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▎ at the 2024 beijing xiangshan forum, phoenix.com special observer chen cheng interviewed wu shicun.

editor's note

on september 14, after being illegally detained for nearly five months, the philippine coast guard ship 9701 withdrew from china's xianbin reef. earlier, philippine media leaked a confidential diplomatic note between china and malaysia, and foreign ministry spokesman mao ning said at a press conference that he was "very shocked" by the incident. in addition to the philippines, malaysia is conducting large-scale oil and gas exploration in the disputed areas of the south china sea, and vietnam has also accelerated land reclamation activities in the south china sea.

what are the reasons for the philippines' various actions? what is the direction of the south china sea dispute between china and the philippines? what impact will the intervention of malaysia, vietnam and other countries have on the south china sea situation? will there be new changes in the south china sea policy after the us election? what role do asean, singapore and other countries play in the south china sea issue? phoenix da cankao interviewed wu shicun, chairman of the huayang ocean research center and founding president of the china institute of south china sea studies.

key points

1. wu shicun believes that both the philippines and malaysia have problems with the philippine media leaking confidential documents from china and malaysia. since the philippines illegally ran aground on ren'ai reef, china has exercised restraint for 25 years, taking into full account the china-philippines relationship. the philippine president's claim that "no philippine personnel should be deliberately killed in the dispute" is a false proposition. after the withdrawal of the philippine coast guard ship 9701, it is impossible to return to xianbin reef for a period of time. "continue to send ships" is just the philippines' self-consolation.

2. wu shicun pointed out that the south china sea dispute does not only involve the philippines. malaysia is also conducting oil and gas exploration in the disputed areas of the south china sea. expanding and internationalizing the south china sea issue through cooperation with foreign oil and gas companies is a consistent strategy of the south china sea claimants, and in fact has helped them gain support from western countries. in addition, vietnam is also carrying out large-scale island and reef construction in the south china sea. considering the sino-vietnamese relationship, china has not made any public moves, but if vietnam continues, china will also take countermeasures.

3. wu shicun said that no matter who comes to power after the us election, there will be no substantial changes in the us south china sea policy. the us will still use the south china sea issue to interfere with china-asean relations and contain china's development, but there may be differences in means and methods.

4. wu shicun stressed that the south china sea dispute occurred between china and specific asean claimants. asean cannot discuss and resolve the south china sea issue as an independent party, but it can play a positive role in promoting member states to accelerate the consultation on the code of conduct. singapore, as it is not a south china sea claimant, cannot play a substantive role either. however, considering singapore's unique language and diplomatic advantages, it should remain neutral on the south china sea issue and promote the consultation on the code of conduct.

conversation | wu shicun, chairman of huayang ocean research center and chairman of the academic committee of china institute of south china sea studies

interview | chen cheng, special editor of phoenix.com

editors: hou yichao, huang han, ji wanqi

china has been very restrained towards the philippines

phoenix reference ： hello, president wu. recently, the philippine media exposed confidential diplomatic documents between china and malaysia, which brought some troubles to china-malaysia relations. what do you think of this behavior of the philippine media?

wu shicun ： first of all, internal documents must be transmitted one-to-one and point-to-point through diplomatic channels, so how could the malaysian diplomatic department release them?we cannot simply assume that the problem lies only with the philippines.generally speaking, diplomatic documents, whether confidential or non-confidential, have special management mechanisms and procedures. outsiders cannot see them before they are decrypted, so why this malaysian document was leaked is a question.

second, for the philippine media, since it is an internal document, its publication may affect china-malaysia relations, or amplify the international impact of the south china sea issue between china and malaysia. so why did the philippine media make it public at this time? so i think we need to look at it from two aspects.

my personal interpretation is that this incident itself is because malaysia is unilaterally exploiting oil and gas in the disputed areas of the south china sea, infringing on china's rights and violating china's claims, or running counter to china's advocacy of shelving disputes and jointly developing. therefore, malaysia's actions have caused china's concern, and china has told you through diplomatic channels that this is not allowed and it infringes on china's rights. i think it can also tell the international community that china, as with any other country, has a good relationship with malaysia on this issue, but china has warned you through diplomatic channels in advance on the issue of infringement in the south china sea, unilateral actions, violations of the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea, or actions that are not conducive to the ongoing consultations on the code of conduct in the south china sea. i think in this sense,it still sends the right signal that china is determined to safeguard its own rights and interests.

so this matter needs to be viewed from two sides.the philippines has bad intentions.it is questionable whether malaysia has problems or loopholes in its management system, or whether it deliberately leaked secret diplomatic documents between china and malaysia to the international community in this way.

