After the Battle of Kursk, the situation of "can't win, can't afford to lose, can't reach an agreement" may continue
2024-08-20
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At present, there are different opinions among all parties on the strategic intentions, future trends and final impact of this battle. It is necessary to objectively analyze the impact of the Battle of Kursk on the "end game" of the Ukrainian crisis.
It has been nearly half a month since Ukraine launched a surprise attack on Russia's Kursk region, and both sides have different views on the relevant results.
Ukrainian President Zelensky said that the Ukrainian army has captured more than 1,250 square kilometers of land in the Kursk region and controlled 92 settlements. Data released by the Russian Ministry of Defense on August 18 showed that the Ukrainian army lost more than 300 people and 6 tanks in the Kursk direction the day before. In the entire battle in Kursk Oblast, the Ukrainian army has lost more than 3,460 troops and 50 tanks. At present, all parties have different opinions on the strategic intentions, future trends and final impact of this battle. It is necessary to objectively analyze the impact of the Battle of Kursk on the "endgame" of the Ukrainian crisis.
The Ukrainian military said that the Ukrainian army is continuing to advance on Russian territory. Source: GJ
First, Ukraine "opened another front" to break the battlefield pattern of "Russia attacking Ukraine defending". Since the beginning of this year, as Ukraine's counter-offensive did not achieve the expected results, "Russia attacking Ukraine defending" on the Donetsk front has become the basic pattern of the battlefield. From the perspective of strategic intentions, Ukraine is trying to delay the Russian offensive in the Donetsk direction militarily, and politically force the United States and Europe to acquiesce in the fact that the weapons aided to Ukraine are used in Russia, breaking the argument that Ukraine will become a "sacrifice" of the US election, psychologically curbing Ukraine's unilateral pessimism of "trading territory for peace", and increasing Europe's confidence in continuing to aid Ukraine. Regardless of whether all of the above-mentioned goals can be achieved in the end, it is undeniable that Ukraine has carefully planned and long-term prepared to launch a surprise attack on the Kursk region, and maintained harassment of Russian border areas such as Bryansk and Belgorod, which has indeed reversed the previous relatively passive defensive situation to a certain extent, and also shows that under the influence of fighting will and external support, it is difficult for the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield to have a real "one-sided" pattern in the short term.
Second, the awareness of the "red line" of all parties still exists, and the risk of escalation of the war is controllable. Although Zelensky claimed that the raid on the Kursk region led to the collapse of Russia's so-called "red line" concept, in fact, all parties have been restrained in their characterization and response to the campaign, and even maintained a certain degree of tacit understanding, deliberately downplaying the breakthrough that "the war extended to Russian territory." Ukraine called the relevant actions an "active defensive strategy", Russia insisted on characterizing Ukraine's cross-border harassment as "terrorist activities", and the United States and Europe tried their best to clarify their position of "not knowing and not participating." From this point of view, all parties retain vague interpretation space and policy flexibility, and the awareness of the "red line" to avoid conflicts between Russia and NATO still exists.
The Sumy region of Ukraine was attacked by missiles on the 17th. Source: GJ
Third, how to maintain strategic focus and overcome the "dilemma" is the key to gaining an advantage. At present, both Russia and Ukraine have maintained strategic focus on the Battle of Kursk. Russia did not follow Ukraine's "encircle Wei to save Zhao" idea and urgently transferred troops from the Donetsk front to defend. Instead, it mainly used reserve forces to prevent Ukraine from advancing into the Russian depths and used air superiority to attack the Ukrainian army's logistics supply. Ukraine adhered to the strategy of "exchanging territory for territory" and set up a military command office in Kursk to take steady steps. However, whether holding the Russian border area dominated by "non-pro-Ukrainian forces" and limited in area can make up for the strategic value of the lost positions on the Donetsk front is a question that Ukraine must weigh. Russia's insistence on the "frontline priority" strategy in eastern Ukraine may lead to a longer struggle and resource allocation to retake Kursk, and the pressure at the political, diplomatic and public opinion levels will also increase day by day. Therefore, how to maintain strategic focus and dynamically adapt to battlefield changes, while solving the dilemma of "wanting both", is a major problem facing both Russia and Ukraine.
Fourth, local offense and defense can hardly change the general direction of the "Palestinian-Israeli" crisis. The upcoming US election is one of the variables in the Ukrainian crisis, but it is not a sufficient condition for achieving peace. Even if the new president will not provide aid to Ukraine on the original scale and in the same way, the pressure from within the party, between parties and allies will not allow Ukraine to become a "discarded child". "Ukraine failure" will also lead to serious doubts about the ability of the transatlantic relationship to provide security guarantees for the surrounding areas. Europe will step up its planning of aid plans for Ukraine "without the United States" or "weak America", steadily advance the process of localization of defense procurement, and further break through legal disputes to use frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine.
More importantly, as of the end of May this year, nearly 100,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory were under Russian control, close to 18% of Ukraine's total territory. According to relevant statistics, the total number of casualties on the battlefields of Russia and Ukraine has exceeded 600,000, and changes in local battle lines are unlikely to reverse this basic fact. Therefore, under the influence of external factors, the Ukrainian crisis has a window period to enter the "second half" of political engagement and military struggle, but the basic position of both sides of "not making concessions, not refusing negotiations, and not accepting pressure" is difficult to change, and it is also difficult to find a compromise solution on issues such as territorial sovereignty. The normal state of "not being able to win, not being able to lose, and not being able to reach an agreement through negotiations" may continue.
Produced by Deep Sea Studio
Written by Zhao Long (Deputy Director and Researcher of the Institute of Global Governance, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies)
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