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the ukrainian army has been in the kursk region of russia for more than three weeks. president putin is furious and has ordered the russian army to mobilize its forces, launch a counterattack, and drive the ukrainian army out of russia as soon as possible. however, contrary to the kremlin's instructions, the russian army did not launch a large-scale counterattack, but instead fought back and forth with the ukrainian army on the edge of the kursk salient. what surprised the outside world even more was that the russian army began to dig trenches and build fortifications in the south and west of kurchatov, where the kursk nuclear power plant is located, and put on a posture of defending the place. this move is obviously to protect the safety of the nuclear power plant, but it also reveals that the offensive force of the russian army on the kursk front may not be sufficient.

■satellite photos show that the russian army is building field fortifications in the area south of kurchatov city.

regardless of whether the ukrainian army could attack kursk, the author noticed a historical coincidence. in the summer 81 years ago, on the battlefield of kursk, millions of soviet red army soldiers also dug trenches and built one of the largest field fortification defense systems during world war ii. their purpose was also to resist the impact of armored cavalry, the fierce offensive of the most elite german armored forces in the world at that time...

kursk salient

in early 1943, the soviet red army, with the momentum of the victory in stalingrad, launched a winter counterattack in the middle and southern sections of the eastern front. however, due to the stubborn resistance of the german army, especially manstein's fierce counterattack in the direction of kharkov, the soviet offensive was curbed. despite this, the soviet army still created a large salient 250 kilometers wide from north to south and 160 kilometers long from east to west, centered on kursk, south of orel and north of kharkov. it became the focus of the strategic decisive battle between the soviet and german armies in the summer of 1943.

■the kursk salient and the offensive route of the german "citadel" plan.

the german high command drew up an offensive plan codenamed "fortress", concentrating elite troops on the north and south wings of the kursk salient to launch a pincer attack to cut off the salient. if successful, it would encircle and annihilate five soviet armies and level the front, saving a large number of mobile forces for subsequent operations. however, this plan had a big flaw, that is, the intention was too obvious and lacked strategic surprise. the commander of the 9th army, model, and the director of armored forces, guderian, opposed the "fortress" plan, but the commander of the central army group, kluge, and the commander of the southern army group, manstein, expressed support. manstein also emphasized the need to attack as soon as possible, but hitler repeatedly postponed the offensive time from may to july in order to allow the troops to obtain more new tanks such as tiger and panther.

■in march 1943, hitler visited the headquarters of army group south in zaporizhia and met with field marshal manstein, who was a staunch supporter of operation citadel.

as opponents of the "fortress" plan worried, the soviet headquarters accurately predicted the strategic movements of the german army and believed that there was a high possibility that the german army would launch an offensive against the kursk salient in the summer of 1943. after determining the german intentions, there were differences within the soviet army on what countermeasures to take. stalin and some offensive front commanders tended to take the initiative and disrupt the german deployment, while deputy commander zhukov and chief of general staff vasilevsky advocated first consuming the german offensive force with a defensive posture, and then switching to a counterattack with a strong reserve to completely crush the german strategic intentions. after some debate, stalin finally accepted zhukov's opinion and determined the strategy of defensive counterattack on the kursk battlefield.

■during the battle of kursk, zhukov, as a representative of the headquarters, studied the battle situation with general konev, commander of the steppe front.

it is worth noting that the soviet defensive strategy was formulated under the condition of superior strength. in the third year of the war, the soviet union's super mobilization ability began to show results, and the military strength was greatly strengthened. the central front and voronezh front, which were responsible for defense within the salient, had 1.33 million troops, and the steppe front, which served as a reserve behind them, had 570,000 troops, with a total strength of more than 1.9 million. the german army was expected to deploy 780,000 troops for the attack, less than half of the soviet army. the soviet army, which had an advantage in strength, took the initiative to adopt a defensive posture because the war in the previous two years showed that even if the soviet army had superior strength, it was often difficult to stop the german army's powerful assault. this reality forced the soviet army to be cautious about the german attack, which allowed the german army to establish a psychological advantage. the appearance of new tanks such as the tiger further strengthened the german army's confidence.

build a fortress

after determining the operational strategy of defending first and then attacking, the soviet army's top priority was to build a large-scale defense system in the kursk salient and its rear, and to be fully prepared to resist the german attack. starting from april 1943, the entire kursk area became a super-large construction site, with busy figures swinging shovels and pickaxes, flying dirt and dust, and piles of building materials. soviet engineer lieutenant general plyaskin later wrote: "in march and april 1943, the most commonly used military terms in kursk were engineering operations, obstacles, mines, and bunkers." all residents within 25 kilometers behind the front line were evacuated, and another 300,000 civilians were mobilized to participate in the construction of fortifications, most of whom were women and the elderly.

