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[Text/Observer Network columnist Shi Yang]

This week, the Ukrainian army's military operations against Russia's Kursk Oblast are still the focus of world military observers. As the Ukrainian army's "stormy advance" in Russia gradually comes to an end and the city of Suja changes hands, the "strategic significance" of this round of Ukrainian army's counterattack is gradually emerging.

At the same time, a fire on a long-retired Soviet aircraft carrier in China once again drew attention to aircraft carrier damage control.

If the Russian army is not afraid of losing face...

As of August 16, the Ukrainian army's large-scale offensive into Russia's Kursk Oblast has been going on for the 10th day. According to various sources, the Ukrainian army has more than 12,000 troops entering Russia, not only capturing and controlling the town of Sudja on the border of Kursk Oblast, but also controlling 82 settlements, occupying an area of ​​about 60 kilometers wide and 20 kilometers deep in Russia. According to the introduction of Ukrainian Army Commander-in-Chief Sersky, the Ukrainian army has occupied 1,150 square kilometers of Russian territory and established a military management agency for the occupation of Russian territory.

Over the past week, both the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian factions have given detailed descriptions of how the Ukrainian army drew elite combat forces and veterans from all over the front line, concentrated the army's advanced mechanized and motorized equipment, secretly assembled and quickly assaulted under the cover of the Ukrainian army's limited field air defense weapons and mobile artillery, and quickly launched an assault when the Russian army was unguarded in Kursk, with weak front-line forces and scattered forces in the rear, and then quickly launched an assault along the traffic lines to attack the Russian side after penetrating the Russian army's border defenses with multiple columns (even disguised raids).

As for the Russian army's response, in addition to various air and fire blockades on the Ukrainian army, and a large number of drones launching hunting and killing of Ukrainian mechanized equipment, since the Russian army has not yet deployed large-scale ground forces to launch a comprehensive counterattack against the incoming Ukrainian troops, therefore, in the outside world's observations, the Russian army, in addition to defending around several larger settlements, seems to have invested more energy in the emergency construction of the rear defense line with a strong "bottom line thinking".

It can be seen that 10 days after the organized surprise attack by the Ukrainian army, the Russian army, whether in terms of objective ability or subjective willingness, does not support launching a full-scale counterattack immediately. The Russian army's current intention is more inclined to prevent the Ukrainian army from breaking through the rear line on the ground, delay the Ukrainian army's advance through defense, and use the relatively superior air force, artillery firepower and drones to kill the Ukrainian army, and then consider counterattack after the arrival of subsequent reinforcements.

Compared with the Russian army, which has relatively limited forces and is in a defensive state and can only respond to each move, so its goals are clear and its means are not difficult to analyze, although the Ukrainian side's offensive means and troop size have been roughly explored, its offensive purpose and specific plan are still shrouded in mystery.

In several important offensive and counter-offensive operations in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Russian army's action plan after February 24, 2022, through wartime information integration, later recollections, and the crucial Lukashenko's explanation map, the Russian army's overall intentions and execution are relatively fully presented. The Zaporizhia counter-offensive launched by the Ukrainian army in May 2023 did not make particularly significant actual progress, but according toNATOAccording to the description and the captured Ukrainian army's combat plan, the Ukrainian army planned to break through the Russian defense within two weeks, go all the way south to Berdyansk, and separate the Russian army's southern line. The combat plan was also relatively clear.

But this time, the Ukrainian army's surprise attack was completely unexpected by the Russian army. Even the United States stated that it "had no prior knowledge of it." Everything seemed quite successful, but the Ukrainian army's battle intentions and goals made all parties even more confused.

For Ukraine and the Ukrainian army, the bottom line, and even somewhat "abstract" goal, is of course to use favorable battle results for political propaganda, especially to obtain additional benefits.

After all, after the Russian-Ukrainian war was fought in several eastern Ukrainian states without continuous trenches, relying on minefields, fortifications, a large number of drones and long-range firepower, the expectations and actual war turned into a total war of attrition. While Russia's own military industry was mobilized and North Korea and Iran directly supplied arms, Ukraine's weapons and ammunition were exhausted, its military industry system was destroyed, NATO military aid was insufficient, and a large number of Ukrainian people left the country.

