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[Text/Observer Network columnist Dang Haonan]

On the morning of August 6, the Ukrainian army launched an offensive from the northern Sumy region towards Russia's Kursk Oblast. Within a few days, the Ukrainian army achieved significant results and currently controls hundreds of square miles of Russian territory, resulting in the emergency evacuation of 76,000 residents of the state. At the same time, the Russian president announced that the three states bordering Ukraine had entered a "counter-terrorism state." The Russian army responded relatively slowly and has not yet launched a large-scale counterattack.

It has to be said that the Ukrainian army's surprise attack was unexpected in the two years when the Russian-Ukrainian front had not changed much and was actually in a stalemate. At the same time, this battle was significantly different from previous attacks by the Ukrainian army that infiltrated into Russian territory:

1. This attack was carried out by the Ukrainian regular army. All previous cross-border attacks were carried out by Russian armed groups such as the "Free Russian Legion" supported by Ukraine. At that time, Ukraine had stated that it would not send its own ground forces to attack the Russian mainland.

2. The scale is large. Previously, only a few hundred people infiltrated the Russian border, but this time the Ukrainian army dispatched several brigades, possibly with as many as 10,000 regular troops, carrying heavy weapons.

3. The results of the battle are quite significant. Unlike previous small-scale skirmishes on the border, the Ukrainian army has entered 30 kilometers into the Russian mainland in this battle and invaded the town of Sudja with 4,000 residents. It is estimated that the Ukrainian army may have controlled nearly 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory.

Overall, this unexpected campaign was well organized and planned for a long time, successfully concealed its tactics, and had clear political and military purposes. In addition, the battle site was also the site of the famous Battle of Kursk in world military history, so it might as well be called the Battle of Kursk 2.0. The following article will analyze the current political and military game between Russia and Ukraine from a historical comparative perspective.

What are the Ukrainian army’s strategic goals?

The tactical effect of this Ukrainian offensive is quite significant. Compared with the counterattack in the summer of 2023, which only recaptured 400 square kilometers of land in the months of counterattack, now more than 1,000 square kilometers of enemy territory have been controlled in just one week. But will the Ukrainian army stick to the spot next, or continue to expand the victory? As time goes by, the Russian army's counterattack forces will increase, and the difficulty of conducting defensive operations on enemy territory is obviously higher than that of the Ukrainian army sticking to the Donbass defense line.

If the Ukrainian army wants to continue to advance, there are two possible directions. Route 1 is the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, one of the largest nuclear power plants in Russia, and Route 2 is the capital of Kursk Oblast. If the nuclear power plant can be taken, it will undoubtedly be a major breakthrough, because of the special nature of the nuclear power plant. Once it falls into the hands of the Ukrainian army, it will be difficult for the Russian army to attack the area again in order to avoid ecological disasters. Route 2 is the city of Kursk, which is farther away, but it is also a goal of great political significance. Since the Russian army launched the "special military operation" in 2022, it has actually only occupied the capital of Kherson Oblast, Ukraine, and gave it up in the subsequent retreat.

No matter which target is chosen, it will be extremely difficult for the Ukrainian assault force of only a few thousand people. Ukraine achieved the tactical assault goal when the Russian army was unprepared and there were only a small number of non-frontline troops on the border. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that if the Ukrainian army continues to attack, the resistance to counterattack will increase every day. In addition, as the supply line is extended, the possibility of being cut off by the Russian army will also increase.

Here we can make a prediction based on the current situation. The Ukrainian army will most likely advance to a safe distance from the border, and the farthest point of this advancement is unlikely to reach the nuclear power plant or the city of Kursk. After that, the Ukrainian army should hurry up to prepare for defensive operations. Given that the area is Russian territory, if it cannot be recovered as soon as possible, the political damage to the Russian side will be great, and it may also face greater public pressure, so the Russian army may counterattack at all costs. Under the current circumstances, the Russian army, which has not completely solved the dilemma of insufficient manpower, may have to withdraw front-line troops from the battlefield, which will reduce the pressure on the Ukrainian army in the Donbas region. If the Ukrainian army can hold the area, holding Russian territory will become a bargaining chip in the possible future Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire negotiations.

The Battle of Kursk and the Current Russo-Ukrainian War

At present, the contact line between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in eastern Ukraine is as long as 1,200 km. Although neither side can completely take the initiative at any point of engagement, Russia focuses on attacking and advancing slowly, while Ukraine has adopted a defensive stance across the board after its fruitless counterattack in the summer of 2023. From the perspective of the environment outside the battlefield, Russia's arms supply is relatively stable, especially with a high rate of localization, so it does not need to rely on others. It can basically produce as much as it needs and produce more of the most useful ones.

