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In April 1987, the PLA border defense forces conducted a military exercise codenamed "87·4" in the Kejielang area at the Sino-Indian border. In this live-fire exercise, the PLA made very thorough preparations, not only preparing for pre-war adaptation training and logistical supplies, but also doing some unnecessary preparations. The soldiers even shaved their heads, wrote suicide notes, and were ready to go into actual combat at any time!

1. China and India had another friction in 1987, but India was still determined to do it

We conducted this military exercise with anger at that time. Our purpose was to let India, a "blind" country, see our strength and make them retreat.

To be honest, this matter has a long history. As early as 1914, when the British controlled India, they had their eyes on China's southern Tibet region. In order to achieve their goals, the British created the so-called "McMahon Line".

This ambition of the British was later successfully inherited by the Indians. So after the founding of New China, India turned part of China's southern Tibet into a temporary "centrally governed region" of its own. After the "wrestling" in 1962, India's ambitions subsided for a while. By 1986, India named the area it wanted to occupy "Arunachal Pradesh".

Once this news was exposed, China became the subject of much discussion in the international community. Its own territory was snatched away by India in just one sentence. Regardless of how China will teach India a lesson, their behavior alone is very "brave". Their thinking is really different from others.

Faced with an increasingly powerful China, especially one that has undergone economic reform and opening up, India actually dares to "rid on our heads". They have really had enough of this!

Subsequently, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs exerted pressure on the Indian side through diplomatic means, but the other side remained indifferent. In the face of the illegal actions of the Indian army, the Chinese side still decided to adopt a soft policy, but we intended to give them a way out, but the Indian side did not appreciate it at all.

Seeing that India was still as stubborn as it was in 1962, the Central Military Commission made a series of decisions, requiring measures to be taken to curb India's expansion plans. This series of measures also included deterrence actions to demonstrate the strength of the People's Liberation Army.

In September 1986, China introduced the American "Black Hawk" helicopter and established a PLA Air Force base in Tibet. At the same time, a military exercise named "87·4" began to be planned.

In March 1987, due to the escalating conflict between the PLA and the Indian Army in the disputed area, a small-scale exchange of fire occurred between the two sides. At that time, the PLA defeated an Indian Army company with two platoons of troops and forced them to withdraw from the exchange of fire. After this exchange of fire, the PLA stepped up the preparation of the "87·4" military exercise, and a large-scale military exercise lasting four months was quietly launched.

During the planning stage, the PLA made sufficient preparations. At that time, the domestic economic reform was about to begin, and the domestic economy had achieved a great degree of development, which was sufficient to help us improve our military strength as much as possible.

Among the numerous preparations, the People's Liberation Army has prepared for everything that should be prepared, as well as everything that should not be prepared.

2. Logistics and practical training preparations

Before the troops move, the food and grass must go first. The PLA had been carrying out transportation work for a long time before the "87·4" operation. At that time, the PLA troops did not have many transportation tools, which could only meet the daily supply quota. At that time, we transferred a large number of troops to the Tibet Military Region in a short period of time, and the soldiers' daily food, drink, clothes, etc. needed to be supplied by the transportation team.

The climate in Tibet is harsh, especially in the border area between China and India. The climate is even worse, and the soldiers have almost no way to be self-sufficient on the front line. This first poses a problem for the PLA's operations.

At that time, my country's development of Tibet was not as advanced as it is now, and transportation was still in a very backward state. Not to mention highways, there was not even a decent dirt road. At that time, the communication between the various garrisons of the People's Liberation Army Chengdu Military Region and the Tibet Military Region was basically entirely manpower. The roads between the regiments were gravel roads, and all were made by soldiers walking. Such roads are not a problem for people and horses to walk, but it would be very difficult for cars to pass.

The Sino-Indian border area is at a high altitude and the air is thin. Using manpower and livestock to transport supplies is not a good idea. It may cause some unnecessary casualties and the transportation efficiency is relatively low. From the perspective of use, it is most appropriate to use automobiles for transportation. In 1987, most of the PLA garrisons had roads from the inner regiments to the border defense companies. The supplies of the companies without roads could only be carried on the backs of people and horses.

Would it be easy to transport by car? Definitely not! We have too few cars.

At that time, the PLA Shannan Military Sub-district Logistics Department had only one motor vehicle company, with only 46 95-horsepower, 4-ton CA10B Jiefang brand vehicles, one Lishan bus and two Jiefang brand buses that could work normally. At the same time, the condition of these vehicles was not particularly ideal and they could only maintain daily transportation tasks.

After learning about this situation, the PLA Central Command felt very embarrassed. The exercise was about to begin, but our "legs" were "tied up". How could this work? Not to mention that the soldiers needed supplies to go from the military region to the front line, if the transportation problem was not solved, where would the soldiers get the bullets to fight?

After weighing the pros and cons, the Central Military Commission specially dispatched a batch of new cars to the Chengdu Military Region in February 1987. All of these cars were transported to Qinghai by train. When the train was about to arrive at the station, the frontline soldiers went to pick up the cars according to the order. Every minute and every second now could become a bullet that drove the Indian army away!

