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independent spirit

yugoslavia's neutrality in world war ii lasted only about twenty months. on april 6, 1941, the german, italian, hungarian, and bulgarian offensive spelled the end of yugoslav independence.

but at the beginning, the top leaders of the kingdom of yugoslavia were inclined to make peace with germany. on march 1, 1941, prince pavle, the regent, visited hitler and proposed that the soviet union was the biggest enemy in europe, and yugoslavia would join germany in attacking the soviet union.

however, most of the opposition parties - the democratic party, the agricultural party and the communist party of yugoslavia - as well as most of the yugoslav people expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government's pro-german tendencies.

the ruling macheco government was determined to use violence to suppress any voices of resistance to the axis powers. at the end of 1940, it decided to ban all trade union activities and set up military concentration camps to put two thousand communists in them.

on march 25, 1941, the yugoslav government signed the document to join the tripartite pact, which led to large-scale demonstrations across the country. riots of varying degrees broke out in serbia, montenegro, slovenia, bosnia and herzegovina, croatia and macedonia. the communist party of yugoslavia issued several declarations in march, accusing the government of selling out the country and demanding that the government conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the soviet union and establish a people's government to safeguard the interests of the masses. at the same time, the communist party of yugoslavia began to organize demonstrations in belgrade on the evening of the 26th.

under the influence of the rising nationalism in the country, general dusan-simovic, who was also dissatisfied with the government's pro-axis policies, overthrew the macheko government in cooperation with different factions supported by the british intelligence agency, the us strategic office, and the soviet intelligence department, and reorganized a new government that included most of the bourgeois parties.

this incident showed that in yugoslavia, from politicians to civilians - whether pro-british people in serbia, clericalists in slovenia, yugoslav communists seeking soviet aid, or generals in the army with pro-slav sentiments - most people opposed the axis. this laid the groundwork for the large-scale resistance movement that broke out after the fall of yugoslavia. in addition, the communist party of yugoslavia, which had been working for the communistization of yugoslavia, also stepped onto the big stage in the future - although the government still maintained hostility towards the communist party of yugoslavia, believing that even if it was occupied by germany, the communist party of yugoslavia could not be allowed to fish in troubled waters.

yet beyond that, yugoslavia, as a postwar state formed for geopolitical reasons, was riddled with internal contradictions. serbs had dominated the country from the beginning, as the ruling ethnic group. this caused resentment and opposition from croats. some macedonians maintained a pro-bulgarian stance. and many minorities (albanians, germans, hungarians, romanians, slovaks, and italians) wanted to return to their homeland. the historical legacy of ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as the competition between european powers for territory and influence in the balkans, undermined all efforts of the new country to strengthen political cohesion.

never bow your head

in april 1941, the republic of yugoslavia was invaded by the axis powers and surrendered. more than 300,000 soldiers were captured because the supreme command ordered not to resist. from the first day of the war until the last day of the liberation war, the bourgeoisie of all ethnic groups in yugoslavia was always worried that the class power balance in society might change and the proletariat would take the opportunity to gain greater power. class interests overwhelmed patriotism, and many bourgeois groups turned to the invaders for this reason. only the communist party of yugoslavia took the approach of dispersing party members to regular troops and influencing the troops to continue fighting, while calling on the vast number of workers and peasants to rise up to resist the axis massacre.

the serbian peasants in herzegovina and bosnia, the home of modern european guerrilla warfare, were the first to rise up. from the beginning of june 1941, the entire eastern part of herzegovina was ignited by the flames of the uprising. serbian peasants in lika and bosnian krajina began to resist the ustasha's massacre in may. on may 8, germany was forced to use heavy artillery to kill dozens of krajina people at the sana river bridge.

in the village of drezne in nevesinje, the ustasha planned to exterminate all serbs on june 3, but more than fifty brave young men set up an ambush and killed three ustasha on the spot. four ustasha were captured and shot. this riot soon spread to nevesinje county, bileča county and gačko county. except for a few cities, the entire region was liberated. the crimes committed by the ustasha and the news of the uprising in herzegovina aroused the anger of the montenegrins, and several montenegrin detachments came to support the herzegovinians.

however, ethnic hatred has always been instigated by some people with ulterior motives. after the herzegovina uprising, under the conspiracy of some nationalists, the uprising masses began to organize the killing of local muslims. the masses accused the muslim residents of being responsible for the massacre of the serbs. in bileca county, the ustasha did not harm a single serb (it was very close to the border with montenegro and they were worried about retaliation), but the uprising serbs killed more than 600 muslims, including women and children, twice in this county.

spontaneous uprisings also broke out in bosnia, lika, kordun and banja. yugoslavia was caught in the flames of the uprising. however, the rebels lacked communication and unified command, which made their impact minimal. communists sent by the central committee of the communist party of yugoslavia tried to unite the rebels, but it was clear that such help was far from enough.

on june 22, 1941, the soviet union officially joined the war, which gave a shot of adrenaline to the yugoslav communist party and all the yugoslav people who were hostile to the axis. the rural areas of yugoslavia always maintained the slav traditions, which made them believe that the slavic companions in the east would come to help them out of the sea of ​​suffering.

after the soviet union entered the war, a larger-scale mass uprising broke out in yugoslavia. in an uprising that began on july 13, more than 3,000 armed montenegrins attacked the italian garrisons. except for a few cities such as cetinje, podgorica, and nikšić, the entire territory of montenegro was liberated. the area of ​​this liberated area reached more than 10,000 square kilometers. at the same time, it had a significant impact on the italians. the italian messina division alone suffered more than 5,000 casualties.

there was blind confidence in the soviet union. montenegrin farmers believed that soviet paratroopers could drop at any time, so they cut the weeds in their fields that might hinder their landing.

not only did the civilians strongly believe that the red army would soon crush hitler's invading army, but many leaders of the communist party of yugoslavia also believed so. in the summer of 1941, veselin maslesa wrote an article for the montenegrin provincial committee's official newspaper "our struggle", asserting that the war would last for six months. he was subsequently held responsible for spreading rumors by a committee of the communist party of montenegro. after june 22, based on the strong optimism in herzegovina - believing that the war would end soon, a new wave of uprisings appeared in northern herzegovina. on june 24, communist party member dukica grahovac led the insurgents, waving red flags and shouting the slogan "long live russia", and attacked nevesine. this group of herzegovinians occupied part of the city and forced the ustasha to retreat to the fortified barracks.

however, soon after, the italians, who had recovered from their shock, dispatched the ninth army to suppress the rebellion. on july 18, six divisions launched an offensive against the montenegrin uprising forces. by august 10, all the liberated areas in montenegro had been captured. the peasants' vacillation was then exposed: they began to regard the communists as dangerous people, actively reported them to the local government and participated in the search as guides. in crmnica, the communist organization was even forced to admit that it was a terrorist organization and was forced to surrender to the government.

this incident reflects the social psychology of the yugoslav peasants at that time: they revolted only to avoid being massacred by the ustasha. once the ustasha began to adopt a slightly more relaxed policy, the peasants would stop resisting. in other words, they were not fighting for the so-called national liberation, they were fighting for themselves. there were many reasons for this. religious traditions and nationalism did not support the peasants to unite, and the communist party of yugoslavia lacked the prestige and ability to integrate the peasants at this time. at the same time, dracha mihajlovic, the former deputy chief of staff of the second army of the yugoslav army and the minister of defense of the yugoslav government in exile in january 1942, was quite popular for his "serbs above all else" nationalism. the chetniks he formed in the ravna gora mountains based on the former yugoslav army soldiers also developed well. at this time, the communist party of yugoslavia was facing not only pressure from the masses, but also resistance from resistance organizations with different ideas.

however, despite the difficulties, the guerrillas under the control of the yugoslav communist party still liberated a considerable area of ​​land. in september, the guerrillas' general headquarters moved from belgrade to the liberated areas, first to krupanj and then to užice. on september 26, a meeting of commanders of guerrilla detachments from all over yugoslavia was held in stolica near krupanj. at the meeting, the supreme command and the general headquarters of various regions were formed.

