feature article丨inherit and carry forward flexible strategies and tactics
2024-09-27
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inherit and carry forward flexible strategies and tactics
——understand the way to win from the great war of liberation
■liu kui liu linjun feng bin
editor's notein december 2017, when visiting the huaihai campaign memorial hall, president xi pointed out that the glorious traditions and historical experience of our party and people’s army should be inherited and carried forward. this year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of new china. looking back at the great liberation war more than 70 years ago and understanding the way to win from the scenes of majestic war dramas is of great practical significance for us to inherit our glorious tradition and win future wars.
in may 1939, comrade mao zedong published an article "the third anniversary of the anti-japanese university" in the "new china news", in which he summarized the education policy of the anti-japanese university as: a firm and correct political direction, a work style of hard work, and a flexible strategy tactics. flexible strategies and tactics are a profound reflection of the laws guiding war, a "swimming technique" for controlling war practice, and a magic weapon for the people's army to be invincible.
the essence of flexibility lies in "activity", which is driven by independent innovation.
combat is a contest of strength, but also a competition of subjective abilities. it is a cognitive activity in which the commander's subjective consciousness is exposed to the objective reality on the battlefield, emphasizing the subjective initiative of the commander. the first priority of a commander is to resolutely implement the orders and instructions of his superiors, but this is by no means a copy of the orders and instructions of his superiors, but a proactive and creative interpretation and execution. it is necessary to combine the actual situation on the battlefield and translate superior orders and instructions into tactics for operations at the same level; it is necessary to make targeted and timely adjustments according to changes in the enemy situation, proactively design operations and plan actions, and achieve flexible responses; when superior orders and instructions are inconsistent with the actual situation, when consistent, we should actively put forward reasonable suggestions. regarding the mechanical implementation of superiors' instructions, comrade mao zedong said: "blindly carrying out superiors' instructions without any objection on the surface is not really implementing the superiors' instructions. this is the best way to oppose the superiors' instructions or to sabotage the superiors' instructions."
during the war of liberation, su yu actively put forward opinions and suggestions several times based on the actual situation, giving full play to his subjective initiative. in 1946, the kuomintang troops launched a massive invasion into the liberated areas. the party central committee initially decided to let su yu lead the main force of the central china field army out of huainan to launch an external attack. after carefully studying the development trend of the war, su yu believed that a few victorious battles should be fought on the inside first, and then moved to the outside, and he made suggestions to the central government. the central government seriously considered and adopted this suggestion, and finally achieved "seven battles and seven victories" in central jiangsu. giving full play to subjective initiative is not only a manifestation of flexible strategies and tactics, but also tests a commander's courage and responsibility.
the key to flexibility is "initiative", which is to actively move toward battle.
when troops are fighting, their mission is their task, their responsibility is their order, and the enemy's situation is their direction. they cannot passively wait for orders from superiors. clausewitz said: "soldiers enlist in the army, put on uniforms, take up arms, receive training, sleep, eat, drink, and march, all just to fight in the right place and at the right time." when the troops are in peacetime, they must be alert and ready to train and prepare for war to ensure that they are ready to fight at any time; when between battles, they must have keen foresight, predict the tasks they may undertake, and make targeted preparations for war; when in a confrontational state, we must be proactive, actively seek out enemies, and make enemies in advance; when in a proactive state, we must plan according to the situation, move in response to the situation, and follow the trend to continuously consolidate and expand the winning situation; when in a passive state, we must when fighting, you must create opportunities through "you fight yours and i fight mine" and change from passive to active; when fighting the first battle, you must think about what and how to fight the second, third, and even fourth battles. as a commander, you must be able to fight well, and you must also dare to fight.
in 1950, in the battle to liberate hainan island, the 15th corps of the fourth field army was responsible for the task of crossing the sea and landing on the island. at that time, our army had problems such as a lack of ferries and boatmen, and insufficient naval combat experience among officers and soldiers. some commanders believed that the conditions for our army to cross the sea and land on the island were not yet mature. faced with various unfavorable factors, han xianchu, then commander of the 40th army, took the initiative to initiate the hainan island campaign in advance. with the approval of the military commission, the sea crossing and island landing operations originally planned to be implemented in june were advanced to april. on april 16, 1950, the main force made a surprise landing on the island. through careful and adequate preparations before the war, and the favorable sea monsoon in april, the entire hainan island was finally liberated on may 1. the korean war broke out on june 25, and new changes occurred in the international situation. if the original plan is carried out, the outcome of the hainan island battle will be unpredictable.
