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about the author: bloodmandra is an explorer of military ideas, a lover of strategic and tactical research, a creator of war novels, and a model maker. he is more utilitarian than seeking honor.

the full text is divided into two chapters, this is the second chapter. this chapter has 4035 words and takes about seventeen minutes to read.

playing with small things brings about big troubles: the ideological confrontation between jia yi, chao cuo and the theory of bank of china

during the wen and jing dynasties, the thinkers who dominated the military and political games between han and huns were first recommended by jia yi, followed by chao cuo, and then zhong xingshuo, the eunuch who defected to the huns. they either wrote or spoke, and their thoughts inadvertently formed three ideas of the game between nomadic empires and agricultural empires in later generations: jia yi represented the political controlists, chao cuo represented the military strikers, and the bank of china theory represented of nomadic traditionalists.

in addition to luxury resources such as food and wine from the han dynasty's gold and silk children, the military minister shanyu who succeeded to the throne also received a good gift: the eunuch zhong xingshuo who surrendered from the han dynasty. this person has been favored by his father, the elder shanyu, and now, bank of china says it will continue to serve the new young shanyu "loyally".

bank of china said that i was from yan area and was familiar with the situation in the border area. emperor wen ordered him to serve as an attaché to escort the princess, but bank of china said he was unwilling to go and threatened that "if he had to be sent to the xiongnu, he would surrender and become a scourge to the han dynasty." everyone thought he was talking crazy and didn't take it seriously. later, the bank of china said that it had indeed taken refuge with the xiongnu, revealing all the inside information about the han dynasty and instigating them day and night, which became a serious problem.

boc said that although his character was despicable, his knowledge and vision were indeed extraordinary. this man revealed to chanyu the sinister thinking behind the han empire's steady flow of extravagant gifts. the bank of china warned that if the huns adopted more than 20% of chinese items such as clothing, trousers, gold and silk, they would lose the convenience of eating cheese and wearing furs, lose their fighting spirit, and even risk being assimilated by the han dynasty ( now the shanyu has changed the customs of good han things, and the han things are no more than ten, then the xiongnu will all return to the han).

later, the history of "jin died at the hands of confucianism" tells us that in the long run, bank of china's suggestion of advocating maintaining the tradition of nomadic people is actually nonsense. but even the well-informed romans could not resist the silks of the han dynasty! the ancient roman naturalist pliny the elder lamented that the silk fabrics of the kingdom of seris (i.e. china) were so exquisite, and at the same time asked himself whether the empire had spent too much wealth (up to 100 million sesterces or 80 ten thousand pounds of silver, approximately one-twelfth of the empire's annual revenue).

the han empire's exquisite, complex, and elaborate food system was enough to make even the pickiest huns salivate. according to the literary works of sima xiangru, mei cheng, yang xiong, zhang heng and others, typical delicacies of the upper class of the han dynasty include stewed veal, fatty beef brisket, fat dog soup, stewed bear paws, roasted tenderloin slices, roast suckling pig, raw carp or seabass fillet (with sauce made from ginger, cinnamon and peony), roast lamb shoulder and venison with bamboo shoots, cattails, leeks, optional salt, plum sauce, meat sauce, season with honey, vinegar or sichuan peppercorns, eat rice or millet, taste sweet rice wine called "li" and ordinary spirits. after the meal, you can also enjoy fruits including lychees, pears, peaches, and oranges, and the banquet throughout the whole process, dancing and music performances by coquettishly dressed artists were performed for the guests to enjoy. according to sima xiangru, it was enough to make the guests "sexful, soulful, and happy."

silk was a luxury product favored by the upper class of the roman empire, and the empire did not hesitate to spend a lot of resources to purchase it. because the parthians charged extremely high intermediate taxes, both the roman empire and the han empire worked hard to open up direct trade channels with each other. ban chao's subordinate gan ying almost set foot on roman territory, but due to the nabataean boatmen's exaggerated description of the risks of sea travel (the sea water was vast... there were many deaths), gan ying finally gave up on the westward journey.

it is not difficult to imagine that in the summer, the military minister chanyu and his royal family members and senior bureaucrats could enjoy the coolness in the silk clothes of the han empire as fine as hair and as thin as cicada wings, taste fine grains and delicious sauces, and listen to the crisp beating of han bells and jade fou, and then watching the beautiful orchid dancers wearing transparent tulle "luoji clothes" performing han dances (three and a half centuries later, this kind of enjoyment was denounced by cao wei official yang fu as "ruining chaos"). jie and zhou are nothing more than that"), even the bank of china said that it could not stop shan yu from falling to the han dynasty. he could only settle for the second best and arrogantly ask the other party to improve the quality of the gifts when receiving the han envoys.