the enemy's first offensive (operation užice)

from september 27 to october 15, 1941, the german and chetnik operations against the partisans in western serbia, which yugoslavia called the first enemy offensive, took place. the republic of užice was not a state with a single authority and a single armed force. there were two different military forces in the republic of užice, one was the partisans and the other was the chetnik movement. there were two independent armies and commands in the republic of užice, but the partisans made the most important contribution to the defense of the republic - in terms of numbers, the partisans' 25,000 fighters far outnumbered the thousands of chetniks. the headquarters of the partisans in the territory was in užice (hence the name of the republic of užice), while the headquarters of the chetniks was in the town of pozega.

the economy of the town of užice was in a state of war. there was a textile workshop in the town, which produced linen, towels, and some medical supplies. in addition, there was a tailor's workshop for making military uniforms, a shoemaking workshop, a guerrilla bakery, and a leather workshop. three small hydroelectric power stations on the jetinje river were in constant operation, and the town and all important facilities had normal electricity supply. there was also a railway, which was mainly used for military purposes (transporting soldiers to the front), but also met civilian needs. workers built an armored guerrilla train to ensure transportation safety.

in this free land, kitchens were set up for the disabled. the influx of people and the evacuation of the wounded to the towns prompted the free town hospitals to organize free medical services. a strong cultural life also developed. in užice, the partisans printed newspapers and published news of the battles. there was even an art department in the partisan company, with active drama, art and music sections.

after the partisans entered the town of užice on september 24, 1941, they established an ammunition factory. frequent bombings by the germans made it impossible for the factory to continue production, so the factory was moved several times to different locations in the town to conceal its presence. part of the machines and tools of the ammunition department were placed in underground facilities that were built before the war to meet the needs of the national bank.

in the užice republic, the partisans produced and secured weapons and ammunition for the front, including:

rifles: 21,000

rifle ammunition: 2.7 million rounds

pistol ammunition: 90,000 rounds

grenade launcher: 300

grenade 30,000

fixed machine gun about 300

mines 2,000

hitler was furious at the rise of the largest territory in occupied europe that was not yet fully controlled. on september 16, hitler issued an order to retake the liberated areas. command was given to general franz böhme, commander of the 18th army. the german 342nd division began its offensive on september 28, 1941. wehrmacht units fought fiercely with the partisans for a month. the partisans and chetniks negotiated repeatedly in the fall, but they did not reach an agreement on cooperation. on october 26, 1941, tito and mihajlovic met again in the town of brajić near ravna gora to try to reach a final understanding, but mihajlovic rejected tito's proposals, including the establishment of a common headquarters, joint military operations against the germans and bandits, the establishment of a joint staff responsible for the supply of troops, and the establishment of a national liberation committee. the chetnik command had sent two of mihajlović’s lieutenants, colonel branislav pantić and captain nenad mitrović, to belgrade, where they made contact with german intelligence officer captain josef matl on october 28. they told the bundeswehr that colonel mihajlović had authorized them to establish contact with prime minister milan nedić and the relevant bundeswehr commands, telling them that the colonel was willing to “put himself and his men at their disposal to fight communism.” the two representatives also assured the germans that their commander would “completely clear serbian territory of communist gangs” and requested assistance from the occupation forces in the form of “about 5,000 rifles, 350 machine guns and 20 heavy machine guns.”

in late november 1941, partisan intelligence informed partisan commander tito that german soldiers were about to attack. german aircraft began bombing the city on november 22, with one of the bombs hitting the bank building used as the partisans' headquarters, causing an explosion in the underground vault where ammunition was being manufactured, killing 120 people. then, on november 28, the workers' battalion in užice and two partisan units from posavina and oraše (both commanded by andrija đurović) were ordered to intercept the wehrmacht's 342nd infantry division, which had been spotted advancing towards kadinjaca mountain, just 14 kilometers from the edge of užice.

at 8 a.m. on november 29, before the german troops reached the kadinjaca ridge, they were intercepted by the guerrillas. the german 342nd infantry division consisted of more than 3,000 soldiers, far outnumbering the approximately 400 fighters of the guerrilla workers' battalion, but the guerrillas continued to fight. as a result, almost all members of the workers' battalion were killed, but they still held their positions and fought the german wehrmacht for nearly 6 hours, buying enough time for the civilians of the supreme headquarters and the guerrilla leaders to evacuate užice. after leaving užice, the guerrillas went to sandzak and entered the italian-occupied area. some guerrillas failed to retreat in time and were dispersed or destroyed. after the main force of the guerrillas went to sandzak, only parts of 5 guerrilla detachments remained in serbia to continue fighting.

second enemy offensive (southeast croatia and ozil)

between january 15 and february 4, 1942, germany led the southeast croatia operation (called the second enemy offensive by yugoslavia), which targeted yugoslav partisans in eastern bosnia. a few days after the southeast croatia operation ended, a follow-up operation called ozren was launched between the bosna and spreca rivers.

general paul bader was the overall commander of both operations. the main force of the operation was the german 342nd infantry division, which had been replaced by bulgarian troops in occupation duties in occupied serbian territory. generalmajor (brigadier general) paul hoffman, commander of the 342nd infantry division, also commanded generalmajor johann fortner's 718th infantry division during the operation. the germans were assisted by the croatian national guard, which included seven infantry battalions and nine artillery batteries. the total number of axis forces available for the operation was 30,000-35,000. luftwaffe support included reconnaissance aircraft and a combat squadron. the targets of the offensive were the areas controlled by the romanian, zwijezda, birac and ozren partisan detachments between sarajevo, tuzla, zvornik and višegrad. in the south, the italians set up cordons along the "vienna line" that separated the german-occupied and italian-occupied areas of the ndh. the germans estimated that there were a total of about 8,000 partisans and 20,000 bosnian chetniks in the target area of ​​the operation.

on january 9, 1942, the 718th infantry division issued orders to its two regiments that any captured partisans would be shot immediately, as would any other insurgents who attacked the germans, were captured with ammunition or information, resisted or escaped. in addition, any house that fired at german troops was to be burned.

participating troops of both sides:

guerrilla

the first proletarian brigade

romanian detachment

birac detachment

star team

and several chetnik units.

croatian troops

2nd and 4th battalions/3rd infantry regiment

VI.

vii. artillery group

ii. company battalion and 13/8. infantry regiment

i. battalion, ii. company battalion and 13/15. infantry regiment.

1st artillery company/9th artillery group

2. artillery battery/xi.

1st and 2nd battalions / 13. infantry regiment

3rd company/iii. engineer battalion

mountain artillery company

black legion (battle 3)

hajifindic regiment (1 battalion)

german army:

342nd infantry division

714th infantry division (part)

718th infantry division

202 armoured regiment

italian forces:

3rd alpine regiment/1st mountain division "taurinense"

the operation began on january 15, 1942. after learning about the start of the operation in southeastern croatia, the chetnik leaders appointed by draza mihajlovic, major boško todorovic and major jezdimir danjic, suggested to other chetnik commanders that the target of the operation was the guerrillas and that there was no need for the chetniks to participate in it. many people crossed the territory of the drina river to avoid fighting, which severely weakened the defense of the guerrillas who were jointly defending, resulting in heavy casualties and losses for the guerrillas. these actions cut off the only remaining cooperative links between the chechens and the guerrillas in eastern bosnia. after adjusting the defensive deployment, the guerrilla supreme staff and the 1st proletarian brigade temporarily improved the guerrillas' defense against the germans and ndh forces, but they could not save the situation and were forced to retreat southwards to foca. about 172 guerrillas were seriously injured due to hypothermia during the transfer, and 6 died. as they approached the german-italian border south of sarajevo, the partisans were able to penetrate through the thin italian cordon. german and ndh forces succeeded in retaking sokolac, rogatica, bratunac, srebrenica, vlasenica, han pijesak, olovo, bosansko petrovo selo, and a number of smaller settlements, inflicting heavy losses on the partisans.

