news

한어Русский языкEnglishFrançaisIndonesianSanskrit日本語DeutschPortuguêsΕλληνικάespañolItalianoSuomalainenLatina

ma su's stationing of troops on the top of jieting mountain was a lifelong regret for zhuge wuhou. thousands of years later, when the battle of tashan was about to begin, cheng zihua summoned the cadres above the group level to climb baitai mountain, the only high ground around tashan. as an important part of the western battlefield of the liaoshen campaign, for such a crucial battlefield blocking battle, general lin did not specify how the corps commanders on the front line should complete the battlefield layout.

his arrangement had only one sentence: we must hold on to tashan. there was not much terrain to rely on on the tashan battlefield. in addition to the baitai mountain that cheng zihua and his team climbed, everyone had two basic opinions. one was to rely on the baitai mountain high ground to garrison, so as to rely on the terrain advantage to the greatest extent possible to block the national army that came to rescue jinzhou. the other was to rely on the tashan village, which had no support, to garrison tashan with hand-dug fortifications.

this is a view from the top of baitai mountain.

in fact, to be fair, from the perspective of battle deployment, it is naturally more advantageous and more reassuring to rely on high ground. for the national army with navy, army and air force, building fortifications in the plains cannot withstand bombardment. but the final core stronghold was still chosen in tashan. because many senior generals, including cheng zihua, understand the importance of "camping on the road". stockpiling heavy troops in baitai mountain, once the national army uses part of its forces to surround the baitai mountain highlands without attacking, and instead concentrates all its main forces to attack tashan, it will be too late to transfer troops to garrison tashan at that time.

what brilliant tactics did cheng zihua use for this defensive battle? it should be said that good tactics come from practice, and from repeated practice. general lin's advice to cheng zihua was to use echelon defense, to establish a deep defense line as much as possible, to block the attack of the national army. but two days after the national army attacked tashan, cheng zihua found that echelon defense still had great shortcomings. because according to general lin's suggestion, cheng zihua adopted an average echelon defense on the front battlefield of tashan. that is, if the first echelon is 100 people, then the second echelon is also arranged with 100 people, and the third echelon is still 100 people.

with such a deployment, the national army's sea, land and air forces attacked simultaneously. whether it was the first line, the second line, or the third line, the losses suffered by these front-line troops were almost the same.

during the attack on tashan, the kuomintang's war history also spent some time and effort to write a few words about the navy:

after completing the formation of the temporary mixed fleet, our navy used ships such as yongsheng to patrol the seabed of lianshan bay and flank the enemy in the northwest of jinxi to prevent them from threatening the rear of our eastward-moving corps; and concentrated powerful ships such as chongqing and taikang in jinzhou bay, and used naval gunfire to strike the enemy positions in the area between tashan and gaoqiao to block their reinforcements and support the advance of friendly forces; and dispatched two gunboats, haicheng and 103, to guard hugang and control three landing ships including zhongji, in order to be ready to load friendly forces for relocation and landing operations when necessary.

this is the attack of the navy in the war history of the national army, which is enough to show how difficult the situation of the tashan defense line was at that time. because of this, cheng zihua personally went to the front line to inspect, and finally optimized the defense layout based on lin's "echelon defense" layout. this defense layout, which is famous for tashan, is called "cone-shaped echelon defense." there are many advantages to such a deployment. one of them is that it minimizes the defenders of the first echelon. the front-line troops may only have a small squad of ten people. no matter how the enemy uses artillery to intensively bombard our front-line positions, casualties on the front line can be minimized.

secondly, the most powerful killer of this defense system lies in the defenders of the third echelon. this line of troops is mainly composed of elite troops from various units, and is mainly used to counterattack positions. don't think that it is easy to lose positions quickly with such a deployment, because the reality is that even if the intensive charge of the kuomintang army can capture our positions in an instant, they still need time to consolidate their positions.

the time difference from capturing a position to consolidating it is the time for our second echelon to counterattack. if the second echelon fails to successfully recapture the position, the absolute main force of the third position will rush out and attack the position captured by the national army with all their strength. therefore, cheng zihua's improved conical echelon defense layout is far more valuable in combat and defense than the simple echelon defense originally proposed by general lin.

in the battle of tashan, the nationalist army attacked intermittently for six days. among them, the most fierce attack was launched by the 95th independent division, which attacked tashan and the bridgehead at the same time. although it repeatedly broke through our tashan defense line, it was still unable to gain a foothold in front of the tashan defense line. this was cheng zihua's extreme use of the time difference between the nationalist army's capture and consolidation of the position!in the memoirs of lin weichou, commander of the 62nd army of the national army, a scene at that time was mentioned:"i looked out from the hill and saw the situation, and immediately called luo qi. luo qi and the commander of the 95th independent division, zhu zhiyi, rushed out of the command post, waving their whips and shouting "breakthrough, breakthrough" and ordering the soldiers to charge forward."

however, no matter how fierce the nationalist army's attack was, no matter how the nationalist army's war history materials described the "brave advance" of the frontline soldiers, consolidating the already occupied tashan position was always a matter of life and death. during the six-day offensive, the nationalist army repeatedly broke through the heavily defended tashan position, but no matter how hard they tried, they could not consolidate the occupied tashan position, and finally they could only declare the failure of the offensive. of course, the failure of the nationalist army was not simply a failure in the offensive action. chiang kai-shek also buried a huge hidden danger in the command of the huludao army.

when our army successfully established the tashan position, the kuomintang frontline generals were not busy studying the war, but were busy scrambling for command. wei lihuang sent chen tie to seize command, and fan hanjie from jinzhou sent tang yunshan to seize command. then que hanqian, the commander of the 54th army stationed in huludao, took over the command.

this was not the end, because while the senior officers of the national army were fighting fiercely for the command of huludao, chiang kai-shek issued an electric order to appointhou jingrucommander of the eastward corps! is that enough? not enough! later, chiang kai-shek sentluo qi, the director of the north china war, commanded the military in huludao. he was given many honorific titles, such as "the eunuch thousand years old", "the imperial envoy", and "luo thousand years old".this farce of seizing power ended in an unprecedented defeat on the national battlefield, and almost all senior generals of the kuomintang should be held responsible for this defeat.

of course, the iron will of our frontline soldiers was also the decisive factor that prevented the nationalist army from making any progress and failing to break through the tashan defense line after six days. those heroes, those heroes who existed and those heroes who had already fallen, used their flesh and blood to build the steel great wall of the tashan defense line.