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putin won the gamble again. before kursk was recaptured, putin's personal support began to reverse.

recently updated polling data from the russian public opinion foundation (fom) shows that although the ukrainian army still controls a large amount of russian territory in kursk and the russian counterattack is progressing slowly, russians' interest in the kursk war has dropped sharply.

[putin's approval rating has emerged from the downward crisis]

it is reported that in the first week after the ukrainian army attacked kursk, 39% of russian respondents paid attention to the kursk crisis, but by late september, only 12% of respondents paid attention to this matter. in contrast, 24% of respondents were more concerned about the russian offensive in donbass.

at the same time, putin's approval rating recovered from 76% after the kursk crisis to the normal level of 80%, successfully achieving a reversal.

the ukrainian army's attack on kursk was the first time that foreign troops invaded russian territory since world war ii. the "special military operation" was turned into a "patriotic war", which was thought to put considerable pressure on the kremlin. however, facts have proved that even if the crisis in kursk lasted for more than a month, putin's basic support rate remained unshakable.

[putin's approval rating has returned to its normal level of 80% from 76% after the kursk crisis]

it seems that putin has indeed won this time. putin's bet is to resolve the situation in kursk as much as possible while maintaining the offensive in the eastern part of ukraine and not transferring the main forces from donbass. if it can be resolved in a short time, that would be the best; if it cannot be resolved, then he believes that the russian people will adapt to this "new reality" as soon as possible, rather than pointing the finger at themselves, leading to a greater crisis in russia.

in fact, looking at the bigger picture, not only the kursk crisis, but also the transformation of the russian-ukrainian conflict into a protracted war of attrition, putin and the entire kremlin have a similar gambling mentality: believing that the people will turn their anxiety about the war back to anxiety about life; believing that putin's approval rating will stabilize at 70% or even above 80%; believing that the ukrainian crisis will be resolved before a major political crisis breaks out in russia.

from the current perspective, except for the last point, the kremlin has achieved the first two points. in the face of the ongoing war and western sanctions, the mentality of the russian people has changed from initial panic and anxiety to gradual acceptance, and they have begun to adapt to the many "new realities" brought about by the war, and have put their focus back on their daily lives. "daily anxiety" has replaced "military anxiety."

russian people's &quot daily anxiety&quot replaced &quot military anxiety&quot

of course, this is also inseparable from the kremlin's intensified propaganda over the past two years. since last year, all russian primary and secondary schools have opened a course called "conversations on important things" every week. the course aims to "strengthen russian traditional values" and "cultivate patriotism" among young people starting from childhood.

it has to be said that the kremlin's propaganda work is still in place. a russian opinion poll at the end of last year showed that more than 60% of russian respondents believed that 2024 would be a "smooth and successful year" for russia, a proportion that even reached the highest level in the past nearly 20 years.

of course, facts have proven that 2024 is not a "smooth and successful year" for russia. the terrorist attack on the moscow state concert hall in march and the kursk crisis in august both prove that russia is still in a difficult stage. the road is tortuous, but whether the future will be "bright" is hard to say.

putin is betting that the battle in kursk will not plunge russia into a greater internal crisis, while zelensky is betting that the kursk crisis will impress western allies and make them loosen up and provide more help to ukraine.

zelensky has arrived in the united states a few days ago. according to the plan, he will speak at the un general assembly and then hold talks with biden and harris. during the meeting with biden, he will elaborate on ukraine's "victory plan."

[zelensky has arrived in the united states a few days ago]

it is said that ukraine's "victory plan" mainly involves four aspects, including nato member states providing security guarantees to ukraine, signing a bilateral security agreement, the ukrainian army continuing its military operations in kursk, and the west providing ukraine with specific weapons and equipment and lifting restrictions on the use of western weapons to attack targets within russia.

before attending the un general assembly, zelensky accepted an exclusive interview with abc, in which he said: "i think we are closer to peace and the end of the war than we thought... putin is afraid of the kursk operation because the russians will see that he cannot protect his territory. only by standing in a strong position can ukraine push russia to end the war."

[zelensky: we are closer to peace than we think]

in fact, ukraine's initial goal in kursk was to contain russia's offensive in eastern ukraine. a spokesman for the ukrainian ministry of foreign affairs clearly stated this goal in early august: "unlike russia, ukraine does not need other people's property, and ukraine has no intention of seizing the territory of kursk... this operation will help the front line because it will not allow russia to deploy more troops to eastern ukraine and make its military logistics more complicated."

but as the crisis continued, ukraine gradually discovered that russia was weaker than it had imagined, and that ukraine could make bigger moves in the kursk direction and use it as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table, not just to contain the russian offensive in the donbas direction.

in order to make the kursk crisis play a greater strategic role, ukraine needs more support from the west, not only to maintain its military presence in kursk, but also to launch attacks deep into russia based on kursk - for this, the long-range weapons provided by the west are indispensable.

[as the crisis continues, ukraine discovers that russia is weaker than it thought]

russians have reduced their attention to the situation in kursk because most people feel that what is happening there has nothing to do with them. so how can more russians feel that the war is closely related to their interests? zelensky's answer is to expand the scope of the conflict. not only should the war spread to kursk, but also to other parts of russia, so that more russians, like ukrainians, can feel the anxiety of war firsthand.

the west is of course full of anxiety about this. previously, the west set the rules of engagement for ukraine, "not to use long-range weapons provided by the west to attack targets within russian territory", in order to avoid angering russia and fear that putin would use "last resort" and lead to the worst situation.

but the situation in kursk has developed to the point where the so-called "red line" unilaterally drawn by russia has been repeatedly crossed. this has given the west another possibility. some european countries have lifted the relevant restrictions on the use of long-range weapons, and the most critical thing now is to persuade the united states to let down its guard and cross russia's "red line" again - this is precisely one of zelensky's most core tasks in the new stage.