one's honey, that's arsenic. the enjoyment of the han dynasty, which seemed very dangerous to zhong xing, was a powerful weapon for defeating the huns in jia yi's view. jia yi once thought in the "new book" that the huns were always hungry and thirsty (which is surprisingly similar to the romans' view of the huns), but chao cuo pointed out that the huns were actually more tolerant of hunger and thirst: "wind and rain fatigue, hunger and thirst are endless. "the chinese are trapped in poverty"), as long as a border market is set up on the border and they sell meals, barbecue and broth, coupled with a lot of wine, the huns will quickly perish due to overeating (this will lead to their demise) you can wait until you are exhausted). in addition to food and wine, in the ever-famous "public security policy", jia yi also hoped to provide the xiongnu with five kinds of enjoyment called the "five bait" (including exquisite clothing and carriages, food, music and beauties, slaves and gorgeous buildings), in order to blunt the fighting spirit of the nomads and let them destroy themselves in singing and drinking.

jia yi may not have expected that the xiongnu would soon accept all the sugar-coated cannonballs fired by the han empire. after eating the sugar-coating to increase their strength, they would shoot ruthless arrows towards the central plains. later history proved that it was unrealistic to corrupt the nomads with materials in a short period of time. the rich and developed material civilization of the central plains empire would in fact further stimulate the desire of nomadic peoples to plunder. for example, during the xuanhe period, the song dynasty monarchs and ministers carefully prevented the jin dynasty envoys from seeing the gorgeous scenes of tokyo, so as not to arouse their evil thoughts. the drunken huns cavalry were even more destructive. sima qian mentioned that under the xiongnu system, each person who beheaded an enemy would be given a large cup of wine (a beheaded prisoner would be given a cup of wine). alcohol undoubtedly inspired the nomads' violent plundering mood. . only after the nomadic peoples come into contact with political and cultural resources such as the confucian ideology and imperial system of the central plains can they truly "change barbarians into summer" and the process of cultural weakening be irreversible. "ignorant yi di"), or the emperors from the qing dynasty to jiadao who had poor manchu language proficiency, were all like this.

if jia yi prefers the strategy of economic appeasement and corruption against the xiongnu, then chao cuo, who was also a political master of the western han dynasty, is a lover of force. in "yan bing shi shu", chao cuo convincingly discussed the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the han and hungarian armies. the xiongnu army had three strengths (horses with strong adaptability to complex terrain, soldiers with high level of riding and shooting, and the ability to endure hunger and thirst for continuous combat), while the han army had five strengths (strong frontal and peaceful combat capabilities, high-quality weapons, and multi-arms integration). strong combat capabilities, strong long-range firepower, and strong melee capabilities). in the early years of emperor jing's reign, the han army still did not have enough horses, so chao cuo hoped to use the surrendered barbarians as cavalry to fight the huns in the mountains (that is, if there were dangers, take this as an excuse), while still using the han army in the plain areas chariots and infantry (level passages are made of light chariot materials).

chao cuo was also particularly concerned about defense and economic issues. compared with jia yi's "three tables and five baits" strategy that was not adopted, chao cuo's proposal in "the second letter on recruiting people to move to fortress" is more practical. he hoped to recruit or move people to the border areas, provide them with food and crossbows, and build a border defense system integrating soldiers and civilians. in addition, he also suggested "making people from all over the world bring grain to the border" and using high-level titles as rewards to encourage people to transport grain to the border to support the border settlement system. on the basis of stabilizing logistics and building strong strategic bases and defense lines, we then mobilized "hundreds of thousands of troops" to fight "tens of thousands of people" against the xiongnu. this steady strategy of defense as offense is in line with sun tzu's "do first, don't do it" the idea of ​​winning and waiting for the enemy to be victorious" deeply influenced the border policies of all subsequent dynasties. if chao cuo had lived during the reign of emperor wu, this discussion might have been put to considerable use.

but history has also ruthlessly proved that war is not a simple linear calculation. the marginal effects caused by unknown enemy situation, unfavorable terrain, inadequate logistics, and weak national strength will have a dramatic increase or decrease in victory or defeat. until the victory of general li guangli of the second division, when the entire army of 70,000 cavalry was annihilated by the xiongnu's 50,000 cavalry, emperor wu finally woke up from the dream of hundreds of thousands of soldiers marching into the desert, and declared the bankruptcy of the militaristic military policy (there was no shortage of armaments) in a self-mocking manner. luntai issued an edict. at that time, sixty-five years had passed since chao cuo's death.