however, due to bad weather, the operation failed to completely wipe out the guerrillas. the germans suffered 25 casualties, 131 wounded, 1 missing, and about 300 frostbite. the germans captured 855 rifles, 22 machine guns, and 4 artillery pieces, as well as livestock and draft animals. the guerrillas suffered 531 killed and 1,331 to 1,400 captured. in addition, most of the fighters of the 1st proletarian brigade were frostbitten while crossing mount igman. the germans believed that they had completely blocked the area, but most of the guerrillas evaded the cordon, splitting into small groups and sneaking through the cordon through seemingly impassable terrain to escape. the germans also believed that some guerrillas simply retreated into the mountains, hiding their numbers by stepping on each other's snowprints, so that they could return to the valley when the axis troops left. on january 25, the staff entered foca and stationed there for three and a half months.

the enemy's third attack (operation trio)

in early january 1942, the partisan high staff decided to allow fighters who did not want to formally join the partisans to fight alongside them. these "volunteer detachments" were controlled by the renamed yugoslav people's liberation partisans and the volunteer army high staff and were formed by former chetnik-allied fighters: jahorina, foca, vlasenica, srebrenica and krajina volunteer detachments. the krajina volunteer detachment was composed of refugees from the region who had fled to serbian territory to escape the bloody rule of the ustasha. volunteer battalions and companies were also placed under the staff of the former partisan detachments, many of which were absorbed into entire units and a communist cadre was added. some volunteer detachments fought under their own leadership, and all volunteer detachments fought under the serbian tricolor flag.

on march 1, the 2nd proletarian brigade was formed in čajniče, formed from partisan units withdrawn from serbia after the užice operation. the partisans began to select the most loyal fighters from each partisan detachment to form assault companies, and to form assault battalions and assault brigades. at the same time, partisan units dispersed by the southeast croatian operation were threatening the tuzla-doboj railway line. in mid-march, the 1st east bosnia assault battalion was formed in srednje (outside sarajevo), and at the end of the month, the 2nd east bosnia assault battalion was formed in drinjača (near zvornik); this battalion incorporated the remaining 240 fighters of the majevica partisan detachment.

the concentration of the most reliable fighters into proletarian brigades, assault battalions, and assault companies weakened the integrity of the four remaining partisan detachments in eastern bosnia, but enabled the partisan high command to concentrate its best forces into mobile units to more effectively conduct offensive operations against the chetniks. by the end of march, partisan operations threatened the railway network throughout eastern bosnia, including around sarajevo. many bosnian chetniks fled to the partisans, usually joining them as organized units still under the command of former chetnik commanders. these former chetnik units became the volunteer army, which by the end of march had reached a strength of about 7,000-8,000 fighters.

in order to organize the guerrillas and integrate the chetniks, the germans took the initiative and began to clear the area north of the demarcation line. from april 20 to 30, the germans, in coordination with the ndh forces, advanced to the drina river, which was the first stage of "operation trio i". the 718th infantry division set out from the assembly areas in sarajevo, olowo and tuzla with the goal of relieving rogatica and clearing the surrounding areas of guerrillas. the main guerrilla forces avoided the battle with the black legion and attacked the chetniks from the rear who were fighting against francetic's troops.

in the second half of april, coups d'état were launched by former chetnik units in support of the chetniks. the first coup took place in a battalion of the romanian partisan detachment, followed by all three battalions of the zvyezda partisan detachment. the political commissars of each company were killed. by the beginning of may, coups d'état also took place in the battalions of the kalinovik partisan detachment and the foča volunteer detachment.

on may 8-9, 1942, the newly formed zenica partisan brigade staged another zintnik coup, killing about 30 communists and their supporters. about 100 partisans from the ozren and zenica brigade were organized into the 3rd shock battalion in eastern bosnia.

the italians believed that the initial german-nhr operation was intended to prevent the italians from expanding their sphere of influence by avoiding involvement in the liquidation of eastern bosnia. amid italian complaints and political manipulation, roatta took over direct control of the operation on may 10. the second phase of the operation (called trio ii or "operation foca") was a rather small-scale joint operation aimed at capturing foca, but by this time the guerrilla high staff and main forces had evacuated the town. the germans took the empty town without a fight.

after clearing the larger towns of the birać area of ​​partisans and chetniks, the croatian black legion committed atrocities against serbs and jews in the area, including the massacre of about 890 people from vlasenica after raping women and girls. the bosnia and herzegovina partisan general staff, along with three eastern bosnian assault battalions, initially attempted to follow the partisan high staff and main forces across the bosna river to western bosnia, but retreated to birać, where they joined the birać detachment in late may. the birać partisan detachment was the only partisan or volunteer army detachment in eastern bosnia that did not suffer the chetnik coup of march-may 1942.

following operation trio, a joint italo-chetnik offensive was launched against partisan detachments in the italian-occupied zones in eastern herzegovina and montenegro, with similar results: the partisans lost almost all liberated areas in these regions. after the operation, despite protests from the italians, ndh units remained south of the german-italian boundary.

after this offensive, the partisans formed three more proletarian brigades, composed mainly of montenegrins. operation trio prompted the partisan high staff to decide to withdraw to western bosnia in the partisan long march that began in late june 1942. although it suffered heavy casualties in the battles with the black legion, the chetnik movement in eastern bosnia benefited greatly from mass desertions by the partisans and from several pro-chetnik coups by both partisan and volunteer army detachments. despite the lack of chetnik unity, the chetnik movement flourished in eastern bosnia during the last part of 1942, due to the compromises some chetnik leaders reached with the ustasha regime and the reluctance of many chetniks and partisans to kill their fellow bosnian serbs who opposed it.

the enemy's fourth attack

on january 2 and 3, 1943, germany and italy held a conference in rome. marshal caballero, commander of the italian supreme command, general alexander-lehr, commander of the german southeast, and general roata, commander of the italian second army, attended the conference. they adopted the general concept of action against the people's liberation army (the official name of the yugoslav guerrilla movement).

in late 1942, as the axis situation in north africa continued to deteriorate, the german high command began to worry about the possibility of an allied landing in the balkans. since they were extracting a large amount of resources from yugoslavia, including timber, copper, and bauxite, if the allies landed, the resistance in yugoslavia would likely interfere with germany's defense operations and the continued exploitation of resources. therefore, on december 16, 1942, adolf hitler ordered generaloberst alexander löhr, commander of the armed forces in southeast europe, to crush the resistance in yugoslavia. at a meeting on december 18-19, the german wehrmacht general staff decided to destroy the republic of bihac. on january 8, löhr and mario roatta, commander of the italian second army, met in zagreb and developed a detailed plan.

the germans aimed to destroy the central headquarters of the guerrilla movement, the central committee of the communist party of yugoslavia, and the guerrillas' central hospital. the axis assembled a total of 90,000 troops in ten divisions, in addition to twelve air squadrons. to support the operation, the chetniks organized the "march into bosnia", the goal of which was to unite chetniks from lika, northern bosnia, northern dalmatia, herzegovina, and montenegro to occupy the core guerrilla territory and launch a genocidal attack on the muslims in bosnia and herzegovina and sandzak. according to the germans, the chetniks had 150,000 troops in february 1943 (100,000 in august 1942). the guerrillas had less than a third of that number.

according to the german general staff, the battle was expected to take place mainly in the area between the kupa river in croatia and the montenegrin border.

these operations were later officially named "operation weiss in autumn", and hitler personally approved the operation plan.

the action plan is divided into three phases:

weiss i -- operations against partisan territory in croatia and western bosnia;

weiss ii - operations against partisan territory from dervar to the neretva river;

weiss iii - disarmament of the chetniks in east herzegovina. this phase was cancelled in early february 1943. (however, two months later, before the fifth offensive, the battle of sutjeska, the germans surrounded the chetniks and forced them to surrender)

troop deployment:

the german "croatian" corps was commanded by general rudolf lutes and consisted of the following units: 7th ss division (22,000 men), 369th division (14,000 men), 717th division (7,000 men), 202nd tank battalion and 714th division (5,000 men). the corps had 30 german battalions and 5 home guard battalions, 30 artillery batteries, 40 tanks, and was supported by 5 german squadrons and 3 ustaša squadrons with a total of 100 aircraft.

italian forces:

the italian 5th army consisted of the following units: the "lombard" division (5,000 soldiers), the "re" division (reinforced by two tank companies, 12,000 soldiers), the "sassari" division (10,000 soldiers), the ustasha (2,000 soldiers) and 1,000 chetniks from lika.

guerrilla forces:

1. the 1st croatian army, commanded by ivan gosniak, consisted of the following units: the 7th banja division, the 8th kodon division, the primorje-gorski kotar brigade group and the 6th lika division, with a total strength of approximately 16,500 men.

