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Key points:

1. The Ukrainian troops that launched the offensive in the Kursk direction were not only equipped with a large number of Soviet weapons, but also equipped with a lot of Western weapons that had rarely appeared on the battlefield before. In addition, NATO also provided a lot of intelligence and tactical command support for the Ukrainian army's operation.

2. The Russian army in Kursk is weak, and in such an area that relies mainly on traditional railways for transportation, it is not easy to quickly mobilize heavy equipment to fight against the Ukrainian army. Therefore, at the beginning of the contact between the two sides, the Russian army used various long-range weapons including "Iskander" ballistic missiles, UMPK glide bombs and "Lancet" cruise missiles to attack, causing the Ukrainian army's personnel and heavy equipment losses to soar rapidly.

3. The probability of Russia using nuclear weapons in eastern Ukraine or Kursk is extremely small. Not only will a tactical nuclear strike fail to change the battlefield situation for the Russian army, but it will also face massive doubts and public pressure from both home and abroad. Russia will definitely not take such an action that does not make up for the gains.

Text｜Chen Mengbo, special military writer for Phoenix.com

For both Russia and Ukraine, maintaining a long front of more than 1,000 kilometers in eastern Ukraine and other places has almost exhausted the manpower and material resources of both sides. How could tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops march straight into the heart of Russia? Are Russian border troops really weak? What is the probability that Russia will use nuclear weapons?

Massive military support from the West

In July 2024, the Associated Press quoted Ukrainian officials as saying that Russia had made some progress in the eastern and southern parts of the 600-mile front in Ukraine, but insisted that "no major breakthroughs have been made and its progress has come at a high cost." Ukraine passed a bill to expand conscription in April, but as of mid-July, Ukrainian President Zelensky still complained in an interview about the lack of suitable training grounds in the country for new troops to complete training, and that 14 newly formed brigades had not yet received the weapons and equipment promised by the West.

The picture shows the Ukrainian Army's "Challenger"-2 main battle tank entering Kursk

However, according to battlefield reports from all sides, the Ukrainian troops launching operations in the Kursk direction used a large number of Soviet weapons, as well as a number of Western weapons that had rarely appeared on the battlefield before. For example, on August 15, the BBC and Sky News both claimed that the British-made Challenger-2 main battle tank appeared on the Kursk front.

The "Akhmat" rapid reaction special forces are affiliated with the Russian Federation National Guard and are deployed in the Chechen Republic of Russia. (The picture shows Major General Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat special forces)

On August 23, TASS quoted Major General Alauddinov, Deputy Minister of the General Military and Political Department of the Russian Armed Forces and commander of the Akhmat Special Forces, as saying that the Russian military used a drone worth only 60,000 rubles to destroy the French-made "Sidewinder" air defense missile system worth 8 million euros in Kursk.

The picture shows the Ukrainian army using the HIMARS rocket launcher system equipped with cluster warheads to destroy the bridge over the Seim River

Not to mention that in order to delay the Russian army's actions in Kursk, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed several bridges on the Seym River with the American-made HIMARS. The Russian side responded by hyping up the destruction of the M-270 self-propelled rocket launcher in the counterattack, but then the two sides quarreled over whether the destroyed targets were baits.

Compared with the open provision of weapons, NATO's deeper and more critical support for the Ukrainian army's operations in Kursk comes from the intelligence and even tactical command levels. On August 23, Reuters quoted NATO official sources, claiming that the night before, the Geilenkirchen Air Base had raised its security level "based on intelligence information showing potential threats." NATO early warning and reconnaissance aircraft from this base patrolled around Ukraine 24 hours a day, which was considered to be the key to ensuring that the Ukrainian army had a certain advantage in intelligence warfare and electronic warfare.

Western media such as Forbes claimed that the tactics of large-scale electronic suppression of the Russian army had been verified on the Kharkov front. (The picture shows the Ukrainian army using electronic warfare equipment to seize a complete Russian "Lancet" cruise missile)

In order to suppress the small number of drones deployed by Russia in the Kursk region, Ukraine, with the technical support of NATO, first carried out repressive interference on Russian reconnaissance platforms and the entire communication and command network around the designated combat area.

Since the Ukrainian army had intelligence and electronic warfare advantages in the Kursk direction and concentrated troops such as the 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades, the Ukrainian side clearly felt at the beginning of the operation that the Russian defenders in the Kursk direction did not seem to be prepared for defense.

