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Key points

1. Russia's incomplete GLONASS is already at a disadvantage compared to NATO's massive satellite system, and the Russian military command structure requires strong battlefield information collection and analysis capabilities of grassroots units. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Russian military, with its low level of information technology, knew nothing about the Ukrainian attack on Kursk.

2. The Kursk region lacks large population centers, and the only large natural gas facility involves the interests of many European and Ukrainian energy giants. The Russian army has always been lucky about this and naturally will not defend it carefully.

3. After Prigozhin's "rebellion", Wagner's previous work on border defense and militia training in Kursk was suspended, and a large number of fortifications under construction were left unfinished. When Ukraine raided Kursk, there were neither main forces nor Wagner militia in the area, and the vast plains with no people for hundreds of miles allowed the Ukrainian army to move unimpeded for a time.

Text｜Ifeng.com Military Special Writer Major General Eugene

On August 6, 2024, the Ukrainian army launched an attack on Kursk with the strength of 6 brigades. The Russian border guards at more than a dozen checkpoints were defeated due to insufficient preparation. After that, the Ukrainian army was like an unmanned land, occupying a large area in the southwest of Kursk Oblast in a very short time.

The picture shows a Ukrainian T-72B3 main battle tank equipped with a protective roof driving quickly towards Kursk Oblast

Outside the front line, Ukraine's cyber warfare, information warfare and propaganda departments are in full swing, releasing false information on a large scale, such as: the Russian army surrendered as a whole, the Ukrainian army has occupied the Kursk nuclear power plant, and seized the Kursk industrial area.

On the one hand, these news created a great deal of chaos in the region, with fleeing residents, attacking Ukrainian troops and Russian troops rushing to the front line crowded together, causing the Russian Aerospace Forces to be cautious in ground support and causing a serious decline in the speed of Russian ground forces' reinforcement and encounter response. On the other hand, the hard work of the Ukrainian propaganda department also greatly boosted the confidence of Western countries and won Ukraine a large amount of aid.

On August 17, the Russian army dispatched 11 battalions to urgently reinforce Kursk.

Of course, what is more worthy of everyone's attention than online information is the battlefield situation. What caused Russia to be unprepared for the Ukrainian army's surprise attack? What caused the Russian army to deploy such a sparse defense here?

GLONASS VS NATO Satellite System

The most surprising thing about the Kursk Offensive was its suddenness. Before the Ukrainian army launched the offensive in Sumy Oblast, the Russian army's defense force in the area consisted of only one border defense regiment and the 144th Motorized Infantry Brigade, and the latter was mainly stationed at the airport in the south of the state and the capital area in the north. It can be seen that the Russian army was almost unaware of the upcoming surprise attack, and its troops and weapons and equipment were at an extreme disadvantage, so that it was very passive a week after the battle began.

The picture shows Russian soldiers captured in the Kursk region

Many people attribute this to the incompetence of the GLONASS system, but we first need to understand the function of the satellite system and the services it can currently provide. Although GLONASS is designed to be a global positioning system, the number of its launches and in-orbit satellites is actually quite limited, far less than the US GPS system.

The picture shows Russia's latest GLONASS-K2 navigation satellite

The range in which GLONASS can effectively cover and provide high-precision location information is basically limited to an oval area extending from Egypt in the south to central Germany in the west and to the Bering Strait in the east.

The Russian Army's T-90M main battle tank can be adapted to the GLONASS system (pictured is the interior of the T-90M tank)

Moreover, the Russian military's informatization is only popularized in the newly developed weapons and equipment after the military reform, such as the newly equipped brigade-level command system, T-72B3, T-90M main battle tanks and 2S19M, 2S35 self-propelled artillery, etc. After the outbreak of the conflict, a large number of old weapons, command vehicles and other equipment were basically not adapted to the GLONASS system.

The Russian military command structure also places high demands on the grassroots units’ battlefield information collection and analysis capabilities. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the border guards, which lack the GLONASS system and the 144th Brigade far from the border, knew nothing about the attack.

The picture shows the "Starlink" terminal equipped by the Ukrainian army

Of course, the Ukrainian army's strategy of direct surprise attack with almost no preparation for artillery and air support and no consideration for subsequent troop and resource replenishment can easily catch the defender off guard.

Unlike Russia, the Ukrainian army and NATO behind it have strong intelligence collection and processing capabilities. Dozens of satellite systems in NATO countries can provide decision-makers with comprehensive military information, and these systems are not necessarily for military use.

Europe's Galileo satellite navigation and positioning system consists of 30 satellites, including 24 working satellites and 6 backup satellites.

A typical example is that in the early stages of the conflict, the Ukrainian army repeatedly used NATO fire monitoring satellites to locate Russian artillery units in forest areas and used HIMARS rocket launchers to attack the Russian army, causing huge losses to the Russian army. In addition, Ukraine's cyber warfare capabilities should not be underestimated. Judging from the results announced by the Ukrainian army, they successfully hacked into multiple settlements, railways and urban monitoring systems in Kursk, and knew almost everything about the Russian troops marching along the main roads and their stationing locations.

The huge external support also allows Ukraine to continuously consume drones for tactical reconnaissance. In comparison, the Russian army is in a very passive situation, and this intelligence disadvantage cannot be changed in the short term.

Strategic carelessness and luck

Even if the Russian army is at a disadvantage in intelligence, it should not have a situation where a border state has less than 5,000 available troops. This is irresponsible to the people and is precisely due to the Russian decision-makers' mentality of taking chances.

