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in this era of serious involution and ups and downs, as long as you have enough patience and confidence, you can always wait for the few critical moments, such as this sudden bull market. in the face of opportunities, choice is often greater than effort, and cognition is often greater than diligence.

from a more macro perspective and from the perspective of social wealth redistribution, what profound impact will this unprecedented super operation of "rescuing the balance sheet" have on the stock market and property market? is this the last chance for wealth transfer?

from the perspective of investing in photovoltaic new energy stocks, some people have already guaranteed their capital or made a profit, and many are still on the way to repay their capital, such as the millionaire shareholders of longi green energy. in this round of bull market, which sectors and companies have the opportunity to stand out and become the longi green energy of the previous round, the jewel in the crown?

from the perspective of the healthy development of the photovoltaic new energy industry, what impact will the prosperity of the capital market and the optimization of the investment and financing environment brought about by quantitative easing have on photovoltaics, which is undergoing a profound reshuffle?

0 1

who missed this bull market?

some people were full, some were empty, and some "voted to the national army before liberation."

the zero-sum game in the capital market does not create value in itself, but it will redefine asset prices and redistribute social wealth. in fact, only a very small number of people can sensitively capture a fighter jet in the first place.

when the bull comes, just be stupid at the beginning. as long as your luck is not too bad, you can make money. those who lose money or make less money are often because they are too smart. there are many well-known companies and institutions that have completely failed and collapsed before dawn.

retail giant walmart sold 144.5 million shares of jd.com a month ago at a price of $24.95 per share. jd.com’s current share price has soared to $46.97. walmart’s mistake cost it $3.2 billion in lost revenue. the key is that wal-mart has gone through the "eight-year war of resistance" - it sold its no. 1 store to jd.com in 2016 and became the second largest shareholder besides liu qiangdong. the thigh was broken, but there was nothing he could do.

there are many similar examples recently:

take ctrip as an example. global investment company prosus sold 14.5 million ctrip shares at a price of us$51.40 per share in block transactions last week. ctrip's current stock price is us$68.43, and the institution made nearly us$250 million less. baidu also sold 10.5 million shares of ctrip last week, losing $180 million in additional profits.

tencent's industrial investment can be regarded as a god, and its scale and strength are not inferior to its main business. however, tencent, which had successfully hatched futu, also fell before dawn. on september 26, before the positive news for a-shares became clear, tencent still chose to reduce its holdings in futu by us$200 million. tencent reduced its holdings to around us$80. before the long holiday, futu had soared to us$128.

time will really reward honest companies and investors. looking back on the buybacks and holding increases advocated by the regulatory authorities this year, some listed companies bought round after round with real money. if it didn't work, major shareholders even went out to buy in person. however, some companies made more noise than rain, and acted coquettishly. . this round of market conditions suddenly hit, and it is estimated that many companies that have not completed the increase in holdings will also have their legs broken. if they had known this, why should they be petty and drag their feet?

take the photovoltaic industry as an example. corresponding to the company's size and market value, goodwe is probably one of the companies with the smallest repurchase efforts among photovoltaic inverter companies, with only a mere 5 million to 10 million yuan. as early as may this year, it had finish. of course, there are also some leading companies whose repurchase efforts do not match their size, strength, industry status, stock price deviation, cash on hand, etc. they are very stingy in saving market value, so i will not name them here.

photovoltaic companies that have made great efforts in repurchasing and increasing holdings include tongwei and sungrow. recently, tongwei announced that the company has spent 1.8 billion yuan on repurchases, with the actual repurchase price ranging from 17.43 yuan/share to 22.94 yuan/share. in addition, the major shareholder tongwei group also increased its holdings by 800 million yuan, at a price of 20.69 yuan per share. as of the latest trading day, tongwei’s share price was 22.83 yuan. judging from the current stage, this round of repurchases and increase in holdings will at least not result in losses.

the stock market has been falling continuously this year. for some responsible companies, even when the ban is lifted, major shareholders or persons acting in concert will take the initiative to commit to voluntarily locking up and delay the reduction of shareholdings out of the need to stabilize the stock price. of course, there are also many large and small investors who are busy reducing their holdings as soon as the lifting time comes. "personal financial needs" and "improving life" are all understandable as long as they are legal and compliant. but those who reduced their holdings to the floor some time ago may have a little mixed feelings in their hearts. for this kind of thing, all i can say is "you deserve it."