■in the spring of 1943, the soviet army started massive construction in the kursk region, building a large-scale field fortification area.

according to the soviet defense plan, six defense zones were set up inside the salient, wrapping the ultimate goal of the german army, kursk, like a cabbage, with a depth of 130 to 150 kilometers. the first three defense zones are the main defense positions of the soviet army and the most solid part of the defense line. they are heavily guarded and have a depth of 40 kilometers. each defense zone is composed of five or more parallel trenches, which are connected by traffic trenches, as dense as a spider web. a large number of infantry bunkers, machine gun bunkers, artillery bunkers, observation posts, command posts, and semi-buried shooting bunkers for tanks are dotted in the trench network. mines, anti-tank trenches, barbed wire and various obstacles further strengthen the defense strength. the last three defense zones are reserve defense positions. the number and density of fortifications are not as good as the front line of defense. only a small number of troops are stationed or there is no defense. they are mainly used as the second line of defense to continue to resist when the front-line positions are breached. in addition to the six defense zones within the salient, the steppe front deployed behind the salient also built two north-south defense zones as a precautionary measure after the german army cut off the salient. with these two lines of defense, the soviet army's defense depth on the kursk battlefield reached an astonishing 300 kilometers!

■in june 1943, soviet engineers destroyed the barbed wire obstacles laid by the german army on the front line, and they also made great contributions to their own defensive positions.

the scale of the kursk field fortification project is huge, as can be seen from the number of fortifications built. according to statistics, the voronezh front on the south side of the defensive salient built 83,912 bunkers of various types, 5,322 command posts and observation posts, 1,755 shelters, and set up 593 kilometers of barbed wire obstacles in its defense zone. the total length of trenches and communication trenches reached 4,240 kilometers. in the defense zone of the central front on the north side of the defensive salient, the length of trenches reached 5,000 kilometers! in addition, the soviet army also built 686 bridges and paved 2,000 kilometers of roads in the salient. on the kursk front, soviet engineers laid mines at an unprecedented density. according to statistics, there were 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-infantry mines, with an average of 2,500 anti-tank mines and 2,200 anti-infantry mines per kilometer of front. there were also a considerable number of improvised explosives modified from artillery shells, and the mine laying density was six times that of the battle of moscow. in addition, the soviet army also deployed mobile obstacle-laying units to carry out emergency mine laying and obstacle laying on the german assault route. usually, a division was equipped with two engineer platoons, and an army was equipped with one engineer company, and each company carried 500 to 700 mines.

■during the interval between battles, a soviet art and cultural group performed for the soviet soldiers in the trenches.

in terms of force deployment, the soviet army deployed 37 infantry divisions in the main defense zone and established more than 350 battalion-level defense positions. a large number of battalion-level defense support points were built in the positions. most of these support points were arranged in a circular layout, with excellent firing range, cross-fire, and mutual cover and support. the front width of the support point was about 2,500 meters and the depth was about 1,500 meters. 2 to 3 support points constituted a regimental-level defense position, with a front width of about 4 to 6 kilometers and a depth of 3 to 4 kilometers. the average defense front width of each division was 14 kilometers and the depth was about 5 to 6 kilometers. in the key defense area, the division-level defense front would be reduced to 6 to 12 kilometers to increase the density of troop firepower, and it would be expanded to 25 kilometers in the secondary defense area. the troops at all levels below the army level were mostly deployed in echelons. the infantry army deployed two divisions to the front, and one division was deployed as the second echelon behind the front. the three regiments of the infantry division also occupied positions in the same way, and so on. a large number of artillery positions were deployed behind the defensive positions at all levels to provide firepower support for the frontline defense operations at any time, and tank units were assembled for counterattacks. the central front and voronezh front were equipped with 19,794 artillery and mortars, 1.98 times the number of artillery in front of the german army, and 3,489 tanks, 1.3 times the number of german tanks.

cleverly set up wild animal traps

as early as early april 1943, zhukov made a sharp prediction that the german offensive in kursk mainly relied on the strength of its armored forces and air force, while the strength of the infantry forces was less than in previous operations, so he asked the central front and the voronezh front to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the positions as much as possible. in fact, this was indeed the case. the biggest cost of the german army in launching the "citadel" operation was to concentrate the most elite armored forces on the eastern front, investing 2,578 tanks and assault guns, plus self-propelled artillery and self-propelled anti-tank guns, with a total of more than 3,000 armored vehicles. although they were outnumbered by the soviets, they were superior in quality, especially the 133 tiger tanks, 200 panther tanks and 89 "ferdinand" tank destroyers. with their powerful firepower and thick armor, they were almost invincible in front of soviet tanks. most of the main iv and iii tanks were equipped with long-barreled tank guns, capable of competing with the soviet t-34 at normal combat distances. coupled with the german army's rich experience and excellent qualities in armored warfare, they were the sharpest armored spearheads in the world at that time.