The picture shows the route map of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines

Before the conflict broke out in 2022, one of the two major natural gas arteries from Russia to Europe was Nord Stream 2, and the other was the pipeline from Kursk through Ukraine to Eastern Europe.

The existence of this pipeline has enabled the Kursk region to host many European companies and offices. After the destruction of Nord Stream 2, this is the only functioning gas pipeline between Europe and Russia, in addition to the Russia-Turkey pipeline.

According to a report on the German magazine Der Spiegel's website on August 9, the Ukrainian army said it had taken control of a facility of Gazprom in Sudja, Kursk region.

From the perspective of economic, political and post-war interests, Europe is unlikely to allow the Ukrainian army to destroy or threaten the pipeline, and the energy giants within Ukraine obviously will not allow the army to threaten their future benefits.

The picture shows the Ukrainian flag raised after the Ukrainian army occupied Suja

Since the facility is not easily threatened and there are no large population centers nearby (the "strategic location" Sudja that the Ukrainian army captured in Kursk in a week is just a small town with a permanent population of less than 5,000), the Russian army will naturally not defend it carefully.

Therefore, since October 2023, the local garrison has only been these, with at most one or two mobilization brigades, logistics or medical units dispatched, and the local peak troop strength has almost never exceeded 8,000 people.

The birth and outbreak of hidden dangers

However, Kursk's defenses were not always so neglected. Between 2022 and 2023, fortification areas and artillery bunkers were built and excavated in the Kursk border area, but they were not garrisoned at all when they were breached by the Ukrainian army, and most of them were not even completed.

Pictured is a Russian trench in the Kursk region

The reason for this situation was last year's "Rostov-on-Don Incident", also known as the "Prigozhin Military Remonstration".

After the Battle of Bakhmut in 2023, the Wagner Mercenary Company suffered heavy losses, and its main force began to withdraw from the main battle zone and then entered the rear for replenishment and rest. During this period, the main business of the Wagner Company was to supervise the construction of border fortifications, train border militias, and conduct garrison defense.

However, with Prigozhin's "rebellion" on June 25, 2023, the military missions of Wagner troops in various places were stopped. Wagner was transferred to Belarus, and its previous border preparation and military training work was also abandoned.

The picture shows the Kursk militia trained by Wagner in memory of Prigozhin and Utkin

Because the Russian government was worried about the continuation of similar rebellions, many Wagner-trained militia defense forces were disbanded or deployed to non-critical areas. Therefore, without the main force or Wagner-trained militia guarding, the Kursk border was naturally deserted and full of loopholes.

In addition, the Ukrainian army's use of rocket launchers and tactical missiles to attack conscript training camps caused many casualties among conscripts.

On January 1, 2023, the Ukrainian army attacked a Russian camp in Makayevka where new recruits were being trained, causing hundreds of casualties.

In order to avoid similar non-combat casualties, the Russian army began to relocate the training facilities and garrisons of the conscripted soldiers inland. Although this can avoid casualties in non-frontal combat, it also caused a large number of fresh troops to be stationed far away from the border and unable to provide real-time support to the front line. It also caused a large number of troops to be monitored by satellites and monitoring systems on their way to the front line and destroyed on the march.

According to video statistics from various parties, at least two motorized infantry companies and one mixed platoon of the Russian Army suffered serious casualties and equipment losses on their way to the Kursk combat area due to intensive attacks from missiles and long-range rocket launchers and were forced to withdraw from the battle.

The picture shows a Russian military convoy heading to the Kursk frontline for support, suffering heavy casualties after being attacked by the Ukrainian HIMARS rocket launcher.

Ironically, the militia members trained by Wagner played a key role despite being far away from the established defense zone. Less than 700 Wagner militiamen in Suja held out for four days during the Ukrainian attack before they had to withdraw, and there were no large numbers of prisoners or deaths.

The militia at the southern checkpoint in Kursk Oblast cooperated with the border guards and police to successfully defeat the Ukrainian vanguard, causing the latter to misjudge the size of the Russian army and lose the possibility of threatening or even seizing the Kursk nuclear facilities by virtue of their speed and equipment advantages.

The picture shows a Ukrainian military officer (right) who was captured by Kursk militia.

In addition, a large number of militia members scattered around the country also attacked the Ukrainian army's small-scale fire reconnaissance units around their respective settlements, causing certain casualties and setbacks to the Ukrainian army's vanguard troops, and buying precious time for the 144th Brigade to advance and meet other reinforcements.

To sum up, the reason for the large-scale occupation of the southwestern part of Kursk Oblast was not the Russian army's ability, but the strategic misjudgment of the Russian government's top brass and the "mess" left over from the Wagner Rebellion.

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the formation of three new army groups on August 20. Russian Defense Minister Belousov said that the three army groups of "Kursk", "Belgorod" and "Bryansk" will be responsible for protecting the territory and people of these three regions. (Pictured is Russian Defense Minister Belousov)

Many commentators have pointed the finger at the new Defense Minister Belousov and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, but it is obvious that the misjudgment of the West did not come from these two people, but from the Kremlin and the State Duma. Of course, they do need to be held responsible for the Russian army's poor defense of Kursk after the Wagner issue and the problem of the deployment of combat troops too far back. However, compared with these, for the current Russian army, how to solve the serious lack of informationized combat capabilities and the flawed intelligence system of the troops since Shoigu's military reform is the top priority of all problems.