On August 13, the Financial Times quoted a soldier from Ukraine's 82nd Air Assault Brigade as saying: "They (referring to the Russian army) were unarmed and did not expect us to come."

From August 7 to August 8, the Russian army used long-range weapons in the Kursk region to carry out precision strikes on NATO mine-protected vehicles, Stryker wheeled vehicles, Bradley fighting vehicles and Marder infantry fighting vehicles. (The picture shows a Marder infantry fighting vehicle locked by a Lancet cruise missile)

According to the footage taken by Ukrainian combatants, the mechanized formations of the Ukrainian army attacking the Kursk region included Soviet-made T-64BV and T-80BV main battle tanks, UR-77 minesweepers, IMR-2 tracked military engineering vehicles, BTR-80, American-made "Stryker", and German-made "Weasel", all heading towards the heart of Kursk. Compared with the Ukrainian army that was struggling to hold on on the Donetsk-Toretsk front in eastern Ukraine, which was interviewed by Reuters and the Financial Times, the treatment and equipment conditions were very different. Therefore, it is reasonable that the Ukrainian army, described by Western media as "the strongest and fastest", successfully entered Kursk in this attack.

How will the Russian army respond?

After the massive march into Kursk, the Ukrainian troops were not greeted by what they had expected. When the Financial Times and other media interviewed Ukrainian soldiers, they all said that the Russian army did not show up, at least not in the way they had expected.

Ukrainian cyber forces invaded the Russian railway system terminal from the Kursk railway port and launched a large-scale cyber attack.

The reason for this situation is that the Russian army is indeed weak in the Kursk direction. Moreover, for such an area with dense river networks and relying on railways for major transportation tasks, it is not easy for the Russian army to quickly mobilize heavy equipment to confront the Ukrainian army head-on.

The picture shows the Russian army using the "Iskander" ballistic missile to destroy the Ukrainian army's "HIMARS" rocket launcher in the Kursk area

In the weeks since the Ukrainian army entered Kursk, it seemed that it had always mastered the rhythm of the advance. However, while the Russian army did not recall its elite frontline troops from eastern Ukraine, it began to mobilize various long-range weapons in the direction of Kursk, from "Iskander" and UMPK glide bombs to "Lancet" cruise missiles, causing the Ukrainian army's equipment losses to soar rapidly.

On August 17, Forbes cited information from the Ukrainian General Staff and Oryx analysts, stating that Ukraine's attack group consisting of about six brigades, some independent battalions and support forces in the Kursk direction lost "a large number of precious armored vehicles" because the Ukrainian armored forces were exposed to Russian drones, artillery and anti-tank missile ambushes.

The picture shows the Ukrainian Army's "Challenger"-2 main battle tank in the Kursk direction being targeted by a Russian drone

According to an analyst at Oryx, Ukraine lost at least four tanks and 41 infantry vehicles in the first nine days of the invasion. The lost vehicles included a rare British Challenger 2 tank and several American Strykers. Last year, all 14 Challenger 2 main battle tanks provided by the UK were equipped to the 82nd Air Assault Brigade of Ukraine, but on the sixth day of Operation Kursk, the Russian army announced that it had ambushed a Ukrainian armored column with a Lancet cruise missile, and the Challenger 2 was destroyed.

The Russian army has an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in the number of various technical weapons. Although the concentration of electronic warfare and long-range firepower strike platforms by both sides in the Kursk direction will have an adverse impact on their own operations on major fronts such as eastern Ukraine, in comparison, the difficulty and impact of Russia's mobilization are relatively small. It's just that such concentration and mobilization will take considerable time.

(Photo) Prior to this, Yevkurov was mainly responsible for Russia's military contacts and cooperation with African countries. This personnel appointment also shows that Russia does not want the Kursk attack and defense to affect its operations in eastern Ukraine.

On August 20, Russian Defense Minister Belousov announced the formation of a "Coordination Committee" headed by Deputy Defense Minister General Yevkurov, which is responsible for military and security issues in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts. It is said that Yevkurov has now arrived in Kursk Oblast.

In addition, the Russian side announced that Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Bliga will be responsible for solving logistics, transportation and assisting civil authorities in evacuating civilians in the coordination committee, Deputy Defense Minister Fradkov will be responsible for engineering and construction, and three new army structures will be established in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod. The undesignated commander of the new army and the undesignated representative of the Russian General Staff will be jointly responsible for the construction of Kursk's anti-UAV air defense system.

August 9. Russian mechanized forces reinforce the Kursk front area.