▎ the world's seventh and asia's first cylindrical "offshore oil and gas processing plant" haikui no. 1, independently designed and built by tianjin enterprise marine engineering, arrived at the liuhua oilfield in the south china sea.

phoenix reference ： at this year's shangri-la dialogue in singapore, then philippine president marcos said that the philippines' red line is that no filipino personnel can be deliberately killed in disputes. what do you think of this red line of the philippines? do you think it is a bluff?

wu shicun : ridiculous, who would kill filipinos? this is very important. unless he committed suicide, how could there be a country where someone would kill filipinos?this is a false proposition, it's also just bluffing.

first of all, he himself did not know who was going to kill them. would the chinese kill filipinos? on may 9, 1999, the philippines used a tank landing ship from world war ii to illegally run aground on ren'ai reef.china has exercised restraint for 25 years.moreover, (china) believed in the philippines. he promised from the beginning that once the problem was exposed, the tank landing ship from world war ii would automatically leave after the mechanical failure was solved and the spare parts arrived. china believed that you would leave one day, and it has been waiting for 25 years but it has not been towed away. there were originally 7 marines on board, then more than a dozen, and now it is said that there are as many as 30 marines on this warship, which ran aground on ren'ai reef.china has always exercised restraint. although china is defending its rights, it still provides you with humanitarian supplies. you said that you have run out of fresh water, food, and daily necessities, but we allow the philippines to provide humanitarian supplies.

i think china is very righteous and considerate of the sino-philippines relationship. who will kill the filipinos? unless they kill each other, there is no such problem. assuming the scenario he may be talking about, the philippines is supplying and the chinese are blocking it. at this time, an accidental conflict may occur, resulting in casualties. such accidental casualties are another matter.

▎ the philippines’ illegal “beached” warship at ren’ai reef

in the china-us plane collision incident, the chinese pilot has been missing and has not been found until now. that was an accidental casualty and did not trigger a war between china and the us. china did not say that this touched the red line. in fact, because it was an accidental casualty, it was unintentional on both sides. that is another matter.

assuming that the philippines is infringing rights and china's rights protection has resulted in abnormal casualties,i don't think it will lead to a war between china and the philippines.if an accident results in casualties, it will immediately rise to the level of state relations and be resolved through war, and the whole world will be in turmoil.

phoenix reference：last week, the philippine coast guard withdrew from the xianbin reef, and the philippines said two days ago that it would continue to deploy ships to the area. in your opinion, what other means does the philippines have in the medium and long term, and how should we respond?

wu shicun : my understanding is very simple. since the philippine coast guard ship 9701 has withdrawn from xianbin reef, i think it is impossible for it to return in the future. the relevant philippine authorities claim that they will continue to send ships to the waters. so what kind of ships will be sent? is it to control and occupy xianbin reef or just to wander around the waters of xianbin reef? these are two different things.i think the philippines is repeating its old tricks and sending a coast guard ship like no. 9701 to garrison the xianbin reef. gradually, the possibility of actual control no longer exists.the philippines knows that they will never return, and saying they will come back is just self-consolation.

south china sea dispute continues to escalate

phoenix reference ：the south china sea dispute previously mainly involved the philippines. now there are new developments on the malaysian side. president wu, do you think the south china sea dispute is showing a trend of expanding?

wu shicun : this has already appeared a long time ago, and it was not exposed just because of the leak of the china-malaysia diplomatic documents. in fact, the entire international community knows about it, and china is also very clear about it.

malaysia's oil and gas exploration in the disputed area of ​​the south china sea is actually very large. in the disputed area of ​​the south china sea, there are quite a few exploratory oil and gas wells and productive oil and gas wells near nankang shoal.therefore, the south china sea issue has been expanding and internationalizing. this has been the case since the south china sea dispute arose.especially after the signing of the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea, the occupation of uninhabited islands and reefs was frozen, and the favorable conditions for them to seize islands no longer exist; or in other words, occupying uninhabited islands and reefs may require a very high political price. so (they) began to seize the sea area.at this time, they should strive to legitimize their claims, and the only way is to expand and internationalize the south china sea issue and involve countries outside the region.