the han generals set out to the west: the end of the tibetan front and the beginning of the counterattack

according to records in "historical records pingzhunshu", in the early years after emperor wu ascended the throne, the treasury was extremely full and grain piled up like mountains. this is where the famous term "chen chen xiang yin" came from, which originally described the abundance of grain in taicang. the government encourages horse breeding. the empire already has 400,000 official horses in dozens of pastures in the liushi garden in the border counties (south of the great wall, in the county of binsai, horses and cattle are allowed to roam freely, and the fields are stocked). there are even more horses in herds, and people are even ashamed of riding a mare. as a result, emperor wu's great cause of "plotting the xiongnu" began from the towering front hall of weiyang palace in chang'an city, and turned into arbitrary and urgent edicts, running in all directions through the empire's sophisticated and strict administrative system.

in 134 bc, emperor wu launched the famous mayi strategy at the suggestion of the general wang hui, using mayi city in yanmen county as a bait, "ambushing more than 300,000 troops, chariots, horsemen, and officers in the valley next to mayi." , and sent 30,000 partial troops to rob the baggage, in an attempt to annihilate the military minister shanyu who was going south in one fell swoop. however, because of the news leaked by yanmen weishi, the shanyu quickly withdrew from the fortress with 100,000 cavalry. the han army failed, which was a pity.

from a military point of view, although the han army has strong military strength, it still has flaws in its commanding skills. it still adheres to the defensive-based combat mode of the wenjing period. it can be said that the failure of the mayi plot is inevitable. first, the han army's campaign plan was too grand, and it was expected to accomplish all the results in one battle. it had to annihilate the main force of the huns and seize the huns' baggage, which was beyond the capabilities of the han army. second, there are difficulties in command and control. although "all generals belong to the guards" and are all under the command of guard general han anguo, with this general who opposes war as the commander-in-chief, he may not be able to oversee all parties, especially among his subordinates. when wang hui (a supporter of the mayi conspiracy) and han anguo still had conflicts, the disadvantages of inconsistent command became even more obvious. third, the han army's battle layout was not scientific enough. the han army was divided into two major groups, the ambush group and the mobile group. the ambush group accounted for nine-tenths of the total force (more than 300,000), while the mobile group only accounted for one-tenth of the total force (30,000). the ambush group had more troops. it is relatively concentrated and difficult to hide. in addition, once an emergency situation occurs, it is difficult for mobile groups with fewer troops to respond in time. wang hui did not dare to pursue in the end (with 30,000 people against 100,000 people, it was expected that they would not win). fourth, the han army adopted the method of luring the enemy with herds in the fields, which was easily seen through by the huns who were familiar with nomadic life.

during the mayi conspiracy, the han army was divided into two battle groups, but it was still a defensive battle.

despite the considerable unhappiness that occurred in mayi, the huns were still "greedy for han property" and the two sides did not cut off trade. the han and hungarian sides continued to coexist in a strange atmosphere of official warfare and private transactions. in 129 bc, the xiongnu entered the fortress from shanggu (in today's huailai, hebei province) and killed and plundered thousands of people. emperor wu finally couldn't bear it anymore and ordered the light chariot general gongsun he to come out of the clouds; the cavalry general gongsun ao to leave the county; and the brave cavalry general li guang left yanmen; the chariot and cavalry general wei qing came out of shanggu, with 10,000 cavalry in each of the four directions, totaling 40,000 cavalry.

this battle was the first time that the han army used a large-scale cavalry regiment to fight, and it was also the first time to take the initiative to attack outside the great wall. it was a preview of the glorious battles of monan and mobei in the future. although gongsun he, gongsun ao, and li guang failed to win, wei qing's light cavalry went all the way deep, spanning more than 2,000 miles outside the fortress, and defeated the dragon city, which served as the chief dome of the chanyu and the altar of the whole clan. the xiongnu were shocked. when the news came, emperor wu was overjoyed: this was the han army's first great victory over the hungarians in a hundred years of fighting, which was enough to comfort all the late emperors!

under the banner of the han general, the setting sun reflected the mountains in the upper valley. after crossing here, we have to say goodbye to the flat sand and decaying grass outside the great wall, and return to the han dynasty where people and people are everywhere. wei qing seems to have predicted that he will be named the marquis of guannei, and even the noble fate of a powerful minister; he also predicted that chanyu will suffer heavy losses and flee to mobei; but it may be difficult for him to predict that the four ten years later, the lord would end his endless conquests with a "luntai edict"; he might have been even more difficult to predict that one hundred and forty-seven years later, the new dynasty general yan you would write "admonition to attack the xiongnu" as emperor wu. the disrespectful comment that "china stopped spending money, the xiongnu also created ai... is a bad idea."

however, when he faced the endless and hard-to-find saibei wilderness, and faced a world that was completely different from the central plains empire, he might really have spoken like zhan shifan ye, the prince of the southern song dynasty five hundred years later. a profound, confused and painful sigh:

"however, the superior strategies for controlling imperialism have never been heard of in history; the strategies of the zhou and han dynasties are only average and inferior. how can we count the number of gods in the sky to reach this level?"