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black tulip

operation white: the fourth anti-encirclement campaign of the yugoslav guerrillas

tito's liquidation! ——battle of the neretva river (part 1)

tito's liquidation! ——battle of the neretva river (part 2)

until the end of the socialist era in yugoslavia, official historiography had always believed that the destruction of the bridge over the neretva river was actually a clever ruse designed by the yugoslav partisan high command to confuse the enemy about the true direction of the partisan breakout. in fact, this was a nearly disastrous decision due to the lack of intelligence on the number and deployment of the chetnik army and the recklessness of tito's military department. this only made the already serious situation of the campaign worse. on february 25, 1943, the german 7th ss volunteer mountain division "prince eugen" and the german 369th infantry division began to advance towards gramoč and livno. due to the continuous consumption of the war and the spread of typhus, the bosnian 1st army was almost unable to resist the vanguard of the axis forces. therefore, the destruction or blocking of ground transportation became the most effective means of defense for the partisans: for example, the german engineering troops found no less than 230 fallen tree trunks on a road that was only 6 kilometers long. fortunately for the main partisan group, the two german divisions mentioned above - the strongest in terms of numbers and equipment - were ordered to protect the vital mostar-livno bauxite mining area, rather than seeking to annihilate the yugoslav partisans in the neretva river area. even so, the weakest german 717th infantry division, which was advancing from horní vakuf to prozor, was considered a deadly threat by the partisans because the central hospital of the yugoslav partisan high command was hidden in the rama river valley outside the town.

with the exception of a temporary disbanding during the period of the yugoslav partisan version of the long march (june-november 1942), the central hospital of the yugoslav partisan high command had been providing medical care for the wounded and sick of surrounding troops since november 1941. in late february 1943, the central hospital admitted about 3,800 patients (an additional 700 were cared for by their troops). the fact that the central hospital admitted such a large number of incapacitated fighters, many of whom were brought to the central hospital on stretchers, had a decisive impact on the planning and combat operations of the main body of the yugoslav partisan operational group. past painful experience had taught the partisans never to abandon their wounded comrades; by the beginning of 1943, this had become an iron rule of their creed and greatly strengthened the yugoslav partisan team spirit. the downside was that this would deprive the army of its greatest combat advantage, namely greater flexibility in combat mobility: the speed of combat operations was now determined by the speed of movement of the cumbersome central hospital. the fate of the guerrillas' wounded brought a heavy burden to tito: he worked day and night to find the best evacuation plan. in these three days, he revised the battle plan for the breakout direction twice. however, before preparing for the breakout and evacuation, the annoying german troops must be dealt with first.

on the same day that the order to remove the bridges over the neretva river was issued, the partisans planned a major counterattack in the vakuf region. although yugoslav historians insist that this was only a feint, the operation was likely a best effort to open the way to central bosnia for the main force of the battle group. by taking advantage of the interior lines and captured vehicles, the yugoslav partisan high command managed to concentrate the combat forces of nine brigades (of a total of twelve brigades available for combat) against six german infantry battalions (later increased to eight) from the 717th and 718th infantry divisions and most of the 1st battalion of the 202nd panzer regiment. the initial battle took place on march 2 at a place called velica gumno, where the 4th proletarian brigade arrived in time to rescue the central hospital from the invading germans. two days later, the general offensive began: the fierce attacks of the yugoslav guerrillas and the dense blocking fire network of "unprecedented intensity" formed by the heavy weapons deployed in prozor and other areas shocked the german troops, and the german wehrmacht began to succumb and retreat. by the morning of march 5, the german troops under the threat of encirclement were forced to evacuate upper vakuf and re-establish defensive positions about 3 kilometers northwest of the town. with the greatest threat to the central hospital from the axis forces eliminated, the yugoslav guerrilla high command decided to change the direction of the breakout. compared with the german army's protracted and arduous battle, it was considered more feasible to risk crossing the preny mountains and breaking through the "chetnik" blockade, because the german reserve forces (the 369th infantry division) had begun to rush to the battlefield. on march 7, the 2nd proletarian division recaptured jablanica and established a small bridgehead on the left bank of the neretva river; four days later, after completely defeating the royalist "chetnik" army, the advance guard of the yugoslav partisans had established a foothold on lake boracko. at the same time, smirnov and his comrades built a simple pontoon bridge over the skeleton of the railway bridge that had been blown up just a few days ago. it took the yugoslav partisans a whole week to evacuate the central hospital and most of the main forces of the battle group to the other side (the 3rd shock division crossed the river from jablanica alone). on march 15, the last rearguard of the 1st proletarian division slowly and arduously retreated from horní vakuw to safety and burned the ancient and solemn bridge building behind them. operation "white ii" officially ended on march 17: "no booty was captured, no guerrillas were captured, and no guerrilla wounded were found" (general alexander lehr).

a destroyed bridge across the neretva river in jablanica, a historical relic of the battle of neretva museum, shows the world what happened in the past.

schematic diagram of the yugoslav partisan counterattack in the upper vakuf region, march 3-5, 1943

mittal bakić (left), political commissar of the 2nd proletarian division of the yugoslav partisans, and peko dapčević (center), commander of the 2nd proletarian division, are interrogating major artur strecker, an officer of the german 718th infantry division, who was captured during the battle of the neretva river on march 4, 1943.

on the surface, the germans seemed very satisfied with the results of the winter campaign. tito's liberated areas, which had been so dangerously close to zagreb, were no longer a threat, and his best guerrilla units were forced to seek refuge in the outskirts of the independent state of croatia; according to public official statistics, the guerrillas lost at least 12,500 officers and soldiers killed in the battle and 2,500 prisoners of war (this does not include the losses inflicted by the italians). in fact, operation white was by no means an absolute victory. most of the yugoslav guerrillas may have been driven out of the liberated areas, but the bosnian 1st army and the croatian 1st army remained in their respective bases and were expected to resume combat operations soon; due to the inherent instability of the "ustasha" regime, long-term peace and stability in these areas was impossible. although the guerrillas were expected to suffer 4,000 irreparable casualties (mainly due to disease and cold), they were far from a desperate army: the german troops only captured about 650 small arms, 8 artillery pieces and 1 tank. tito still had about 20,000 able-bodied partisans at his disposal, although they lacked heavy weapons, having to throw them into the neretva river on their way back. in the end, the axis forces paid a heavy price for this hollow victory. the independent state of croatia, fighting under the wehrmacht, saw relatively little action: 126 killed, 258 wounded, and 218 missing. german units reported 536 killed, 1,348 wounded, and 164 missing; the 717th infantry division suffered the heaviest losses, losing nearly 13% of its starting strength. however, the biggest losses were suffered by the italians: the 12th "sassari" infantry division lost about 1,000 killed, wounded, and missing; the 13th "king" infantry division and the 57th "lombardy" infantry division each lost about 600 men. the italian 154th "murge" infantry division was actually devastated: official battle reports stated that 2,000 people were killed and 1,300 were missing, as well as the loss of all related weapons and equipment.

schematic diagram of the yugoslav partisans' attempt to break through the axis blockade at the neretva river, march 6-15, 1943

operation white, overall combat situation of both sides, january to march 1943

Trifković, Gaj, Sea of Blood: A Military History of the Partisan Movement in Yugoslavia 1941-45, Helion and Company, 2022

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