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the soviet union's interpretation of "security interests" was quite broad. between 1939 and 1940, the soviet union also made territorial claims to neighboring countries for its so-called "security interests." comparing this with the situation in 1944 is illustrative. stalin's plan in 1944 was almost exactly the same as the request he made to hitler through molotov: to extend the soviet union's "scope of interests" to hungary, romania, bulgaria, greece, and the straits between the mediterranean and black seas. in addition to the addition of yugoslavia and albania to the soviet list in 1944, the soviet union's territorial claims were strikingly similar to what karl marx had called russia's "natural frontiers" a century earlier. stalin did not hesitate to take great military risks for this plan. for him, the necessity of occupying budapest was not only due to the need for competition between britain and the united states, but also to complete the "timetable" of bolshevising hungary.

stalin once said: "freeing the capital (budapest) from the enslavement of german fascism will accelerate the establishment of a democratic government and will also have a beneficial impact on the indecisive elements of bourgeois parties and groups." the soviet union, britain and the united states both had this idea. the soviet union attaches great importance to the "race" for spheres of influence, which precisely proves the soviet union's imperialist ambitions. churchill's adriatic offensive was the only western allied operation in the region, and unlike stalin, churchill did not want a dramatic change in the political situation in the region, he just wanted those assigned to him just "percentage". for the united states at that time, political control of western europe was not its main concern.

the allied forces repeatedly postponed the invasion of normandy, and the british and american troops were almost completely inactive from october 1944 to march of the following year. this also showed that the strategic goals of the british and american high command did not include competing with the soviet union.

after the departure of the allied delegation, stalin, armed with his "security interests" plan, asked his general staff headquarters whether it was possible to capture budapest immediately. shortly before, he had received a report from general lev mehlis, stalin's former secretary and at this time the political representative of the 4th ukrainian front. mehlis's reports were always overly optimistic and had led to military disasters before. the ill-fated crimea operation in 1942 was the work of this man. he reported to stalin: "the units of the hungarian 1st army facing our front are falling apart and their morale is low. our troops are capturing 1,000 to 2,000 people every day, sometimes even more. enemy soldiers are in small groups in the forest "they were running around, some with weapons, some without, and many wearing civilian clothes."

regarding stalin’s question “whether it was possible to seize budapest immediately”, general sergei shtemenko, the first deputy chief of the general staff of the red army, later recalled: “we did not realize anything and replied that since it is most practical to launch an attack on the solid bridgehead on the great hungarian plain that the left wing of the 2nd ukrainian front has captured. this way our army does not have to cross the river, and the enemy forces here are relatively weak," said alexey antonov, chief of the general staff of the red army. general aleksei antonov also had reservations. he explained that mehlis' report could only explain the situation of the hungarian 1st army, but could not explain the overall situation. but stalin still issued the order to attack budapest immediately despite the objections of the generals.

◎ rodin malinowski (1898-1967)

malinovsky was only a military commander when the soviet-german war broke out in june 1941, but due to his outstanding commanding ability, he soon became the commander of the southern front in december. in december 1942, he led the third army in stalingrad. the 2nd guards army successfully defeated the german army's attempt to relieve the siege. from 1943, it served as the commander of the southwestern front, which was later renamed the 2nd ukrainian front.

at 10 pm on october 28, stalin had the following telephone conversation with rodion malinovsky, commander of the 2nd ukrainian front:

stalin: budapest - must be captured as soon as possible, to be precise, within the next few days. this is an absolute must. can you do it?

malinovsky: five days will be enough, as long as the 4th guards mechanized corps arrives and joins the 46th army.

stalin: the supreme command cannot wait for you for 5 days. you have to understand that for political reasons budapest had to be won as quickly as possible.

malinowski: if you give me 5 days to prepare, i can capture budapest in just 5 more days. if the offensive begins now, the 46th army will not have enough troops to resolve the battle quickly, and will inevitably fall into a protracted battle on the road to the hungarian capital. in other words, there was no way to capture budapest.

stalin: what's the use of being so stubborn? you obviously don't understand the absolute political necessity of attacking budapest immediately.

malinowski: i fully understand the political importance of capturing budapest, so i asked for five more days.

stalin: i explicitly order you to launch an attack on budapest tomorrow! !

stalin then hung up the phone without saying a word.

scholars dispute whether stalin's decision was correct. when the attack order was issued, the 23rd infantry corps as reinforcement was still on the way. malinovsky's only armored unit, the 2nd guards mechanized corps, did not join him until the next day, and the 4th ukrainian front army, which was supposed to participate in the encirclement of budapest, failed to reach the great hungarian plain at all.

the german command realized the soviet threat and began to redeploy troops on october 26. by november 1, the 23rd and 24th armored divisions of the army had moved to the kecskemét area, and the 13th armored division, the panzergrenadier division "commander hall" and the 8th ss "florian gei" the redeployment of the florian geyer cavalry division has also begun. general hans friessner, commander of the german army group south, planned to use these troops to retake the greater hungarian plain and establish a solid defense line along the tisza river.

the german armored divisions were certainly formidable, but the low morale of the hungarian army was the key that could trigger the collapse of the entire defense line. malinovsky certainly knew this. in order to break through the weak hungarian 3rd army's defense line, he planned to use lieutenant general ivan schlemin's 46th army to capture kecskemét. , and finally captured budapest. lieutenant general mikhail schumilov's 7th guards army was responsible for directly covering the right flank of the 46th army. they were ordered to cross the tisza river, expand the bridgehead near szolnok, and then turn northwest , capturing cegléd and other places along the way, outflanking and cutting off the defenders of budapest from the north. on shumilov's right wing, the 53rd, 27th and 40th armies would contain the german army on the opposite side to prevent the latter from launching an attack.

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