there are also companies where the actual controller on the left has reduced its holdings and the listed company on the right has repurchased, and that is the energy storage company shenghong shares. after the ban was lifted, the company's controlling shareholder last reduced its holdings on august 26 this year, reducing its holdings by 1.88 million shares at a price of 16.64 yuan. on september 30, the market price of shenghong shares was 27.56 yuan. during the same period, the company repurchased only 750,000 shares.

although most chinese-style buybacks are used for equity incentives, unlike apple and meta's buybacks and cancellations to increase shareholder returns, they are at least an attitude and reflect confidence in the company's future development. this is a steelyard. when this bull market diverges, it may be the basis for an investor's decision-making decision to bid.

qiantanhao would like to say that apart from the small traders who were injured and left the market, there are not many people and institutions who deserve sympathy for those who missed this bull market.

02

lessons from the japanese stock market

at the lujiazui financial forum in june this year, central bank governor pan gongsheng made it clear in his speech that incorporating government bond trading into the monetary policy toolbox does not mean engaging in quantitative easing (qe).

now, mainstream economists have defined this round of economic revitalization measures as china's version of quantitative easing, or even an operation to save the balance sheet. the u.s. dollar interest rate cut only created an opportunity. this is very similar to the unblocking after the reset. it seems sudden, but in fact it has already been a matter of course and logical.

in june 2023, koo chaoming, chief economist at nomura research institute, used the balance sheet recession theory to explain japan's "lost thirty years" in a public speech. he believes that when asset prices plummet and the private sector's balance sheet deteriorates, the latter will turn to the pursuit of debt minimization, leading the economy to fall into a sustained recession. both the united states and japan have experienced balance sheet recessions. he believes that china is facing the risk of balance sheet recession.

gao shanwen of anxin macro holds a similar view. he believes that due to the interaction of factors such as negative population growth and structural changes, real estate downturn, private enterprises encountering unprecedented difficulties, and geopolitical uncertainty, residents and enterprises have lowered their expectations for china's long-term economic growth. adjusting its own economic behavior is manifested by generally reducing consumption, reducing debt, and cutting investment, thus forming a japanese-style balance sheet recession.

there are no two identical leaves in the world. the chinese economy and the japanese economy in the mid-to-late 1980s are fundamentally different in terms of size, development stage, driving model, especially the central government's ability to control and mobilize resources, decision-making mechanisms, etc. however, further research on the japanese stock market in the 1990s is still necessary for us today. our stock market will definitely diverge in the future. how did the japanese stock market diverge when it rebounded in the 1990s? what is the logical support behind this?

in the 1990s, operating problems were common among japanese companies. the avalanche of asset prices led to the rapid decline of the balance sheets of japanese non-financial companies at that time. the population structure entered an aging stage. coupled with insufficient effective demand, the overall profit margin of non-financial companies dropped significantly.

from the outside, japan in the 1990s faced the challenge of anti-globalization caused by japan-us trade friction. as an economy with severely limited endogenous growth momentum and a rising country in the last round of globalization (china is a rising country after japan that has benefited from the wto and globalization), japan needs to actively respond to the challenges arising from globalization during this period. the challenge of restructuring and reshuffling, on the other hand, also requires a positive attitude and a higher division of labor in the value chain to integrate into the new round of globalization.

from the perspective of downstream demand, the demand side of japan's manufacturing industry was generally weak in the 1990s, but there was still order growth in highly competitive sectors - the representative industry was undoubtedly semiconductors, which was much stronger than general industrial manufacturing. in addition, automobiles, another representative industry with strong competitiveness in japan, also experienced relatively good order growth in some years between 1990 and 2010. the pattern shown is that they no longer win with low prices, but with high prices. quality wins.

the third major theme supporting the periodic rebound of the japanese stock market is consumption. in the 1990s, the substitution of domestic products in japan’s consumer industry accelerated significantly. on the one hand, the unit price of residents’ willingness to consume was significantly reduced, and the demand for affordable domestic products on the consumer side coincided with the affordable domestic products on the supply side. affordable domestic consumer goods represented by uniqlo, salia, etc. achieve higher growth performance. in addition, it needs to be emphasized that consumption replacement is not consumption downgrade. the essence of consumption replacement is cost-effective and rational consumption without sacrificing happiness/gain. reflected in our country's consumer market, similar patterns are also shown.

