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As an observer of the Middle East, especially Iranian affairs, I wanted to observe the special presidential election in Iran after former President Rahi died suddenly in a plane crash on May 19.

The last time I went to Iran, I was unable to attend the presidential election because of the pandemic. Now that the conditions for travel are in place, I don’t want to miss this opportunity to observe Iran’s political and social conditions. Of course, when planning this trip to Iran, I never expected that Hamas leader Haniyeh would be assassinated in Tehran. My stay in Iran was therefore extended by several weeks.

Why did Zarif resign?

On the eve of Iran's presidential election in June, I was in Tehran and witnessed two rounds of voting and the electoral political mobilization that preceded it. Frankly speaking, until now, I do not think that Iran currently has the environment for a truly reformist president to take office, even though the so-called reformist candidate Pezerhiziyan won the second round of elections on July 5 and has been officially sworn in.

Today, I still hold the view that Pezeshiziyan's victory in the election is not a victory for the reformists, but a defeat for the hardliners. In this presidential election, not many people voted for Pezeshiziyan because they liked him. Among all the more than 60 million voters in Iran, no more than 25% did. A large number of voters who were deeply worried or afraid of the hard-line candidate Jalili voted for Pezeshiziyan.

Although Pezhecyan once brought hope to some Iranians, the political development in Iran so far has proved that the new Iranian president is seriously lacking in "reform elements". Former Foreign Minister Zarif was Pezhecyan's right-hand man during the election and one of Iran's most famous and active reformist representatives. He resigned just a few days after being appointed as Vice President by President Pezhecyan. Zarif's resignation is clearly colored by the political divisions in Iran, and he belongs to the losing camp in this round of struggle.

Why did Zarif resign? There are roughly three theories within Iran:

First, most of the candidates for the new cabinet recommended by the special committee he led did not appear on the list submitted to parliament for review, which made Zarif deeply disappointed and angry.

The second is the nationality of his children. Although Zarif has clearly stated that his entire family is Iranian and that he himself is still under U.S. sanctions, his children were born in the United States and have U.S. citizenship under U.S. law, which is contrary to Iran's laws on holding important positions. However, some influential Iranians disagree with this, believing that the talented Zarif should not be deprived of the opportunity to serve the country because of U.S. laws.

Third, Zarif’s recent statement on Iran’s Palestinian policy, in which he bluntly said that Iran’s Palestinian policy is problematic and that Iran cannot act more Palestinian than the Palestinians on the Palestinian issue. Obviously, at a time when the leader of Hamas has just been assassinated in Tehran, Zarif’s widely circulated remarks will bring him disaster.

Although Zarif is well-known in Iran for his irritable character, his resignation just a few days after being appointed vice president is enough to show the role of the reformists in current Iranian politics and their attitude towards it.

Although reformist ideas are more popular in Iran today, and even within the conservative camp, the number of people dissatisfied with the status quo is increasing day by day, frankly speaking, the complex political realities at home, in the surrounding areas and in the world make it very difficult for real reformists in Iran to stand out.

This is also the fundamental reason why the cabinet ministers proposed by the working group headed by Zarif were largely ignored. Pezeshiziyan, who won the election with the banner of reformists, had to accept pressure from many parties and make compromises when drafting the cabinet members.

The key lies in the progress of the Gaza ceasefire negotiations

The pressure on the governance of "reformist president" Pezeshiziyan is obvious. In the early morning of the day after his presidential inauguration, Hamas leader Haniyeh, who was invited to attend the ceremony, was assassinated in Tehran. This unexpected incident greatly increased the difficulty of Pezeshiziyan's governance, and his presidency can be said to have ushered in a "bad start". His slogans during the election to ease relations with the West and reform internal politics have encountered many obstacles in practice, and his chances of success are slim, at least for now.

The assassination of Haniyeh should be condemned, and Iran has enough reasons to retaliate against Israel. Moreover, Haniyeh was assassinated in a place controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. Therefore, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei quickly issued a warning of retaliation against Israel, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is very powerful in Iran, could not remain indifferent to this.

Pezehiziyan's attitude on whether to retaliate against Israel is relatively clear, that is, to avoid taking measures that may seriously escalate the situation. In fact, his proposition has a place in the Iranian political circle. After Haniyeh was assassinated, the Iranian people generally do not support pushing the country into a serious external confrontation. This is an important reason that cannot be ignored for Iran's delay in taking retaliatory actions.

However, if Iran cannot obtain satisfactory diplomatic gains from Israel and the United States, Iran's retaliation against Israel is still inevitable. This is the will of Iran's supreme leader and the proposition of the Revolutionary Guard.

Therefore, the negotiations on a ceasefire in the Gaza war promoted by the United States, Egypt and Qatar in recent days have become one of the key points regarding whether Iran will retaliate against Israel. If there is no ideal result, the day when Iran retaliates against Israel will be closer.

On the other hand, since the escalation of another round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict on October 7 last year, Israel has been claiming that it was Hamas, supported by Iran, that launched a surprise attack on Israel, and that it was Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi armed forces in Yemen, supported by Iran, that continued to attack Israel. Therefore, strangling Iran's various proxies in the Middle East one by one has become Israel's established policy, which has already involved a direct confrontation with Iran.

In fact, it was no accident that Israel bombed Iran's diplomatic mission in Syria on April 1 this year, and it was also Israel's deliberate assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. Israel is using various means to attack Iran's various proxies in the Middle East, and the ultimate goal is of course to weaken Iran.

How will the situation in the Middle East develop next? In my opinion, it does not depend on whether Iran will retaliate against Israel, but on whether Israel will continue to implement its policy of cracking down on Iran's various proxies. Unfortunately, until now, Israel has not found an effective way to make the country safer. Its absolute security concept itself can easily lead to its own insecurity.

(The author is a professor at the Institute of Middle East Studies, Shanghai International Studies University)

Author: Fan Hongda

Editor: Xu Fangqing