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written by new jersey

the full text is divided into four chapters. this is the fourth chapter, which includes three parts: battleship classification, signal transmission, and tracing the origin of trafalgar tactics.

four. battleship classification

at the beginning of the french revolution, the royal navy had as many as 146 battleships. at this time, the royal navy fleet classification standard still followed anson's three-tier system, that is, according to size, purpose and number of artillery, it was divided into battleships, cruisers and other small ships. this classification system continued until the end of the sailing warships.

first class battleship hms britannia

there are also clear classifications within various warships. a first-class ship generally refers to a warship with a registered number of 100 guns. , in 1792, the royal navy had 5 first-class ships. its crew usually reaches more than 800 people, and its tonnage usually exceeds 2,000 tons. the second-level ship refers to the 90-gun battleship. in 1792, nine such battleships were in service with the royal navy. they are simplified versions of expensive first-tier ships. therefore, compared with the first-level ships, the construction cost of the second-level ships is relatively low, but compared with the combat effectiveness, other warships still have an overwhelming advantage. at this time, most of the second-tier ships were 98-gun battleships. these two battleships usually served as the flagships of fleets and had three gun decks.

74-gun battleship spartan

the main force in naval battles is third-tier ships. when britain entered the war, there were 71 third-class ships in service. the most famous one is the famous 74-gun battleship. smaller 64-gun battleships were also included. 80-gun battleships later joined the ranks. these battleships had two gun decks, and some guns were sometimes installed on the forecastle. the royal navy believes that the 74-gun battleship has achieved a perfect combination of navigation capabilities and combat effectiveness. therefore, it is also the largest and most important battleship in the royal navy. the 80-gun battleship has strong combat effectiveness. most of them were repaired from french ships captured in naval battles, such as the battleship belle isle that followed collingwood into enemy lines at the battle of trafalgar. these 80-gun battleships have powerful firepower. after some battleships changed their armaments, the projection volume of many ships even exceeded that of some second-level ships. the 64 gunboat evolved from the old specification 60 gunboat. at this time, the 64 gunboats were already considered "too small and too weak" as a battleship, so they were not very active in the war.

although the projection volume of double-deck battleships continues to increase, the advantages of three-deck battleships are also very obvious. for example, "the light guns of large battleships can suppress small battleships, and all cannonballs can be shot down from above" and "the crew jumps from high places." it is much easier to get off a smaller warship than to climb up a larger warship from below." if it is in close combat and the lower deck artillery cannot be used, the firepower comparison of a three-deck warship to a double deck is "two decks. the gun deck is against one deck, not three against two." the generals at the time generally agreed with the conclusion that the combat effectiveness of a three-deck battleship is equal to that of two double-deck battleships, "even if the opponent is a powerful french 80-gun battleship."

since the seven years' war, fourth-tier ships have rarely appeared in battle lines as battleships. they usually serve in the royal navy as large cruise ships. the number of such warships in service is also very small. however, when necessary, such warships will also participate in fleet operations. the leander took part in the battle of the nile estuary under nelson's command.

36-gun cruiser euryalus (model)

the fifth-level and sixth-level ships have registered guns of 32 and 28 respectively, and serve as cruisers. their role is different from that of battleships, and they are usually used for reconnaissance and breaking diplomatic relations at sea. between 1793 and 1815, britain built 195 new cruising ships of various types

the actual number of guns carried by a battleship is generally not the same as the number of guns registered on the ship. as an 80-gun battleship, belle isle was actually armed with 30 32-pounder guns, 30 24-pounder guns, 18 9-pounder guns, 14 32-pounder carronade guns, and four 24-pounder carronade cannons. in the battle of trafalgar, the actual number of guns on the victory also reached 102. in addition, among 74-gun battleships, the lower decks are usually equipped with 32-pound guns, some smaller battleships are equipped with 18-pound guns on the upper deck, and larger battleships are equipped with 32-pound guns. this has led to the number of guns even being registered for ships of the same class. the actual combat effectiveness of battleships with the same number is different.

carronade is a mortar produced by the scottish carrone company. it has a short barrel, low muzzle velocity and short range. however, the low-velocity heavy projectiles it fires can cause large amounts of devastating hull fragments, consistent with the royal navy's close combat tactics. compared with cannons that fire shells of the same weight, carronades are lighter, so smaller warships can also be equipped with a large number of large-caliber carronades. the 44-gun cruiser indefatigable, which was transformed from a 60-gun battleship, has 26 24-pound guns, 12 12-pound guns, and 6 42-pound carronade guns. the victory is even equipped with a terrifying 64-pound caron gun. it can be seen that the high-bullet and heavy carronage gun greatly increases the projection volume of the battleship and improves the close combat capability of the battleship.

five. a brief introduction to signal transmission

fleet actions depended largely on whether the signal was delivered properly. generally speaking, the fleet commander hangs a signal flag on the flagship, and nearby frigates and squadrons will repeat the signal and pass it to warships further away. the 1689 anglo-dutch manual of signals was used in the british navy for a century. in this signal manual, the instructions and signal book are not arranged in a logical order, and many messages are not expressed in a clear way. it is easy to cause confusion during signal transmission. although admirals can temporarily add or agree with subordinates to express other messages to deal with anticipated tactical situations. but if the other party is not informed in advance, misunderstandings and confusion can result. some admirals will use similar signals and expect their subordinates to understand their intentions. in the battle of st. vincent, troubridge gave full play to his subjective initiative and completed the actions jervis tried to ask him to complete.

many generals tried to solve this problem. lord howe reworked the signal manual, greatly increasing the number of available signals and using some signals to express new maneuvering methods. lord howe attempted to use a complex signaling system to control the fleet more closely in order to carry out more complex tactical actions. in 1790, howe's signal manual was combined with a digital signaling system to make signaling and translation simpler and more efficient.

