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In 1985, Vietnam launched a massive counterattack in the Laoshan area on the Sino-Vietnamese border, code-named "M-1", attempting to reverse the situation through this surprise attack.

However, after three days of fierce fighting, the Vietnamese offensive was stubbornly resisted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which paid a heavy price with more than 700 people killed and 27 artillery pieces destroyed.

Although the sound of gunfire on the Laoshan battlefield has subsided, the shadow of defeat still lingers.

A few months later, Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong stated on the international stage that Vietnam had been seeking opportunities to restore relations with China, and even hinted that it intended to "give up."

However, the Chinese side remained silent and did not respond.

Can Vietnam finally escape this self-inflicted dilemma? Will China really ignore Vietnam’s overtures?

Tensions on the Sino-Vietnamese Border in 1985

In May 1985, the Laoshan war zone on the Sino-Vietnamese border fell into an atmosphere of tension and depression.

Le Duan Group, the core leader of Vietnam at that time,It was decided to launch a counterattack plan code-named "M-1".

This was a risky military operation aimed at breaking the Chinese military's defenses in the border area and trying to turn the tide against Vietnam in the ongoing conflict.

There had already been serious internal strife within Le Duan's group, and power struggles and strategic differences led to the leak of this plan shortly after it was finalized.

In order to cope with the powerful firepower of the Chinese army,The Vietnamese Ministry of Defense has decided to abandon the past method of relying on large-scale cluster impacts that relied on coordinated infantry and artillery operations.

Although the traditional infantry-artillery coordination tactics had achieved some results in previous conflicts, as the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict continued, the Chinese army gradually understood the tactical characteristics of the Vietnamese army and effectively curbed the power of this offensive method by strengthening firepower and position construction.

Therefore, the Vietnamese side realized that if they continued to use the old tactical model, their losses would only be more severe when facing the well-equipped and powerful Chinese army.

To this end, after many discussions and studies, the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense decided to adopt a new tactic:Geotechnical excavation tactics.

Simply put, this tactic is to dig tunnels and trenches to achieve the purpose of covert advance and avoid exposure to the heavy firepower of the Chinese army.

Geotechnical excavation tactics have their unique advantages, especially at night or in concealed environments. The Vietnamese army can use these underground passages and bunkers to conduct more flexible ground advances and reduce the chance of direct exposure to enemy fire.

In actual operations, the Vietnamese army took advantage of the terrain and dug a large number of tunnels and fortifications in some easy-to-cover mountainous and jungle areas.

In some key areas, the Vietnamese army even set up simple command posts and medical stations in the tunnels to deal with possible long-term confrontations.

In such circumstances, the Vietnamese army could avoid the fierce fighting during the day and launch surprise attacks at night or in the early morning.

The core of this strategy is to minimize the losses suffered by the Vietnamese army during the advance and to strike the Chinese army's defense line through unexpected offensive means.

Geotechnical excavation tactics are particularly important in areas with complex terrain and easy concealment.

Vietnamese soldiers hid in tunnels or trenches during the day to avoid Chinese reconnaissance and artillery fire. Once night fell, they would quickly pass through these underground passages, approach the Chinese army's positions, and prepare to launch a surprise attack.

However, although this tactic can theoretically help reduce the direct losses caused by direct conflict,But in actual operation, it faces huge challenges.

First of all, earthwork excavation requires a lot of manpower and time. On the battlefield, this means that the Vietnamese army must remain hidden for a relatively long time and cannot be discovered by the Chinese army.

Secondly, although tunnels and trenches can provide a certain degree of cover, the structure of the tunnels is still fragile when facing the Chinese army's heavy artillery and high-explosive ammunition, and it is difficult to completely defend against direct attacks from artillery fire.

The Battle of Laoshan

At around 5:40 a.m. on May 31, before dawn, the Vietnamese army suddenly launched a fierce attack.

This time, the Vietnamese army assembled an infantry reinforced regiment of about 2,000 people, with a clear goal, heading directly towards Laoshan Nara.

The Vietnamese army chose to launch the attack before dawn, apparently wanting to take advantage of the dark hour and the fact that the People's Liberation Army's 67th Army had just been deployed here and was not fully familiar with the terrain and enemy situation, in order to catch the enemy off guard.

They divided into several groups and advanced quietly along the complex mountain roads, approaching the frontline positions of the Chinese army.

In order to minimize the risk of exposure, the Vietnamese soldiers cautiously approached the Chinese army's defense line under the cover of night.

However, the Vietnamese action was not completely unexpected.

Although the PLA 67th Army had just arrived at the Laoshan theater, the Chinese Yunnan front-line command had already grasped the Vietnamese army's offensive plan in advance and had already made careful arrangements for all possible offensive directions.

As the Vietnamese army approached, the PLA soldiers on the front line quickly entered combat status.

The gunner quickly adjusted the firing angle of the gun, and the machine gunner held the gun tightly, ready to meet the enemy's fierce attack. In less than a minute, the entire position was fully on alert.

Although the Vietnamese army was advancing very quickly,But what they didn't expect was that the PLA's response was even quicker.

When the Vietnamese army entered the firing range, the PLA positions suddenly opened fire across the board, with heavy machine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers firing in unison. The dense firepower network completely blocked the Vietnamese army's way forward.

Artillery shells and bullets rained down on the Vietnamese army's route. The explosions and gunshots were deafening, and the entire battlefield was instantly engulfed in flames.

