news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

author: the eagle of berchtesgaden

editor: haijiu

there is a saying in the military fan circle: "air defense and air defense, nine out of ten air defenses" are often used to ridicule the inefficiency of using anti-aircraft guns for air defense operations before the emergence of anti-aircraft missiles. this view is not only spread among military fans, but also exists in professional research areas. the largest air defense operation before the missile age was the german air force's defense against british and american strategic bombing on the european battlefield in world war ii. when evaluating german domestic air defense operations after the war, many people focused more on the role of german fighter jets and ignored the effectiveness of ground anti-aircraft artillery. .

■in the american tv series "heroes", a fleet of b-17s flew through the black clouds of explosions from german anti-aircraft shells.

an official british investigation report on the strategic bombing of germany stated: "the number of (german) anti-aircraft guns is sufficient, but their radar guidance capabilities are relatively low, and they cannot prove to be a very deadly weapon even when they are in the largest number." some scholars expressed similar views: "the anti-aircraft guns damaged many aircraft and forced the bombers to fly higher, but very few were shot down." one evidence to support this view is that statistics show that the german 88mm anti-aircraft guns averaged it took 16,000 rounds of artillery shells to shoot down one allied bomber, which meant a huge waste of resources and was even regarded as one of the important factors that brought down germany. however, is the prestigious 88mm anti-aircraft gun, known as the "anti-all gun", really so unbearable when it plays its role? the answer must be found from the construction of germany's domestic air defense system and the actual combat records of the anti-aircraft artillery unit.

building germany’s iron dome

as the first country in the history of war to practice the concept of strategic bombing, germany used zeppelin airships and "gotha" bombers to spread terror from the air to britain during world war i. perhaps because of their deep understanding of air power, the germans have paid attention to air defense operations very early, and its origins can even be traced back to the franco-prussian war. during world war i, german ground air defense forces shot down 1,588 aircraft, more than all other participating countries combined. after the end of world war i, the german army was strictly restricted by the treaty of versailles and could only retain small-scale anti-aircraft units and old anti-aircraft guns. however, a treaty cannot imprison thoughts. during the weimar republic, the german army continued to study air defense operations in depth and secretly prepared to rebuild a strong air defense force in the future.

■the german army equipped the flak 16 88mm anti-aircraft gun during world war i, which was also the predecessor of the future flak 18 88mm anti-aircraft gun.

from october 1929 to march 1930, a series of articles discussing air defense operations were published in the weimar wehrmacht internal magazine military weekly. these articles accurately predicted that in the next war, "the huge air fleet will force the enemy through bombing" germany surrendered", and at the same time proposed a variety of air defense measures, the first of which was the development of heavy anti-aircraft guns. in addition, it also included using smoke screen generators to create smoke screens to protect targets, using searchlights to blind enemy pilots, establishing early warning systems, and building air defense bunkers, emergency rescue and firefighting training for workers, etc., almost all measures were used in subsequent wars, which can be said to have drawn up the blueprint for german domestic air defense.

at the same time as the theoretical construction was carried out, the reconstruction of the air defense force was also carried out simultaneously and secretly. in january 1930, the weimar wehrmacht formally established an anti-aircraft artillery unit, with lieutenant colonel gunther rudel responsible for the organizational construction and equipment development of this new unit. regarding the construction of the future german air defense system, rudel proposed three key factors: first, high-performance anti-aircraft artillery, which can engage enemy bombers flying at an altitude of more than 10,000 meters and with a speed of 600 kilometers per hour; second, anti-aircraft artillery must it has the ability to fight at night or in densely cloudy weather conditions; finally, it must be considered that enemy bombers will lay more armor in the future to resist anti-aircraft gun attacks. facts have proved that rudel's views are very forward-looking.

