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unrest and restlessness spread throughout germany and even europe

in september, the german bundestag and many regional parliaments were still on summer break. in this season, which is usually more about vacations and less about politics, unease and restlessness are spreading throughout germany and even europe because of the election results in two eastern states.

in saxony, governor michel kretschmer's cdu party has a narrow lead over the far-right alternative for germany party. in thuringia, the afd ranked first in the state parliamentary election with 32.8% of the vote. the green party’s vote rate was below the 5% threshold and was shut out by the state parliament. the liberal democratic party was reduced to “unworthy of having a name.” , was classified as "other" in the final election result statistics. even with the addition of the social democratic party, the three-party coalition in the federal government only received a vote share of just over double digits.

the intense sentiment was also reflected in high voting participation rates of around 75% in both states. as soon as the election results came out, the stock price of carl zeiss medical technology, an old industry giant based in thuringia, fell. since then, the brandenburg state election at the end of september has attracted more attention. the social democratic party of chancellor scholz can no longer afford to lose.

in the early morning of september 23, local time, the results of the brandenburg election were announced. the governor's social democratic party retained its position as the largest party with an advantage of less than 2 percentage points. however, it was closely followed by the afd, which received nearly 30% of the vote.

bjorn hock, chairman of the thuringia state party of the alternative for germany.

the “firewall” is short

the election results in germany's two eastern states are the first time that a far-right party has achieved such a victory in a german state parliamentary election since the end of world war ii, and this victory did not benefit from anyone else. the european establishment has a rule of building a "firewall", that is, it does not form a government with parties labeled as far-right.

this is especially true in germany, which has historical baggage. the establishment political parties can argue to no end on every domestic and foreign issue, but there is only one red line that all parties will declare in a unified voice on any occasion: they will never consider joining the afd. cooperate. given that so far no party in the parliament has dared to publicly abandon its "desire for survival" and change its position, it cannot be said that this "firewall" has been burned through. the current situation is: the firewall is a little short, and the fire is so fierce that it is about to reach the top of the wall.

what makes many european media even more "thinking about it with horror" is a certain familiar historical memory: in 1929, the nazi party won the thuringia state parliamentary election, and four years later, hitler came to power. bjorn hock, chairman of the thuringia state of the afd, is very close to the appearance of the "master race" according to the standards of the nazi party, which also adds a lot of vivid colors to the memories of this past event: blue eyes, thin lips, pale lips golden to light golden brown hair color.

what makes the "drama" even more ups and downs is another episode: the new saxony state parliament election management agency announced the wrong number of seats in the first round of data. the official explanation was that there was a bug (fault) in the software and there was a problem in the calculation process of seat allocation. after the correction, the greens and spd gained one seat each, while the cdu and afd lost one seat each than originally announced.

but this seat is crucial. according to relevant legal provisions, some major decisions require a 2/3 majority instead of a 1/2 majority to pass. the recalculation resulted in the second-placed afd accounting for less than one-third of saxony, thus losing its minority seat in the state. to some die-hard afd fans, such a crucial change smacks of a conspiracy theory.

for the saxony establishment, the last safety valve before sliding into political disorder has been closed, which is a blessing in misfortune. in thuringia, the valve cannot be closed. once key disputes arise in the future involving the dissolution of parliament, re-election, election of judges of the constitutional court, or revision of certain important bills, the afd can use the power of the minority to intercept the majority. and thuringia chairman hawke has always had extreme views and will definitely do the same. although the afd has not yet seized power, such a power operation mechanism is enough to paralyze parliament.

at 9 a.m. the day after the election results were announced, saxony governor kretschmer appeared at the cdu headquarters in berlin with black circles under his eyes. under normal circumstances, as a governor in power, he works hard without any credit, but he can always gain some "impression points" for his party. since german reunification, the governorship of saxony has been in the hands of the cdu. kretschmer’s own reputation is not bad, with more than 50% satisfaction rating. however, in this election, he and thuringia governor porto ramero of the left party have become close friends.

in the past two years, two governors have resigned due to dismal election results, namely tobias hans of saarland and franziska giffey of berlin. in both thuringia and saxony, more than half of the cdu voters said they only elected the cdu out of a desire to curb the afd's ambition to become stronger. positively, this means that there are still a considerable number of people who remain politically sensitive and wary of the rise of populist forces. negatively, this means that even for the cdu, the only rival to the afd in both states, the public lacks heartfelt recognition. this is a situation that will be reflected in the bayern and hesse state elections in the autumn of 2023. nearly a year has passed, and this situation has not only not been corrected in time, but has intensified.

on august 29, in thuringia, germany, sarah wagenknecht (right), founder of the sarah-wagen alliance, was splashed with red paint during a campaign rally.

