news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

[text/bao shaoshan, translation/peng yuxuan, proofread/guo han]

as the domestic debate over the aukus agreement and the government's stance on the palestinian issue intensifies, australia's influence in the asia-pacific region - what some call "soft power" - is facing jeopardy. risk of weakening.

at the end of august, a private conversation between us deputy secretary of state kurt campbell and australian prime minister anthony albanese regarding australia's new police agreement with pacific island countries was exposed. during the conversation, campbell said, "we've made way for you, just go ahead."

these remarks have further intensified doubts about australia's national sovereignty and independence, including which country's interests the agreement serves.

although australia's establishment politicians have shown bipartisanship on their positions on the orcus agreement and israel, opposition has grown around these two core issues.

australia's identity issue is once again undergoing an "inside-out" examination, just as the region where australia is located is reflecting on its own future in the context of changes in the global geopolitical landscape. against this background, asian countries are working hard to construct their own identities and regional sovereignty, while australia is facing the risk of drifting away from the asian region due to overemphasis on history and culture rather than geographical factors.

in short, the risk australia faces is that it may further consolidate its historical status as an extension of western colonial power, seeking security in asia, rather than actively participating in and contributing to regional security as a member of asia.

the decline of soft power

a number of soft power indicators point to australia's declining standing. according to the global soft power index released by brand finance, australia's ranking has gradually slipped from 6th in 2015 to 10th in 2019, and will further drop to 14th in 2023. if this represents a global trend, it is also reflected in the overall decline in trust in australia in southeast asia.

edelman's trust barometer shows that australia continues to be among the worst-performing countries, with trust scores hovering between 1 and 49 (out of 100), clearly in the "not trusted" range. . the australian media has failed to gain public trust, scoring only 40 out of 100, while public trust in the government is lukewarm at best. for years, many people in canberra have been worried about the country's declining soft power in the asia-pacific region. although the government has invested a lot of efforts and funds in promoting educational exchanges and other fields, this has obviously not substantially changed australia's continued decline in soft power rankings.

although the decline of australia's soft power has caused many problems, no effective measures have been taken to curb this trend. in 2018, australia's department of foreign affairs and trade (dfat) launched a review of "soft power" that was ultimately shelved when the albanese government came to power in 2021.

as frances adamson, then deputy secretary of foreign affairs and trade, lamented when testifying to the senate budget committee in 2020, it is difficult to define the concept of “soft power”, let alone “measure” it. these issues have plagued efforts to boost nonmilitary influence. the removal of all references to "soft power" from the australian department of foreign affairs and trade's organizational chart may be a clear revelation that even the department of foreign affairs and trade is unable to deal with what cannot be quantified. as for tough non-military measures, the lowy institute's global diplomacy index clearly shows that australia's limited diplomatic presence further highlights the country's fragile influence in the region.

for a country grappling with the realities of geography and the legacy of its colonial past, australia's place in asia remains a difficult question. a recent lowy institute poll of indonesians found their trust in australia fell from 75% in 2011 to 55% in 2022. this trend echoes indonesians’ declining trust in the united states. across asia, public opinion of the united states is generally on a downward trend, while the proportion of people with positive views of china has risen relatively. since australia has clearly moved closer to the united states on foreign and defense policy issues, this may result in some of the negative attitudes directed toward the united states being transferred to australia.

from an australian perspective, no matter what understanding there is of "soft power," it was and still is a proposition that the country's government is struggling to answer.

orcus - a fait accompli in disintegration?

if australia's so-called soft power status is eroding, one cannot help but ask how "hard power" strategies have or will affect the situation? orkus is undoubtedly the clearest example of the shift to a "hard power" strategy.

three years ago, on september 21, 2021, the morrison government signed the orcus agreement, a landmark agreement signed by australia to ensure its future regional security commitments. in many ways, it can be seen as the ultimate pillar in the long-term process over the past decade of integrating australia more closely into america's larger asia-pacific military strategy and ambitions.

the core content of the orcus agreement is that australia gave up its previous contract to purchase french-made conventional submarines and instead chose to purchase nuclear-powered submarines from britain and the united states. as expected, as the most expensive defense decision in australia's history, this huge contract of up to 368 billion us dollars has attracted widespread attention.