■gunther rudel, the "father of anti-aircraft artillery" in the german army, was later promoted to general of anti-aircraft artillery.

in the early research on air defense operations, the german army had already proposed a method of centralized command of anti-aircraft guns, in which a firing director controlled multiple anti-aircraft guns at the same time for concentrated firing. in line with this, the german zeiss company was commissioned by the german military in the mid-1920s to develop a new type of commander. it was delivered in 1930 and was named the p27 anti-aircraft commander. it combined a high-precision optical rangefinder with a ballistic computer. , determine the target orientation, height and speed, solve the shooting elements, and effectively direct the shooting. by 1939, it had been upgraded to the p40 type and became the standard equipment of the german anti-aircraft artillery unit. at night and in bad weather conditions, german anti-aircraft artillery relied on air listeners and searchlights to search for targets.

■the p40 anti-aircraft director is standard equipment for german anti-aircraft artillery units. usually, one director can control four anti-aircraft guns.

in terms of artillery equipment, rudel uses the new 88mm anti-aircraft gun as the main battle equipment because it is the most balanced in terms of power, mobility and operating cost. although larger-caliber anti-aircraft guns are more powerful, they are too bulky, inconvenient to maneuver and are expensive to build. . in december 1933, the flak 18 88mm anti-aircraft gun rolled off the production line of the krupp arsenal and entered service with the german anti-aircraft artillery force. the flak 18 anti-aircraft gun has a muzzle velocity of 840 meters per second and a maximum shooting height of 9,900 meters. under the control of a skilled gun crew, the rate of fire can reach 15 to 20 rounds per minute. with excellent fire control equipment, it became the most advanced gun in the world at that time. it is an anti-aircraft gun, and its ground shooting capability is also quite powerful. later, improved models such as flak 36/37/41 were introduced. from 1933 to 1945, the entire series produced more than 21,000 guns, creating countless battlefield legends.

■the flak 36 88mm anti-aircraft gun displayed in the museum today is the most famous anti-aircraft gun in history.

in addition to the 88mm anti-aircraft gun, the german army has also successively developed heavy anti-aircraft guns such as the flak38/39 105mm anti-aircraft gun, the flak40 128mm anti-aircraft gun, and the flakzwilling 40/2 128mm twin anti-aircraft gun, with a shooting height of 11,000 to 14,000 meters. , but the weight has doubled and the output is also less. most of them are deployed on fixed positions, such as tall air defense towers. in addition to heavy anti-aircraft guns, the german army is also equipped with a large number of 20mm and 37mm light anti-aircraft guns to deal with low-altitude flying targets, thus forming a multi-level air defense firepower system from low to high.

■the flakzwilling 40/2 128mm twin anti-aircraft gun deployed in an anti-aircraft tower in berlin in 1945.

in january 1933, the nazi party came to power. hitler, who took power, recognized that anti-aircraft artillery was an important force in protecting the german homeland with unusual sensitivity. therefore, he gave high priority to the anti-aircraft artillery unit in the process of rearmament. in march 1935, the luftwaffe was formally established. anti-aircraft artillery became an independent branch of the air force. its primary responsibility was to coordinate with fighter units to defend the german mainland from enemy air attacks. it also provided air defense cover for ground forces and provided support when necessary. ground combat. the german army and navy also had their own anti-aircraft artillery units, but their size and resources were far smaller than those of the air force's anti-aircraft artillery units.

■in september 1935, the flak 18 88mm anti-aircraft gun was unveiled at the nuremberg rally. together with the fighter groups flying through the sky, it formed the new image of the german air force.

with the strong support of the nazi high-level, the luftwaffe's anti-aircraft artillery force expanded rapidly from 1933 to 1938. by the outbreak of world war ii in september 1939, it had more than 70,000 officers and soldiers and established 657 heavy anti-aircraft artillery batteries (equipped with 2,628 guns). 88 mm/105 mm anti-aircraft guns), 650 light anti-aircraft guns (equipped with 6,700 20 mm/37 mm anti-aircraft guns) and 188 searchlight companies (equipped with 2,052 searchlights). they were ordered to protect 2,359 important targets throughout germany, including important industrial enterprises and military installations. if there were any shortcomings in the construction of the german anti-aircraft artillery unit before the war, one was the lag in radar development. although the early warning radar "freya" had been put into use when the war broke out, the "würzburg" with real fire control capabilities "the radar did not enter service until the summer of 1941. despite this, when world war ii broke out, germany still had the largest and most well-equipped ground air defense force in the world. no wonder rudel, who had been promoted to general of anti-aircraft artillery, proudly declared: "anti-aircraft artillery will be the decisive factor in future wars."