"brothers" are not equal

although the economic growth rate of the five east german states has exceeded the german average in recent years, they only account for 15% of the total german economy. saxony is traditionally the regional leader in east germany, with a population nearly twice that of thuringia. the development level of some cities in the state has long been as good as that of west germany. the capital, dresden, is known as the "pearl on the elbe river". thuringia, on the other hand, is close to the border between east and west germany and has a strong rural character. in the 1990s and early 21st century, there were frequent exchanges with the west german federal states, and many people commuted across the two states. however, frequent exchanges have not played a significant role in promoting economic development, but have greatly affected the lives of local people. the gap between east and west germany in terms of development and political discourse was revealed without reservation.

after the joy of the reunification of the two germanys, they soon had to face the stark reality. to this day, even in the capital berlin, traces of the division are still vivid. taking the subway across berlin, the cityscape is clearly defined by alexanderplatz. although germany implemented a "solidarity tax" at the federal level to support the development of east germany, the wave of globalization that accompanied reunification still exacerbated social divisions. from 1990 to 1995 alone, about 75% of people in east germany lost their jobs due to the reunification of the two germanys, exacerbating the existing gap. faced with a bleak and uncertain future, young people in east germany "voted with their feet" and emigrated in large numbers, leaving many small towns almost empty. in many areas, only the elderly are left. they have strong resonance with topics that represent a sense of "security" such as public safety, crime rates, public services, and medical quality. other young and middle-aged people who have stayed in the local area are more concerned about east germany due to the gap. regional rather than federal.

this gap is reflected in the current elections in saxony and thuringia, that is, the alternative for europe and the traditional establishment christian democrats have been given different meanings. it is not unknown to people that the cdu is better at improving the economy, education, and stabilizing employment, but these are not so high priority in east germany right now. in the areas of refugee and asylum policy, social justice, and the interests of the east german region, people in the east german region trust the afd more.

when talking about west germany, many people in east germany often do not think of old industrial and agricultural bases such as the ruhr area or saarland, which are facing severe transformation pains, but think of the sunny and picturesque konstanz. or hamburg, a city with a large concentration of businessmen and a foreign accent, where there is wealth unimaginable in the east germany, a prosperous and diverse cultural life, and a middle class who are worldly and well-off. this social picture, inherited by the stable middle class, mixes the busyness that represents affluence and the relaxation that represents superiority. it allows the people in east germany to have a deep understanding of social divisions and identity gaps. an anger that is filled with jealousy, incomprehension, and unwillingness, and is eventually filled with a sense of frustration, devaluation, and deprivation. west germany's middle-class elites, companies and politicians are everywhere in germany and even the world, but this glamor has nothing to do with them. the west german-style "superiority look" with a hint of subtle disgust in the politeness stung the eyes of "east germans" even more. they understood that although they were brothers, they were not equal to the "west germans". today, more than 30 years after the reunification of the two germanys, about 2/3 to 3/4 of east german voters still consider themselves to be "second-class citizens" in many aspects.

in thuringia around the turn of the millennium, those in favor of federal politics outnumbered those opposed to it by almost a third. the first time the two curves crossed was around 2010. the number of those in favor reached an all-time high in 2014 and then fell. today, there are more than five times as many opponents as there are supporters. after the reunification of the two germanys, just as they had been re-educated by the allies, west germany "reformed" east germany in a drastic way. not only has everything once related to the east german region been cast in a derogatory tone, but the voices from the east german region have been silenced at the federal level for a long time, leaving behind a group of people who have lost their homeland and have nowhere to place their memories. .

for east germany, the "first opening" of the reunification of the two germanys brought them condescending west german brothers; the "second opening" marked by the wave of globalization, including the influx of refugees, let their already depleted hometown be hit again.

a recent survey showed that about three-quarters of east german voters believe that they cannot have a real influence on politics through their own activities. thus, criticism of the system emerged. does this system really work as it should? is it the failure of individual actors due to not having the right agenda in place, or is it the system as a whole that is not doing what it promised to do? are political elites no longer listening to the people? in east germany, the number of people raising such fundamental questions and criticisms was more than twice that in west germany.

on september 1, in dresden, the capital of saxony, germany, voters cast their votes for regional elections at a polling station. picture of this article/visual china

not a "special" turn

to be fair, the afd is not a unique phenomenon. in many western countries, movements opposed to left-wing liberal thought have emerged. from trump to meloni, political forces representing the opposite side of the western political trend since the 1960s have entered national governments. the elections in two eastern german states have so stirred up european public opinion, first of all, because the historical association of using the combination of "germany" and "extreme right" as keywords is indeed too painful. but if in most parts of the developed world a significant portion of the electorate seeks refuge in similar types of parties at more or less the same time, this cannot be said to be a coincidence or a “feature.”

from a broader perspective, from the united states to the united kingdom, from scandinavia to italy and spain in southern europe and then to eastern europe, the issue of "irregular" immigration has become a major issue in elections in almost every western developed country in recent years. the focus of controversy.