Ukraine has also achieved certain results with the Western military aid and weapons in its hands. However, as the US election is approaching and Trump's "homecoming group" is likely to enter the White House, it cannot be ruled out that Western countries will have major changes in their aid to Ukraine. Given Ukraine's current defense industry capabilities, if Western aid cannot arrive on time and in quantity, the battlefield confrontation situation may deteriorate sharply. It is also for the above reasons that there has been a recent argument in the outside world that "Ukraine is slowly losing the war."

The anxiety about the uncertainty of Western military aid and the difficulty in stopping the steady advance of Russian troops on the Donbass front have forced Ukraine to take the initiative and use limited military resources to try to shake Russia politically while also showing it to its Western allies.

Ukraine should have known about the weak defense of the Russian army in the Kursk direction earlier, but the large-scale attack of the Ukrainian army on the Russian mainland would have too much impact on all parties, so it was delayed until now. For Ukraine, it is crucial to maintain a balance, that is, to embarrass Russia politically through such a "not very harmful but very insulting" raid, while trying not to over-stimulate the Russian people and avoid making them feel nervous that war is approaching and they must defend their country at all costs.

For Russia, this attack also exposed many problems. For example, at the beginning of the battle, the Ukrainian army captured dozens of Russian soldiers at one time. Another example was that some soldiers retreated without fighting. It seems that the quality of the border garrison and the Russian army on the Donbas front is far behind.

This may be because Russia still only sends contract soldiers to the front line, and a large number of conscripts remain in the country according to the law. It seems that the difference between contract soldiers and conscripts is not just "whether they can be sent to the front line", but there is a big gap between the two in terms of training level, equipment level, and alert status. To some extent, Russia, which has experienced several rounds of mobilization and recruitment, has not yet gotten rid of the problem of insufficient manpower (real combat effectiveness).

Recently, the Russian president instructed the Federal Security Service (FSB) to coordinate the "anti-terrorist operations" in the Kursk region, while the Russian troops that should have taken the lead were only given the opportunity to "play auxiliary". After the Wagner rebellion broke out in June last year, the author wrote an article pointing out that Wagner's record was not due to any magical generals, but was completely based on "peers", and Prigozhin's brazen rebellion would hardly end well, and the so-called "Belarusian president mediation" was just a smokescreen to cover up the political struggle; Sure enough, within two months, Prigozhin crashed strangely, and Wagner almost disappeared from the Ukrainian battlefield. However, the Russian military high-level officials who were roared and denounced by Prigozhin also experienced a major earthquake this year. First, Defense Minister Shoigu was transferred, and then a large number of senior officials were investigated for corruption. It seems that it will take some time for the Russian army to truly cure the poison and revive its military prestige.

Battle of Kursk in history

If today's battle is Kursk 2.0, then by comparing it with the historical Battle of Kursk, perhaps we can gain some experience and inspiration.

In 1943, the Soviet-German battlefield was still undecided. The German army had recovered from the disastrous defeat in Stalingrad and was planning to launch an offensive to regain the initiative in the war. The Soviet High Command had learned through intelligence and battlefield reconnaissance that the German army seemed to be planning to launch an offensive in the direction of Kursk. The German army's usual tactic was to use armored assault clusters to launch a pincer attack and eat up the surrounded Soviet army in one bite.

Therefore, the Soviet army especially strengthened the anti-tank forces on both wings of Kursk, and secretly mobilized a large number of troops as a reserve counterattack force. In the end, the German army "according to plan" hit the dense anti-tank defense line of the Soviet army. After the German armored forces were greatly consumed for more than ten days, the Soviet tank troops launched a counterattack and recaptured Belgorod (now in the "anti-terrorist state" together with Kursk Oblast) and Kharkov (now Ukrainian territory) in one fell swoop. At this point, the Battle of Kursk, in which both sides mobilized a total of more than two million troops, came to an end, and the German army lost the initiative on the battlefield forever.

In terms of war intensity and historical significance, the current Kursk battle is obviously not comparable to the 1943 battle. But it is worth noting that both the Soviet army of that year and the Ukrainian army today successfully concealed their strategic intentions before the battle broke out. At the same time, they played to their strengths and avoided their weaknesses - the Soviet army took advantage of its numerical superiority and intelligence to gain the upper hand, while the Ukrainian army took advantage of the enemy's defense loopholes, squeezed out limited troops, and attacked unexpectedly.

The Ukrainian army has achieved a tactical success that has inspired itself, and it can be expected that no matter when the Russian army recaptures the lost territory, it will seem politically embarrassing. However, the Battle of Kursk is unlikely to become a "strategic turning point" like in 1943, and peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will not come any faster.

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