2. the 1st bosnian army, commanded by kosta-nadje, consists of the 4th krajina division, the 5th krajina division and the howitzer battalion; total strength is about 11,000 men.

on january 20, operation weiss i began. the axis forces attacked the territories held by the partisan 1st croatian and 1st bosnian armies - banja, kodon, lika and western bosnia. the partisan operational command had left bihać in late january and during this time tried to implement the supreme staff's operational plan of moving east. the command wanted its forces to move from bosnia and herzegovina to serbia, while the croatian and bosnian armies held their positions against the enemy.

before the operation began, the german leadership was weighing the combat effectiveness of the 2nd and 5th krajina brigades and the 1st proletarian division to the north and east of banja luka. they concluded that banja luka could be attacked. therefore, the 714th division was mainly defensive and was completely excluded from operation weiss i.

the 717th division operated between sanski most and bosanski petrovac. on january 25, the 6th krajina brigade attacked the flank of the 717th division. in the battles near the village of benaković on january 28 and 29, the 4th division succeeded in encircling the 737th regiment of the 717th division, but failed to destroy it.

although the guerrillas' defense was well organized and their counterattacks were well planned, they were forced to start a gradual retreat in the face of the enemy's encirclement. the 7th banja division withdrew from bihać on the night of january 28-29. about 15,000 civilians left with the troops.

during the axis operation weiss i, the decision was made by the partisan leadership to launch an offensive towards the neretva river valley. on february 8, tito proposed the offensive plan at a meeting with the staffs of the three elite divisions (the 1st proletarian division, the 2nd proletarian division and the 3rd shock division).

the task of the right column, the 2nd proletarian division, was to advance past imotski, reach the village of dreznica, capture it and cut off the traffic between jablanica and mostar. after capturing the village, its task was to protect the right flank of the main guerrilla force, prevent the italian garrison in mostar from intervening, and continue to advance towards jablanica with the strength of a brigade.

the central column - the 3rd assault division had the most difficult task: to capture prozor, konich and all the strongholds in the valleys of the rama and neretva rivers, and to open a road across the neretva river.

the left column, the 1st proletarian division, was ordered to advance towards gornji vakuf, capture the mountain pass ivan sedlo, and cut off communication between sarajevo and konjic. they also had to provide protection for the northern flank of the main guerrilla force against possible german intervention from sarajevo. the 9th dalmatian division was tasked with protecting the right flank and background of the 2nd proletarian division and following the retreat of the central hospital.

the mission of the 7th banya division was to protect the central hospital (with about 4,000 wounded and sick) from the north.

the axis forces involved in operation weiss ii were:

the 717th and 718th divisions and the 5th ustasha brigade advance through bugojno towards rivno

the 7th ss division and the 369th army division advance in the direction of derval-glamoch-livno

the italian 18th and 6th armies and the chetnik corps - advanced from the south and southeast.

the german 717th and 7th ss divisions merged near petrovac on february 8, thus encircling the görmec mountains. the three brigades of the 4th krajina division found themselves surrounded by a large number of german forces and immediately began to take countermeasures. on the night of february 12, the 5th and 6th brigades came down from the cliffs and defeated a small german detachment, thus breaking the encirclement.

at the same time, on the other side of the mountain, the 2nd krajina brigade also managed to break out. the german command was convinced that they had surrounded the main partisan forces and therefore paid no special attention to them.

on february 9 and 10, the right column (2nd proletarian division) easily defeated the garrisons at posušjie and imotski. on february 15, they captured and secured the village of drežnica. the 1st battalion of the 260th regiment of the murzh division marched from mostar, but the battalion was almost completely destroyed in a battle with elements of the 2nd proletarian division. in late february, elements of the 2nd proletarian division captured jablanica, completing their main mission.

on february 19, the german kampfgruppe vogel, consisting of the 718th division, the 5th ustasha brigade (black legion), and artillery, advanced towards gornji vakuw. they captured gornji vakuw and then found themselves in a 10-day battle with the banja 7th division, which had been reinforced by partisans, near prozor.

the 7th ss division was charged with attacking the positions of the 8th division of kolden. the 369th division attacked in the same direction. the goal was to reach the bihac-petrovac line within a day. on this front, the germans and the partisans fought back and forth over every position. today the germans took it, tomorrow the partisans took it back. after several days of fighting, the 7th ss division finally reached bihac. during this time, the strongest german division in the battle line failed to encircle and destroy any of the partisans. the partisans' organized defense successfully thwarted the german plans.

the italian "lombardy", "re" and "sassari" divisions were tasked with advancing in northern dalmatia. these divisions engaged the 6th lica division. interestingly, under the cover of darkness, the guerrillas inflicted heavy losses on the italians, who had no air superiority. what the italians conquered during the day, the guerrillas recaptured at night.

in late february, tito's main battle group found itself in a critical situation. pressure was building from the north on prozor (where the central hospital was located), and from the south and southeast the italians were increasing. the 7th ss and 369th ss divisions were approaching from the west.

in this situation, tito decided to change the direction of the attack. he decided not to attack neretva by force, but to hit the german forces near prozor hard. he also ordered the pioneer company to destroy all bridges over the neretva river. tito tried to bluff the axis forces with this tactical move, making them think that the partisans wanted to break out in the north instead of the south.

the guerrillas who took part in the counterattack at gorngivakuf were

the right column under koca-popović, composed of the 1st proletarian brigade, the 3rd sandzak brigade, and the 1st dalmatian brigade;

the central column, commanded by peko-dapčević, with the 2nd and 4th proletarian brigades, the 7th banja brigade, and the 3rd krajina brigade, supported the tanks;

the left column, commanded by pavle jaksic, consisted of the 8th banja brigade and the 3rd krajina brigade.

the main task was to encircle and destroy the german forces in gorngivakuf.

the attack began at 3 p.m. on march 3. the right column successfully completed its mission and covered the right flank.

the central column had the most difficult task. their task was to push the troops of the "vogel" battle group to upper vakuf. after fierce fighting, they succeeded in breaking through the defenses of the 717th division.

the left column made very slow progress. due to their delay, the germans managed to retreat to bugojno. the german command realized that the partisans wanted to break out to the north, and they made a wrong conclusion.

tito did not want to continue the offensive. he fulfilled his promise not to abandon the wounded and sick. he ordered a 180-degree turn and moved most of the army back to the neretva river.

at this point, the guerrillas were trapped in a pocket with their backs to the neretva river. on their western flank were german forces, including several elite units, supported by an armored brigade. the eastern flank (opposite the guerrilla pocket) was guarded only by chetnik formations operating in coordination with the germans. to reach this side, the guerrillas had to cross one of the five bridges over the neretva river. if the guerrillas could cross the river, they would be relatively safe.

the pioneer company that destroyed the bridge mentioned above built a simple new bridge on the skeleton of the old bridge. the guerrillas crossed the river under intensive aerial bombardment. the first troops to cross the bridge immediately engaged in a battle with the garrison.

the germans soon discovered this and launched a fierce attack. however, due to the rugged mountains, even if the axis powers dispatched a large air force formation to carry out intensive aerial bombing, the makeshift bridge could not be accurately destroyed. the guerrillas' defenders resisted the increasingly powerful offensive of the germans and successfully crossed the river.

the 9th dalmatian brigade and the 7th krajina brigade were the last to cross the improvised bridge. after they crossed, the bridge was destroyed. by this action, all the wounded and sick were rescued.

unfortunately, the main combat force was forced to throw about 10 tanks and all light and heavy artillery into the neretva river gorge, because the terrain of eastern bosnia was covered with high mountains and carrying these heavy weapons could not be effectively used. therefore, they had to plan to seize artillery and howitzers again.