defend the imperial heartland

at the beginning of world war ii in september 1939, the british royal air force launched air raids on the german mainland. however, they were severely damaged in the face of the air defense line built by the germans. they suffered heavy losses under the double interception of fighter jets and anti-aircraft guns. at the end of 1939, the royal air force gave up day bombing and turned to night bombing as its main combat method, which was implemented throughout the subsequent war. however, the darkness provided protection for the bomber group, but also increased the difficulty of targeting. the lack of four-engine heavy bombers and imperfect night navigation technology made night air strikes ineffective. a report in august 1941 showed that even under the best circumstances, only 10 to 20% of bombers dropped bombs within 8 kilometers of the intended target, plus a 10 to 30% dud bomb rate. the overall bombing effect was quite dismal.

■the shot of german anti-aircraft artillery troops rushing to battle positions in the american tv series "fighting heroes", judging from the windmills in the background, should be in the netherlands.

although the air defense pressure on germany's mainland was not great at the beginning of the war, as the german army won successive battles on the european continent, the control area gradually expanded, and the size of the luftwaffe's anti-aircraft artillery force also expanded rapidly, reaching 528,000 by the end of 1940! it is worth noting that since anti-aircraft artillery is a technical branch, most officers and soldiers have an academic background in electrical or mechanical engineering and are of high quality. by early 1942, the air defense forces deployed on the german mainland and on the western front alone included 866 heavy anti-aircraft artillery batteries, 621 light anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and 273 searchlight companies. in order to prevent allied bombers from invading the german hinterland, the luftwaffe deployed anti-aircraft artillery units mainly on two lines of defense: the first line was deployed along the coastlines of northern france, belgium, the netherlands, and denmark. this airspace was the only way for allied aircraft to enter and exit europe. it is called the "bomber highway". in addition to being responsible for early warning, this line of defense can intercept the allied forces twice when they attack and return; the second line of defense is along the western german border, from the swiss border to the air defense zone set up on the north sea coast is guarded by anti-aircraft artillery and fighter jets. in addition, major german cities are also heavily fortified.

■the german 88mm anti-aircraft artillery battery is firing into the air at night.

there are three ways for german anti-aircraft artillery to attack allied bomber groups: first, continuous tracking and shooting, using optical sights or radars to obtain precise target data, and using the pilot aircraft as the aiming point to carry out continuous shooting until the group of aircraft is out of range, and friendly units replacement shooting, this method is the most efficient and poses the greatest threat to the allied aircraft fleet; the second is preset concentrated fire, which is used at night or in weather with thick clouds and when it is difficult to obtain effective radar guidance, using a relatively rough the target information determines the route of the allied aircraft fleet, and sets up a number of concentration fire locations to organize concentrated anti-aircraft artillery fire; the third type is barrage shooting, which is also used at night or when the weather is bad and the radar fails, to concentrate as many anti-aircraft artillery as possible on the allied forces. the military aircraft group bombs a certain area on the route and fires intensively to form a box-shaped barrage area, forcing the allied aircraft group to turn to avoid or break through the barrage. this method consumes the most ammunition.

■the "würzburg" fire control radar equipped by the german anti-aircraft artillery unit.

the greatest progress the german anti-aircraft artillery units made in technical equipment in the early days of the war was the acquisition of practical fire control radars and the establishment of an effective radar guidance system. the "würzburg" radar was developed by telefunken. the first prototype was delivered in 1940. after improvements, it was officially installed in the summer of 1941. the detection range of early models was 24 to 38 kilometers, and the detection range of later models was increased to 70 kilometers. meters, with a ranging accuracy of ±10 to 15 meters, which can provide stable target tracking for anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, greatly improving night air defense capabilities. with the equipment of the "würzburg" radar, night was no longer a protective color for bombers. the british army's losses in night bombing increased significantly and once fell into a trough. a three-month follow-up survey conducted by british bomber command in 1942 showed that 70% of equipment losses and casualties were caused by anti-aircraft guns. however, compared with the rapid expansion of the anti-aircraft artillery force, radar was always in short supply. by 1944, the german army still had 5,560 anti-aircraft listening machines.