the highlight of flexibility is "agility", which is to use tactics and move
war is a zero-sum game, leaving no room for a win-win situation, but providing the ground for strategy. "soldiers never tire of deceit." in order to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy on the cruel battlefield, one must break through inertial thinking, break the traditional shackles, go beyond doctrines and norms, and create eclectic strategies through deception, attack, confusion, shortcomings, inducement, and differentiation, etc., show that you can't use it when you can, show that you don't use it when you are using it, show you when you are close and show you are far away, and show you when you are far away, so as to achieve high combat effectiveness. "the enemy is defeated by strategy, not by numbers." this is an irrefutable iron law of victory. it is difficult for an army to defeat the enemy if it is brave but not resourceful or has too much courage and little strategy. a superb command strategy has the power to move a thousand pounds. when the enemy is strong and we are weak, we can use "sword skills" to make up for the lack of "sword weapons" and defeat the strong with the weak; when the enemy is weak and we are strong, we can avoid "killing a thousand enemies." self-destruction of eight hundred", even achieving the effect of defeating the enemy without fighting.
during the war of liberation, the people's liberation army inherited and carried forward strategic wisdom, came up with various strategies and developed a set of strategic "combination punches". in early 1947, chiang kai-shek mobilized superior forces to attack northern shaanxi. the party central committee and the northwest field army took the initiative to withdraw from yan'an, adopted "mushroom tactics" to deal with the enemy, and achieved "three battles and three victories." in the first battle at qinghua bianstone, i took advantage of the enemy's eagerness for a decisive battle and adopted the strategy of attacking in the east and attacking in the west, inviting the emperor to enter the urn. i used a force to mobilize the enemy's main force to go north to ansai, while our main force set up an ambush at qinghua bianstone on the enemy's flank. the enemy's 31st brigade, which was responsible for flank search and alert, got into the "pocket" carefully set up by peng dehuai. i achieved my first big victory after withdrawing from yan'an. in the yangma river in world war ii, i adopted the strategy of using the small to restrain the large and using the large to eat the small. i used a small force to resolutely resist the enemy's main force advancing northward, and the majority of the force wiped out the enemy's 135th brigade in the yangma river as it moved south. in the third battle of panlong, in order to seize panlong and provide food to the enemy, i adopted the strategy of moving the tiger away from the mountain and attacking the point to block reinforcements. i established a suspicious formation in the direction of suide, mobilized a large number of ships, and assumed the posture of crossing the yellow river eastward with the main force. at the same time, i on the road leading to suide, some troops were sent to pretend to gather towards suide. the kuomintang was indeed fooled, and its main force rushed from panlong to suide. i used feint troops to fight step by step along the way, discarding military supplies while fighting to deepen the enemy's misjudgment. my main force took advantage of the situation and captured panlong. the strategic application of "three battles and three victories" vividly demonstrates flexible strategies and tactics.
being flexible does not mean "acting without permission", it means acting in compliance with the overall situation
"military power is the most important thing." only by centralization and unity can the overall synergy be exerted, so flexibility and maneuverability are limited. this limit is the superior's intention, or even the overall strategic intention. it is like the center of a circle, and all combat units must make circular movements around it, rather than acting arbitrarily and blindly without restrictions or direction. in this regard, marshal liu bocheng had a vivid metaphor: the central committee of the party is like the player who plays the drum in the opera, and all of us are like the players who play the huqin and gongs. we must play how the central committee plays, and we must listen to his command so that we can play. put out a good set of music. human cognition develops according to the law of "whole-part-whole". any thoughts and behaviors can only have practical significance when placed within the whole. only by basing oneself on the overall situation and understanding the overall situation can one make better use of the parts. therefore, flexible maneuvering is flexible maneuvering under the overall situation. in other words, only by starting from the overall situation can we achieve better flexibility and maneuvering.
at the end of 1947, the kuomintang and the communist party were in a tug of war on the battlefield in the central plains, and the central government had been thinking about how to break this situation. finally, the central government planned to have su yu lead three columns to cross the river south and jump to the rear of the kuomintang-controlled area. su yu was not aware of the central government's decision at this time, and sent out the famous "zi yang telegram" on january 22, 1948, suggesting to the central government to concentrate forces in the central plains region to fight a war of annihilation. the central government rejected su yu's proposal. on january 31 and april 18, 1948, su yu repeatedly stated his views to the central government. three "bold statements" attracted great attention from the central government. on april 30, the central government summoned su yu to report the situation in person. finally, the central government agreed to postpone crossing the river and stay in the central plains to fight the war of annihilation. from january to april 1948, the central government's decision was always to cross the river, but su yu's idea was not to cross the river. despite this, su yu did not act without authorization, but actively carried out preparations to cross the river in accordance with the central government's intentions. regarding the dialectical relationship between autonomy and flexibility and obedience to the overall situation, su yu himself concluded: when about to carry out combat tasks assigned by superiors, one should think in conjunction with the overall situation of the war, consider the gains and losses from the overall perspective, and connect the local and the overall situation well. the overall situation is composed of many parts. problems seen from the parts may be of reference value for the central government to observe the overall situation and make decisions.
when it comes to winning a war, people are the decisive factor. no matter how the conditions of the times develop or how the form of war evolves, this will never change. the fundamental reason why humans are different from other objects lies in their “conscious initiative”. it is necessary to cherish and maintain this kind of conscious initiative, inherit and carry forward the flexible strategies and tactics of the liberation war, and improve the ability to control informationized and intelligent warfare.
(source: china military network - people's liberation army daily)