■the german tiger heavy tanks used in the battle of kursk. the elite armored forces were the greatest confidence of the german attack.

in the summer of 1943, the main anti-tank weapon of the soviet front-line troops was still the underpowered 45mm anti-tank gun, and the better 57mm anti-tank gun was in short supply due to delayed delivery. the 45mm anti-tank gun could not penetrate the frontal armor of the german heavy armored vehicles, and it was also difficult to deal with the improved type iii and type iv tanks. therefore, in defensive operations, the division's 76.2mm field guns often had to participate in anti-tank combat by direct shooting. the su-76m self-propelled artillery, which was combined with the t-70 light tank chassis, was considered an excellent fire support platform and made its debut in the battle of kursk. in 1943, the backbone of the soviet tank forces was still the t-34/76 medium tank, but the performance advantage enjoyed by the t-34 in 1941 had disappeared, especially when facing german heavy tanks, and could only shorten the exchange of fire by suicide charge and attack the vulnerable sides and tail of the target as much as possible. the biggest flaw in the soviet army's anti-tank capability was the lack of infantry anti-tank weapons such as the "panzerfaust" and the "bazooka". the 14.5mm anti-tank gun was still one of the few weapon options for soviet infantry to fight against tanks. more often, they even needed to use explosive packs, grenades, and even "molotov cocktails" to engage in close combat with german tanks.

■the soviet 76.2mm field gun for direct-fire shooting. this type of artillery often performed anti-tank missions during the battle of kursk.

when establishing defensive positions, the soviet army's first line of defense against german tanks was dense minefields, anti-tank trenches and anti-tank obstacles. behind the minefields and obstacles were carefully constructed anti-tank support points. a typical tank support point is usually equipped with a company to a battalion of troops and an engineer platoon carrying explosive equipment, equipped with 4 to 6 anti-tank guns, 6 to 9 anti-tank guns, 5 to 7 light and heavy machine guns, and some support points will also set up semi-buried tank bunkers, with only the turret of the t-34 tank exposed as a mobile anti-tank firepower point. each infantry regiment usually builds 3 to 4 anti-tank support points, and each infantry division has 9 to 12. behind the defensive positions above the regimental level, the soviet army also deployed anti-tank reserves. the regimental reserve is a mixed infantry platoon of anti-tank guns and automatic weapons, the divisional reserve is an anti-tank company or battalion, and the army reserve is an anti-tank artillery regiment. the front-line defense forces will also be reinforced by tank reserves. infantry battalions will be equipped with a tank company, infantry regiments will be equipped with a tank battalion, and infantry divisions will be equipped with tank regiments or brigades. however, most of these tanks supporting the infantry will be exhausted in the early stages of the defensive battle.

■ soviet anti-tank gunners and riflemen guarding the trenches. such weapons were no longer sufficient to pose a serious threat to german tanks.

in the case of anti-tank weapons being at a disadvantage, the soviet army needed to rely more on the willpower and fighting spirit of grassroots officers and soldiers to fight against the german armored forces. in order to enable the infantry to overcome the psychological fear of tanks, the soviet army generally carried out special training called "ironing" before the war, that is, letting the infantry hide in the trenches and letting the tanks repeatedly pass over the top of the trenches. the soviet infantry was required to separate the connection between the german tanks and the infantry as much as possible, and to carry out close-range attacks on the german tanks with melee weapons. this tactic was particularly effective against the "ferdinand" destroyer without a self-defense machine gun. the soviet army also offered a reward of 1,000 rubles for each tank destroyed to encourage soviet officers and soldiers to fight against german tanks. this trick also appeared on the russian-ukrainian battlefield 80 years later.

breaking the steel spearhead

the battle of kursk began in the early morning of july 5, 1943, with an unexpected soviet artillery counterattack. the soviet artillery bombardment caught the germans off guard and forced them to postpone their offensive, but as the sky turned white, the germans launched a ground offensive after heavy artillery and air strikes.