■an anti-aircraft listening device equipped by the german anti-aircraft artillery unit.

the strategic bombing of germany reached a turning point in february 1942. the royal air force issued general order no. 5 and decided to adopt area bombing, that is, it no longer pursued precise hits on targets, but targeted entire cities for large-scale destruction. at the same time, bomber command welcomed its new commander, general arthur harris. shortly after taking office, he organized and implemented the first "thousand-plane bombing" on may 30, and verified the "bomber flow" tactics. 1,047 bombers were deployed in squadrons. as a unit, air strikes were carried out continuously on cologne, germany's third largest city, at predetermined heights and times, lasting as long as 90 minutes, hoping to overwhelm the german air defense system. this tactic had the desired effect. the british army lost 22 aircraft over cologne, 16 of which were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. the total loss that night was 41 aircraft. compared with the overall scale of the attack, this loss rate was quite low, and cologne had 18,000 buildings were destroyed and more than 55,000 people were injured or killed. after cologne, essen and bremen suffered two other "thousand-plane bombings". the poor performance of the german air defense forces made hitler greatly disappointed with göring.

■a painting depicting an raf bomber raid on cologne, the city's first "thousand-plane bombing" in may 1942.

after the united states entered the war in december 1941, the u.s. eighth air force stationed in the united kingdom in the spring of 1942 and began conducting small-scale air raids on the german-occupied areas of western europe in august to gain experience. different from the british army, the us military believed in the theory of daytime precision bombing and firmly believed that the powerful b-17 and b-24 bombers were enough to resist the attacks of german fighter jets, but ignored the threat of german anti-aircraft artillery. the initial losses in the operation were slight, which strengthened the confidence of the us military's top brass in daytime bombing, but front-line personnel were deeply aware of the terror of german anti-aircraft artillery firepower. in the autumn of 1942, colonel curtis lemay, who later became famous for "the burning of tokyo", took office as the commander of the 305th group. he asked colonel frank armstrong, the commander of the 97th group, about the situation of german anti-aircraft artillery. the answer he received was: "if if you keep flying in a straight line for even 10 seconds, the enemy will knock you down!"

■a group of u.s. b-17 "flying fortress" bombers flying in formation over england in the summer of 1942.

although the british army resorted to the "thousand-plane bombing" strategy and the us "flying fortress" also appeared on the stage, the decisive battle between the allied bomber forces and the german air defense forces did not officially begin in 1942. by the end of 1942, the allies had dropped bombs on the european continent. the tonnage of bombs accounted for only 6.5% of all bombs dropped during the war. for the german air defense forces, the real critical moment would come in 1943.

fierce battle with the invincible fleet in the air

in january 1943, the heads of state of the united kingdom and the united states decided at the casablanca conference that the air forces of the two countries would carry out joint strategic bombing against germany, known as the "direct strike" operation. based on high-level decisions, the british bomber command carried out a series of large-scale air raids on the ruhr industrial area in germany in the spring and summer of 1943. the u.s. 8th air force was also actively preparing to launch long-range air raids against targets in germany, thus starting day and night. alternating bombing patterns. the pressure from the british and american air forces is evident from the further expansion of the german anti-aircraft artillery force. at the beginning of 1943, the anti-aircraft artillery troops deployed in germany included 659 heavy anti-aircraft artillery companies and 558 light anti-aircraft artillery companies. by june of the same year, it had increased to 1,089 heavy anti-aircraft artillery companies and 738 light anti-aircraft artillery companies. by january 1944, reaching 1,234 heavy companies and 693 light companies, the total number of troops increased by 61% compared with 1942.

