way to "defend Taiwan" is to provide more mines, drones and anti-ship missiles, and support Taiwan's self-production of such weapons. This will make Taiwan "no longer a burden on US resources, but a huge burden on mainland China", leaving the PLA with no time to spare. His calculation is that "after the PLA recovers Taiwan at great loss, the United States can fight China in the wider Pacific and globally."

In addition, the author also suggested that the US military threaten China's oil supply channels, because most of China's oil and natural gas are imported from the sea. In this way, the Chinese navy will be forced to move forward and fight the United States and its allies far away from its homeland, so that China will "retreat in the face of difficulties."

As a U.S. military scholar, Caverly, despite his different thinking from some U.S. politicians, still views Taiwan from the utilitarian perspective of military confrontation. As Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, recently said: "The United States always pursues the so-called 'American interests first', and Taiwan will not be an exception...'chess pieces' will eventually become 'abandoned pieces', pushing Taiwan into danger and bringing serious harm to Taiwan compatriots."

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