(editor's note: the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea, abbreviated as doc, was signed by the foreign ministers of china and asean countries in november 2002. it is the first political document signed by china and asean on the south china sea issue.)

for example, western oil companies are cooperating with malaysia in oil and gas development, bp is developing oil and gas in brunei, and russian oil companies are cooperating with vietnam. the drilling platforms are from japan, and even before that, spain and norway. so (these countries) bring in external forces and foreign oil and gas companies, and they are intertwined, so china may be afraid to act rashly in safeguarding its rights.therefore, expansion is in fact a strategy pursued by these claimant countries, which gradually makes their illegal claims accepted by the international community and even supported when necessary.

in fact, it has already played such a role. why did so many western countries protest against the philippines' unilateral infringement on ren'ai reef and china's legitimate rights protection actions? it was completely because they chose to stand on the side of the philippines. the doc clearly stipulates that no settlement actions should be taken on uninhabited islands and reefs. the philippines obviously violated the doc provisions. which country came out to condemn the philippines? instead, it stood on the opposite side of china. so in this sense, their promotion of the expansion and internationalization of the south china sea issue has produced positive effects for them.

▎ on may 16, 2024, local time, in manila, philippines, several philippine ships illegally gathered in the waters near our huangyan island and carried out activities unrelated to normal fishery production operations. the chinese coast guard strengthened on-site surveillance and evidence collection.

phoenix reference ： the south china sea dispute also involves vietnam. recently, some american think tanks have also noticed that in fact, the construction speed of vietnam's islands and reefs in the south china sea has been accelerating in the past two years. however, there has not been any major friction between china and vietnam. in addition, the vietnamese leader visited china last month, and china-vietnam relations seem to be good. what does president wu think of the current state of china-vietnam relations?

wu shicun : actually, vietnam has indeed been active in the south china sea issue, especially the rapid expansion of islands and reefs and the scale of reclamation, which is unprecedented. when i visited the united states in june, american scholars told me that they were a little confused, saying that vietnam's island and reef construction was so large, but there was no public response from the chinese government, not even protests and condemnations. i believe that china may warn the vietnamese through diplomatic channels that this malicious reclamation violates the doc, is unhelpful to the ongoing coc consultations, infringes on china's rights and claims in the south china sea, and will fundamentally affect china-vietnam relations. i still believe this.

(editor's note: coc is the code of conduct in the south china sea. negotiations on the coc began in 2014. in july last year, the foreign ministers of china and asean countries agreed to speed up the progress of the negotiations and announced that the negotiations would be completed within three years, but the parties to the dispute are currently less enthusiastic about the negotiations. wu shicun said in an interview with the south china morning post that the coc needs the consent of china and the ten asean countries to move forward, but the parties are still in dispute over whether the coc will be legally binding. the parties have also not reached a consensus on the geographical scope of application of the coc: vietnam hopes to cover the xisha islands; china believes that it should only cover the nansha islands; the philippines hopes to cover not only the nansha islands, but also the cover huangyan island. in addition, china regards the code as a crisis management mechanism, while vietnam and the philippines regard it as a dispute settlement mechanism. after the united states abandoned its "neutral position" in the south china sea dispute and the negotiation window of the code narrowed, both the philippines and vietnam hoped to strengthen their presence in the disputed waters: the philippines used the third-party mechanism of the international court of arbitration to initiate arbitration in an attempt to win the sympathy of the international community, and at the same time, as the only ally of the united states in the south china sea, it cooperated with the united states' strategy to contain china's rise; vietnam reclaimed land in the south china sea and is expected to deploy military forces. considering the depth of its security cooperation with the united states and japan, it may provide it to the united states and japan for use in the future. )

considering the level of mutual trust between china and vietnam, there are other considerations for the way to deal with it. for example, between china and the philippines, because the united states factored in, the philippines made the matter public, so china's response or public opinion counterattack can only be taken in a public way. this gives the international community the impression that china is only stricter with the philippines and more lenient with vietnam. however, i think we will definitely have internal channels to tell the vietnamese that you have to stop, you have changed the status quo, and have affected the peace and stability of the south china sea. if you continue to develop, it will affect china-vietnam relations.