over the years, germany has welcomed hundreds of thousands of refugees from war and poverty, equivalent to the population of a medium-sized city. following the refugee crisis in 2015, the comprehensive escalation of the crisis in ukraine caused a large number of refugees to flow into germany. how to digest and integrate such a large number of outsiders in a short period of time? berlin, the center of german politics, has taken the lead in opening up and accepting many times, but in 2022 it had to say that "it has far exceeded its capacity." in addition to the problems and contradictions shared by other western countries, the thorny point of germany is that any discussion that may be related to "race" and "xenophobia" will be particularly difficult to discuss due to the original sin of its world war ii history. only one direction is correct and tellable. what is in the other direction is sealed, and everything behind the seal is very vague. but the huge pressure and contradictions will not disappear just because they cannot be expressed. when berlin held state parliamentary elections in 2023, then-governor giffy’s public satisfaction rate was only 36%.

political turns are not always brought about by one particular party. in denmark, the social democrats tightened asylum rights; in greece, the conservatives sealed the borders. in germany, on "immigration/refugee policy" and "russia-ukraine", two issues that have attracted the most attention and are related to each other in the two east german states, the alternative party has similar views to the alternative party and has risen strongly since its establishment this year. the sarah-wagenknecht coalition splintered off the left party.

sarah wagenknecht, the founder of the sarah-wagenknecht, was once the most prestigious top leader of the left party. after establishing her own company, she brought many followers with her. the most famous follower is her husband, the experienced oscar lafontin, who was also the social democratic party's chief chancellor candidate after the reunification of germany. he served as the leader of the social democratic party for several years and served as finance minister during schröder's administration. he was once the number one a core figure in the first schröder government. later, lafontin unexpectedly resigned from government office, and then left the social democratic party to join the newly formed left party, and devoted himself to squeezing the social democratic party into a state-level party. the rise of the left party under his leadership was once impressive. afterwards, la fountain withdrew from the left party and soon announced his membership of the shah-vaud alliance after its establishment. in thuringia, the s&w coalition's initial support gains are now nearly twice those of the afd.

for such a turn, people who are more tolerant will think that this is a lack of communication. a more paternalistic approach is to describe dissenting or skeptical voters as uninformed or stupid, and even directly issue racist or even nazi-like warnings. the result is a lot of rhetoric on a range of issues, from overstretched national infrastructure to cultural clashes, crime and terrorism, but with real consequences. in no western country could such a development go unnoticed by the political establishment for long. either the so-called established parties respond to these problems, or right-wing populists themselves come to power. so far, german federal politics has either justified its openness and equality from a moral perspective, but ignored that another group of local people outside national politics is also a vulnerable group and has the right to be respected; or it has argued that "german society needs labor". from a pragmatic perspective, it is fully necessary to accept refugees, but the extent and details are often unclear.

if persuaded, people in west germany may be willing to give it a try, but for many people in east germany, the original lack of identity and uneven development are compounded by the rejection caused by refugees/immigrants and the russian-ukrainian the war brought about strong worries about survival, and their pain was too strong. they couldn't get through it now, and they couldn't care about the distance. moreover, the university liberation movement that began to flourish in western europe in the late 1960s and the left-liberal trend advocated by globalization were not originally endogenous issues in east german society. they feel like they've been ignored for so long, so why should they pay for "other people's ideas"?

forced out of comfort zone

a week after the election results of saxony and thuringia were announced, exploratory contacts and negotiations between the parties still have no obvious results, making it very difficult to form a coalition government. although the afd achieved record votes in both state elections, it did not receive a majority of the votes to govern independently. therefore, the "firewall" remains in effect. in addition, the cdu has an incompatibility resolution in both federal and state governments prohibiting cooperation with left parties. in this case, there are not many options left. the leaders of the saudi-venetian alliance will reject the deployment of medium-range missiles by the united states in germany and further supply of weapons to ukraine as a condition for forming a cabinet and alliance, requiring the state government to make its position clear, thus putting pressure on the federal government.

it currently appears that in thuringia, state leader mario voigt, who is from the christian democratic union, and afd state chairman houck will both run for governor. candidates for governor must obtain an absolute majority in the first or second round of voting, with the candidate receiving the most votes in the third round of voting winning. the extent to which other parties will support voight to avoid hawke's election will be a test of the firewall's resilience. in saxony, kretschmer is considering forming a coalition with the spd and the sch-w, an attempt that is also controversial within the cdu.

in brandenburg, the social democrats narrowly won. but this is largely due to governor wojdek - feeling pressured, he announced before the election that he would never serve as governor if the social democrats lost. this desperate approach of tightly binding one's political career to the party has won the social democratic party a lot of "unity votes."

regardless of the combination, all parties will be forced out of their comfort zones. german chancellor scholz and his ruling party are also quite embarrassed. in germany, where historical memory is particularly sensitive, the connection between the "far right" and the nazis is more easily evoked than in any other country. from the 1920s to the 1930s, the german social democratic party was the last political force to form an institutional resistance to the nazis. therefore, it was deliberately targeted and framed during the nazis' seizure of power, and was the first to be attacked after the nazis seized power. there was brutal persecution. this time, can the "red fortress" that once represented progress and conscience survive the impact? no matter what the reality is, such an association that is too historically heavy will trigger a considerable wave of political emotions. against this background, the german general election in one year's time will become a "concrete future" that may be affected.

(the author is a sociologist and political commentator at the university of hamburg, germany)