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the picture shows the "legend" patrol ship of the u.s. coast guard

us president biden recently hosted the last "quadrilateral security dialogue" summit between the us, japan, india and australia during his term of office. after the summit, the four countries issued a joint statement, the wilmington declaration, announcing a plan to strengthen the "indo-pacific maritime situational awareness partnership", including a joint coast guard patrol of the four countries that will be launched in 2025.

as the so-called substantive result of the "quadrilateral mechanism" between the united states, japan, india, and australia, the "indo-pacific maritime situational awareness partnership" plan has obviously high hopes from the biden administration, and "big news" is released at every quadrilateral summit. similarly, the joint action plan of the four coast guards announced this time has also attracted widespread attention, and people have speculated on the intentions and the reality behind it.

at present, except for some exchanges of personnel and interoperability arrangements, the united states and the other three parties have not disclosed specific operational details, including the sea areas and plans for joint operations. however, considering that the south china sea and east china sea are too sensitive, joint operations may give priority to the south pacific and indian ocean island countries, under the banner of "assisting in responding to illegal, unreported and unregulated (iuu) fishing activities", in the waters under the jurisdiction of these countries show presence and cause some trouble. in fact, it is "picking the weakest persimmons", ignoring the sovereignty and jurisdiction of these countries, and intruding into the waters under the jurisdiction of the relevant countries.

law enforcement forces such as the coast guard are different from the navy in that their activities are of a police and law enforcement nature, so their activities are inherently more sensitive than those of the navy. unless permitted by the coastal state, other countries have no right to engage in law enforcement activities in the waters under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. however, they can conduct various military activities in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal state with "due regard".

of course, the united states has seen this and has made some preparations for skirting around the edges. in addition to emphasizing its dual-use attributes, the u.s. coast guard has also actively cooperated with the cook islands, micronesia, kiribati, nauru, palau, marshall islands, samoa, tonga, tuvalu, and vanuatu in recent years. it has signed a "ship-borne observer agreement" with fiji and other pacific island countries in an attempt to circumvent or evade the legal issues of operating in the waters of the relevant countries. previously, the u.s. coast guard had been operating in the waters of many pacific island countries and had boarded and inspected some ships on behalf of these coastal countries. the united states is pulling in the other three countries this time, simply to strengthen its momentum from the strategic and diplomatic levels, while making up for its own shortcomings in capabilities, and allowing the "indo-pacific" quadrilateral mechanism to be implemented into concrete actions.

based on the united states' previous operations in south america, such agreements and cooperation are similar to "trojan horses", giving the united states an excuse to intervene in the affairs of relevant countries and regions. the u.s. coast guard often uses its military advantages to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under the pretext of helping these countries crack down on so-called illegal fishing and illegal and criminal activities at sea, and continues to worsen the security environment in relevant regions. if future joint coast guard operations by the united states, japan, india, and australia take place in the waters under the jurisdiction of the above-mentioned countries, they will inevitably replicate what the united states has done in latin america, thereby adding new variables and risks to the regional situation.

what's more, because the "indo-pacific maritime situational awareness partnership" plan is too targeted at china, the implementation of the four-nation coast guard joint patrol plan will inevitably intensify the complexity of sino-us strategic competition and stimulate sino-us maritime strategic competition from the taiwan strait, east china sea and south china sea. extending to the entire indian ocean and pacific region, this runs counter to the efforts of china, the united states and the top brass of the two militaries to manage competition. the "cost-effectiveness" of this kind of action is not high. apart from increasing public opinion and momentum, it will only have little effect on changing the balance of power and restricting china.

therefore, there is no need to exaggerate the threat posed by the joint patrols of the coast guard of the united states, japan, india, and australia. in order to boost the morale of the "indo-pacific" quadrilateral mechanism, the biden administration will of course exaggerate the results of this summit. however, there are still many uncertainties and challenges if the united states' ideas are to be implemented.

first of all, unlike the navy, long-distance power projection is not its main mission. with the exception of the u.s. coast guard, the coast guard forces of japan, india, and australia mainly focus on their surroundings and do not have much spare power to project power to areas outside their surroundings. even the u.s. coast guard, despite its high-pitched tone, has fallen far short of its expectations in the western pacific over the years.

secondly, the systems and mechanisms of the four countries are vastly different, and the coast guard force is more inward-oriented. the four parties also pay different attention and attention to issues such as iuu. the process of cooperation with substantial impact will be very complicated.

furthermore, where joint action takes place is critical. out of concern about "tit for tat", japan, india, and australia have more concerns about activities in the waters surrounding china. if they send coast guard and other law enforcement forces to patrol china's periphery, china can also take a reciprocal response and send more the coast guard patrols their surroundings. however, if the sea areas where the united states leads joint activities are too common, it will cause some of its allies to lose confidence and question the "gold content" of such operations. therefore, this joint patrol plan may end up in an awkward position.