■the german 88mm anti-aircraft artillery position (left) and the anti-aircraft artillery in readiness (right).

the large increase in anti-aircraft artillery units, together with the fighter units returning from other fronts, launched fierce and tenacious resistance to the allied air offensive, causing the opponent to experience a "bloody summer." in june 1943, the royal air force shot down 207 bombers in a series of air raids on the ruhr area, accounting for one-third of the front-line combat force. on august 17, 1943, the u.s. 8th air force launched a large-scale air raid on schweinfurt and regensburg, paying a high price. 60 of the 376 bombers were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, and another 173 bombers were shot down. wounded. the allies tried to evade german anti-aircraft artillery fire through low-altitude bombing. on august 1, 1943, 166 b-24s attacked the ploiesti oil field at low altitude. as a result, 33 were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, 10 by fighter planes, and another 56 the frame was damaged. continuous setbacks forced the allies to temporarily suspend their offensive and seek new ways of restraint.

■the u.s. b-17 fleet flying to schweinfurt on august 17, 1943 suffered heavy losses in this bombing.

on the night of july 24, 1943, 791 british bombers attacked hamburg. they used a secret weapon called the "window", that is, jamming aluminum foil, which paralyzed the german air defense radar system. most anti-aircraft guns and night fighters missed their targets. the british the army lost only 12 aircraft, the air raid was a great success, and the "window" was quickly used widely. however, the jamming effect of aluminum foil was not long-lasting and was easily blown away by strong winds at high altitudes. at the same time, the german army countered by upgrading radar and improving communications. by the autumn of 1943, it basically restored its air defense capabilities. in addition, allied bombers also took measures such as avoiding air defense positions, evacuating formations, increasing flight altitude, accelerating flight, and maneuvering to avoid the threat from german anti-aircraft artillery.

the greatest advantage of the allies was their growing material strength. although a large number of aircraft were lost in 1943, rear factories continued to deliver aircraft to the front, making up for the losses while continuing to expand the size of the force. by the beginning of 1944, the us 8th and 15th air forces could dispatch 3,000 heavy bombers in a single day, and the british bomber command could also dispatch 1,300 to 1,400 heavy bombers at the same time. correspondingly, germany's ground air defense forces in the homeland and occupied areas also reached their peak in february 1944, deploying 13,500 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 21,000 light anti-aircraft guns, 7,000 searchlights, and 2,400 arresting balloons.

■in 1943, anti-aircraft artillery trajectories intertwined in the night sky over kiel. the german anti-aircraft artillery troops met the british bomber group with a dense barrage.

however, the biggest crisis for the german anti-aircraft artillery force came from within. in 1943, the german army suffered major defeats on the eastern front and the north african battlefield, losing a large number of soldiers. in order to make up for frontline losses, the german army transferred a large number of personnel from the anti-aircraft artillery unit to ground combat units, and the anti-aircraft artillery unit became the most important reserve of the german army. the vacancies they left were filled by a diverse and poorly trained replacement force, including part-time anti-aircraft artillery units made up of workers and civil servants who worked during the day and were on duty at night, as well as members of the reich labor front, female auxiliaries, hitler youth league members, foreign volunteers, and even soviet prisoners of war! taking the 14th anti-aircraft artillery division in october 1944 as an example, only 28,000 of the 62,500-personnel in the division were regular air force officers and soldiers, and the rest were substitutes. the decline in the overall quality of the soldiers directly led to a reduction in the combat efficiency of the anti-aircraft artillery unit.

