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【text/observer network columnist yan mo】

as soon as the "low-tech terrorist attack" in lebanon occurred, the shockwaves were transmitted to east asia. from the perspective of both sides of the taiwan strait, there are two main issues: in terms of supply chain security, the main concern in the past was "chain break", and now there is also the concern of "weaponization". will this incident have a profound impact on the development of the region's technology manufacturing industry? this is the first issue. if taiwan becomes an accomplice to terrorist attacks, or has already become an accomplice and will become a normalized accomplice in the future and be retaliated against, how should the mainland authorities deal with the changes? this is the second issue.

in the past, it was unthinkable to plant mines in the supply chain for the information and communications electronics manufacturing industry, which is the mainstay of cross-strait trade. if this link is weaponized as hostility between the two sides continues to rise, the consequences will be disastrous, even if it is just a single terrorist attack.

yes, the chances are low, but mossad has captured our imagination. yes, israel has not admitted guilt, but it has not denied it either.

who is laying mines in the supply chain?

in the current case, the taiwanese manufacturer golden apollo pushed the issue aside, saying that it was just a licensed trademark (commonly known as oem), and that the design and manufacturing were not done in taiwan, but by the hungarian company bac. if this is true, then the problem is bigger than imagined - is the oem phenomenon a huge security loophole?

oem is a common phenomenon in the industry, but generally speaking, the original manufacturer will provide key materials or parts, and the buyer will assemble the finished product. this is to save shipping costs or avoid taxes. pure authorization without providing materials and parts is rare because it involves brand reputation and legal issues. pure authorization by the original manufacturer requires full trust and understanding of the buyer, or the original manufacturer can only survive by selling trademarks.

although golden apollo was small (it had only 40 employees), it was far from having to rely on selling trademarks to survive. moreover, the licensing fee for a pager in this case was only $15, and hezbollah only ordered 5,000 units, so the business was too small to be worth mentioning.

so, does jin apollo know the current situation of bac? obviously not. after the incident, bac was found to be a shell company, and the hungarian government also denied that bac had a factory in the country. this means that jin apollo handled trademark authorization very casually, and it was easy for the buyer to put explosives in the product. whether this phenomenon is a common phenomenon in cross-strait information and communication product trade is worth further investigation.

xu qingguang, chairman of the golden apollo company, issued a statement to the media, saying that the pager used in the lebanon explosion was not produced in taiwan. video screenshot

furthermore, from a legal perspective, it is impossible for golden apollo to stay out of it, because the authorization needs to comply with the information security management measures and the cmmc standard (cybersecurity maturity model certification).

according to the law, there must be strict management procedures and risk assessments between the authorized manufacturer and the buyer. the authorized manufacturer has the right and obligation to monitor the buyer's design and manufacturing process to prevent the buyer from violating international sanctions or using the products for military purposes. however, jin apollo was obviously unaware of the regulations or basically ignored them. after the incident, it could not produce any relevant contract terms to shirk its responsibility and prove that it complied with safety procedures.

in other words, the lebanese government has every right to prosecute king apollo, and should do so, allowing international judicial bodies to investigate.

ironically, the "low-tech public attack" incident immediately gave the us "clean network" advocates the opportunity to emphasize its rationality, while taiwan, which joined this initiative, aroused doubts about "uncleanliness". this is another possibility, that is, as the taiwan "ministry of economic affairs" claimed, the golden apollo pagers were manufactured in taiwan, but were not exported to lebanon, and "made in taiwan" did not have the possibility of causing casualties due to explosions.

the statement of the taiwan "ministry of economic affairs" contradicts that of golden apollo. the latter wants to completely distance itself from the issue, while the former admits that it is made in taiwan, but "modified after export." this contradiction shows that the taiwan authorities do not want the international community to suspect that taiwanese products are "not clean," while golden apollo's "oem" statement highlights the major security loopholes of taiwanese products.

i personally doubt the claim that the "murder weapon" was modified overseas. i tend to think that the explosive was placed during the production process, because modifying 5,000 pagers is not a small project. therefore, the key point is where the production site is, which is still a mystery. i don't quite understand why the lebanese government has not yet released the import information. it should not be difficult to find the crime scene based on this information.

there must be an answer to the question of whether taiwan is an accomplice to terrorism, because following the thinking of the "clean network", public opinion quickly linked the "low-tech terrorist attack" incident to mainland china, even though the mainland had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks in lebanon.

who is "dirty"? taiwan is the suspect, but some people want to take this opportunity to throw shit at the mainland. although this move is despicable, it is worth the mainland authorities to re-examine the security loopholes in cross-strait information and communication trade.

what the mainland needs to be vigilant about is that taiwan, the united states and its allies are increasingly attaching importance to scientific and technological cooperation. israeli parliamentarians visited taiwan in april this year, and publicly stated that their purpose was to use each other's industrial advantages to deepen the partnership. this fact was also taken into account in the list of sources of this terrorist attack. some people questioned that according to the time sequence, this cannot be ruled out as a terrorist attack in cooperation between taiwan and israel. even if taiwan did not know the purpose of israel's industrial cooperation, it was also an unwitting accomplice.

