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after completing its overseas deployment cycle, the uss eisenhower of the u.s. navy has returned to its base in the country for rest and recuperation. the aircraft carrier has been wandering around the red sea for more than six months, escorting israel, but ultimately failed to keep the red sea route open. in early september, an american reporter interviewed the captain of the aircraft carrier, hill, hoping that he could give a summary of the red sea operations, but captain hill could not say anything. i think there are reasons for military confidentiality and also reasons for the frustration of the battle. they couldn't find an opponent who could make them feel refreshed, and they didn't use the naval warfare mode familiar to the u.s. navy. of course, this battle was very awkward.

according to him, before october 7 last year, the crew had been looking forward to disembarking and resting, either to the mediterranean or to a port in the north sea of ​​the united kingdom, and then preparing for nato exercises. but after the outbreak of operation al-aqsa flood, the eisenhower had to give up resting and re-enter the deployment state and rush to the eastern mediterranean. at that time, the eisenhower did not know who it would fight.

for the next six months, the eisenhower was adrift on the sea. only two ports could provide supplies. the morale of the crew was declining. captain hill had to repeatedly remind the crew that this mission was just a deterrent, not an exciting battle. he specifically told reporters that if you look at the problem from a microscopic perspective, this mission was a success.

the reporter asked hill, "people are concerned about whether the uss eisenhower can intercept all drones or missiles and prevent them from slipping through the net." this was obviously a question about the rumor that the uss eisenhower was hit. hill did not give a direct answer, saying that we should not indulge in such rumors. he has arranged for deep defense of multiple warships and sent early warning aircraft into the air for uninterrupted patrols.

it can be seen that the captain's experience during the entire deployment can be described as helpless. the houthis have almost no naval power, and can only use various forms of anti-ship missiles or suicide drones. although the technical level is very low, due to the large number and the fact that combat operations are not so intensive, the eisenhower can only float in the red sea day after day. there is no fierce battle, nor is there any fierce confrontation. it has neither prevented the merchant ships from being attacked nor been able to eliminate the houthis' strike capability. there was not even any challenging things, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it was a waste of time.

when the reporter asked him whether the carrier-based aviation wing had anticipated intercepting a large number of drones and whether there were any targeted tactical measures, hill said he could not answer this question. the reporter then asked him whether he had noticed that houthi drones were constantly improving, but he still did not answer.

the most interesting question in the entire interview was when the reporter asked hill: what lessons can this battle in the red sea teach us about future battles with china? captain hill only answered two questions: we must try to cope with logistical challenges and resilience challenges. logistical challenges are easy to understand, but resilience challenges are about how to cope with complex and changing situations and diverse combat modes.

this is similar to the question raised by other experts during the battle. if the u.s. navy consumes so many high-value weapons and ammunition in fighting against a weak target like the houthis, will the logistics support be sufficient when it really faces the people's liberation army one day? can the factories in the rear produce so many missiles? even if they can, can they be transported to the battlefield and replenished in time? so far, the u.s. military has no ability to resupply missiles at sea. if there are only two ports left, how can the u.s. navy maintain its continued combat effectiveness?

in addition, before the war between major countries like china and the united states, there is a high probability that there will be a long period of confrontation. during the confrontation, aircraft carriers like the uss eisenhower may have to wander around the war zone for a long time. this will be a long, boring but nerve-wracking stage. so as an aircraft carrier commander, how can you control the mental state of the officers and soldiers and prevent them from breaking down? if after waiting for a period of time, the war suddenly breaks out, then, will the personnel on the aircraft carrier still be in the mental state to fight? all these questions are what captain hill wants to answer but cannot answer. at present, the other two aircraft carriers of the us navy are in the gulf of oman, waiting for possible armed attacks by iran. this scene is somewhat similar to the sino-us confrontation we discussed earlier. the real war has not yet broken out, but the fleet must be ready to fight at any time. no one knows how long it will take. it seems that the problem that the us navy is entangled with is difficult to solve.