In fact, there is not much gap between the equipment and overall level of military technology of the Russian and Ukrainian armies, but the Russian army has been advancing step by step in several directions of eastern Ukraine through continuous and active offensives, relying on more abundant ammunition supplies and supplementary troops, especially more drones, cruise missiles and artillery support. On the one hand, it is gradually changing the defensive situation of Donetsk, and on the other hand, it is trying to gradually regain the offensive starting position of the Red Army Village-Slavyansk-Izyum line lost in the autumn of 2022.

Although both sides suffered casualties in such battles, and sometimes the Russian army suffered more, Ukraine's military morale and national mentality will become increasingly numb and may even collapse as the front line retreats step by step and there is no turning point in the rear. In this case, even a nominal victory (not to mention that the Ukrainian army actually took advantage in Kursk Oblast) can boost the morale of the Ukrainian army, not to mention that the secondary processing and creation of battlefield materials by pro-Ukrainian people can create an atmosphere of great victory.

Furthermore, this kind of information about gaining a favorable situation can prove Ukraine's strategic united front value to the United States and the West, thereby obtaining further military assistance from the United States and the West. Judging from the recent rumors that the United States is considering assisting Ukraine with JASSM cruise missiles, the Ukrainian military's military adventure has been quite effective.

From Ukraine's perspective, an offensive that demonstrates the value of "united front" is of great significance for continuing to obtain weapons assistance in the future.

However, as a large-scale military operation involving tens of thousands of people, if its sole purpose was to "impress the world" or "boost morale" just like the Nationalist government sent 800 warriors to guard the four banks, then this scale is definitely too much. The Ukrainian army's military offensive into Kursk must have had some more urgent and practical goals or motives.

Seizing territory for the "territorial competition" between the two armies seems to be one of the reasons, but considering the investment in the operation, if this is the only reason, it seems too far-fetched. It is also reasonable to let the Russian army withdraw some troops from the front of eastern Ukraine to reduce the pressure of frontal operations, but considering that the Ukrainian army "assembled" the attack cluster by weakening the elite backbones of various fronts, and the Russian army's forces to deal with the Ukrainian army are not all transferred back from the front line, although the Russian military operations on the Kursk front will inevitably occupy the ammunition, fuel and supply quotas for operations in other directions, affecting the intensity of the Russian army's offensive on the Donetsk front. But whether this can effectively reduce the pressure on the Ukrainian defense forces that have also been weakened is also unknown.

As for the important strategic targets in Kursk Oblast, although Sudja is a natural gas transit point and the intersection of several roads, it is not of great significance in Russia's special military operations against Ukraine, and it is difficult to say that capturing this place will improve the overall defense situation. The Russian side claimed that the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, which was obtained based on the documents seized from the Ukrainian army and the interrogation of prisoners, is more valuable, but its location close to Kurchatov is far from the current offensive state of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian army is currently exaggerating the significance of capturing Sudja, which is more realistic than "fighting wherever you are pointed" and "praising wherever you are fought."

This has created a contradictory situation in the battle between Russia and Ukraine in Kursk Oblast: in the view of military analysts, based on an assessment of the Ukrainian army's equipment situation, before receiving further large-scale military assistance, Ukraine's existing relatively well-trained mechanized forces are limited in size and extremely valuable. In the event of an unfavorable frontal defense situation, these forces should be used as counterattack "fire brigades" everywhere, used for flexible defense to slow down the Russian army's offensive, while inflicting as much casualties on the Russian army as possible.

According to this "living life" attitude, when the Ukrainian army used all these troops to attack and control a militarily worthless territory in Kursk Oblast, suffered damage in the attack, and had to continue to keep these troops in Russia to withstand the attacks of the Russian army's superior aviation and drone forces in order to defend against the subsequent counterattack of the Russian army, this "living life" behavior is difficult to understand and unacceptable. Some NATO observers and analysts also analyzed that the Ukrainian army might shrink to a favorable terrain in Russia, or withdraw to Ukraine for defense, based on this thinking.

Although it is not possible to drive out all the Ukrainian troops for the time being, the Russian aviation and drone strikes are still continuing.