since the suspect israel has set a precedent, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the united states will cooperate with taiwan to launch various "attacks" on the mainland through supply chain channels. even if it does not follow this path, according to the "clean network" thinking, taiwan can also use this incident as an opportunity to launch a new supply chain transfer plan, forcing taiwanese businessmen to withdraw their investments in the mainland, accelerating the "de-chinaization of industries", and further disrupting the mainland's investment environment.

i have always advocated that the cause of unification should be embedded in china's development track. in the past, some people may have thought that these were two different things, or just a matter of sequence. now mossad has provided an imagination. from the perspective of cross-strait supply chain security, taiwan-us cooperation is destructive to the development of the mainland, and it can be immediate. there will definitely be bad elements who want to take advantage of the global supply chain panic caused by mossad, use taiwan's industry as leverage, worsen cross-strait relations, and hinder the development of the mainland.

in addition to supply chain security, another level of question is - if taiwan is retaliated against, how should the mainland respond?

if china taiwan becomes an accomplice of terrorist attacks

the "taiwan independence" authorities reacted to this incident in a low-key manner, denying it flatly and using a small effort to divert attention, which in turn aroused suspicion, because this is a characteristic of complicity.

public opinion has warned at the first time that it is very dangerous to be involved in the chaos in the middle east. the taiwan authorities should solemnly refute their relationship with terrorist attacks and produce evidence to set the record straight, otherwise there is a possibility of retaliation. especially considering that there are many muslim foreign workers in taiwan, it is difficult to predict whether israel’s current actions will arouse the indignation of muslims in taiwan and attack taiwanese society.

however, lai ching-te did not realize the potential seriousness of this incident, or the united states did not want its accomplices to make mistakes due to "talking too much" because taiwan and the united states may both be accomplices.

frankly speaking, it is hard for me to imagine that muslim foreign workers would attack taiwanese society. they are all hardworking people who come to taiwan to make money. there is no need for asian muslims to risk their lives for middle eastern muslims in terrorist attacks. this is not the middle east. however, the golden apollo company is located in the area where i have lived for more than 20 years. there are indeed muslim foreign workers in the industrial zone. if someone sponsors them to do something, the probability cannot be said to be zero.

golden apollo corporation located in the far east world center park in xizhi, new taipei city

if a "golden apollo attack" were to occur, no matter how minor the incident was, it would inevitably attract international attention, and the mainland authorities would face at least two problems:

1. the taiwan independence authorities will inevitably frame the mainland as the mastermind behind the incident in order to further deepen the plot of "internationalization of the taiwan issue". how can the mainland solve this problem?

second, the international community recognizes that taiwan is a part of china. if taiwan becomes an accomplice to terrorist attacks and is retaliated against, should china condemn the muslims or the us-israel complicity structure?

if we treat taiwan as an "outsider" and separate it from others, we will fall into the trap of "one". if we treat taiwan as one of our own and accept it as a whole, we will have to solve the problem of "two".

the answer is obvious. the mainland will inevitably label the "taiwan independence" authorities as a "rebel group to be dealt with" and taiwan as a "rebel province to be recovered", and call for "unification and quelling of rebellion" as a response to the international community. only in this way can the above two problems be solved.

in addition, if taiwan becomes the "israel of china" and begins to use the supply chain to infiltrate, alienate, and sabotage the mainland in various ways, resulting in loss of life and property of the mainland people, even if the degree is limited to harassment, how should china respond or prevent it?

it is true that taiwanese are relatively moderate, taiwanese independence activists are far less capable than jews, and cross-strait hatred is far from comparable to that in the middle east. the probability of the above-mentioned extreme situations occurring is very low, but the precedent set by mossad is not just a "low-tech terrorist attack." it has inspired the possibility of "weaponization of civilian supplies." if someone really wants to do something wrong, they can also target the food supply chain. the imagination space is enormous.

it is important to know that it is difficult to make friends, but it is much easier to make enemies. "taiwan independence" may not need to create a terror atmosphere on both sides of the taiwan strait, but only needs to breed hatred and distrust bit by bit. over time, it will be the winner. at the very least, it can completely offset the mainland's integration policy.

conclusion

it is really unexpected that the chaos in the middle east has been transmitted to east asia in this form. east asia is now a major manufacturing base for electronic consumer products and a relatively peaceful and prosperous region in the world. everyone is working hard to develop, and similar terrorist attacks are also decreasing. therefore, we must do our utmost to prevent terrorism from entering the country no matter what.

there is no state terrorism in east asia, but taiwan may be a candidate. the current "taiwan independence" forces have long been thinking about developing militia organizations, but the united states obviously does not support it, so it has not taken shape. however, we do not know whether this plot has been concealed and is waiting for the right time.

from a certain perspective, the policy of peaceful reunification and integration is to prevent the emergence of terrorist organizations in taiwan after reunification. although militia organizations are not tolerated at home and abroad at present, we will inevitably witness the emergence of various cultural products that amplify hostility and accumulate into fertile ground for terrorism during lai ching-te's rule.

the issue of the possible weaponization of the supply chain can no longer be avoided. relevant industries on both sides of the taiwan strait must enhance security measures. because the mainland is moving towards an open path, risk factors will increase accordingly. in addition to boosting the economy, we must face up to security issues and prevent them before they occur.

things like what happened to hezbollah and innocent lebanese civilians must never happen where we live.