by the end of march, the germans claimed to have killed about 11,915 partisans, executed 616, and captured 2,506. despite the heavy losses and the axis' tactical victory, the partisans managed to keep their headquarters and hospitals and were able to continue fighting. in fact, reaching the eastern part of bosnia and herzegovina, the partisans were relieved of pressure and began their offensive against the chetniks.

it is worth mentioning that during weiss ii, italian troops suffered a series of heavy defeats: on february 16, the 2nd proletarian division annihilated the 1st battalion of the 260th regiment of the murzh division near drenica; on february 20-22, the 1st battalion of the 259th regiment was annihilated in rama and jablanica. in february, many small units were also annihilated in rama and jablanica.

however, although the yugoslav guerrillas escaped from danger, the heavy casualties caused by the german army could not be ignored. although there were still many new recruits who were eager to join the defense of their country, the decline in combat effectiveness was inevitable. at the same time, due to the continuous pursuit of the german army, the guerrillas' good luck in escaping unscathed could not protect them every time. two months later, they were about to encounter a catastrophe...

the enemy's fifth attack

in mid-april 1943, the german command decided to launch a new offensive against the mog, codenamed "black dial". the german command adjusted the combat plan against the guerrillas according to the terrain characteristics:

"it was planned to concentrate the main partisan divisions and their high command in the naturally isolated and almost uninhabited area between the tara and piva ravines and mount durmitor, and there to destroy it using aviation, artillery and mountain troops in large numbers. the 1st mountain division and its northern flank were the italian 19th venetian infantry (mountain) division, kampfgruppe ludwig (724th german, 61st and 63rd bulgarian regiments), the 369th infantry division, the 118th jager division and the 4th home guards jaeger brigade of the independent state of croatia were deployed in a semicircle on the eastern and northern sides. in the first stage, these forces were to hold sandzak and push the partisans to the left of the tara river. the southern flank of the 1st alpine division, the 23rd ferrara infantry division and the 7th ss prinz eugen mountain division was to push the partisans from the south and southeast.

in addition to these units, there are another 4 italian divisions deployed in the adriatic hinterland, from the albanian border to the lower neretva river: these italian divisions are: the 155th infantry division emilia in the bay of kotor, the 151st infantry division perugia in the areas of velusi, bileca and trebinje, the 154th infantry division murg near dubrovnik and the 32nd infantry division marche in the lower neretva river, from mostar to metković.

meanwhile, the germans and italians had serious disagreements over how to use the chetniks who had surrendered in previous battles. the germans believed that the chetniks were extremely unreliable and should be disarmed and thrown into concentration camps; the italians insisted on using them as puppet troops. in early may, the surrendered yugoslav officer pavle djuricić established contact with the 1st mountain division and parts of the 4th brandenburg army. the germans decided to conceal their true intentions, so they sent the first disarmed chetniks home. through correspondence with the chetniks, by mid-may 1943 they managed to concentrate a large number of chetniks, led by djuricić, around the town of kolasin, where german combat units were already deployed. in a surprise attack on the chetniks on the morning of may 14, the germans captured the chetniks in their sleep and disarmed them, despite strong opposition from general ercole roncaglia, commander of the italian 14th army. the germans on the ground appealed to the higher command to reconsider the decision to arrest the chetniks, as they proved to be reliable allies against the partisans, but the german command did not give up the original idea. some of the captured chetniks, including djuricić, were held in prisoner-of-war camps in greece and poland. after capturing most of the montenegrin chetniks near kolasin, the germans continued with operation black dial.

axis order of battle:

1) germany: 7th ss volunteer mountain division prince eugen, 1st mountain division, 118th jaeger division, 369th (croatia) infantry division, 4th brandenburg regiment, reinforced 724th infantry regiment (104th division)

2) italy: 1st alpine (mountain) division, 19th venetian (mountain) infantry division, 23rd ferrara infantry division, 32nd marche infantry division, 151st perugia infantry division, 154th murg infantry division and troops in the podgorica area

3) independent state of croatia: 4th national guard jaeger brigade, 63rd and 61st infantry regiments of the 369th infantry division under german command

in total, 127,000 troops, eight artillery regiments, tanks, and about 300 aircraft took part in the offensive.

yugoslav partisans:

1st proletarian division (1st proletarian brigade, 3rd proletarian brigade, 3rd krajina brigade), 2nd proletarian division (2nd proletarian brigade, 4th proletarian brigade, 2nd dalmatian brigade), 3rd shock division (5th montenegrin brigade, 10th herzegovina brigade, 1st dalmatian brigade), 7th banja division (7th banja brigade, 8th banja brigade, 13th proletarian brigade), 6th proletarian brigade, 15th majevica brigade

a total of about 16,000 soldiers and 4,000 wounded from the previous four battles

assault! assault!

on the morning of may 15, the axis forces began their operations against the partisan territory. the 1st mountain division in the direction of kolašin and parts of the 369th division attacked the partisans. at the same time, parts of the 7th ss division advanced to gacko and nevesinje. on may 18, the 7th ss division and the italian ferrara division began their advance from the south towards šavnik, žabljak and mratinje. the 1st dalmatian brigade and the 5th montenegrin brigade successfully blocked the right flank of the 7th ss division and the italians and organized an attack on the left flank of the 7th ss division. in the first five days, the germans achieved significant results. they succeeded in destroying parts of the mog troops near gorazde and čajniče, thus threatening the mog's central hospital. by may 20, there was a temporary lull on the front, and the italian units did not launch the scheduled offensive against the positions of the 7th bania division. during the first five days of fighting, the partisan headquarters realized the intentions of the german command. therefore, they took countermeasures to the offensive action and ensured their exit from the encirclement.

by may 21, the germans had almost surrounded the mog, but its forces were quite dispersed. on may 22, the reinforcements of the 1st proletarian division succeeded in defeating part of the german 118th jager division and part of the croatian jaeger brigade near the village of čelebići (the 7th mountain regiment on may 21 and the 13th mountain regiment on may 24), thus eliminating the direct threat to the central hospital.

after 10 days of fierce fighting, the germans did not achieve their objectives, but the mog was also unable to break out of the encirclement. on may 24, the 1st proletarian division launched a general offensive against german and croatian positions. however, the stubborn resistance of the germans prevented the 1st proletarian division from breaking out of the encirclement near foča until may 25. after parts of the german 369th division attacked the flank of the 1st division near gradac on the 25th, the attempt to break out proved hopeless. on may 27, the high command ordered all units to move to the left bank of the tara river. at the same time, the 2nd proletarian division conquered the vučevomountain range. vučevo occupies a very important position. whoever controls vučevo controls the sutješka river valley. on may 25, the partisans abandoned the attempt to break out of the german encirclement near foča, which was being reinforced. the next day, the high command decided to try to break out of vučevo and sutješka. on the night of may 27-28, the british military delegation parachuted to the supreme headquarters. tito asked for help from the allied allies, but the soviet union, which was fighting the german army in the battle of kursk in ukraine, politely rejected tito's request. the british delegation's report on actively requesting the british royal air force to carry out air strikes on german assembly areas in the near east was also ignored by the british command.

soon after, all units were ordered to move to the sutjeska river valley. during the partisan movement, the anaker kampfgruppe anaker, part of the 738th regiment of the 118th german jager division, attempted to wrest control of the vucevo mountains from the superior yugoslav forces. the anaker kampfgruppe anaker launched several attacks, but all failed and they were forced to retreat. meanwhile, parts of the 118th division that came to support them were pinned down on the other side of the drina river by the retreating 1st proletarian division.

the reorganization of the partisans was completed on may 31, and the high command decided to expand the sutjeska bridgehead to ensure that the retreat was not cut off. at the same time, all areas of the sutjeska river valley were involved in fierce fighting. from may 31 to june 5, the exhausted 4th montenegrin brigade, the 7th krajina brigade and the 10th herzegovinian brigade fought fierce battles with the germans on the rugged slopes of mount bioč and the upper reaches of the piva river. given the overwhelming strength of the germans and their superior equipment reserves, the odds of victory were clearly slim. by this time, the high command had found itself trapped in the sutjeska river valley along with the central hospital.