But in the eyes of Ukrainian and NATO politicians or Russian and Ukrainian "funny people" who hold different positions, the life and death of the Ukrainian army's reserve troops are not important, and the situation of the Ukrainian army's defense forces on the front line in eastern Ukraine is not taken into consideration. The "slap in the face" and humiliation of the Ukrainian army's invasion of Russia has become one of the purposes of the large-scale campaign.

After the Russo-Ukrainian war entered a phase of steady attrition that was obvious but dull, Ukrainian politicians lost their means of promoting Ukraine's values ​​and claiming more aid through the war, and NATO decision-makers could not see the value of continuing to aid Ukraine, a bottomless pit, when Russia seemed to be getting bigger and stronger.

If the operation in the Kursk Oblast direction can be successful, NATO is willing to further expand the scale of aid and help Ukraine train a large-scale ground force and elite air force with the strength of rebuilding a Ukrainian army as it did from 2022 to 2023. Then, even if the Ukrainian reserve troops are severely damaged and the Russian army's advance in eastern Ukraine is further accelerated, the Russo-Ukrainian war will still be further prolonged because Ukraine has successors in personnel and equipment. According to the consistent position of Ukraine and NATO, the prolongation of the war means an increased chance of changes or even collapse of the Russian regime, which is considered to be a crucial link in defeating Russia.

Because of this, Ukraine's military adventure in Kursk is undoubtedly similar to the desperate attempts of many countries in history when the war situation was unfavorable. They all have a rather grand but extremely difficult to achieve strategic goal. In order to implement the corresponding plan, the country needs to dig out the bottom of the box from the limited war resources and make a desperate bet.

In the Battle of the Bulge, the German troops used up almost all of Germany's reserve manpower and fuel reserves, and the Luftwaffe launched its last large-scale air attack in World War II, just to rush to Antwerp and split the Allied forces in two. Although the German army did not achieve its strategic goals in time and effectively delayed the Allied offensive and advancement on the Western Front, it did not have any visible benefits in saving the fate of Nazi Germany and organizing subsequent German defensive operations.

Of course, Ukraine also wants to influence NATO, which is a huge variable that aids the Ukrainian army. Whether NATO can respond in a timely manner as Ukraine wants and provide Ukraine with assistance of sufficient scale and at the right time is a test of NATO's strategic decision-making ability.

Rescue of aircraft carrier fire

On Friday afternoon, many social groups of military enthusiasts were circulated with a series of videos and news: "Minsk is on fire." As the first "real aircraft carrier" that a generation of Chinese military enthusiasts have come into contact with in China, although it has been abandoned for a long time, the news still makes people feel a lot.

The local government quickly released news that "a fire broke out on an abandoned aircraft carrier near the Yangtze River in the Suxitong Industrial Park during its dismantling and renovation." The fire on the aircraft carrier burned overnight and was basically extinguished during the day.aircraft carrierThe superstructure was severely damaged, with a considerable portion of it melted and collapsed. Repairing it in the future would be extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible.

As one of a series of ill-fated Soviet aircraft carriers, the Minsk was retired from the Russian Navy in 1993. It was first sold to South Korea in 1995 for dismantling, and then resold to China in 1997. It has been open to the public in Shenzhen as an aircraft carrier theme park since 2000.

On February 14, 2016, Shenzhen Minsk Aircraft Carrier World announced that it would close. On April 2, the Minsk was towed away from Shenzhen and headed north to Zhoushan Shipyard for repair and maintenance. It was then docked on the north bank of the Sutong Yangtze River Highway Bridge. When it was converted into a theme park, in order to avoid confusion with Minsk, the capital of Belarus, the park was deliberately called "Minsk". But an aircraft carrier is still an aircraft carrier after all. Even if swords are turned into plowshares, everyone is used to calling it by its Soviet Navy title "Minsk".

As a fire that occurred on an aircraft carrier, this fire was quite atypical: it was not a fire that occurred on a fully equipped, well-equipped, and well-functioning aircraft carrier in service, nor was it a fire that occurred on a dock or pier undergoing modification or repair and that had relatively complete shipyard fire-fighting equipment and organization.