Although there was a lack of large-scale Russian military deployment in the Kursk region before, the construction of future combat systems and logistics issues will still plague the Russian army for a long time, but it is not appropriate to deny that the Russian military's combat effectiveness is "poor" because of this.

The Russian National Defense Control Center has set up a special working group to solve the problems of supply and technical weapons deployment in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod. These actions are in line with Russia's existing military mobilization system, indicating that the Russian army is trying to use superior artillery, aviation and other long-range strike platforms to consume the Ukrainian troops entering Kursk without withdrawing frontline troops in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, combat units are drawn from second-line troops such as overseas enclaves such as Kaliningrad, Crimea and the eastern Ukrainian front to be sent to the vicinity of Kursk.

Will the Russian army use nuclear weapons?

Judging from the current battlefield situation, the Russian army will almost certainly choose to first use concentrated artillery, aviation and a large number of suicide drones and cruise missiles to attack the Ukrainian army's technical weapons in Kursk, while targeting Ukraine's logistics supply lines with long-range strike platforms, preventing the Ukrainian army from expanding its occupied areas through air blockades, and buying time for the subsequent Russian army to concentrate superior forces and launch a counterattack. This tactic has already achieved results, and the Russian side has begun to announce that it has control over the situation in Kursk.

The picture shows the Russian military's FAB-500 bomb equipped with a guided glide kit

If the Russian army launches a counterattack in the next step, it is likely to "repeat the old tricks" and launch the same tactics used in the previous offensive in eastern Ukraine, using thermobaric bombs in combination with 1.5-ton or even 3-ton glide bombs to clear out the Ukrainian defense support points in the direction of Kursk, and then launch an attack with small groups of infantry supported by armored vehicles and artillery. However, the difference from the eastern Ukrainian front is whether the Ukrainian army can quickly build a defense line in the Kursk-controlled area that can partially offset the Russian army's firepower advantage, and whether it can limit the Russian army's firepower advantage with artillery and air defense equipment provided by the West.

The Russian Iskander ballistic missile deployed in Belarus has tactical nuclear strike capability

It is said on the Internet that Russia may use nuclear weapons in eastern Ukraine to force the Ukrainian army to withdraw from Kursk. In my opinion, this possibility is very small. At present, the Russian army has successively captured strategic locations such as Red Army Village and New York Town in eastern Ukraine, opening up the situation for the next westward movement. If tactical nuclear weapons are used now, it will not only not bring any changes to the battlefield situation, but also give others a handle in the international community. What's more, similar remarks about the use of nuclear weapons in Kursk are nonsense. If it comes true, putting aside the struggle between Russia and Ukraine in the direction of Kursk, the massive domestic public opinion pressure will overwhelm the government and the military. Russia will definitely not take such a loss-making action.

According to Bazaar, one of the rails was found damaged by unidentified persons at the 28th kilometer of the Love-Souza railway.

However, compared with the Ukrainian army, which relies on the road network for replenishment, the Russian army uses the powerful railway network in Kursk to mobilize heavy equipment and organize logistics supply networks around Kursk, and its transportation capacity is much higher than that of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian army failed to break into the Kursk nuclear power plant, which also enabled the Russian army to continue to use this energy supply station.

The only thing that is beneficial for the Ukrainian army to maintain a long-term presence in Kursk is the agricultural area. More than 70% of the land in the province is agricultural land, but in the long run, it is almost impossible for Ukraine to build a defense line similar to the eastern Ukraine in Kursk, because the area controlled by the Ukrainian army lacks a large number of large residential areas and does not have enough mechanical engineering equipment and materials to call on.

Therefore, after the Ukrainian army seized territory with small NATO-style battle groups, although it once claimed to build fortifications and defense lines, it soon stopped doing so and chose to use the long-range strike platforms provided by NATO to destroy the bridges on the Seym River that might be used by the Russian army.

The picture shows Ukrainian soldiers captured by the 810th Marine Infantry Brigade and the "Akhmat" Battalion of the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet Marine Guards

Of course, this concentration on artillery and other long-range strike means has had a significant negative impact on the Ukrainian army's defense in eastern Ukraine. On August 23, the Associated Press interviewed a battalion commander of the 47th Brigade of Ukraine, saying that "poorly trained recruits led to the loss of territory on the eastern front of Ukraine" and "some people did not want to shoot." But even the 47th Brigade of the Ukrainian Army has been transferred to Kursk. How to maintain the next line of defense has indeed become a problem that is known to the West and Ukrainians, but no one is willing to talk about it too much.