on june 4, the high command ordered a breakout in two directions: the army group consisting of the 1st and 2nd proletarian divisions would break through the sutjeska river and cross the zelengora mountains, and the group consisting of the 3rd and 7th banja divisions with the central hospital would break through the tara river and head for sandžak. due to exhaustion and extreme lack of supplies, as well as the typhoid epidemic that had been prevalent before the war, the combat effectiveness of all the partisan units was reduced to varying degrees. for the next three days, the 1st and 2nd proletarian divisions fought extremely fierce breakout battles, with blood flowing for every tree. the partisans succeeded in opening a 5-6 km passage for the main force in the sutjeska and susan river valleys. the 1st proletarian division crossed the milinklade and broke out to zelengora on june 8, 1943. the 2nd proletarian division was not so lucky. in bare, not far from volujak, a bloody battle broke out with the german 118th jaeger division. at the same time, the 3rd assault division and other troops failed to cross the tara river and decided to move closer to friendly forces on zelengora mountain. however, they were running out of time.

on june 6, the troops hid all their heavy weapons and began to cross the river. the germans occupied the upper reaches of the sutjeska river, but failed to occupy the commanding heights. here the fiercest fighting of the battle of sutjeska took place. the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd dalmatian brigade of the defending guerrillas issued the following report on june 8: "the germans are attacking more and more frantically with more and more powerful forces. we have suffered two-thirds of casualties, but you can still count on us, just as if our establishment is full." on the morning of june 9, marshal josip broz tito was injured after a heavy bombing. captain stewart, head of the british military delegation, was killed in the same attack. on the same day, the 1st proletarian division launched a fierce attack in the direction of the german army. faced with the offensive launched by the guerrillas for liberation and survival, the axis vassal states were the first to collapse. on june 10, the 1st proletarian brigade, led by its division commander lekic, formed a battle formation and charged the german 369th division's defense line in balirovec, occupying the position. on the morning of june 10, the 1st proletarian division broke through the position of the 369th division, which was mainly composed of croatians. in the milevina area, the division also broke through the second enemy encirclement, allowing all troops to break through.

that night, the seventh division broke through the encirclement and joined the main force with more than 600 wounded soldiers.

at this time, the 3rd assault division and the main body of the central hospital, which were still in the encirclement, were facing an extremely severe situation: on the one hand, the troops suffered heavy casualties in the fierce fighting for days, and a large number of soldiers lost their combat effectiveness, which became a factor affecting the speed of the troops' advance. on the other hand, the german army believed that only a small part of the troops had broken through the sutješka river valley, and most of the guerrillas were still in the encirclement. therefore, they dispatched nearly five divisions to deal with the 3rd assault division. on june 11, the 1st dalmatian brigade, as the vanguard of the 3rd division, began to break through tjentište. soon, the advance brigade lost contact with the headquarters of the 3rd division.

sava, accompanied by the brigade staff, assessed the situation with the army and divisional headquarters. the radio operator sent a telegram to the high command, which read:

it seems that the entire division is unable to break out, so special measures must be taken to break out in groups and individuals!

sava kovacevich, commander of the 3rd assault division

at dragos-sedlo, sava gave the final orders to the assembled division and determined the direction of the attack via sutjeska and tevendisla towards zelengora.

after the last radio contact with the high command, the 3rd division launched a general attack on tevendisla in the early morning of june 13. the soldiers rushed to the german trenches without fear of death, but by noon, the attack began to weaken. the commander of the 3rd assault division, sava kovačević, was killed in the first attack on the german trenches. by the afternoon, the 3rd assault division was completely defeated, and only a small group of soldiers continued to break out. what followed was an extremely brutal massacre. the germans used military dogs to search for wounded nurses hiding in the mountains, and once they were found, they were executed on the spot.

the sutjeska battle memorial left some descriptions of the final charge by officers and soldiers of the 3rd assault division:

"at 3 o'clock in the morning of june 13, the column moved towards the german defenses. as the first rays of dawn heralded the arrival of a new day, the first explosions under the burning village of krekova marked the beginning of the 3rd division's breakthrough to sutjeska. the soldiers rushed into the german trenches. division commander sava kovacevic was one of the first to be attacked. at his call, the column launched a fierce attack from the front to the rear...

the germans opened fire with terrible force. from the first trench the germansdrop bombs and fire artillery and mortars from behind the hills.variedthe whole area between sutjeska, krekova, kosur and kazan was suddenlyfalling into flamessoldiers attacking german trenches andvariedcardtransfersoldiers died one after another.soon,the germans captured the first trench and began to occupy the second trench...

luka vucinic, the commander of the 5th montenegrin brigade, wrote:

"the soldiers did not leave their commanders, and the commanders did not leave their soldiers.

there were no living soldiers, not even the dead were separated."

enver cemalovic, commissar of the mostar battalion of the 3rd division, wrote:

"around noon, su jievariedthere was a deathly silence in kaguya. the silence seemed to be a tribute to those who remained there as eternal witnesses of the greatest epic of our national liberation war.

we have experienced death, see, we are not afraid. listen, rescue comrades, do not die for us. you have fulfilled your duty to us. for months, you have carried us from the end of bosnia, through the most difficult struggles and battles. we will fall on the battlefield of honor. our death will bring freedom to generations, and our friends will avenge us. give priority to saving healthy comrades, we see that we are surrounded.'

june 13, 1943. the 3rd assault division was crushed in a clash with about 40,000 german soldiers, 20 times its size. more than half of the soldiers and more than a thousand wounded comrades were left forever in the sutjeska river valley. the division was crushed, but not defeated...

the third division could have broken out in several directions as a whole or in small parts, but according to the tradition of the struggle, it tried to rescue the wounded, thus exposing itself to the risk of being annihilated. neither the supreme command nor the third division command forgot this great military and humanitarian obligation.

these brave commanders will remain on the battlefield forever!

post-war statistics showed that more than 7,000 yugoslav guerrillas died, and 1,500 poor people who tried to help the guerrillas were massacred. the average death rate of the three main divisions reached 30%, and the 7th division reached 50%, and the number of wounded was incalculable.

according to the report of the 1st german mountain division: "captured: 498, of whom 411 were shot." most of the immobilized wounded (about 700 of them) were hidden by the partisans and nurses. however, the germans used search dogs to search the terrain and killed them along with the nurses. in addition, a large number of civilians were killed. after this battle, the yugoslav resistance suffered a major blow.

the enemy's sixth attack (operation kugelblitz）

the winter 1943/1944 operations in yugoslavia, known as the "sixth enemy offensive", were large-scale combat operations between both sides for the important strategic position between the sava river and the adriatic sea. these operations lasted from december 3, 1943 to february 15, 1944.

both sides committed unprecedented forces - about 300,000 axis troops and about 120,000 guerrillas. the main characteristics of this offensive were that each side tried to gain and maintain the initiative and strive to gain advantage by depleting the other's resources.

the german plan was to put the guerrillas at a disadvantage, then seize important strategic positions and deal them a severe, preferably fatal blow, while the lowered target expectations reflected the rapid expansion of the guerrilla forces. the guerrillas were trying to prove that they could not only defend flexibly in one part of the battlefield, but also launch an offensive in another part.

after intense mobile fighting throughout the area of ​​operations, the second panzer army achieved some objectives and successes in the lim and vrbas valleys and along the croatian coast, but failed to significantly weaken the yugoslav people's liberation army. although the amount of liberated territory was significantly reduced, the partisans still controlled several cities and large tracts of territory after the battle.

the operation began in early december 1943 with synchronized raids by german forces in the southeast and northeast (kugelblitz) as well as in the southwest (cítění) and northwest (panther).

the germans had significant success in the east, managing to defeat some of the partisan groups (the 2nd and 1st proletarian dalmatian brigades) and opening passages deep into free territory. this operation was a success for the germans due to very good intelligence work, detailed planning and aggressive advances, and on december 16th, it turned into operation blizzard.

the germans also achieved significant success in the cítění operation, capturing livno, an important transportation hub.