The Minsk, which had been anchored near the bridge for several years, did not have complete firefighting equipment around it. Firefighting forces were unable to arrive at the scene in time after receiving the alarm, and it was difficult to effectively rescue the ship when they were unfamiliar with the scene, had difficulty entering the ship to approach the fire point, and were at risk of sinking/capsulating. Therefore, the fire on the Minsk was more like a fire that was simply extinguished from the outside, so it is naturally difficult to use it to discuss topics such as damage control on aircraft carriers or onboard firefighting organizations.

From the perspective of the structural design of the aircraft carrier, the Minsk is a large aircraft carrier cruiser that represents the Soviet Union's special aircraft carrier philosophy. It was also a warship designed in the late 1960s and built in the 1970s. This was also clearly reflected in this fire: due to the dense weapons on the Soviet aircraft carrier cruisers, a large number of electronic facilities and weapon operators are required, as well as the adherence to a series of "cruiser" traditions, the Minsk's island is long and tall.

In order to reduce the impact of such a huge island offset to one side of the aircraft carrier on the center of gravity and stability of the aircraft carrier, the Minsk used aluminum-magnesium alloy, which was quite fashionable at the time, in the structural design. The third deck of the aircraft carrier's island is made of aluminum-magnesium alloy, and the rest is built of two high-strength steel plates. The amount of aluminum-magnesium alloy used is as high as 650 tons. After the fire burned all night, the aluminum-magnesium alloy part melted and collapsed. Although the two layers of the island below were also burned, the overall structure remained intact. As a shipbuilding method that is harmful to damage control and we have long been familiar with it, the fire on the Minsk once again proved the necessity of the evolution and progress of shipbuilding industry technology.

The Minsk is under construction on slipway 0 of the Black Sea Shipyard.

Since the Minsk had been essentially abandoned for a long time, in addition to renovating it into a usable warship park, many people have suggested that the military take over and sink the ship as a target ship, accumulating experience in aircraft carrier design and testing the power of anti-ship weapons in the process.

However, on the one hand, the name of the Minsk has a certain degree of political sensitivity. On the other hand, as a Soviet ship negatively affected by the theory of missile victory and the theory of the uselessness of armor, the Minsk and several previous Soviet aircraft carriers have full-length double bottoms and compartments, but they have no decent underwater protection structure. In addition, the ship's watertight system and damage control system have long been in disrepair and have long been ineffective, so its anti-strike capability is quite limited.

Considering the decisive significance of the 1143 series aircraft carriers for the development of China's aircraft carrier technology, although there is a difference in simulation when using the Minsk as a target ship, the technical experience that can be gained still has irreplaceable value for a major shipbuilding country like my country that lacks large surface combat ships.

In the just concluded multinational naval exercise "RIMPAC", the US Navy contributed the retired dock transport ship "Dubik" and the retired amphibious assault ship "Tarawa" as target ships for the naval and air forces of various countries to conduct attack drills. Forces from Australia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, South Korea, as well as the US Air Force, Army and Navy participated in the two "sinking drills", in which the US Navy F/A-18F launched the "RASM" long-rangeAnti-ship missiles2. The U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber dropped a "quick sink" bomb and participated in the sinking of the "Tarawa".

Earlier, as part of the "Valiant Shield 2024" exercise involving the United States, Japan, France and Canada, the participating troops sank the retired U.S. Navy's "Austin" class amphibious dock landing ship LPD-7 "Cleveland" "more than 40 nautical miles from the land in the North Pacific."

These real-life ship-to-ship strike exercises not only allow the U.S. military to collect valuable data on ship anti-sinking and weapon strike effectiveness, but also allow participating troops to gain a rare, relatively realistic, close-to-actual combat attack experience. For a country actively preparing for a conflict with another naval power in the Western Pacific, the benefits of all this are difficult to measure simply in terms of money.

The USS Tarawa is anchored in Hawaii, preparing to serve as a target ship in the Rim of the Pacific exercise.

For a military that has only risen in the past 20 years, the Chinese Navy has too few large ship targets and too little experience in attacking such targets.Anti-ship ballistic missileSuch "trump card" weapon testing activities are worth paying a certain price for the naval and air force combat units to be able to obtain such a close-to-actual combat strike experience.

It may be worth our further observation to see how the fate of the Minsk changes after a fire.

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