Although the Vietnamese soldiers tried desperately to break through this firepower network, the PLA's defense line was solid and its firepower was dense and accurate. Whenever the Vietnamese army tried to organize a new charge, they would be suppressed by the powerful firepower.

The PLA officers and soldiers on the front line relied on their strong fortifications to continuously use firepower to attack the Vietnamese army's waves of attacks, forcing them to retreat and reorganize their formations again and again.

The battle was extremely fierce. Although the Vietnamese army successfully approached the Chinese army's position at one point, they found themselves unable to advance effectively when faced with the PLA's powerful defensive firepower.

Every attempt to break through was blocked at the front by the PLA's firepower, making it impossible to make substantial progress.

Under the suppression of firepower, Vietnamese soldiers could only choose to use the terrain to hide, and even had to seek cover in trenches and tunnels to avoid greater casualties.

The battle lasted until 7 a.m. on June 2. For three full days, every hill and every position in the Laoshan battlefield became the focus of fierce competition.

The Vietnamese army made great efforts, mobilizing almost all the forces it could mobilize, and even launched night attacks and multiple charges in the hope of breaking through the PLA's defense line.

But in the end,They only managed to capture the No. 1 and No. 2 outposts on Hill 211, and the rest of the positions were still firmly in the hands of the People's Liberation Army.

More than 700 soldiers were killed

In this battle, the Vietnamese army suffered heavy losses.More than 700 soldiers were killed in the fighting.

Their artillery also suffered a heavy blow, with 27 artillery pieces destroyed, almost completely losing the ability to provide fire support. Every artillery preparation by the Vietnamese army would be quickly located by the People's Liberation Army and then hit with precision.

The People's Liberation Army used advanced artillery observation and fire control systems to destroy the Vietnamese artillery positions one by one, rendering the Vietnamese artillery support useless.

At the same time, although the Chinese People's Liberation Army also suffered losses in this battle, their defense line remained indestructible. A total of 72 PLA officers and soldiers were killed or wounded in the battle, including 19 who died.

Their sacrifice was to defend Laoshan, an important strategic high ground, and ensure that the Chinese army's defense line would not be breached.

The PLA commanders demonstrated outstanding command skills in the battle, being able to adjust troop deployment in a timely manner according to changes in the battlefield situation, ensuring that there were no major loopholes in the defense of each position.

The Vietnamese army originally hoped to reverse the passive situation in the Laoshan battlefield through this battle. However, it turned out that their tactical adjustments did not achieve the expected success.

The Le Duan group misjudged the strength of the Chinese army, believing that they could effectively avoid China's heavy firepower attacks through earthwork excavation, but they ignored the PLA's strong advantages in fortifications and rich combat experience.

The People's Liberation Army not only maintained its firepower advantage on the front battlefield, but was also able to effectively utilize the tunnel defense line to resolve the Vietnamese army's attacks one by one.

Clear stance

In November 1985, Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong accepted an interview with American journalists amid the ongoing tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border.

In the interview, Pham Van Dong said that Vietnam has been trying to find opportunities to restore relations with China. However, he also mentioned that although Vietnam has repeatedly expressed its willingness to improve relations between the two countries, China has never shown any signs of improving relations.

This statement obviously contains a certain amount of diplomatic rhetoric, intending to win some sympathy and support for Vietnam in the international community.

Pham Van Dong's statement attracted some attention on the international stage, but was soon regarded as an attempt by Vietnam to find a way out for itself in the face of internal and external difficulties.

Against the backdrop of the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, Vietnam's domestic political situation was unstable, economic difficulties intensified, and the internal contradictions of the Le Duan group gradually became public.

Although Fan Wendong's speech attempted to shift some of the responsibility to China,However, the international community generally believes that Vietnam’s attitude and behavior on border issues make it difficult to ease the situation.

The Chinese side did not make a positive response to this, but expressed a clear position through the military: China does not want to continue military confrontation with Vietnam, but if the Vietnamese army fires another artillery shell into Chinese territory, the People's Liberation Army will resolutely fight back.

China's attitude is very firm.That is, we will not take the initiative to provoke conflicts, but we will never tolerate any form of provocation.

During this period, although the conflict on the China-Vietnam border had eased on the surface, the actual tension had not been completely eliminated.

The defeat of the Vietnamese army in the Battle of Laoshan put them under tremendous military pressure, and this pressure was directly transmitted to the internal structure of Le Duan's group.

After the defeat in the war, dissatisfaction within the Le Duan group gradually spread, and power struggles and internal conflicts became increasingly fierce.

The strategy of the Le Duan clique to divert domestic conflicts through foreign military adventures has become increasingly ineffective.

At the same time, Vietnam's domestic economic situation continued to deteriorate. The long-term consumption of the war, coupled with the reduction of international aid, brought Vietnam's economy to the brink of collapse.

Faced with dual pressures from home and abroad, the Le Duan group has found it difficult to respond effectively.

Pham Van Dong's statement is more like a symbolic diplomatic gesture, intended to buy some breathing space for the Vietnamese government, but it is actually difficult to change Vietnam's unfavorable situation in the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict.

In 1986, Le Duan's health began to deteriorate rapidly.

On July 10, Le Duan died of illness.

The strategic reform plan that Le Duan tried to promote during his lifetime was shelved after his death, and it could even be said to have died in the womb.

References: [1] Zhang Guowei. Analysis of the Historical Logic of Laoshan Spirit [J]. Journal of Wenshan University, 2021, 34(5): 30-34