success in the west was limited. the german command considered the operation in banja a success, believing that it had dealt a heavy blow to the 7th banja division. however, the planned operation to connect banja's forces through prijedor to the banja luka area completely failed. this failure had a significant negative impact on the germans' subsequent operations.

the guerrillas engaged the germans head-on in strategic locations, while other areas adopted a flexible defense. after abandoning the attack on livno, the guerrillas prepared to launch an operation against banja luka and the surrounding fortresses. the main goal of the operation was to attract the germans to withdraw their forces from the east to relieve the pressure on the third army of the yugoslav people's liberation army. this operation forced the german second panzer army to immediately mobilize the 92nd mobile regiment, the 901st panzer grenadier regiment and part of the 1st cossack and 373rd army divisions.

chetnik commander stefan leko damjanovic discusses his plan of action against the partisans with members of the ss division in eastern bosnia.

by early february, both sides were facing a situation where they could not achieve their maximum objectives. both sides suspended offensive operations. in a series of operations along the croatian coast and western lika, the germans finally captured karlobag and senj, the last port held by the free territories, in late january. through operation emil, the germans tried to seize important positions and defeat the yugoslav people's liberation army, which controlled the connection between lika and northern dalmatia. however, this operation did not meet with much success.

the territory captured by the germans in this offensive was limited to the lower reaches of the lim river, part of the vrbas river, livno and the croatian coast. the area of ​​territory controlled by the guerrillas was reduced, communications between some areas were hindered, and sea links with the allies were also hit.

the enemy's seventh offensive (operation vault)

because the communist guerrillas under tito's leadership were able to escape every time, the german army's numerous large-scale encirclement and suppression operations ended in failure. in may 1944, due to the continued shortage of manpower, the allied invasion of france, the elimination of italy, and the soviet attack on hungary, the german army was unable to mobilize its main forces to encircle and suppress the yugoslav guerrillas, so it began a series of decapitation operations against tito.

the guerrillas' highest headquarters was hidden in the bosnian town of drvar in the independent state of croatia (now in bosnia and herzegovina). it was not only a strategic location, but also the heart of the yugoslav resistance. tito's personal secret base was set up in a hidden cave about one kilometer north of the center of drvar. the unac river, like a natural barrier, flowed quietly along the ridge, adding an extra layer of difficulty to the passage between the guerrilla headquarters and the town. in addition, a railway line was laid on the ridge behind the cave, which facilitated the strategic transportation of the guerrillas. in this land, in addition to the guerrilla headquarters, there were also various guerrilla subordinate units and the youth organization of the communist party of yugoslavia, which together formed a strong line of defense in drvar and its surrounding areas.

in the villages near delwar, there were military delegations from britain and the soviet union, as well as american officers carrying out missions.

in this war-torn land, the intelligence war was equally fierce. there were three powerful intelligence forces trying to find the location of tito's headquarters and the deployment of the guerrillas in delval. they were the intelligence department and the special secret operations department of the german wehrmacht, as well as the intelligence department of the ss (sd). among them, the benesch special unit under the second brandenburg unit of the german intelligence agency was particularly eye-catching. some members of this unit briefly found out tito's whereabouts in the town before the german army attacked and recaptured the town of jajce.

the unit had many connections with the chetniks and ustashe militias, organizations organized by former yugoslav royalist soldiers who had surrendered to the axis, and had been tracking tito since october 1943. lieutenant kirchner of the unit was responsible for finding tito before retaking jajce, and he established a patrol base near bosansko grahovo. in fact, he was very close to the delvar cave and found the allied military delegation. but although the information intercepted by german radio confirmed that delvar was the location of tito's headquarters, kirchner could not confirm that the headquarters was located in the cave. kirchner was then assigned to the 500th ss parachute battalion, the main force of the airborne operation, to participate in the operation.

at the same time, under hitler's orders, ss major otto skorzeny, who had commanded the operation to rescue mussolini, independently participated in the intelligence gathering before the raid.

acting on behalf of the sd, skorzeny, known as "the most dangerous man in europe", obtained intelligence from a partisan deserter that tito's headquarters was in the cave, so he proposed a plan for a small group of soldiers to sneak into delval and assassinate tito. from later historical records, it seems that he did not pass on the useful intelligence he collected to kurt rybka (captain), the commander of the 500th ss parachute battalion, who was responsible for planning the crucial airborne part of the operation. because skorzeny himself believed that airborne raids were too conventional, his plan was to infiltrate at night by commandos posing as partisans - this risky plan was not approved by field marshal weichs, the commander of army group f.

the competition among intelligence forces led to the inefficient use of useful intelligence, which laid the groundwork for the difficulties that the operation would face later.

on 23 may 1944, a german fieseler fi 156 reconnaissance aircraft flew several times parallel to and above the una valley at 2,000 feet (610 m) above drvar. coincident with the aerial photography activities. the aircraft paid special attention to the villages of prinavor and trninić brijeg, where there were british military delegations and american military personnel. this was noticed by lieutenant colonel street, the acting commander of the british military delegation, who believed that this was a reconnaissance for a bombing raid and made a suggestion to tito and the americans. subsequently, both allied delegations moved their positions.

despite the intelligence received and the british observations, the partisans seemed quite complacent about the threat, with tito's chief of staff arso jovanović vowing that "a german attack is impossible". on the evening of may 24, 1944, tito did not return to the bastasi cave after celebrating his birthday, but stayed in the delvar cave overnight.

lieutenant general ernst von leyser, commander of the xv mountain army, based in knin, was in charge of the operation. von leyser's ground forces were heavily reinforced by army group f, the ii panzer corps, and the v ss mountain army reserve. these reinforcements included two armored companies, the reconnaissance battalions of the 1st mountain division (54th mountain reconnaissance battalion) and the 369th (croatia) infantry division, and most of the 7th ss volunteer mountain division prinz eugen. according to the xv mountain army's plan, luftwaffe aircraft would conduct a heavy aerial bombardment of the guerrilla positions in and around dervar, followed by parachute and glider attacks by the 500th ss parachute battalion, whose mission was to capture or kill tito and destroy his headquarters. the assault also included capturing or destroying the allied military delegation sent to the guerrillas. on the same day, ground forces of the 15th mountain corps will gather towards derwal to link up with the 500th ss parachute battalion.

as for the 500th paratrooper battalion, on may 20, rebka received the outline of the operation, and received more details the next day. he realized that the gliders and transport planes were not enough to transport the entire 500th ss paratrooper battalion to derval at one time, so he proposed a plan involving two waves, the first wave of 654 people to attack at 7 am, and the second wave of 220 people to attack about 5 hours later. crucially, the intelligence he received about the suspected location of tito's headquarters (code-named "citadel") showed that tito's headquarters was located in or near a cemetery on the heights southwest of the center of derval, nearly two kilometers away from tito's actual headquarters cave. this would have a profound impact on the planning and implementation of the offensive.

the first wave of rebka's plan called for german luftwaffe dfs230 gliders to carry 314 paratroopers in three groups (red, green, and blue) to secure the town, and another 354 paratroopers in six glider assault groups to carry out specific missions.

a second group of 220 soldiers, based on the training company of the 500th ss parachute battalion, was to parachute in at noon. rybka did not appear to have planned for any major contingencies, such as the possibility that intelligence on the location of tito's headquarters might be wrong. his only contingency plan was to fire a red flare, ordering all available troops to converge on his position for the follow-up mission.

on may 22, 1944, the 500th ss parachute battalion was transported to the airfields at nagy-betskerek, zagreb, and banja luka, dressed in wehrmacht uniforms for security reasons. however, the troops were not briefed on the operation until a few hours before it began. they were linked up with transport aircraft (including a ten-man glider that would carry the troops on gliders to the objective). by may 24, all preparations for the airborne assault were complete.

the offensive began at 05:00, with ground forces moving out from assembly areas around the area of ​​operations. at around 06:35, five luftwaffe bomber squadrons, including junkers ju 87 dive bombers, began bombing targets at derval and posavka. a total of 440 sorties were flown on 25 may 1944.