Under the full coordination of the central government, 20 new Jiefang brand vehicles with 115 horsepower and a load capacity of 5 tons, 1 ambulance and 2 Beijing brand command vehicles were all on the road. After receiving the vehicles, the soldiers did not stop for a moment and drove the vehicles directly back to their units to transport supplies. According to the PLA veterans who participated in the battle at that time, they drank ice water and ate compressed dry food on the road in order to avoid fatigue. It took 7 days to drive all the vehicles to the military station.

After the bus arrived at the station, the logistics problems of the troops were basically solved. The next step was adaptive training.

Because many of the PLA troops transferred to the Sino-Indian border area to participate in the military exercise had lived in low-altitude areas for a long time, and the dispute between the two sides was in a high-altitude area. In order to maximize the combat effectiveness of the troops, actual combat training must be carried out. Only after the body adapts to the hypoxic environment can it reduce physical discomfort as much as possible and ensure the effectiveness of the action.

At the same time, when arriving in high-altitude and cold areas in a short period of time, weapons and equipment also need to be adjusted, and some effort may be required during maintenance, otherwise it will easily affect their performance.

3. I did all the preparations that I shouldn’t have done.

There are also some pre-war training projects, which cover multiple departments and arms, such as cadres, logistics departments, health workers, cooks, custodians, ordnance repair shops, and vehicle repair shops. From a combat perspective, some aspects of pre-war training are not that important. After all, the Indian army had already come to our door, and we were making these preparations, which was a bit over the top. Although the Indian army's combat effectiveness has improved to a certain extent after military reform, there is still a big gap between them and us, and there is no need to be overly nervous.

At that time, our People's Liberation Army actively learned from the problems encountered by the troops during the battles with the Vietnamese army and made some improvements.

In response to the problem of the military leadership's poor command in combat, we considered that some officers and soldiers at the grassroots level of the troops had not participated in real combat and did not react quickly enough on the battlefield, so we decided to strengthen the training of cadres. We conducted all-round training for the PLA cadres in terms of combat implementation and battlefield cleaning to enable them to gain certain combat experience. At the same time, we selected personnel who had studied in military academies to give lectures. This can increase the intelligence of fighter jets as much as possible.

In addition, to ensure the smooth completion of the exercise, the PLA also conducted training on the tasks that various departments need to complete in war and on how to better coordinate and cooperate with each other during the war. In simple terms, it is to train each department's ability to perform tasks and their ability to coordinate and complete tasks. Only in this way can the troops conduct large-scale unified operations.

Not only that, our PLA cadres also received training in wartime official document writing, map reading and use, and pistol and rifle day and night shooting skills. These skills need to be determined according to different positions. Different soldiers have different tasks. Many people use the skill of map reading and use incorrectly, which will cause a waste of educational resources. Of course, it is not redundant to learn it, but there is no need to be so cautious against a "weak chicken" like India.

In addition, the PLA's motor vehicle soldiers also need to receive training in enhanced driving skills; medical personnel need to receive training in temporary battlefield rescue techniques such as hemostasis, bandaging, and fixation; cooks need to receive technical training such as burying smokeless stoves; custodians need to be trained in the ability to quickly receive and send supplies at night; and ordnance repair shops and car repair shops need to be trained in the ability to quickly complete inspection and repair tasks. Physical training is even more rigorous. All PLA personnel need to run for half an hour every Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday mornings, climb mountains on Tuesday and Friday mornings, and have to march at night.

It is said that the PLA frontline troops at that time asked all the soldiers to shave their heads, write suicide notes, receive guns and ammunition, and also distributed first aid kits. The reason we did this was to wait for the Indian army to arrive, and also to reduce casualties as much as possible, or to make it easier to rescue the soldiers after being injured. Improving the survival rate is our focus.

To some extent, some of the PLA's preparations at the time were redundant, but it is always good to be cautious. After decades of military reform and rearmament, the Indian Army in 1987 was very different from the poorly equipped and poorly dressed army that was barely concentrated in 1962. They had a large number of transport planes and combat helicopters to provide supplies and support ground attacks. At the climax of the exercise, the Indian Army directly mobilized 12 divisions and several local independent brigades to fight against the PLA's eastern offensive forces. According to other records, the Indian Army also mobilized 5 squadrons of air force units at the time.

From this perspective, the PLA's preparations are not so redundant. Although we have prepared everything we need to prepare, and even what we shouldn't prepare, opportunities are reserved for those who are prepared. This is the truth we Chinese always believe in. As long as the battle has not started, we can always prepare, even if we are completely sure of the situation, we will still prepare. This is our modest and prudent combat concept of being rough but meticulous.

Of course, these efforts have indeed provided great help to the PLA's exercise operations. After three months of preparation, the PLA's physical endurance, wartime operations, and night marching skills have been significantly improved.