so the treatment methods are different, but i thinkchina's position on safeguarding its rights and claims in the south china sea has not changed, but there are differences in the means and methods of handling different countries.because vietnam itself has not made this public, china has not acquiesced to this matter. i believe that if vietnam continues to develop, china may take stronger countermeasures. assuming that it builds airports on some reefs in the nansha islands, given the depth and breadth of vietnam's security cooperation with the united states and japan, it will affect the peace and tranquility of the entire south china sea region. i believe china will have new measures.

the us election has no real impact on south china sea policy

phoenix reference: you just mentioned the united states. do you think that if trump wins the us election at the end of the year, will there be new changes in the south china sea?

wu shicun： i don’t think there will be any substantial adjustments to the us’s south china sea policy.regardless of whether it is harris or trump in the future, the policy of using the south china sea issue to contain china's development and to interfere with china-asean relations, especially the relations between china and other south china sea claimants, will not change.

we should not expect that after the change of president, the united states will let china off the hook on the south china sea issue, or slow down its involvement in the south china sea issue. there will only be differences in means and methods. for example, during the trump era, from 2016 to 2020, the trump administration conducted freedom of navigation operations in the south china sea on the south china sea issue; there were 9 freedom of navigation operations in the south china sea against china in 2019 and 9 in 2020.

on the contrary, during the biden era, the frequency of "freedom of navigation operations" has declined, but the frequency of u.s. aircraft carriers conducting close-in reconnaissance in the south china sea strike group reached 7 times last year, with an average stay time of more than 7 days, and (aircraft) close-in reconnaissance exceeded 1,000 sorties last year.

in addition, the security mechanisms targeting china include the joint patrols by the us, the philippines and japan, the us, the philippines and canada, and even the us, the philippines, australia and japan. such a security mechanism targeting china in the south china sea has differences and similarities in means and methods, but there has been no substantial change in the direction of using the south china sea issue to contain china.

▎ on july 30, 2024, local time, in quezon city, philippines, the u.s. and philippine foreign ministers and defense ministers’ “2+2” talks were held.

non-conflicting parties should play an active but not decisive role

phoenix reference ：asean countries have different interests, and it is difficult to reach a consensus on many key issues. some people believe that asean as a whole may not be particularly important for resolving the south china sea dispute. what do you think of this view?

wu shicun ： china has never believed that asean can discuss and handle the south china sea issue with china as an independent party. , because asean is a regional organization, a regional group, not a country. the south china sea dispute only occurs between china and relevant asean claimant countries: between china and vietnam, between china and the philippines, between china and malaysia, and even between china and brunei. therefore, asean cannot and is not qualified to discuss the south china sea issue with china at the negotiation table as an independent party. therefore, asean's role in resolving the south china sea issue is limited.

however, as a regional organization, asean can promote consultations on the code of conduct in managing the south china sea crisis. the 10 asean member states are all parties to the consultations on the code of conduct in the south china sea.asean can play a more active role in promoting member states to actively accelerate the consultation on the code of conduct.however, asean is powerless to resolve the south china sea issue.

▎ on july 25, 2024, local time, in vientiane, laos, the 57th asean foreign ministers' meeting was held at the vientiane national convention center, attended by foreign ministers and government officials of asean countries.

phoenix reference ： the last question is about singapore. during our exchanges with foreign media reporters, we found that they were very concerned about singapore’s position on the south china sea issue. how do you evaluate singapore’s current position?

wu shicun： first of all, let me make it clear that singapore is a coastal country of the south china sea, but it is not a claimant country of the south china sea. in other words, the territorial disputes over the islands and reefs in the south china sea and the resolution of the disputes have nothing to do with singapore.therefore, singapore cannot play a substantive role in resolving the south china sea issue.

singapore should play a more active role in the code of conduct negotiations. because singapore can walk between the east and the west, considering its language advantage, plus its long-term security cooperation partnership with the united states, such as the united states has a military base in singapore, etc. so i thinksingapore must remain neutral on the south china sea issue.as a member of asean, singapore should be more proactive in working with china and the majority of asean member states to push forward the code of conduct consultations as soon as possible, rather than being influenced by external forces.

sometimes singapore is influenced by external forces, such as the united states and japan behind it, who hope to express the concerns of the united states (japan) in asean countries through singapore or other countries. this is actually the united states indirectly interfering with the consultations on the code of conduct in the south china sea, which will delay the progress of the consultations on the code of conduct. so i think singapore should remain neutral on the south china sea issue and take a more proactive attitude in the consultations on the code of conduct to avoid being influenced by external forces.