■late in the war, two young anti-aircraft gunners, obviously teenagers, operated a 20mm anti-aircraft gun under the guidance of a veteran.

despite this, due to their large numbers, the german anti-aircraft artillery units still maintained resistance to allied bombing until the end of the war. in the first four months of 1944, 315 bombers of the us 8th and 15th air force were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. another 10,563 aircraft were damaged. with the use of "mustang" fighter jets for long-range escort and the allied forces' systematic attacks on the german aviation industry and oil industry, the luftwaffe fighter force suffered catastrophic losses. by the autumn of 1944, the allies had basically mastered the air superiority over europe. , the anti-aircraft artillery force became almost the only pillar in defending german airspace. in november 1944, a report from the us 8th air force showed that two-thirds of the more than 700 bombers lost between june and august of that year were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and 13,000 bombers were damaged in combat. 98% were caused by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

■in 1944, a u.s. military b-17 fleet encountered intensive anti-aircraft fire over merseburg, germany.

by the end of 1944, as the war situation on the east and west fronts worsened, more and more anti-aircraft artillery units were transferred to ground combat units and sent to the front line, further weakening the local air defense force. according to statistics, in the last eight months of the war, 555 heavy anti-aircraft artillery companies and 175 medium/light anti-aircraft artillery companies were transferred to the front line. even berlin was not immune, with 30 heavy anti-aircraft artillery companies, 13 light anti-aircraft artillery companies and all searchlights. the company was disbanded and its men were converted to infantry to fight against the soviet attack. even so, when the weather is good, the german anti-aircraft artillery units can still give the allies a head-on attack. for example, on february 3, 1945, the 8th air force dispatched 1,003 bombers to attack berlin. no german fighter jets took off to intercept, but the fierce anti-aircraft fire still shot down 25 bombers and 8 fighter planes, and damaged 397 other aircraft!

■an 88mm anti-aircraft gun abandoned on the battlefield in berlin in may 1945, with the reichstag building in the background.

on april 25, 1945, the us 8th air force carried out the last large-scale air raid. none of the 595 bombers were shot down, but more than 200 aircraft were damaged by anti-aircraft shells, and 4 were judged to be total losses. in the final moments of the war, most german anti-aircraft guns leveled their muzzles and fired at ground targets, their roar eventually disappearing among the ruins of berlin...

inefficient anti-aircraft artillery brought down germany?

after the war, when people evaluated german domestic air defense operations, they used to use the number of aircraft shot down as a criterion to measure the efficiency of air defense operations. in this regard, anti-aircraft guns seemed to be naturally less efficient than air defense fighters. as shown in the american drama "fighting heroes" aired at the beginning of this year, most tragic crashes occurred after fierce attacks by german fighter jets, and the existence of german anti-aircraft artillery was nothing more than black smoke dotting the sky. . based on this intuitive impression and the extremely large scale of the german anti-aircraft artillery force, many people believe that the german anti-aircraft artillery force is a large and unnecessary waste that does not play its due role while occupying a large amount of resources, causing huge waste and even it is regarded as one of the important reasons for bringing down germany. is it really so?

■a u.s. b-24 bomber was hit by a german anti-aircraft gun.

in fact, facts show that even in terms of kill numbers, the performance of the anti-aircraft artillery unit is not inferior to that of the fighter unit, especially in the later stages of the war. according to statistics, 5,380 bombers of the us 8th and 15th air forces lost over europe were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery, while 4,274 were shot down by fighter jets. at the same time, using the number of kills as a measurement criterion directly ignores the more important combat effects of anti-aircraft guns, which are mainly reflected in three aspects.

first of all, the firepower of anti-aircraft artillery forces the bomber group to fly higher, thus reducing the accuracy of bomb delivery. this is actually the most important combat goal of anti-aircraft artillery. the bombing accuracy of bombers during world war ii was always a technical problem. even the bombing accuracy of the norton sight, which has the "pickle barrel myth", is equally impressive (for details, please refer to this historical article "what is so magical about the norton sight that the us military desperately guards? its is the secret really kept? 》). according to a rough estimate, every 1,500-meter increase in flight altitude can reduce the accuracy of anti-aircraft guns by 50%. in turn, the error of bombers dropping bombs from an altitude of 4,500 meters is twice that of 1,500 meters! in march 1945, general carl spaatz, commander of the u.s. strategic air forces in the european theater of operations, admitted that anti-aircraft guns were the biggest factor affecting bombing accuracy.