morrison deftly cornered albanese's opposition labor party, giving it only about seven hours to decide whether to support the orcus deal. in the run-up to a national election, labor believes it cannot afford to be seen as "weak" on defense issues and china policy.

furthermore, the labor party has long (with a few exceptions) cherished the alliance between australia and the united states, and many in the parliamentary group actively support australia becoming a defense and security alliance partner of the united states in the asia-pacific region. as early as december 2011, prime minister julia gillard from the labor party agreed to the united states expanding the scale of garrison rotation in the northern city of darwin. this agreement laid the foundation for the continued expansion of u.s. military power in australia.

in fact, as the "australian financial review" (july 30, 2023) pointed out, "since world war ii, the united states' permanent military presence on australian soil has reached an unprecedented scale, and its expansion is accelerating." as the "washington post" described, australia is being used as a "springboard" for the united states to launch military intervention in the asia-pacific region, because the us military is increasing its weapons and ammunition reserves in the country.

andrew fowler mentioned in his recently published book "nuked: the submarine fiasco that sank australia's sovereignty" that the united states seems to be getting rid of the influence of the united states. it was deeply dissatisfied with the attempt to reach a security agreement with france and acted decisively to undermine this possibility. morrison and the labor opposition are both vulnerable to pressure from the united states. fowler hit out at morrison, writing:

"the man who single-handedly precipitated a major shift in australia's foreign policy was a christian fundamentalist who had been a tourism marketing manager and had never been trained in strategy or foreign affairs, but was quite adept at secrecy and deception. talented.”

in any case, the australian political and defense establishment at that time already regarded the acceptance of the orcus agreement as a fait accompli. with the support of both parties, this move is undoubtedly an advancement and deepening of the integration of u.s. military planning in the asia-pacific. even if the labor party has concerns about this, political considerations limit the party's room for action in the face of the upcoming election.

when the orcus agreement was first announced, the criticism was negligible, which may have led people to believe that it was a foreseeable and easy victory. over the next three years, however, criticism grew. as more details emerge—or lack thereof—public discussion of orkus slowly begins to heat up, raising questions about the legitimacy of the decision.

there has been fierce debate over whether the orcus agreement will undermine australia's national sovereignty and how much substantive significance the decision has in the area of ​​defense strategy. at the practical level, public opinion has cast serious doubts on the united states' ability to deliver submarines as scheduled. in any case, this delay will lead to heightened doubts about the strategic dependence caused by this decision on military equipment. at the regional level, there are vague concerns about the risk that denuclearization in the pacific is being undermined. some southeast asian countries, including indonesia and malaysia, have publicly expressed concerns that the okus agreement may exacerbate military tensions and regional instability, rather than easing tensions.

so far, the australian government and opposition parties have stepped up their support for the orcus agreement, regardless of public opinion concerns. it remains to be seen whether these public doubts will ultimately influence government decision-making, although there are still plenty of institutional-level reasons to explain why it will be difficult to change course in the short term.

in any case, australia's firm commitment to the us-led asia-pacific security framework - as reflected in its participation in the orcus agreement - has exacerbated the uneasiness of asian countries, especially the impact on regional stability and the impact on australia's future efforts to maintain cast doubt on its role in asia's security and stability.

genocide in gaza

if there is any international issue that has created greater divisions between australia and other countries, particularly in southeast asia, it is the genocide in gaza. there is no need to repeat the series of tragic events that have occurred in the gaza strip since october 2023 to notice that the position taken by the australian government is very different from that of regional countries.

in the face of growing global concern and condemnation of israel's actions, the australian government's position has been described as vague and slow to respond. the muscle memory formed by australia's political establishment at the institutional level is that its official position must be consistent with that of the united states.

over the past few months, the australian government has been forced to adjust its deeply pro-israel stance and begin to voice mild criticism of the need for a ceasefire amid growing public anger over its refusal to condemn israel. this moderate adjustment of discourse cannot conceal the possibility that australia has violated its international legal obligations on the issue of genocide in gaza. what's more, by providing military equipment parts to israel, australia has actually contributed to this genocide. the australian government's silence and belated verbal condemnation of the genocide in gaza is at odds with the positions of many countries in the region.

malaysia unreservedly condemned israel's actions, indonesia condemned israel's rejection of the "two-state solution", and the foreign ministers of asean countries also condemned israel's atrocities. the ambiguous stance of the australian government is in sharp contrast, and other asian neighbors will not turn a blind eye to this.