the most reliable semaphore signaling system in the napoleonic wars was invented by colonel popham in 1800 and was adopted unofficially as a supplement to the official signal book. it uses official digital flags to refer to letters, words, phrases and proper names in the vocabulary, and can be used to express any message. subordinate ships can now also send signals like a flagship. for the first time, the general could clearly state his intentions, and the captains could report their status at any time. nelson's fleet took this approach shortly before the battle of trafalgar. nelson's victory could therefore fly into the enemy lines with the signal flag "england expects all to do their duty".

prior to the introduction of the popham signal, the fleet commander had significantly less control over his fleet once entering battle. we can only rely on the degree of training of the fleet before the war to determine whether there is a tacit understanding between the warships and whether they can complete the fleet commander's vision. the popham signal allows the fleet commander to "micromanage" each ship to a certain extent.

however, nelson himself did not advocate sending too many signals during the battle. like jervis, he sought to produce better officers capable of executing more sophisticated tactics. he preferred to let his lieutenants and captains understand his tactics and intentions before the battle. during the battle of trafalgar, cuthbert collingwood said impatiently on the hms sovereign: "i hope nelson will not send more signals, we know what to do." it is a manifestation of this kind of thinking.

six. traceability of trafalgar tactics

on september 29, 1805, nelson's birthday, the captains held a dinner in nelson's honor. at the dinner, nelson introduced his latest tactics to the captains. nelson described this scene to lady emma hamilton: "when i introduced the 'nelsonian engagement' to them, they were like electric shocks, crying bitterly, and all agreed, thinking that this was a new excellence. tactics"

during the period of repair in england, nelson said to keats, the captain of the hms magnificent: "(if there are forty battleships in the fleet) i will divide the fleet into three squadrons, one of which will consist of the fastest 12 ships. to 14 battleships, the other battleships were divided into two battle lines, excluding one-third of their ships from the battle

the specific concept of tactics is deconstructed in great detail in sir julian s corbbet's "the battle of trafalgar" (ps: a masterpiece, highly recommended by the author). as can be seen, nelson's tactics have three elements. 1. engage the enemy with three fleets 2. cut off the battle line 3. lure the enemy into hiding your intentions, and then use rapid attacks to enter the melee.

none of the elements of nelson's tactics was his original creation. at the battle of camberdown, duncan attacked the dutch fleet with two columns. in the battle of st. vincent, jervis also split the fleet into three during the battle. nelson, who personally participated in this battle, was obviously deeply affected and thought it was "quite remarkable".

cutting off the battle line is an older tactic. george rodney used this tactic many times. rodney again used this tactic and defeated de grasse at the battle of the straits of saintes. many participants in this naval battle became nelson's close friends, such as rodney's deputy commander samuel hood (1st viscount hood), and william cornwallis (william cornwallis), who was a battleship captain at the time. cornwallis, and saumarez, then captain of the frigate, who was nelson's squadron commander at the battle of the nile.

melee is an even longer tradition. during the battle of quiberon in the seven years' war, hawke attempted to start a melee. jervis and edward locke served under hawke for a long time, and these two men also had a profound influence on nelson in the early and middle stages of his career. among them, jervis also raised the "close action" flag during the battle of st. vincent.

therefore, the core elements of the "nelsonian" approach to engaging the enemy were not his first creation. it was all something he had heard and seen in naval battles, or at least talked about it with his friends.

the tactical ideas nelson used at the battle of trafalgar had long existed in his mind. before the battle of the nile, on june 18, 1798, he wrote a memorandum: if the enemy does not form a line when i attack, then i will divide the fleet into three parts. the first, and most powerful, squadron was led by myself, and the other two squadrons were led by sommeliz and troubridge. each squadron will operate independently. it can be seen from this that

it was at this time that nelson began to envision decentralization and coordinated operations across multiple squadrons.

the concept of concentration of forces was also demonstrated in the battle of the nile. nelson wrote in the memorandum that he had hoped to launch a siege on the enemy's rear guard, but the reality did not allow him to do so, so he sent another signal to "engage the enemy's forward chinese army." bruyes's forward and center armies were devastated, while villeneuve was lucky enough to escape unscathed in this battle. after the amiens contract was torn up and nelson came to the mediterranean, he believed: "we must successfully suppress some of the enemy before they can reinforce them." "all warships should focus on the opponent's first six warships and pass through the battlefield as much as possible." line".

many of his ideas were put into practice at the battle of trafalgar.

the battle formation formulated by nelson was very different from the usual cruising formation. he believed that "the less maneuvers, the better." he could not forget the battle of hyères in 1795, commanded by hotham. during that battle, hotham spent much of his time switching fronts, allowing the french to escape. nelson was very worried about this. he said, "if lord hood were here, he would never let this happen."

the 1805 memorandum concluded that if a fleet had as many as 40 battleships, it would be difficult to form a traditional battle line. once a lot of time is wasted, it's hard to win a decisive victory. therefore, the navigation formation should also be a combat formation. once the enemy is discovered, immediately move forward to attack.

in the battle of st. vincent, the forward fleet did not receive orders from jervis. if nelson himself had not blocked the spaniards' way, the situation would have been very serious. therefore, although nelson adopted the new popham signaling system, he still did not have high hopes for semaphores. he clearly handed over the tactics to his subordinates. if the signal flag could not be seen on the smoke-filled battlefield, then they could proceed according to the plan. or, to quote another of his words, “a captain never makes a mistake if he lays his ship alongside the enemy to engage him.

perhaps, just as the famous flag slogan "england expects everyone to do their duty", nelson let his subordinates know what their responsibilities were and how they should perform them, instead of blindly following the flag flag on the flagship. this was the key to his victory.