■a b-17 bomber with its nose smashed, german anti-aircraft artillery damaged tens of thousands of allied bombers.

secondly, damaging bombers with anti-aircraft artillery will bring multiple hidden effects. german anti-aircraft artillery shells mostly use timed fuzes, which detonate within a range of 9 to 24 meters from the target, releasing a large number of fragments. although these fragments cannot directly shoot down the bomber, they are enough to cut off various pipelines, causing the aircraft to malfunction and become difficult to control. as a result, it breaks away from the formation and becomes the prey of german fighter jets. even if the injured aircraft can return to the base, it still needs to be repaired, which reduces the aircraft's performance. the accuracy rate affects the scale of its attack. data show that the number of aircraft damaged by german anti-aircraft artillery is much higher than the number shot down. from december 1942 to april 1945, 66,954 us bombers were damaged by anti-aircraft artillery, of which 14,889 were seriously damaged, and a considerable number of them lost their repair value. .

thirdly, anti-aircraft artillery fragments will cause both physical and psychological damage to bomber crew members. as shown in "air combat heroes", flying shrapnel can kill people and cause maiming and injury. for german fighter jets, the crew members can also use airborne weapons to fight back, but they have no ability to resist against anti-aircraft guns. this psychological gap intensifies the fear effect, demoralizes people, triggers timidity, and even gives up the attack in advance. the bomb was discarded, so the crew member suffering from stress disorder had to be temporarily removed from duty and receive treatment.

■in the american tv series "fighting heroes", a machine gunner was hit by anti-aircraft artillery shrapnel and died on the spot.

comments that disparage the german anti-aircraft artillery force often cite the data that the average 88mm anti-aircraft gun used to shoot down a bomber was 16,000 rounds. however, this data is based on the ammunition consumption at the climax of the local air defense battle in the late war. the factors behind it are quite complex, including the huge number of 88mm anti-aircraft guns, excessive wear of the gun barrels leading to a decrease in accuracy, and the poor quality of a large number of replacement personnel. and lack of training, as well as allied countermeasures and the altitude at which allied bombers flew. during the entire war, the average amount of ammunition consumed by the german anti-aircraft artillery units to shoot down a bomber was 3,400 rounds. based on this calculation, the exchange ratio was actually beneficial to the german army. at that time, the cost of 3,400 rounds of 88mm artillery shells was 267,440 marks, which was approximately us$106,976, and one the cost of a b-17 is us$292,000, the b-24 is us$327,000, and the "lancaster" is 320,000 pounds, which is still a good deal from an economic point of view.

regarding the accusation that the german anti-aircraft artillery troops wasted a large amount of human resources, in fact, they only looked at the size of the number of people, but ignored the composition of the personnel. in the autumn of 1944, the number of german anti-aircraft artillery troops reached an astonishing 1,110,900 people, but 448,700 of them were not regular soldiers, accounting for about 40% of the total, including 220,000 part-time artillerymen, labor front members and middle school students, 128,000 female auxiliary personnel and 98,000 foreign volunteers and prisoners of war. among the regular army, 21% are between the ages of 39 and 48, and 35% are over 48 or physically unfit for frontline service. in other words, at the end of the war, the majority of the german anti-aircraft artillery troops were old, weak, women and children, and a large number of high-quality soldiers had been gradually transferred out to supplement other combat units since 1943.

■the hitler youth members operating the 88mm anti-aircraft gun in the film "downfall".

to be fair, the dramatic expansion of the german anti-aircraft artillery force during the war was in line with the increasing scale of bombing by the allies, and this is understandable. for allied bombers flying over the european continent, heavy anti-aircraft fire was a serious threat from beginning to end and caused considerable losses. without german anti-aircraft guns struggling to stop the allied bombing of german cities and industrial bases, germany would have collapsed much faster than it actually did. the comments of general henry arnold, commander of the u.s. army air forces, better illustrate the effectiveness of the german anti-aircraft artillery force: "we never conquered the german anti-aircraft guns.”