of course, technology is the most important theme of this era, and it is also the main driving force behind the rise of the japanese stock market in the lost 30 years. take the u.s. stock market as an example. in the past 15 years, the s&p 500 has risen from 667 points to 5,767 points in one breath. during the same period, the nasdaq has risen from 1,266 points to a maximum of 16,212 points. from this point of view, our science and technology 50 will most likely be stronger than the csi 300.

mapping u.s. stocks was the main logic for pricing japanese technology stocks in the late 1990s. as a relatively mature market, the u.s. stock market has a relatively obvious impact on other global markets in terms of important technological innovations. although there were few internet technology companies with top competitiveness in japan during the pc internet wave at the end of the 20th century, it could still enjoy the mirroring effect of the u.s. technology industry.

the mapping path of u.s. stocks to japanese technology stocks can be roughly divided into three types:industry chain mapping, competing product mapping and secondary mapping.

china today is by no means comparable to japan back then. humanity is now at a scientific singularity, on the eve of the big explosion of science and technology, and this is far from comparable back then. so, compared with the u.s. stocks that have been benchmarked against changniu for 15 years, who will be the chinese version of nvidia, apple, and tesla today and in the future?

we can use this question to guide our thinking and decision-making.

03

is it possible that the mismatch between photovoltaic supply and demand is just a man-made disaster?

fortune always plays tricks on people, and photovoltaics have always been ill-fated.

on september 19, seven photovoltaic tycoons participated in cctv's "dialogue" "where is the confidence in photovoltaics in 2024?" when the special program was recorded, the market was still pessimistic, and they still needed to gather together for warmth to boost confidence.

now, the market environment seems to have changed, but it still seems to be the same as before. photovoltaic stock prices are rebounding, but photovoltaic module prices are still falling unsatisfactorily. the rise of photovoltaic concept stocks is a general rise, a repair, a correction, and a return to normality from abnormality. what about the photovoltaic industry that is trapped in a price war? who will correct it and fix it? !

the talented and knowledgeable qiantanhao discovered a very strange phenomenon. whether it is overcapacity or mismatch between supply and demand in various industries, it is not as severe as that of photovoltaics.

it seems a bit far to compare with steel, electrolytic aluminum, and home appliances, but at least we can compare with lithium batteries. the mismatch between supply and demand of lithium batteries is far greater than that of photovoltaics. why is there no vicious competition in photovoltaics?

‌in 2023, the total nominal production capacity of global lithium batteries is 2568gwh, the total output is 1210gwh, and the total demand is 850gwh.

in 2024, the global nominal production capacity of lithium batteries is 30,000gwh, the total output is forecast to be above 2,344gw, and the total demand is forecast to be 1,356gwh.

if calculated based on the above data, the global lithium battery operating rate in 2023 will be only 47%, and the inventory ratio (the ratio of inventory to total production) will be 30%. in 2024, the global lithium battery operating rate will be 78%, and the inventory ratio will be as high as 42%.

these data seem to be much scarier than photovoltaics. what is the actual situation?

in 2024, the global lithium battery operating rate is only 47.42%. especially in recent months, the operating rates in june, july and august this year were 63.71%, 49.66% and 47.42% respectively, showing a monthly downward trend. however, the operations of lithium battery companies have not deteriorated. except for materials companies, the entire photovoltaic industry has not experienced an overall cash loss.

the supply and demand situation of photovoltaics is actually far less severe than that of lithium batteries. in 2024, the nominal production capacity of the entire industry will be 1,000gw, and global photovoltaic installed capacity is expected to be around 600gw this year. in other words, even if all nominal production capacity is fully realized, the ratio of demand to supply will only be 60%. so, the imbalance between supply and demand is far less serious than that of photovoltaics, so why is it so involved?

qiantanhao believes that there may be three reasons:

one is, the customer structure of photovoltaics is more single in the domestic market, which is different from that of lithium batteries. under the requirements of the five major and six small centralized purchasing mechanisms, the principle of the lowest price is followed. in order to win the bid, photovoltaic companies did not hesitate to bid below the cost price, which caused a price stampede, which in turn affected the spot market price.

the second is, some leading companies launched multiple rounds of price wars at the end of last year and the beginning of this year in an attempt to kill their peers. as a result, instead of being caught up in the competition, the entire industry fell into a vicious cycle of price wars that were out of control.

the third is, in the midstream and upstream sectors such as silicon materials and silicon wafers, leading companies have launched a reshuffle war and stretched their production capacity to capacity, resulting in a stampede on the midstream and downstream cells and components. the downstream industry is in disgrace and cannot rise even if it wants to.