the 500th ss parachute battalion began parachuting and gliding at 7 a.m. the ju 52 formations carrying the paratroopers consisted of three planes per group, each dropping 45 paratroopers (15 per plane). in less than five minutes, all the paratroopers were airborne. in order to minimize losses from anti-aircraft fire, the paratroopers risked parachuting at very low altitudes, and the descent lasted only about 15 seconds. ss high commander rebka was one of the first paratroopers to reach the ground.

most of the paratroopers were able to land relatively close to their targets in the smoke and dust of the bombing. however, some gliders deviated seriously from their routes when landing, one of which landed in front of the bastasi caves seven kilometers west of derval, and several landed in frtoch. the glider crews that landed in bastasi were immediately killed by members of tito's guard battalion guarding the caves, while the glider crews in frtoch had to struggle to move towards derval.

however, although almost all the gliders reached the designated landing sites, they were hit by partisan anti-aircraft fire: there were many casualties in the wreckage. one of the 30 dfs 230 aircraft crashed quite far from the planned location, killing the leader of the grefa group on the spot. the headquarters of the rebka was located in a dfs 230 aircraft on the ground. the draufgänger group landed in the city center square and quickly lifted the yugoslav signal jammer; however, it was difficult to capture the building where the telephone exchange was located because the yugoslav women's resistance was quite fierce. at 9 am, dervar finally fell.

captain rebka then established a new headquarters behind the cemetery wall. however, the germans found no trace of tito or his headquarters.

the greifer and brecher groups also had no success, as the allied delegation had moved after the aerial reconnaissance on may 23. part of the stürmer group landed its gliders on an open field just south of the drval caves and was fired upon by members of tito's guard battalion on the heights near the caves. the draufgänger group landed its gliders on the "western cross" and then attacked a building they thought was a partisan communications center. however, the building was actually the offices of the central committee of the communist party of yugoslavia, and the party members who were still working in the building took up arms and put up a stubborn resistance until the building was razed to the ground by bombs carried by the paratroopers.

the fighting also involved paratroopers, who landed in the eastern part of the main residential area of ​​drvar. a conference of the yugoslav communist youth league had just concluded in drvar, and many delegates remained in the town. many of the youth took up any weapons they could get their hands on and began fighting the paratroopers who were trying to establish a cordon on the eastern side of the town.

two kilometers east of the road to mokronoge was a guerrilla officer training school with about 130 students. hearing the fighting coming from the direction of dervar, the students marched west, initially armed only with pistols and a few rifles. they split into two groups, a small group crossed the unak river and advanced west along the railway line on the ridge leading to tito's cave, while a large group collected weapons and ammunition from several cans of german equipment dropped by parachutes. at around 8 a.m., the large group of students attacked the paratroopers from the east, suffering heavy casualties but continuing to put pressure on the german flank. by around 9 a.m., the germans had basically controlled dervar. shortly after the operation began, rybka realized that guerrilla resistance was concentrated in the north near the cave. therefore, he fired a red flare to call his troops to attack in that direction.

at about 10:30 a.m., rybka's group, supported by at least one mg42 machine gun, crossed the unac river and launched a frontal attack on the cave entrance. at this time, tito and about 20 staff officers took refuge in the cave.

the germans advanced to the foot of the hill, 50 meters from the cave entrance, but suffered heavy casualties in the attack. while the troops were gathering, the surrounding guerrillas also rushed towards delval. three battalions of the 3rd proletarian brigade of the 1st proletarian division approached from the southeast. one battalion attacked the german positions in the cemetery, while the other two battalions attacked the germans from the west.

at about 11:15 a.m., after the first rybka attack was defeated, tito and the small group that had gathered with him escaped from the cave. there was a platform at the entrance of the cave, and they climbed down using ropes through a trapdoor on the platform. although tito's mistress davorjanka paunović (codename "zdenk") and his dog "tiger" showed some panic, they still left the cave very quickly. following a stream that led to the unak river, the group climbed up the high ground to the east and retreated to the village of potoci.

when the german paratroopers finally fought their way into the cave where the guerrilla headquarters was located, they only found a dress that tito had not taken away.

around noon, the second paratrooper force was dropped in two waves to the west of the cemetery. the drop zone was within the range of the guerrillas west of delvar, and the paratroopers suffered heavy losses in the process. rebka gathered the remaining men and launched a second attack, but the pressure on the flank was too great and the attack failed again. the battle lasted all afternoon, with heavy casualties on both sides.

in the evening, rybka ordered all troops to withdraw to the cemetery area and form a defensive perimeter. during the retreat, at least one group was surrounded and annihilated. at around 6 pm, rybka was wounded by a grenade and was subsequently evacuated along with other wounded in a light aircraft - the aircraft was originally intended to transport tito after his capture. by 9:30 pm, the germans held their positions in the cemetery, although they were now completely surrounded by the partisans. during the night, the 3rd proletarian brigade attacked the cemetery, and the attack was reinforced by troops from the 9th dalmatian division. at 3:30 am on may 26, the partisans launched a final attack on the cemetery, breaching several walls, but the paratroopers held out.

meanwhile, throughout may 25, the ground forces of the xv mountain army failed to advance as quickly as expected. the 1st, 5th, and 8th partisan armies put up unexpectedly stubborn resistance along their axis of advance, and communications between the various units were very poor, resulting in a lack of coordination in their actions. they were also repeatedly attacked by allied air forces, led by the newly formed balkan air force. tito, escorted by elements of the 3rd krajina brigade, headed for potok, where he met a battalion of the 1st proletarian brigade. in potok, they met the allied delegation, which had moved its positions in advance. fortunately, the liaison officer of the british delegation brought the only surviving radio. after the last night attack failed to annihilate the german forces in delvar, tito realized that ground forces would eventually reach the town and rescue the paratroopers, so he ordered the partisans to withdraw from the town. after observing german forces in the potoch area, tito, his staff, and his escort continued toward kupres, traveling on foot, on horseback, and in carriages on the narrow-gauge logging railway. during this long trek, a member of the soviet delegation was wounded by artillery fire.

after six days of evading the germans, the head of the soviet delegation, lieutenant general nikolai vasilevich korneev, who had lost a leg in the battle of stalingrad, suggested an air evacuation of tito and the soviet delegation. after three days of deliberation, tito agreed to the proposal on june 3, and the evacuation took place that evening from an raf-operated airfield near the town of kupres. seven douglas c-47 skytrain aircraft (one flown by a soviet crew and the rest by american crews) carried tito, the allied mission, and 118 wounded partisans to bari, italy. although tito's headquarters and several other partisan organizations were temporarily disrupted during the operation and lost many key staff members, all of the partisan organizations were quickly relocated and resumed operations. delval was also restored to partisan control within a few weeks of the operation.

the 500th ss parachute battalion suffered heavy casualties during operation knight, with 576 killed and 48 wounded. the battalion remained the only paratrooper unit in the ss for the rest of the war, but was later renamed the 600th ss parachute battalion. operation knight became the battalion's only combat parachute operation. german reports said that the ground forces of the 15th mountain army suffered 213 killed, 881 wounded, and 51 missing during operation knight. the same report stated that 6,000 partisans were killed. according to otto kumm, commander of the 7th ss division, ss brigadier general (waffen-ss general), partisan losses included 1,916 confirmed killed, 1,400 estimated killed, and 161 captured. kumm also claimed that six allied aircraft were shot down during the operation.

after learning of the german intentions, the guerrillas quickly demonstrated their excellent knowledge of the terrain and their deep popular base, gathering a large number of troops to form an encirclement and tightly lock the germans. this critical operation against the delval cemetery was undoubtedly a fatal blow to the ss airborne troops, who suffered a heavy defeat in this contest. if the germans set up a tighter cordon around the target, it would be possible to reduce tito's chances of escaping. however, considering the tightness of the german manpower and the fact that a larger cordon is more difficult to hide and maintain, such a strategy is not easy to implement in reality.

even if the germans succeeded in this operation, there were still questions about whether it was enough to turn the tide in the balkans. with the allied landings in normandy and the collapse of army group center and the romanian front, the situation in the balkans became increasingly dire. the germans faced an increasing threat from the guerrillas and were increasingly unable to cope with them. the fall of belgrade marked the complete defeat of the axis in yugoslavia.