deputy sheriff of the pacific

at the end of the pacific islands forum meeting, australia signed a new police cooperation agreement with relevant island countries, and australia's scope of sovereignty and "institutional authority" were also questioned. a new zealand reporter filmed australian prime minister albanese introducing the agreement to us deputy secretary of state campbell. campbell praised albanese in front of the camera at the time: "we have made way for you, just go ahead."

this incident prompted former australian ambassador to china geoff raby to write an article stating that recent events have reminded the world that australia is the "deputy sheriff" of the united states. if australia does not take action to negotiate that police cooperation agreement, the americans are likely to take over all related work. campbell's speech to albanese made it clear that the americans had previously raised the matter with australian ambassador to the united states kevin rudd, meaning the americans planned to take action. rudd assured campbell there was no need to do that.

australia's relationship with the pacific island countries has historically been characterized by colonialist condescension and a "languid insouciance" attitude. australia tends to take action only when necessary. even so, the pacific island countries are often deeply disappointed by the "one family" they talk about and the development promises that have never been implemented in reality. the west's failure to deliver on its commitments to take action on climate change, which is an existential issue for pacific island nations, is adding salt to the wound. in any case, although the two sides recently reached a police cooperation agreement, some leaders of pacific island countries still question the sincerity of this agreement. they worry that they may be dragged into the vortex of great power competition by australia against their will.

identity in crisis?

australia's soft power has been declining for the past decade, and perhaps started earlier. the department of foreign affairs and trade recognized this and began investigating the slide in 2018. by 2020, the investigation had been concluded without a clear conclusion. during the same period, australia's policy focus seemed to shift further away from the level of "soft power," whatever that concept means.

although the united states has expanded its rights to station troops in australia through the force posture agreement, the united states has always been worried that australia may drift away, and took decisive actions to disrupt the submarine contract signed between france and australia. the orcus agreement is the us-led alternative.

in september 2021, the orcus agreement was born with almost no opposition. however, three years later, criticism has become louder and louder, led by former prime ministers, foreign ministers, and various political and civil opinion leaders. when morrison persuaded albanese to support this arrangement, people may have thought that the agreement was a fait accompli, but now that seems less certain.

as domestic concerns gradually emerge, the orcus agreement has caused the regional situation to develop in an unstable direction, and has also worried neighboring countries. the differing responses between australia and asian countries to the massacre in gaza starkly reflect the differences in perspective between the two sides. asia's most populous countries have long condemned israel's atrocities and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure; australia, meanwhile, has followed washington's lead and has maintained its leadership position for much of the period since october 2023. an uneasy silence. australia's recent police agreements with pacific island countries also have an air of sovereign subordination, as if australia is "just go ahead" with the permission of the united states.

instead of being seen as a participant and contributor to regional security and stability, australia is likely to be clearly defined as a colonial invader taking orders from washington. the orcus accords opened scars in history that have never fully healed. the australian political establishment's egregious silence on israel's genocide has only rubbed salt into the wound. and policing deals with pacific island nations underscore australia's submission to u.s. priorities: "thank you for stepping aside, kurt."

the critical response that is raging in public opinion reflects a struggle not just about australia's identity, but also about australia's place on the world stage and its relationship with asia. can australia break free from the shackles of history and the anxieties and fears that have bound australia's relationship with the region and its desire to seek a transatlantic protectorate? can australia find its identity as an asian nation, or will it seek solace in its cultural and colonial roots, drifting further away from its geographical identity?

australia's political establishment has developed instincts and muscle memory. decades of integration with the washington system have only deepened this. however, a growing public is questioning this apparent cession of sovereignty, demanding that australia play less of a "deputy chief" role and more of an independent country no longer taking orders from the united states or britain.

as the 21st century unfolds, australia faces an unanswered question: whether it can find a way out of its anxieties or fears and become an asian nation, or whether it will remain an asian invader trying to carve out its share of the region. interests".

this article is an exclusive manuscript of observer.com. the content of the article is purely the author's personal opinion and does not represent the platform's opinion. it may not be reproduced without authorization, otherwise legal liability will be pursued. follow observer.com on wechat guanchacn and read interesting articles every day.