the industry reshuffle of silicon materials and silicon wafers could have been completed quickly, but unexpectedly, with the support of government industry investment and capital assistance, this knockout competition turned into a tug-of-war that was divorced from the rules of the market game - whose electricity bill is cheaper? whoever can live longer. this was far beyond the expectations of the leading company that initiated the knockout competition. they could only go with the trend and then get out of hand.

if the above three points are true, then the vicious competition in photovoltaics is more of a man-made disaster than a natural disaster. as li junfeng said, there has never been an industry as stupid as photovoltaics!

the elasticity of photovoltaic demand may be far beyond our imagination.

at the recording site of cctv's "dialogue" special program "where is the confidence in photovoltaics in 2024", liu hanyuan, chairman of the board of directors of tongwei group, loudly shouted:

the key to our confidence in photovoltaics comes from the futurehow big should the coming market be?

first of all, we should be able to calculate how big the energy and electricity markets should be between 2050 and 2060 when all mankind is basically carbon neutral and renewable energy plays the leading role, especially when photovoltaic is the leading role.

second, in order to realize our predictions for the future, under the premise that photovoltaic power generation currently accounts for only 5% of the energy structure, as far as our country is concerned, we need at least 500 million, 600 million, or 700 million kilowatts of photovoltaic installed capacity every year. achieve carbon neutrality within the next 20 to 30 years.

third, our decision-making agencies and government officials must use the above scientific data to understand the speed of development of photovoltaic companies, how to be responsible, take necessary risks, activate our machines, optimize our mechanisms, and accelerate the application of photovoltaics. .

04

chicken feathers fly to the sky

no one can live with a bull market.

today, this photo is all over the social media. yes, during the national day holiday this year, it is said that 10 million shareholders opened accounts - i don’t know how many of them opened accounts after they had closed their accounts before.

what shocked the carbon company today was an announcement from bangjie shares: yangzhou bangjie new energy technology co., ltd., a secondary subsidiary controlled by the company, received a certificate issued by the people's court of yangzhou economic and technological development zone on september 30, 2024. (2024) su 1091 po shen no. 12 "civil ruling",the court allowed the applicant jiangsu puhui health examination co., ltd. to withdraw its bankruptcy and reorganization application against yangzhou bangjie。

if some real estate companies with explosive performance and debt defaults are lucky enough to return to ktv from the icu, then this quantitative easing is a bit like this for bangjie shares, whose core subsidiary has already applied for bankruptcy and reorganization. i was already lying in the morgue, but when the bull market came, i suddenly opened my eyes - i'm okay, help me up and try.

the bull market is here, and orders from some photovoltaic companies are also coming. because now there is a lot of money pouring in, it has become very important and urgent to increase market value.

the most suitable one is undoubtedly the bc equipment concept stock - dier laser. on october 8, dier laser issued the "announcement on the signing of major contracts for daily operations": recently, the company and its subsidiaries signed a "purchase contract" with a leading photovoltaic enterprise and its entities under common control. this contract is a major contract for daily operations. contract, the total contract value is 1,228.6283 million yuan (rmb, excluding tax), accounting for 76.36% of the company's audited main business income in 2023. the subject matter of the contract is "laser equipment and transformation".

it’s unclear which day the “recent days” are, but it’s probably not now. the "leading photovoltaic company" is most likely longi green energy, which will make some big moves on october 11. from the perspective of lcoe, all the debates about which one is better between bc and topcon are actually unimportant. let’s enjoy this feast of capital together.

blessings to the millions of shareholders of longi green energy, including of course the "friend of time" whose holdings have returned to more than 5%, and of course to the companies in the bc industry chain, including hbc, which has been followed by qiancarbon.com before concept stock - jinyang new energy. if it weren't for jiejia weichuang's patent litigation, there would have been another company in this capital feast called laplace.

yuneng technology, which once topped the list of declines among all photovoltaic companies, also won a large energy storage order before the long holiday. on october 8, the company issued a voluntary announcement:

on september 30, 2024, after receiving the "notice of winning the bid" from shenzhou kunteng energy storage co., ltd., tianjin aolian (note: yuneng technology holds 55% of the shares) won the bid for shenzhou kunteng 100mw/ 400mwh shared energy storage project general contracting (epc), with a winning bid amount of rmb 435.2383 million (tax included).

when the bull comes, no matter what, these companies are actually people who have foresight. ordinary investors who queued up to open accounts during the long holiday, as well as more surging capital, may soon become their fans.