■during the battle of kursk, german infantry passed through an anti-tank trench dug by the soviet army.

the main attackers on the northern wing of the salient were the 9th army commanded by model, which had about 1,100 tanks. on the first day of the offensive, model concentrated more than 400 tanks and assault guns on a 20-kilometer front, and fiercely attacked the defensive positions of the soviet 13th army under the cover of artillery fire and air force, but ran into a minefield consisting of 57,000 anti-tank mines. german tanks hit mines and broke down one after another, and were immediately hit by the concentrated fire of soviet anti-tank guns. the following infantry was also bathed in the fire rain of soviet machine guns. after fire suppression, the german army used radio-controlled blasting vehicles to open up a channel in the minefield, allowing the german armored spearheads to finally penetrate the main defense zone of the soviet army. the fierce battle lasted until sunset. the german army broke through the first line of defense of the soviet army, advanced 6 to 8 kilometers, and approached the second line of defense, but paid a painful price of more than 7,200 casualties in a single day.

■the german armored group advancing towards the soviet positions left deep ruts on the grassland.

on july 6, the 9th army continued to attack deep into the soviet army and was counterattacked by the soviet tank forces. although the soviet counterattack was repelled by the advantages of heavy tanks such as tiger and ferdinand, the offensive pace was also slowed down. in the following days, the german army repeatedly fought with the soviet army around the key point of boneri on the northern line, but was unable to break through the dense defense positions of the soviet army, which seriously consumed the insufficient manpower and weapons. the battle lasted until july 12, and the german army, which had lost its spirit, began to retreat. by the 14th, the german offensive in the north of the salient had completely ceased. its maximum advance distance was only 12 kilometers, but it lost 647 tanks and assault guns.

■the "ferdinand" tank destroyer destroyed on the kursk battlefield.

the german 4th panzer army and the "kempf" battle group, which were attacking the southern wing of the salient, were more powerful than the 9th army, including three ss panzer divisions and the "grossdeutschland" division, equipped with about 1,500 tanks and assault guns, posing a more serious threat to the soviet army. on the first day of the battle on july 5, the german 4th panzer army concentrated 8 divisions, 1,089 tanks and assault guns on a 35-kilometer front and charged the defense line of the soviet 6th guards army. the soviet army described the german offensive force as a "tank wall" coming head-on! however, the german armored group soon ran into trouble and was trapped in a large and dense minefield. the "grossdeutschland" division could not move for 10 hours. it should be noted that the 6th guards army had buried 90,000 mines on the front line, and an average of 90 mines per german tank! by the end of the day, the german army had only penetrated about 6 to 10 kilometers into the soviet defense line, far below manstein's expectations.

■tiger tanks and armored grenadiers of the ss "reich" division participating in the southern offensive.

on july 6, the german army continued to attack fiercely on the southern front. the soviet army relied on fortifications and artillery support from the rear to resist tenaciously. in some areas, they even repelled eight german charges. after the war, german combatants recalled: "there are mines everywhere." after paying a painful price, the german army made limited progress in the direction of oboyan. although the soviet army delayed the german offensive, the voronezh front almost exhausted all its tank reserves and could only request reinforcements from the steppe front. from july 7 to 9, the german army failed to attack oboyan head-on and could only make a detour from the flank and made some progress. however, on july 12, it encountered the soviet 5th guards tank army in prokhorovka, and the largest tank battle in world war ii broke out. the result was heavy losses of soviet tanks, but it stopped the german army's advance. on july 9, the allied forces landed in sicily, forcing hitler to withdraw reinforcements from the eastern front. in addition, model withdrew from the offensive, and operation citadel was doomed to fail. on july 17, manstein had no choice but to retreat. the german army lost 965 tanks and assault guns in the offensive on the southern front!

■painting showing the prokhorovka tank battle, which is considered the largest tank engagement in world war ii.

conclusion

the battle of kursk has long been forgotten in history, but among the many factors that thwarted the german armored offensive, the field fortifications built by the soviet army before the war undoubtedly played an important role. after the war, a western scholar commented on the soviet army's defense capabilities: "for the soviet red army, which is proficient in field fortification technology, four months is almost the same as four years." in other words, the soviet army built a defensive position in four months that would take an ordinary army four years to build.

■to this day on the russian-ukrainian battlefield, trenches and other field fortifications remain an important defensive support for both warring parties.

in fact, building field fortifications is the specialty of the soviet russian army, and it has been inherited by the russian army and the ukrainian army today. today, many people say that the russian-ukrainian war has become a trench war in the style of world war i, and the primary factor in shaping this war mode is not the "himars" or the drones flying all over the sky, but the large number of fortifications built by the warring parties on the battlefield in eastern ukraine. the fortified positions that the ukrainian army has operated for many years have forced the russian army to gnaw bones in one village after another until today, and the "shoigu" defense line built by the russian army on the thousand-mile front also successfully thwarted the ukrainian army's 2023 summer counterattack! therefore, we don't need to laugh at the russian army's move to dig trenches in kursk, because this method is really useful on the current russian-ukrainian battlefield.